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ABSTRACT

REPORTING SOCIALISM: SOVIET JOURNALISM AND THE JOURNALISTS’
UNION, 1955–1966
Mary Catherine French
Warren Breckman

This dissertation is a historical investigation of the Journalists’ Union of the
Soviet Union, the first creative union for media professionals in the USSR, and the first
study of a creative profession after the death of Stalin. While socialist journalism had
existed since before the 1917 revolutions, journalists were not incorporated into a
professional body until 1959, several decades after their counterparts in other creative
professions. Using sources from Russian and American archives together with published
documents, I investigated the reasons for the organization’s formation and its domestic
and creative work to “develop professional mastery” in its members at home while
advancing the Soviet cause abroad. Chapter one explores the reasons for the Journalists’
Union’s formation, and the interrelationship between Soviet cultural diplomacy and
domestic professionalization. Chapter two describes journalists’ efforts to make sense of
the immediate aftermath of de-Stalinization through a case study of the Communist
Youth League’s newspaper. The third chapter describes the creative union’s formal
establishment and the debates about journalism’s value at its inaugural congress. Chapter
four is devoted to the creative union’s international work, specifically its management of
the International Organization of Journalists, a front organization based in Prague,
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demonstrating that journalists were key participants in the Soviet Union’s effort to
establish a positive international reputation, especially in the developing world. Chapter
five features the debates about genre and audience engagement that preoccupied elite
journalists in the years after the creative union’s formation. Chapter six describes the
changes in the journalism profession under Brezhnev, and journalists’ efforts to reshape
the creative union in its second decade. The epilogue traces the fate of my protagonists
and the challenges to professionalization in Putin’s Russia. Throughout the study, I
describe how journalists articulated and promoted their own ideas about the meaning and
value of their profession even as they acknowledged the leading role of the Communist
Party and frequently responded to political interventions in their work.
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Introduction
In his 1981 short story collection, The Compromise, the writer Sergei Dovlatov
describes his journalistic career at the newspaper Soviet Estonia during the 1970s.
Finding himself unexpectedly out of work, a friend who worked in television suggested
he apply for a vacant post at the newspaper. Dovlatov disliked his editor, and described
his ten years of columns as “ten years of lies and deceit,” though each story reflected
some genuine experience, if only subtextually. Following this theme, Dovlatov begins
each chapter of the work with a selection from his newspaper columns. Following each
excerpt, Dovlatov shows his readers the real and often humorous events behind each
piece. In one case, a short description of a scientific congress involving Western
Europeans saw Dovlatov called into an editor’s office because he had committed a “grave
ideological error.” In listing all of the countries alphabetically, he had given an improper
understanding of global class conditions by not listing the Eastern bloc nations first,
followed by neutral countries, and then capitalist ones. After submitting a second draft,
Dovlatov discovered that his editor was furious. The man asked him, “Аre you mocking
me? Did you think this up on purpose?” When Dovlatov asked what the problem was, he
was told, “You mixed up the countries of the people’s democracies. You have the GDR
after Hungary. Alphabetical order again?! Forget this opportunistic word! You are a
worker at a Party newspaper. Hungary goes in third place! There was a putsch there!”
Dovlatov reminded his editor that the USSR had fought a war with Germany, and was
then told, “Don’t argue!” and accused of “moral infantilism.” Dovlatov concluded
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laconically, “They paid me two rubles for the article. And I thought they would pay
three…”1
With this anecdote, and through the collection as a whole, Dovlatov aims to
convince the reader that Soviet newspapers were far from an accurate reflection of
reality—a reality that was often absurd, though editors failed to grasp this fact and clung
to rigid interpretations of Marxism-Leninism rather than confront the deficits around
them. Dovlatov was only able to publish the work after his emigration to New York; he
had previously been expelled from the Journalists’ Union of the Soviet Union for
publishing other materials abroad. Dovlatov’s collection had at least some impact on
Western scholarly assessments of Soviet journalism: political scientist Thomas
Remington concludes his article on Soviet journalism’s reform potential and professional
development arguing that the “malaise” Dovlatov depicted was also shared by less
overtly oppositional Soviet journalists, perhaps due to the failure of earlier reform efforts,
Khrushchev’s included.2
Official Soviet texts, unsurprisingly, offer a far more optimistic view of Soviet
journalism’s value. One such comprehensive textbook, The Journalists’ Handbook, was
issued in three editions between 1961 and 1971. The work was comprehensive,
discussing not only genre and writing but also publishing, television, radio, and the
technical aspects of newspaper layout. At the same time, these sources do offer some
insight into the politicized nature of Soviet media work—only the preface to the second
edition, issued in 1964, contains explicit references to the “unmasking of Stalin’s
1

Sergei Dovlatov, “Kompromiss,” (New York: Serebriannyi Vek, 1981), 3–6.
Thomas Remington, “Politics and Professionalization in Soviet Journalism” Slavic Review 44 no. 3
(1985): 499–502.
2
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personality cult.”3 Where official texts are relatively silent about the challenges of deStalinization, this dissertation, the first detailed archival study of the Journalists’ Union
of the Soviet Union, investigates how journalism’s development as a profession was
shaped by Khrushchev’s pursuit of political reforms and the realities of Cold War
competition. I focus on the formation and activity of the Journalists’ Union of the Soviet
Union, from its establishment in 1955 to its second all-Union Congress in 1966. In
contrast to Dovlatov’s cynical stance, the key figures of my dissertation expressed pride
in their work and their sense of public mission, especially during the early months of
1956, after Khrushchev’s official denunciation of Stalin’s personality cult. As we will see
below, Dovlatov was far from the only Soviet journalist who experienced strict oversight
of his work when it touched on foreign policy issues—the relationship between the
Journalists’ Union and Cold War politics is a major theme of my study.
Soviet journalists insisted on the superiority and uniqueness of their work, both
in interactions with foreigners and in domestic discussions of genre and expertise.
Comparability is an important theme for my analysis of writing and genre: as we will see
below, the Soviet attachment to writing and reading was intense, and ideological
understandings of genre and reader needs profoundly shaped journalists’ understandings
of their professional responsibility. At the same time, Soviet journalists grappled with
similar challenges to their Western counterparts, especially in higher education. Though I
have found that creative union members took their responsibilities seriously, they also
felt that their profession was undervalued and were frustrated with official obstruction of

3

Nikolai Bogdanov and Boris Viazemskii, Spravochnik zhurnalista (Leningrad: Lenizdat), 1961, 1964,
1971. Here I refer to the second edition, especially page 3 and 45–7.
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their work and with the creative union’s ability to provide them with social prestige and
material support, especially in the early Brezhnev era. The successes and failures of
journalistic professionalization in the 1950s and 1960s help explain the depths of
Dovlatov’s pessimism and suggest that it was the product of a particular historical
moment rather than a pervasive postwar condition.
Though recent work on the Khrushchev period has underlined the importance of a
new “honest journalism” founded on a new conception of the Soviet person, most
historians examine journalists as lone authors or focus on single publications rather than
locating journalists’ lives in their institutional context. While Khrushchev’s son-in-law,
Aleksei Adzhubei, features prominently in these accounts for his leadership of Izvestiia,
there is little sense of Adzhubei’s colleagues in these narratives.4 The Journalists’ Union
was one of the last creative unions to be established, and its history demonstrates the
diverse approaches to intellectuals under Khrushchev. Since the other creative unions
formed in the 1930s, their history is most closely associated with the tumult of the Stalin
era and the efforts of writers, artists, and composers to adapt to a changing political and
cultural landscape. This “cultural revolution” was focused almost exclusively on the
Soviet Union itself, as befit the new doctrine of “socialism in one country.” In contrast,
the Journalists’ Union, formed only in 1956, was a product of the Soviet Union’s
superpower status and the “dilemmas of de-Stalinization.” Throughout my study, I
demonstrate that journalists, like other intellectual and cultural figures, struggled to make
sense of the new political landscape. Even individuals who supported reform efforts
4

On “honest journalism,” see Vladislav M. Zubok, Zhivago’s Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2009), 140–54; see also Thomas Wolfe, Governing Soviet Journalism: The
Press and the Socialist Person After Stalin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).
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expressed anxieties and doubts about how to achieve their goals.5 While some
scholarship exists on creative unions under Stalin, my study is the first such
organizational history of creative intellectuals in the Khrushchev era.6 Though the
Journalists’ Union was created “from above,” through Party initiative, its formation was
due to the Soviet Union’s new superpower status rather than the Party’s need to direct
and guide media work.
The Journalists’ Union was first conceived of in 1954, after a well-known foreign
correspondent named Danil’ Kraminov wrote to the Central Committee to advocate for
its establishment. His motives were rooted in fears about Cold War competitiveness and
the Soviet Union’s international needs. The absence of a Journalists’ Union was, in
Kraminov’s view, jeopardizing Soviet Union’s leadership of its front organization for
progressive journalists, the International Organization of Journalists (MOJ), which was
based in Prague. In the nearly six years between Kraminov’s memo and the Journalists’

5

One thorough overview of this process is Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in
Revolutionary Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); For an introduction to the problems of
conceptualizing Khrushchev’s rule, see Polly Jones, “Introduction,” in The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization
ed. Polly Jones (London: Routledge, 2005), 1–18. The literature on the Khrushchev era intellectuals has
grown vast in recent years, resulting in a more nuanced approach focused on conflict and uncertainty as
much as liberalization. Particularly influential works that feature at various points in this study are: Stephen
V. Bittner, The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience, Myth, and Memory in Moscow’s Arbat
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees,
Crime, and the Fate of Reform After Stalin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), and Zubok, Zhivago’s
Children.
6
Kirill Tomoff’s recent study of the Union of Soviet Composers ends with Stalin’s death, and work on the
Writers’ Union was produced before the Soviet collapse. See Creative Union: The Professional
Organization of Soviet Composers, 1939–1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); the classic study of
the Writers’ Union is John Gordon Gerrard and Carol Gerrard, Inside the Soviet Writers’ Union (New
York: Tauris, 1990).
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Union’s inaugural congress in November of 1959, the organization took over
management of the MOJ and established its domestic membership structure.7
Though the organization was at least partly established in response to
international concerns, I have found that the Journalists’ Union’s formation and activity
are crucial to understanding journalists’ social and political identities, not only in terms of
the Party’s expectations but also for how journalists themselves understood their roles
and responsibilities. From its inception, the Journalists’ Union would always have dual
functions—to promote socialist journalism abroad while developing the “professional
mastery” of its members at home. Throughout, I refer to this as the creative union’s dual
mandate.8 The Journalists’ Union’s formation process provided unique opportunities for
both media elites and rank-and-file journalists to think critically about what journalism
was, who practiced it, and who could rightfully claim the privileges the new organization
dispensed. This began as an elite process but would eventually become a truly national
conversation among journalists, as journalists from all local branches of the new creative
union commented on the organization’s draft bylaws— these comments form the main
subject of my first chapter. Though radio and television professionals were also eligible
to become Journalists’ Union members, the preponderance of print journalists in the

7

Rossisskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (RGANI), f. 5 (Apparat of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), op. 16, d. 671, ll. 33–38. I describe the episode in more detail in
chapter four.
8
Michael David-Fox comments on the intertwined nature of Soviet cultural diplomacy efforts in his
Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 12–13). The first published use of “mastery” as a positive journalistic trait in a
Journalists’ Union publication is from the first issue of its trade journal. See “Tvoi dolg, zhurnalist”
Sovetskaia pechat’ no. 1 (October 1955): 1–2, though the term was applied to other creative professions as
well.
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organization means that this study is almost exclusively focused on those who worked for
newspapers and journals.9
In studying the union at length, and advancing arguments about its social and
political importance, I take a position distinct from other scholars who have been
dismissive of the Journalists’ Union as an institution too close to the Party to provide real
reform or professional autonomy.10 In some respects, this view of the organization is
accurate: creative union members did have high levels of Party membership, and the
organization’s international activities were closely supervised by the Central Committee
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but these institutional relationships reflect the
creative union’s importance as much as its limitations. Dismissing the organization
entirely, however, obscures the consultative aspects of its development. In later years,
creative union leaders took particularly active roles in promoting Soviet interests abroad
and in developing journalistic genres that were considered essential to social reform.
The most obvious challenge to the creative union’s development, of course, was
the leading role of the Communist Party in directing the mass media. Previous research
tends to search for journalists operating independently from the Party, assuming that
Soviet media workers were all secretly “liberal subjects” who sought freedom from
official ideology. Most of my protagonists were born after the October Revolution, and
9

For demographic data demonstrating the dominant presence of print journalists in the organization, see
the stenogram of its first Congress: Pervyi vsesoiuznyi s’’ezd sovetskikh zhurnalistov 12–14 noiabria 1959
goda (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politiheskoi literatury, 1960), 131–135. The overwhelming
majority of conference delegates were newspaper journalists or worked in journals. Less than one percent
worked in radio or television. The Journalists’ Union’s official journal also devoted very little coverage to
radio and television for the period of this study. Radio and television developed separately from print
journalism and have been well-documented in recent studies, especially Kristen Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime
Time: How The Soviet Union Built The Media Empire That Lost the Cultural Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2011).
10
Here I have in mind Thomas Remington’s article on the profession—see note two.
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few of them had the opportunity to travel abroad. Logistics and demographics alone
would suggest that active interest in the idea of a “free” press would be difficult for them
to cultivate. More fundamentally, assuming that Soviet journalists merely performed their
commitment to socialism cannot account for the pride individuals took in their work or
the discomfiture they experienced when a story that seemed to advance socialist values
was criticized by authorities. While it is true that the Journalists’ Union had less control
over mass media content than the Composers’ Union, this was related to journalism’s
significance: the profession was too large for a single body to control. Similarly,
newspaper content was too vital for officials to abdicate their supervisory role. Unlike
music, newspaper content was readily accessible to the bureaucrats who supervised it,
given that many members of the Agitation and Propaganda department had previously
worked as journalists.11 While maintaining their proximity to the Party, journalists could
“interpret and act upon” their commitment to write for the domestic public and engage
foreign colleagues in different ways.12
Since most of the creative union’s activities focused on print journalism, reading
and writing practices, and their history in Russian and Soviet cultural space, are crucial
background to this study. Journalists self-identified as part of the “creative
intelligentsia”—a social stratum dedicated to mental labor in the service of a Communist

11

On the search for liberal subjects and its obscuring of the Bolshevik vision of the self, see Jochen
Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary Under Stalin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2006), 86–87; on agency and expertise, especially as it enhanced creative union autonomy, see Tomoff, 95–
96. I consider Tomoff’s distinction between agency and autonomy lacking in analytical utility; instead, I
describe moments when my protagonists themselves experienced frustration or constraint, or sought greater
advantage and prestige, without imposing categories that cannot be meaningfully measured, especially due
to journalists’ unique subject position.
12
This phrase is taken from Benjamin Tromly, Making the Soviet Intelligentsia: Universities and
Intellectual Life Under Stalin and Khrushchev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 11.
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utopia. Applying this term to Soviet professionals requires engaging with the persistent
historical and historiographic debate about the origins and nature of this social group and
the value and meaning attached to writing in Russian and Soviet culture.
Though they publicly celebrated the Soviet Union’s multiethnic print culture,
most journalists invoked Russian-language traditions in their analyses of genre and their
own professional identity. In the early nineteenth century, Russian literary culture
became more focused on prose and literary criticism, at the same time as publishing itself
grew into a viable commercial enterprise. This expanded interest in fiction involved a
search for new genres, such as the satirical feuilleton, travel narratives, and
ethnographies. The origins of a modern Russian literary canon were inextricably bound
up with this new print culture and genre politics—Pushkin envisioned his journals as a
source of “beneficial influence on the public” that would also be economically viable. In
this environment, the boundaries between journalism and literature were especially
porous. In his classic study of the “thick journal” from the imperial period to the 1920s,
Robert Maguire argues that it became increasingly common to consider “any kind of
writing about the problems of the time as fuel for the great machine of fiction.”13 In
contrast, the growth of a mass-circulation press in the late imperial period saw some
journalists endeavor to re-establish stricter boundaries between fields—emerging ideas of
“objective” reporting were in some cases opposed to the “didactic” approach favored in
thick journals.14
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This interest in less overly politicized reporting was a comparatively brief
moment in the history of Russian print culture. The Soviet insistence that genuine
“objectivity” required acknowledging the material and class-based underpinnings of
human existence owed far more to the “didactic” approach. The Bolshevik adulation of
the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia included figures like Belinskii and Pushkin, especially
the former’s insistence on a socially responsible literature. In his analysis of the prerevolutionary intelligentsia, Michael Confino argued that Pushkin and Belinskii’s
generation of intellectuals “viewed action as consisting of the spoken and written word.”
Though they did not always invoke this legacy directly, Soviet journalists vociferously
rejected any view of language as ideologically neutral: the newspaper was meant to
instruct readers and bring about their self-improvement, in addition to informing them
about events.15 At the same time, when journalists positioned themselves as critics of a
social evil, they often expected an article to have tangible results, such as the firing of a
corrupt official, in addition to any possible effects on an individual’s thinking or
philosophical position. Though Lenin and the Bolsheviks repudiated the old intelligentsia
and sought to replace it with a popular one, Stalin formally declared the intelligentsia a
“social stratum” in 1936. This maneuver allowed intellectuals—especially students—to
embrace Pushkin or Belinskii as models of socially responsible behavior, especially in
the years following the Great Patriotic War. Though intellectuals became more closely
tied to the state apparatus, they retained a commitment to the social and moral uplift of
15
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the nation, particularly as carriers of culturedness, or “kulturnost,’” and demonstrating a
love of books and reading remained particularly important. In his study of the postwar
university, Benjamin Tromly treats the Soviet intelligentsia as a Weberian status group—
that is, a group defined by its “social honor” and commitment to ethical codes, such as a
disdain for materialism. Where members of the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia have
often been treated as a group entirely disdainful of state power and institutions, the Soviet
intelligentsia was not necessarily alienated from existing power structures, especially as
levels of Party membership rose in the postwar period.16
Though Tromly concentrates almost exclusively on university students rather than
working professionals, many aspects of his framework demonstrate that Soviet journalists
should be considered part of the intelligentsia. Vladislav Zubok goes some way toward
demonstrating this point by including reform-minded journalists in his study of
“Zhivago’s Children,” the name he gives to those intellectuals who came of age after the
Second World War.17 In many respects, the institutional history of the Journalists’ Union
corresponds to many of Tromly’s points, though my findings expand upon them in
important ways. Journalists, especially during the creative union’s formation process,
defended their social value precisely in terms of their writing skills, though they struggled
not only with the great cultural value attached to literature but also with the greater
material privilege of the Writers’ Union. The historical overlap between journalism and
literature described above, along with the greater material status of writers, complicated
journalists’ efforts to defend the dignity of their work. Some leading journalists,
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including Khrushchev’s son-in-law Aleksei Adzhubei, insisted that journalism’s social
resonance and commitment to factual accuracy made it more socially significant than
belles-lettres. At the same time, as we will see, journalists often employed the language
of social responsibility in describing professional achievement. And, though they decried
“bourgeois” journalism’s emphasis on profits, creative union members also insisted that
their socially useful labor entitled them to a certain standard of living, one that would put
them on equal footing with writers.
Though I treat journalists as part of the Soviet intelligentsia and stress the novelty
of the creative union, the legacies of Soviet print culture before the organization’s
formation are key to understanding the effects of Khrushchev’s reform agenda.
Journalists were instrumental in the 1930s drive for industrialization and the
establishment of socialist realism as a dominant literary genre. The new creative union
would continue to elaborate on these cultural legacies, though media elites frequently
acknowledged that their audiences had become more sophisticated in the intervening
years.18 Newspapers were equally critical to the establishment of the personality cult,
with its continuous focus on the “economy of the gift” and Stalin’s role as benevolent
provider to the Soviet people. While the Second World War is somewhat understudied by
historians, the contributions of war correspondents to the renewed “moral authority” of
Soviet journalism have been acknowledged frequently.19 Memoir literature also points to
the war as a critical moment for a generation of journalists. Il’ia Shatunovskii, who would
become famous as a satirist and feuilletonist for both Komsomol’skaia pravda and
18
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Pravda, described the war as a maturation experience which forever shaped his writing
career—he thought of his fellow frontoviki (the Soviet term for war veterans) and their
possible reactions to every piece of his writing. Like others of his generation,
Shatunovskii lacked an established career before his war service and felt uncertain and
adrift in civilian life. A chance meeting with a journalist in his home city of Ashgabat’,
Turkmenistan, while he had not yet acquired a civilian wardrobe, transformed him from
an aimless young man into a journalist.20 Several of the senior figures in the creative
union attained stature as war correspondents and applied their expertise to the new
organization. Moscow University’s journalism department was established in 1950—the
first separate academic department for the field. Shatunovskii and many of his colleagues
would study there before embarking on newspaper careers. Higher education would
become an important part of the Journalists’ Union’s domestic agenda, and features in
chapter five.
The pivotal role of war correspondents soon gave way to the renewal of Stalin’s
personality cult and an exacerbation of domestic and international tensions. Andrei
Zhdanov, Stalin’s chief ideologue, launched campaigns against foreign influence in
Soviet culture, while the show trial against the Kremlin doctors intensified attacks on
Jews as “rootless cosmopolitans.” Though Zhdanov used the press in his cultural
campaigns, journalists themselves came under increased scrutiny at the end of Stalin’s
rule, even those who had formerly been hailed as heroes. The writer Il’ia Ehrenburg, who
served as a war correspondent, had once been so popular that an officer who criticized his
anti-Nazi rhetoric was brought up on charges. Ehrenburg began to write articles sharply
20
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criticizing the United States during the height of the Zhdanovschina. By this time, many
of his fellow members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee had been murdered, so the
turn toward anti-Western rhetoric was likely an attempt at self-preservation.21 The young
satirist Shatunovskii also experienced the political challenges of late Stalinism. As the
son of someone sentenced under Article 58, the criminal statute for counter-revolutionary
activity, he too was in a precarious position. To get him away from the capital, Dmitri
Goriunov, the editor of Komsomol’skaia pravda, sent Shatunovskii to report on the
construction of the Volga-Don Canal. In his memoir, Shatunovskii described the
suffering of forced laborers who worked on the project and notes that their story was
absent from his optimistic dispatches. He encountered the infamous Major-General
Rapoport during this time, a figure who would become nationally known after the
publication of Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago. Shatunovskii claimed that he could
only call himself a “journalist by profession” (zhurnalist po-professii) after this period,
echoing existing scholarship about the transformative effects of the Gulag on selfperception and literary identity.22 In the period of my study, journalists intensely debated
the meaning and value of Stalinist cultural codes and operated in an environment of
intensified xenophobia in the aftermath of the Hungarian uprising in November 1956,
along with the presence of dedicated reformers who embraced the more permissive
climate of de-Stalinization.
In my first chapter, I discuss the work of the Journalists’ Union’s Orgburo. Short
for organizational bureau, this body was made up of senior newspaper editors and
21
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seasoned journalists, who were tasked with defining the creative union and specifically
its efforts to define the creative union and refining its bylaws by soliciting feedback from
the organization’s rank-and-file members. The formation process points to the
importance of Cold War competition to Soviet domestic change—the creation of the
Journalists’ Union was a direct response to the need for more cultural exchange and
direct management of the International Organization of Journalists (hereafter referred to
with its Russian acronym, the MOJ). The MOJ, which is also a major subject of chapter
four, was a Soviet front organization based in Prague aimed at working with
“progressive” journalists throughout the world. The construction of a creative union,
however, soon had domestic repercussions both for Orgburo members and rank-and-file
journalists, as they strove to determine the qualifications for creative union membership
and the responsibilities and privileges it would convey. This process highlights that
creative unions were, at least in the Khrushchev era, self-reflective organizations
dedicated to promoting high standards for intellectual work. Many of these traits
correspond to sociological definitions of a “profession,” in other modern states,
especially as this scholarly literature has recently expanded beyond the Anglophone
world to include studies of German professions and the Soviet music field.23 The creative
union’s domestic mandate was most often expressed by the requirement to cultivate the
“professional mastery” of its members. While this term was employed in a variety of
ways, its more substantive definitions usually involved successful reader engagement,
language skill, and mastery of particular genres. In presenting journalists as professionals
throughout the dissertation, I find meaningful continuities between Soviet journalism and
23
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that of other modern states—in contrast to studies of Stalinist media work which have
tended to stress Soviet uniqueness.24
My close reading of the Orgburo’s interactions with rank-and-file journalists,
largely in the form of comments on the organization’s draft bylaws, offers insights into
how rank-and-file journalists defined their profession. The bylaws were the creative
union’s governing document, and both elite journalists and rank-and-file members took
the drafting process very seriously. Rank-and-file journalists continually advocated for
more material and social privilege, especially for access to leisure and material funds that
would put them on par with the Writers’ Union, and argued for high moral and literary
standards in membership. In so doing, they expressed a strong sense of what factors
distinguished the Soviet creative professional: material and social privilege, influence
over higher education and employment, and a conviction that writing for the public,
especially as creative union members, required both quality of output and a certain moral
and political stature. Members’ sense of what the creative union should be was strongly
and clearly articulated throughout my study, but the organization remained relatively
weak. One reason for this was its persistent failure to establish a financial support fund,
which would have enhanced journalists’ social and economic position. This failure was
more likely the result of the profession’s large size than any substantive desire to ensure
that journalists remained inferior to writers, though stating this with certainty this would
require a more substantive economic history of the creative intelligentsia than I have been
able to undertake. The other practical challenge to the creative union’s total control of
professionalization was related to employment and demographics: creative union
24
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membership was not required for work in the journalism profession, and the organization
never asserted power over the operations or content of the newspapers in which it
members worked, no doubt because the creative union was the largest in the USSR and
such an undertaking would have required a massive bureaucratic structure.
Soviet journalists’ intellectual commitments—including their work in the new
creative union—took place in a period of extraordinary upheaval, as Khrushchev actively
pursued reform projects and repudiated parts of Stalin’s legacy. Because the creative
union began its most significant work well after 1956, I use the newsroom of
Komsomol’skaia pravda to understand how journalists navigated the immediate
aftermath of the Twentieth Party Congress. Though I argue that most of my dissertation
subjects were likely far less cynical than Dovlatov, I have found that editorial meetings
are a particularly useful way to discover the social and political tensions behind
newspaper stories. Like other scholars, I question the utility of the dominant “Thaw
metaphor,” pointing to the diversity of opinion among journalists about de-Stalinization’s
meaning and their own capacity to criticize authority in order to bring about social
change.25 Though some KP staff members embraced reform, others were fundamentally
anxious about the de-stabilizing nature of the project, especially after unrest in Eastern
Europe during the fall of 1956. The “putsch,” which Dovlatov ignored in his
alphabetization efforts, was a major turning point for KP’s reform agenda. Episodes at
the newspaper also point to the limits of journalists’ close association with the Party and
the Komsomol: even the paper’s senior leadership would experience surprise and
uncertainty when some articles were received unfavorably.
25
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In chapter three, I turn to the public inauguration of the Journalists’ Union at its
all-Union Congress held in Moscow in November of 1959. This event, attended by senior
Central Committee members and concluding with an official reception where
Khrushchev himself spoke, was a public celebration of the professionalization process,
where senior journalists, Adzhubei among them, celebrated the formation of the creative
union as a sign of the Party’s regard for their work. At the same time, they continued to
debate and discuss the nature of professional stature and whether the final form of the
bylaws accurately reflected journalists’ needs and goals. The event’s major domestic
themes, such as genre, reader engagement, and the relationship between journalism and
literature, underlined journalists’ status as members of the creative intelligentsia, with
close relationships to literature but a distinct social and political mission. The creative
union’s dual mandate to cultivate professionalism abroad while pursuing foreign
exchange was another key issue, especially as senior media managers sought to ensure
that Soviet ideological purity was not compromised by increased engagement with
foreigners.
Journalists were unique among Soviet creative professionals in that their creative
union was formed as an explicit response to the Cold War—specifically, the pursuit of
cultural exchange to ensure both Soviet competitiveness with the “bourgeois” world and
further alliances with developing nations.. The role of journalists in foreign exchange,
both as hosts of foreign guests and participants in trips abroad, is the principal subject of
my fourth chapter. Soviet cultural diplomacy first thrived in the interwar period, as
Michael David-Fox has shown in his study of the All-Union Society for Cultural Ties
Abroad (VOKS), and the larger “party-state system” of cultural diplomacy it participated
18

in. David-Fox convincingly demonstrates that VOKS, and other cultural diplomacy
agencies, helped shape not only the impressions of foreigners but also of Soviet citizens,
as well as a broader “superiority-inferiority complex,” in which Soviet elites alternately
admired and denigrated the West. After the Stalinist purges removed many of its key
players, and the Cold War resulted in new foreign policy priorities, VOKS was
restructured and replaced by the State Committee for Cultural Connections Abroad
(GKKS). Though the creative union both hosted and received foreign delegations, the
MOJ was its most important cultural diplomacy undertaking, and my analysis reflects this
focus. My findings demonstrate that journalists were key players in restructuring the
cultural diplomacy apparatus to make it more effective in a Cold War climate and in
shifting Soviet priorities toward the developing world as Europeans became more
difficult to win over.26 Though much of this work was conducted under the auspices of
“peaceful coexistence” with the West, Soviet journalists and the media managers they
answered to were often deeply anxious about cross-cultural encounters, as their Stalinist
predecessors had been.
In chapter five, I discuss the creative union’s domestic endeavors the years after
its inaugural congress, specifically its plenums and more significant creative seminars.
Where plenums were often devoted to membership issues or political objectives, most
creative seminars were focused on genre and reader needs. These events reveal ongoing
rank-and-file dissatisfaction with the organization, including the explicit wish that the
creative union exercise more control over its members’ work environments and access to
26
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material privilege. At the same time, the organization’s leadership expressed concern that
its original membership criteria were too relaxed. Though the content of creative
seminars and other professional gatherings points to continued Party supervision of the
Journalists’ Union, this relationship is not readily discernible from archival records I have
been able to access. Rather than engage in conjecture about the forms such supervision
might have taken, I concentrate on journalists’ own perceptions of this relationship.
Other creative union members frankly discussed problems of journalism
education and training, expressing doubts about the current curriculum’s capacity to
produce successful journalists. In their effort to operate as professionals—especially as
they sought to control the qualifications of future entrants—Soviet journalists confronted
similar challenges to their American competitors.27 Creative seminars under Khrushchev
heavily featured supporters of a renewed journalism self-consciously reflecting on
changing audience needs, the effects of de-Stalinization, and the relationship between
journalism and literature. Elaborating on these issues requires a brief overview of major
Soviet newspaper genres, as genre skill was seen as an important professional attribute,
and often used to contrast newspaper work from belles-lettres. In most cases, I leave
terms in the original Russian to avoid imprecise translations. Though I analyze satire in
less depth than other genres, the feuilleton was particularly important to journalists
engaged in social reform, as they targeted individuals based on the social and political
challenges of the day. Soviet satire, like other forms of criticism, was often limited in the
subjects it could describe—in the late 1950s, for example, Literaturnaia gazeta was
27
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extensively criticized for satirizing the unsatisfactory conditions in the new apartments
Khrushchev championed for Moscow’s workers. It was more common—and less risky—
for newspapers to satirize delinquents who impeded social progress.28 Journalists
considered the ocherk, sometimes translated as a feature story, as especially key to
professional development to the extent that novice journalists would often work to
produce one as a demonstration of their skill. The essence of the genre was not only to
report on an event or a person but to focus on a central theme or fact and immerse the
reader in a location or individual life.29 This linked the ocherk to another genre or
journalistic approach—publisistika, a term that was used to describe politically minded
journalism of great social importance, which allowed the author to interpret or defend a
position. As Dina Fainberg has noted, many journalists claimed that all of their work had
some element of publisistika or identified the genre with journalism itself, since it was
considered essential to properly forming informed audiences. The genre was also closely
associated with the literary heritage of the nineteenth century, including such notable
figures as Belinskii and Pushkin.30
Though aspects of the ocherk bore a strong resemblance to the short story, they
were always founded on a real person. The ideal form, as described in an overview of
Soviet genres, “showing them in action, opening up the essence of a phenomenon. Its
heroes are living people, events in it are depicted in a documentary manner.” To illustrate
the importance of this value, I turn back to the Bogdanov and Viazemskii textbook. They
28
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described a case from Leningrad where an ocherkist exaggerated his subjects so much
that they wrote to the newspaper to complain. Soviet journalists often invoked reader
interests and needs to justify their insistence on factual accuracy and their need for
updated information. Тhe ocherk was also more tightly contained than other literary
forms, using only a few details to describe what might go on for several pages in a short
story. The genre did not have to be relentlessly positive—though it could “show the high
moral qualities of our people…as it helps form the charter of the new person, his moral
image,” struggles or deficits could also be appropriate subjects. Describing the goals for
the genre after the creative union’s 1958 seminar, the authors highlighted the value of
attention to the “living person” and their “spiritual image” as a corrective example for
journalists focused on “the narrow interest of his profession.”31 As these lines suggest,
cultivation of the ocherk was considered especially important in engaging with readers
and depicting the diversity of human experience. This effort had its own genre rubric in
many newspapers by the 1960s and was known as the “moral and ethical theme.” In the
Khrushchev era, many ocherki, except those about science or technology, were expected
to touch on both the working lives and inner struggles of individuals. Tatiana Tess, a
longtime journalist at Izvestiia, was acknowledged as a master of this type of ocherk, as
we will see.32
In their reflections on genre, particularly the newly popularized moral and ethical
theme, Soviet journalists elaborated their own visions of the relationship between writing,
reading, and the individual’s moral and social position. Though they were committed to
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narratives about individuals, creative union members’ visions of emancipation remained
fundamentally collectivist, much like their visions of professional conduct. While their
relationship to political authorities was not without friction, Soviet journalists never
embraced the core values of Western print culture, such as the absence of direct
censorship and a commitment to apolitical conceptions of objectivity, and indeed actively
rejected them.33 The development of Soviet polling was much more closely associated
with state initiative than similar projects in other nations, particularly the United States,
which was one of the first states to widely adopt polling and sociological research.34
By the time of Khrushchev’s ouster in October of 1964, the Journalists’ Union
had expanded both its cultural diplomacy mission and its domestic professional activities.
Chapter six focuses on the creative union’s restructuring efforts and the extent and nature
of newspaper editors’ struggles with the new regime. The early Brezhnev years were
somewhat tumultuous for journalists, especially for those who had been close to
Khrushchev, such as his son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei. The senior leadership of central
newspapers, along with the creative union, underwent significant changes from 1964 to
1968, though these changes were less the result of a coherent program than a series of ad
hoc responses to events and publication controversies. Though many reformers
experienced personal setbacks in this period, some important continuities in professional
priorities and practices remained, such as the creative union’s greater involvement with
higher education. Creative union leaders continued to refine their thinking about
membership, professional responsibility, and material privilege. But where the first
33
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bylaws debate displayed journalists’ pride and optimism, the second featured a greater
sense of disappointment. Most importantly, by this time, it was clear that the organization
would always remain subordinate to the Party, and the focus on bylaws reflects this:
rather than substantively intervening in policy debates, creative union leaders confined
themselves to revising a single document. Where the creative union’s origins reflect a
moment of optimism and professional pride, its second decade helps to account for
Dovlatov’s more critical approach in The Compromise.
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Chapter 1
“He Who Does Not Write, Is Not a Journalist”: The Formation of the Journalists’
Union of the Soviet Union, 1954–1959
In October of 1954, Danil’ Feodorivich Kraminov, a senior journalist at Pravda,
was distressed that he and his colleagues did not have a creative union that would
facilitate cultural exchange with foreign journalists, and he took it upon himself to draft a
lengthy proposal to the Central Committee’s Agitation and Propaganda Department about
this problem. Kraminov had previously worked as a TASS foreign correspondent and war
correspondent for the Allied Forces.35 His concern stemmed from a recent trip to
Budapest, where he attended an executive committee meeting of the International
Organization of Journalists (hereafter the MOJ), an organization for “progressive”
journalists based in Prague but funded and largely directed from Moscow. The MOJ was
an early battleground in the cultural Cold War: by 1950, most members from Western
Europe and the United States left to form the “bourgeois” International Federation of
Journalists.36 Foreign exchange between socialist countries was a major agenda item at
the meeting and in Kraminov’s memorandum to the Central Committee. To his dismay,
the GDR had taken such a leading role in the MOJ’s professional exchange work that
other socialist journalists had drafted resolutions formalizing its position, though these
did not pass thanks to a Soviet counterproposal. In his memo, Kraminov lamented that,
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“it is impossible to note without acrimony that not one of the speakers…raised the
possibility of professional exchange with Soviet journalists, insofar as it is known that
there is no Journalists’ Union in the Soviet Union, and therefore Soviet journalists can
offer no professional exchange in this area.” For capitalist colleagues, the absence of a
journalists’ union raised “puzzling questions.” He argued that the “demands of
international relations” and the “internal goals of promoting the professional mastery and
creative growth of journalists” demonstrated the necessity of a Journalists’ Union.
Kraminov’s vision of on organization that not only promoted Soviet interests abroad but
also provided domestic professional opportunities and would become the new creative
union’s foundational principles.37
I discuss the creation of the Journalists’ Union of the Soviet Union аs a response
to the cultural Cold War. Its domestic formation process prompted a national
conversation about the nature of the journalism profession. These exchanges took place
in a variety of venues and contexts—Kraminov’s memo was merely the initial stage of a
lengthy effort. In this chapter, I concentrate not only on the reception to his proposals but
also the first organizational structures of the creative union and the ultimate production of
its draft bylaws. Because journalists from all over the Soviet Union participated in the
process, understanding the development of the bylaws and the debates surrounding them
are crucial to understanding Soviet journalists’ conceptions of their work and social
standing. The elite media managers who formed the creative union’s Organizational
Bureau (Orgburo) were the first to formulate specific goals and objectives for the creative
union, and members of this body assumed responsibility for drafting bylaws and
37
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soliciting feedback on them. They then oversaw the establishment of local union
branches, which were responsible for the organization’s first membership drives. I focus
particularly on the years 1957 to 1959, the period when elite and rank-and-file journalists
concentrated most intensely on the draft bylaws. The ratification of permanent bylaws
took place at the organization’s inaugural congress in November of 1959, which forms
the main subject of chapter three. Understanding this bylaws debate is essential to
understanding how its prospective members saw the organization both as a tool to
improve their status and as an acknowledgement of their existing social and political
standing.
The bylaws debate raises questions about the nature of Soviet journalism,
particularly its claims to represent “professionals” or embody a “profession.” While
journalism had some attributes of a profession during the Stalin era, the Orgburo’s
activities and the bylaws debate marked a period of “conscious professionalization” in
which journalists throughout Soviet society reflected on their rights and responsibilities.
Indeed, it is this reliance on discussion and participation that distinguished the formation
of the Journalists’ Union from that of the other creative unions. They were brought into
being in the 1930s to give the Soviet state greater control in the creative realm—a process
in which writers merited special attention, though the period was one of broad cultural
consolidation.38 In 1956, journalists had been under state control and supervision for
many years, since newspapers had been essential mobilizing tools from the revolutionary
period through Stalin’s industrialization campaigns and beyond.39 Rather than bringing
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journalists to heel, the Orgburo made some effort to determine how a creative union
could meet journalists’ needs. The bylaws debate ensured that the Journalists’ Union
would be both an organization and an argument about the profession’s value and
meaning.40
In presenting journalism as a profession, I expand upon existing efforts to study
these occupational groups outside of the Anglo-American context and present Soviet
social structures as comparable to those of other states. As Kirill Tomoff does in his study
of the Composers’ Union, I define a “profession” as a group of individuals engaged in a
type of specialized labor requiring expertise. Acknowledgement of expert status allows
the group to set its own admissions standards to evaluate work performance. In most
historical studies of professions, the recognized social and cultural significance of
specialized labor is accompanied by material privilege and enhanced social standing.41
The early years of the creative union fit many aspects of this framework: the resulting
discussion and debate over bylaws, which occurred over several years, should be
understood as an argument about Soviet journalists’ professional status, one where social
and material privilege was particularly significant and where claims of agency were
relatively limited—though not nonexistent. Additionally, journalists’ claims for greater
standing and recognition explicitly stemmed from the Soviet understanding that “mind
work” was more meaningful than other forms of labor. The development of professions is
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closely associated with modern states, putting the Soviet Union on a similar
developmental trajectory. While some journalism scholars are increasingly skeptical of
the “professional” framework’s relevance, I see this critique as more applicable to the
liberal democracies that dominate journalism studies than to the Soviet Union.42 The
Journalists’ Union’s draft bylaws and the resulting discussion of them reflect many of the
essential traits of a profession: an effort to “provide codes of conduct” organize a group
of individuals performing similar work, and to define a socialist “service orientation.”43
Other scholars have made similar arguments about journalism in socialist Eastern Europe,
especially Poland. Though some “typical” traits of the journalism profession are missing
from such cases, such as a distance from politics, I have found that Soviet journalists, like
Polish ones, had “high levels of self-identification as professionals, and of loyalty to their
profession.”44
In this respect, my work departs somewhat from Thomas Remington’s contention
that Soviet journalists’ priorities, especially at the raion-level, were predominantly
shaped by Party objectives and pressures rather than a commitment to public service or
“professional objectivity.” Remington further argues that the creation of the creative
union failed to give journalists any significant power over the mass media’s function,
though access to material privilege increased. In his view, the creative union’s formation
only improved “self-articulation.” Remington’s analysis, due to lack of archival access,
misses the historical uniqueness of this “self-articulation”: the consultative element of the
Journalists’ Union was unique in the history of Soviet creative organizations.
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Remington’s view of professional standing also minimizes the extent to which material
status was a key part of professional standing in a Soviet context. Perhaps most
significantly, Remington’s reliance on objectivity as a professional trait misses Soviet
journalism’s fundamental conceptual frame: Marxist-Leninist views of media work
decried objectivity as incompatible with a materialist approach to the world. Remington’s
approach, at base, is a search for “liberal subjects” in the Soviet media—his opening
question concerned the potential for journalists to challenge the Party and promote
reform. Such a search is doomed to failure and, I would argue, is an inappropriate starting
point for a historically nuanced investigation of Soviet journalism. I argue that while the
participants in the bylaws debate did not challenge the Party’s leading ideological role,
they did discuss specific “professional values,” essentially arguing that their specialist
status set them apart socially as well as materially.45
In identifying journalists as “professionals,” I advance broader arguments about
the Khrushchev regime’s early relationship to the creative intelligentsia: just as the
regime renounced state terror in favor of persuasive methods, journalists were brought
into a creative union through a process that involved dialogue along with centralized
control. At the same time, my findings prove that journalists belong in the broader
intellectual and cultural history of the 1960s: the participants in the bylaws debate
promoted a vision of a stronger and more influential profession without rejecting Party
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leadership, much as other intellectuals of the period sought renewal through a purified
revolutionary ideology.46
•••
To understand precisely what Kraminov was arguing for in his memo to the
Central Committee, it is crucial to understand the cultural and political status of creative
unions in Soviet life. While there is a recent in-depth study of the Composers’ Union in
the Stalin period, no such work exists to compare journalism to its closest counterpart—
literature. Despite this limitation, some aspects of Kirill Tomoff’s analysis of the creative
union’s social and political function are pertinent to this study, since Tomoff positions
creative unions in relationship to political and state institutions in the course of his
analysis. Creative unions, in the Soviet context, were responsible for providing an
“institutional venue” for creative discussions, as part of their mandate to develop the
“professional mastery” of their members. As we will see in more detail in chapter five,
all-Union creative seminars, usually focused on a particular genre or audience, were the
main method used in the Journalists’ Union. Creative unions focused not only on
“developing the socialist creativity of their members, but also in defending and
representing their legal and economic interests.” A major source of authority for both the
Writers’ and Composers’ Unions were their separate material support funds—Litfond and
Muzfond, respectively, which provided assistance to needy members, subsidized travel
and leisure, and provided subsidized housing and work spaces.47 The Journalists’ Union
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was similarly dedicated to both the cultural and material well being of its members but
faced significant logistical challenges in this area. Zhurfond, the equivalent support
system for the Journalists’ Union, was never formally established during the period of
this study—elite and rank-and-file members of the creative union keenly felt this absence
and routinely sought to remedy it. These self-conscious efforts at material improvement,
together with genre discussions and debates about professional success, point to an
important feature of creative work in the Soviet context: creative unions were selfreflexive—in these officially recognized social bodies, members exchanged opinions
about the meaning and value of their work and the direction the organization should take.
Creative union membership conveyed less tangible forms of privilege, since these
organizations were devoted explicitly to the development of the intelligentsia. The deep
attachment to books, reading, and writing in Soviet society—and its close association
with intelligentsia status—was often in evidence at creative union seminars and, as I will
explain below, in journalists’ willingness to compare themselves to writers.48 A final
distinguishing feature of creative unions was their involvement in international exchange
and transnational organizations related to their area of expertise—the expansion of the
Journalists’ Union’s international mandate is the main subject of chapter four.49
Though trade unions and creative unions were distinct, the interrelationship
between them forms a major theme of this work, in part because of journalism’s unique
status in this area. Journalists were the only creative professionals who relied on a formal
relationship with a trade union to compensate for their lack of an exclusive support fund.
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The Trade Union for Cultural Workers (profsoiuz rabotnikov kul’turyi) was the body
officially responsible for their material needs. Trade unions were distinct from creative
ones in several important respects. They lacked any claims to exclusivity—a trade union
was open to all employees of a given establishment. The trade union for cultural workers,
then, might include both the editor-in-chief of a newspaper and the machinist who
worked in his building. Trade unions were consequently much larger than creative
ones—by the 1970s, some 98 percent of Soviet workers belonged to creative
organizations, and some studies suggest there were as many as 2.5 million distinct “trade
union groups.” Having said that, the Journalists’ Union was always significantly larger
than the other creative unions. In 1959, there were about nineteen thousand members of
the Journalists’ Union and only 4,801 members of the Writers’ Union. By 1977, the
Journalists’ Union had 77,000 members, compared to 1,936 in the Composers’ Union and
about 8,000 in the Writers’ Union. This difference in size, while often publicly celebrated
as a sign of the profession’s social value, posed significant logistical challenges for the
organization’s efforts to influence its members and set up Zhurfond.50
Just as creative unions were distinct from trade unions, they should be considered
separately from two other institutions—universities and, to a lesser extent, the ideological
apparatus of the Communist Party. Though these distinctions are part of the history of
other creative unions, journalism had a unique developmental trajectory. In contrast to the
music field, which had an established pre-revolutionary history of conservatory programs
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from which the overwhelming majority of creative union members graduated, not all
Journalists’ Union members had higher education of any kind, and specialized journalism
degrees were not available until after the war. As part of its commitment to professional
development, the creative union frequently proposed reforms in journalism education, as
we will see in chapters five and six. Tomoff argues that the legal and organizational
separation between the government cultural apparatus and the Composers’ Union
ultimately gave the latter group more influence over the music field. The situation for
journalists was distinct, as the creative union always had very high levels of Party
membership, and its first president, Pavel Satiukov, was a member of the Central
Committee and close personal associate of Khrushchev.51 Whatever capacity to shape
their field journalists enjoyed, then, stemmed from the officially recognized importance
of their work rather than separation from the Party.
•••
The creative union’s early organizational history had several distinct stages, all of
which are crucial to properly contextualizing the professionalization process. With
startling rapidity, the heads of the Central Committee’s Agitation and Propaganda
department responded positively to Kraminov in late December of 1954, commenting
that progressive journalists increasingly requested more contact with their Soviet
counterparts. The question of parity with other socialist countries was explicitly raised:
the other Eastern bloc nations all had separate journalists’ unions or special journalism
sections in their trade unions. Capitalist countries tended to have “independent
51
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journalists’ unions,” and “progressive” journalists in Western Europe frequently
coordinated leisure and professional activities. In contrast, the twenty-five thousand
journalists in the Soviet Union “did not have their own independent organization,
specially devoted to giving them assistance with their creative growth and perfection of
their journalistic skills (masterstva).” The department heads echoed Kraminov’s
contention that the “absence of such an independent organization…creates known
difficulties in our influence on this stratum of the intelligentsia abroad…so that many
undertakings in the area of international social relations are carried out without the
participation of Soviet journalists.”52 As all of these comments demonstrate, both the
MOJ and the planned creative union were meant to facilitate exchanges between Soviet
journalists and media professionals of different nations, as well as Soviet participation in
independent and “front” media organizations, all of which I refer to as “cultural
diplomacy.” Though the term is the subject of intense debate, it is best understood, at
root, to refer to “communication between governments and foreign people,” often
designed to improve a nation’s image or status. The degree to which such efforts are an
extension of state policy—and are or were carried out by state agencies—varies widely.53
As part of their justification for supporting Kraminov’s proposal, the Agitation
and Propaganda department heads discussed journalism’s historical development in the
Soviet Union. From 1917 to 1935, journalists had a “central bureau” and trade union.
From 1935 to 1953, they were briefly part of a larger organization for press workers and
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printers and then became part of the Trade Union for Cultural Workers under the auspices
of the all-USSR Central Council of Trade Unions (VTsSPS) where they constituted the
largest “stratum of the intelligentsia” but lacked their own section. To correct this
imbalance, the Central Committee department heads concluded the memorandum with a
proposal to create a separate journalists’ section in the trade union.54 The organization
was needed due to the “quantitative and qualitative growth of the Soviet press,” and its
responsibility for the “communist upbringing of Soviet workers.” These proposals
introduced phrases that would become a near-constant refrain in seminars, articles, and
public speeches about the Journalists’ Union’s goals for its members: to aid in the
“ideological and theoretical sophistication” and “creative and professional mastery” of
journalists. Again, the narrative was one of absence: no organization was devoted to this
cause, and journalists lacked “the appropriate creative atmosphere” for their work. Most
sophisticated genres had “practically disappeared” from many newspapers. An undated
draft Central Committee decree authorizing the organization’s creation also highlighted
the detrimental effects on the ability of journalists to connect with their counterparts
throughout the world.55 The decree explicitly referenced the drafting of bylaws and the
creation of an Organizational Bureau and trade publication. The creative union’s print
journal first appeared in the autumn of 1955, as the successor to Journalist.56 As part of
its follow-up to these proposals, the VsTsSPS sent an organizational blueprint for the
journalists’ section to the Central Committee in April of 1955. According to this
proposed outline of its structure, the organization’s main goals were to train journalists to
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assist in the ideological and moral “upbringing” of workers and in representing Soviet
journalists abroad in the “international professional movement.” It was also expected to
promote the “cultured leisure” of its members and oversee their working conditions
through oversight of local branches. All-USSR Congresses were to be held every two
years.57 By the spring of 1956, the organization had a separate Orgburo independent of
the VTsSPS, though trade union relationships would structure much of the Orgburo’s
early work and the subsequent bylaws debate. Although the reasons for the Journalists’
Union’s separation from the trade union body remain opaque, the brief period of closer
association with the VTsSPS was not insignificant: the arrangements for an all-USSR and
local structure, and many of the cultural and organizational missions, would retain much
of their original function after the “journalists’ section” was transformed into an
independent creative union.
Though Kraminov and his supporters in the Agitation and Propaganda
Department relied on a narrative of absence and potential Soviet decline as justification
for a new journalists’ organization, it should be noted that their joint portrait of Soviet
failure should be seen more as a lobbying effort than a reflection of Soviet reality. Soviet
journalists were active participants in Stalinist industrialization, and as war
correspondents, they had achieved high social status, all without a Journalists’ Union or
even a section for journalists within a trade union structure. Journalists also worked
abroad in the Stalin era: perhaps the most famous was Mikhail Koltsov, who became an
especially active journalist after his Red Army service during the Civil War Era. He
achieved particular fame as a satirist and political commentator. Before his execution on
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espionage charges in 1940, Koltsov was an influential commentator on foreign affairs
who maintained close ties with both the Comintern and the Secret Police—though he did
this as a member of the Writers’ Union.58 Kraminov’s own work history as a foreign
correspondent and ability to report on MOJ activities belied some of the more dramatic
language about the Soviet Union’s international position. In 1955, mot long after
Kraminov penned his memo, a delegation of famous Soviet journalists visited the United
States. The delegation was led by Boris Polevoi, well known for his reporting from the
Nuremburg trials and as a secretary in the Writers’ Union. Polevoi published a volume of
this visit, American Diaries, in which he paid homage to One-Story America, the famous
work of the satirists Evgenii Petrov and Il’ia Ilf about their journey around the 1930s
United States. Оther members of the delegation included Alexander Sofronov, a special
correspondent for Ogonek, and Khrushchev’s son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei, who would
eventually serve as editor of both Komsomol’skaia pravda and Izvestiia.59 Though
foreign exchange and professional connections abroad would become a critical part of the
Journalists’ Union’s function, exchange clearly took place prior to its establishment,
despite the dismal picture Kraminov and his supporters presented. The language of these
arguments, and their ultimate success, reveals as much about the importance Soviet elites
attached to competitiveness with both socialist and capitalist print culture as it does about
the actual status of journalists. Rather than treat the Journalists’ Union’s formation as a
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single foundational moment, I see its development as part of an ongoing effort to reshape
journalism’s purpose.
The creative union’s incubation period spanned several years and had distinct
stages of development, which I will briefly describe here before describing the draft
bylaws and unpacking the arguments journalists advanced about the nature of the new
organization. In the spring and summer of 1956, the elite media managers who formed
the creative union’s organizational bureau (Orgburo), held their first meetings and
discussed their goals and objectives for the organization. These debates, and some
consultation with the Central Committee, led Orgburo members to produce the
organization’s draft bylaws and set up a basic organizational structure. The draft bylaws
were first published in the creative union’s trade journal in August of 1957, and Orgburo
members held some public discussions with rank-and-file members about the document
around this time. Local branches of the creative union began their membership drives in
the fall of 1957. In 1958, they took in more members and formalized their organizational
structures, with a particular focus on preparations for local conferences. Following
instructions from the all-Union Orgburo, local journalists commented on the draft
bylaws. These conversations, which occurred both before and after local congresses the
following year, involved open discussion of the possibilities the creative union offered
for professional development and greater social and material prestige. These comments or
proposed amendments to the draft document were subsequently sent to the Orgburo as it
prepared a final version for discussion and ratification at the creative union’s first allUnion Congress. After some scheduling setbacks, local conferences occurred in the
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winter of 1959 and the all-Union Congress was held from November 11 to November 14
of that year. These local and national events are the main subjects of chapter three.
•••
Kraminov’s memo and the Central Committee’s support for his initiative would
be far from the last alteration in Soviet journalism’s institutional bases. The creative
union’s Orgburo officially began its work in April of 1956 and continued until the body
dissolved itself in 1959. Though some of the organization’s form and goals were
inherited from its embryonic period under the auspices of the VTsSPS, the Orgburo’s
early work would further address the new domestic and international responsibilities
facing journalists, along with the profession’s evolution since the 1930s.60 The Orgburo’s
official tasks were to draft bylaws, oversee membership, and conduct the first all-USSR
Congress for the new creative union. In achieving these goals, the Orgburo would serve
as a forum for a multi-year debate about the meaning of work as a “professional
journalist.”
The career trajectories of the Orgburo members demonstrate that expertise in
foreign affairs remained a central concern for the new organization, and that the new
creative union was closely tied to state and Party institutions. The Orgburo’s chairman,
Nikolai Grigor’evich Pal’gunov, was also head of the Soviet Union’s official wire
service, TASS. А factory worker in his youth, Pal’gunov became a journalist in his native
Iaroslavl’ and began his career at TASS in 1929. He completed journalism courses as an
international specialist (zhurnalist mezhdunarodnik) and worked as a correspondent in
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Iran, Finland, and France from 1929 to 1940. He was head of the press department of the
People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and served as general director of TASS from
1943 to 1960 and a secretary in the Journalists’ Union from 1959 until 1966. Kraminov,
as befit his leading role in creating the organization, was also an Orgburo member. He
served as editor of the Union’s foreign affairs journal Abroad (Za rubezhom). Prominent
zhurnalist-mezhdunarodnik Iurii Аleksandrovich Zhukov had also served as a war
correspondent, then as a foreign correspondent for Pravda. At the time of the Orgburo’s
formation, he was headed the State Committee for Cultural Connections Abroad (GKKS)
for the first few years of its existence. Thus, the Orgburo’s composition and the careers of
its key figures demonstrate that journalism was expected to promote both international
and domestic agendas.61
Other Orgburo members, if less experienced in international matters, had
similarly long careers in both bureaucracy and journalism. Maria Dmitrievna
Ovsiainnikova, the only female member of the Orgburo, had been active in the Party
since the Civil War. She worked as a teacher and eventually edited pedagogical journals,
also serving as secretary and then as president of the trade union for press workers.
During the war years, she served as secretary of the Party bureau of a battalion on the
Western Front and as editor of several regimental newspapers. From 1945 to 1947
Ovsiannikova was assistant to the head of Glavlit, the Soviet Union’s censorship body,
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and editor of the journal Soviet Woman until her retirement.62 Dmitrii Petrovich Goriunov
was editor of Komsomol’skaia pravda, the newspaper for the Communist Party’s Youth
League (hereafter Komsomol), and would replace Pal’gunov as director of TASS. Boris
Sergeievich Burkov worked as editor of Trud and then as the first head of the news
agency Novosti.63 B. L. Leont’ev was a member of the editorial staff of the newspaper
Literaturnaia gazeta and a specialist in foreign affairs.64 The Orgburo’s general secretary,
P. P. Erofeev, was the first editor of the Russian Republic newspaper, Sovetskaia
Rossiia.65 As Matthew Lenoe describes, the journalists of an earlier era had presided over
the transition from “mass enlightenment” to “mass mobilization” for the industrialization
campaigns, the Orgburo members in the 1950s were further shaped by war experiences
and international travel, as befit the organization’s dual focus on domestic skill and
cultural diplomacy.66 Though he is closely associated with journalistic reform under his
father-in law, Aleksei Ivanovich Adzhubei, then an assistant editor at Komsomol’skaia
pravda, did not take a major role in the creative union until after 1959.67
•••
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As they began their work, the Orgburo’s members faced a number of interpretive
challenges, as the Journalists’ Union had to find its place in the existing social and legal
framework. At the first meeting in April 1956, Pal’gunov pointed out that because of the
organization’s status as a creative union, the bylaws of the Writers’ Union, as well as
those for composers and architects, were appropriate initial models. Legal studies of
creative unions produced in the Soviet period demonstrate that all creative organizations
were established in accordance with the Soviet civil code about social organizations. The
very concept of “professional mastery” was a goal for all creative unions, and it featured
frequently in Journalists’ Union discourse.68 While Pal’gunov stressed domestic
comparisons, Boris Burkov pointed out that the bylaws of foreign Journalists’ Unions,
particularly those from Eastern Europe, should be consulted as well. TASS
correspondents abroad were tasked with sending copies of these bylaws to the Orgburo.
Now, both international and internal models for creative organization could be taken into
consideration, in light of the changed political landscape after the Second World War.
Kraminov’s international vision of the organization had clearly prevailed by the spring of
1956, since the Journalists’ Union—which at the time had no members—was already
taking a leadership role in the planning and execution of an international journalists’
meeting in Helsinki that summer—a major event discussed in detail in my fourth
chapter.69
The Journalists’ Union’s status as a cultural diplomacy organization was
determined early and never disputed. In contrast, its domestic functions would be a
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subject of persistent debate. The primary task of the Orgburo’s April 1956 meeting was,
in the words of Zhukov: “to determine what the Union should represent, whether it will
be constructed as a creative organization or more closely resemble a trade Union.
Decisions about the Union’s membership will be determined by its nature. Whether all
journalists, including members of the editing bureau, literary workers, and members of
the letters department will be members, or should only creative workers join it, that is,
individuals who have experience with journalistic work, like editors, feature-writers, and
satirists? Should members of the Union of Soviet Journalists simultaneously be members
of one of the trade unions?”70 The potential overlap in functions between a trade union
(profsoiuz) and a creative union (tvorcheskii soiuz) would prove to be a key issue in the
Journalists’ Union’s development. In Soviet society, creative unions were more exclusive
and traditionally had more privileges and social status—membership came with
obligations as well as rights, and not all members of a creative profession were eligible
for membership. Trade unions, in contrast, were open to all employees of a given type of
institution: the trade union for cultural workers, for example, included engineers and
machinists as well as artists, provided they worked in some cultural institution.71 The
questions about membership suggest uncertainty about the organization’s status: whether
it would be an inclusive organization based on employment status, or one rooted in more
specific notions of achievement.
Offering his own thoughts at the same Orgburo meeting, Dmitri Goriunov
asserted that these questions of status and membership could not be answered until the
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organization had set its “goals and tasks.” He saw these as “coordinating all possible
means for the victory of communism, raising journalistic mastery, and cultivating the
young upcoming journalists, and expanding ties with journalists from foreign countries,
as well as the theoretical resolution of journalists’ creative problems.” Goriunov argued
for an expansive definition of Union membership—that the organization should “unify all
creative workers of newspapers, journals, radio, and publishing houses,” encompassing
all major forms of mass media and other written work aimed at large audiences. Any
aspiring member should work or have worked as either staff or a contributing author, and
also have a work history and portfolio.72 It was clear to him that the Journalists’ Union
would resemble other creative unions and be dedicated to specific “professional” tasks,
rather than have the universalist approach of Soviet trade unions. The stress on the
abstract notion of “professional mastery” and assisting in the maturation process of
members may invite comparisons to the German professions and the concepts of Bildung
and Beruf. In his introduction to the history and historiography of German
professionalization, Konrad Jarausch describes Bildung—in this case, translated as the
study of an abstract knowledge base—as crucial to the educational dimension of
professionalization. Beruf, a Protestant term for “calling,” was later grafted on to the
German term for professionals, akademimische Berufstanden, which encompassed only
university-trained professionals. “Professional mastery” however, would prove a
particularly malleable term, used as a placeholder for any number of activities or
achievements. The more direct parallel to the German case is that Soviet elites also
pursued “professionalization from above,” particularly in the early years of creative
72
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unions. The debates about inclusivity and privilege suggest that Orgburo members were
far from unanimous in their views of the profession.73
One major point of contention in the Orgburo’s first debates was the amount of
seniority required for membership: some argued for work experience of at least three
years, while others thought that this requirement was too stringent as it would exclude
young journalists. Ultimately, no specific time period was spelled out in the draft bylaws,
leaving only a reference to “work experience.”74 B. L. Leont’ev asked whether
membership would be open to freelancers, making the creative union “an organization of
all journalists publishing their works in print and on the radio, regardless of their work
status.” Pal’gunov argued that this was at odds with the organization’s goal of “instilling
professional mastery in journalists working in print publications,” since it would require
accepting all “journalists who publish.” In response, Leont’ev’s proposal was
withdrawn.75 The defeat of this inclusive model demonstrates that the new creative union
was envisioned as a somewhat selective organization. Ultimately, the Journalists’
Union’s overall structure closely resembled that of the other creative unions: it
established commissions dedicated to creative matters, international exchange,
membership, and the creation of the Union’s local branches, a committee to look into the
organization’s legal status, and another committee tasked with creating Zhurfond, a
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financial support fund for journalists similar to the ones for members of the Writers’ and
Composers’ Unions.76
In February of 1957, a period when the organization still existed on paper but as
yet had not taken in any members, Pal’gunov reported on some obstacles to the
Orgburo’s initial organizational plan. After consultation with the Central Committee,
Pal’gunov was told that the organization was too large, both in its membership and the
size of its apparat. None of these setbacks would prove decisive, as Pal’gunov noted that
backing away from the new organization was “impossible… inside the USSR interest in
the Union’s creation is exceptionally great, and the Orgburo of the Journalists’ Union has
made a series of useful connections abroad.” To reduce expenses, Goriunov suggested
that newspaper and journal staffs enter the creative union collectively, so that these
groups could discuss “all creative questions.” This proposal was ultimately rejected, since
it might offer membership to “people who lacked the basis to be called journalists.”77
Even the harsh realities of planned economics could not alter the essential commitment of
the Orgburo members to a more professional organization.
However, these financial exigencies did prevent the establishment of Zhurfond, an
episode that should be recounted briefly due to its long-term repercussions in the Union’s
own history. Though the proponents of a creative Union found support for their proposals
relatively quickly, the absence of a sustained and substantial material support base was a
persistent complaint in the Union’s later years, one which elite journalists continually
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promised to address, though no structure emerged during the period of this study.78 The
Orgburo’s initial policies would have lasting consequences for the organization’s
relationship to its members. The rejection of Goriunov’s collective model affirmed that
membership in the Journalists’ Union would evaluate individual qualifications, as other
creative unions did.
•••
The Journalists’ Union’s status as an all-USSR organization was apparent as early
as the fall of 1956. The formation of local and republic chapters was a crucial stage in the
organization’s development, as journalists first gained the opportunity to comment on the
draft bylaws at this stage. The federal nature of the Soviet system was mirrored in the
new creative union, though the Journalists’ Union’s structure and practices confirmed the
superior status of journalists based in Moscow and Leningrad. In September of 1956, the
Orgburo determined that each of the Union Republics—with the exception of the Russian
Republic—would have a governing body with a secretariat. Below the republics,
branches (otdelenie) of the Journalists’ Union would exist in oblasts, krais, and the
Soviet Union’s autonomous republics (ASSRs).79 At the raion level, smaller “groups” of
journalists would elect representatives to the relevant larger body; that is, if an oblast’
chapter existed, the raion groups would elect representatives to it. The Orgburo
conducted a kind of census of the “creative cadres” in the Soviet Union in order to count
the number of local journalists and determine the possible number of prospective

78

Journalists from Moscow oblast’ complained about the absence of Zhurfond as late as 1966. See
TsGAMO (Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Moskovskoi Oblasti) f. 7950, op. 1, d. 26, ll. 28–9.
79
Oblast’ and krai’ lack precise English-language equivalents; the two terms are juridically and practically
similar to what English speakers might call a region; the subunit is raion, most often translated as district.

48

members.80 The leaders of local chapters formulated additional lists of possible members,
ranging from editors and their assistants, genre specialists, content editors and those who
worked in book publishing, as well as photojournalists and radio and television
professionals. As early as 1956, draft proposals for the formulation of the Moscow and
Leningrad departments were already circulating, a process closely matching the history of
other creative unions, specifically the Composers’ Union. The early focus on establishing
the creative union in major urban centers, and the slow progress of local organizations,
was an enduring concern not only during the creative union’s incubation period, but in
the entire period under study.81 Other urban centers would also have union branches, such
as Kiev, Minsk, Riga, and “other major cities of the country.”82 The all-USSR Orgburo
would later declare that the creative union officially came into being when local chapters
began to form and take in members in the fall of 1957.83
Throughout this study, my reference point for the activity and concerns of local
chapters is most often Moscow oblast’. Because the local branches of the Union appear
in the all-USSR records only sporadically, particularly after 1959, I selected a local
branch of the organization in order to broaden my discussion of the union’s origins, as
well as its evolution. I selected the Moscow district chapter not only for the accessibility
of its archive, but also because the oblast’ journalists clearly saw themselves as distinct
from their counterparts in the capital, despite their relative geographic proximity. The
Moscow oblast’ branch formed in September of 1957, and its primary objective was
incorporating members into its ranks. This task required oblast’ Orgburo members to
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actively recruit members. They visited the area’s publications in teams, explaining the
membership requirements and encouraging candidates to sign up, a process referred to as
“explanatory work.”84 These efforts appear to have been fairly successful: one year after
its establishment, its head, V. N. Golubev, the editor of The Moscow Propagandist, later
renamed The Leninist Herald, submitted a report to Pal’gunov about his six hundred
prospective members, out of one thousand viable candidates.85 As we will see in later
chapters, the discrepancy between available candidates and actual members was due not
only to problems with qualifications but local disinterest in the organization.
The all-USSR Orgburo was frequently frustrated with the gradual approach of
local branches—as part of their work, its members were sent to major cities or regions of
the Soviet Union to monitor the progress of organizational development. At this stage,
the all-USSR Orgburo approved all membership decisions of every lower branch. By
March of 1958, Iaroslavl’s had only thirty members. In Gorky, the local branch was
“passively confining itself to taking in new members.” Though some local groups lagged
behind, there were also bright spots: the Leningrad branch was among the fastest to
develop in the RSFSR—accepting two-hundred fifty members and setting up
commissions for creative work, international connections, and the “quotidian” needs of
journalists (byt).86 The commencement of creative work and establishment of hierarchies
was considered a key sign of success: the Arkhangel’sk branch had apparently
distinguished itself by conducting seminars, and the republic-level branch in Ukraine had
found “qualified and experienced members” and begun to organize events for “raising
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their professional and ideological level.” These included press conferences, journalists’
meetings with members of government ministries, national economic councils, city and
district institutions, and interactions with other important “cultural and scientific actors.”
Genre seminars were seen as particularly encouraging signs that local chapters were
taking steps to “develop professional mastery”—the link between genre skill and
professionalization would remain central to creative union activity throughout the period
under study.87 At the all-USSR level, genre seminars on humor and satire as well as
feature stories were also planned.88
In 1958 the relationship between the Moscow Orgburo and local branches was
becoming routinized in ways that firmly established the greater importance of the capital.
Orgburo secretary P. P. Erofeev requested that the Union generate regular reports to send
to all lower branches about “creative work, press conferences, lectures and the like.”89
Since local chapters were beginning to conduct seminars, the Orgburo needed to create a
“lecturers’ group” in its secretariat to address the “arising need for speeches from
experienced Moscow journalists.”90 Visits from journalists who had been abroad were
also considered part of “practical help to local organizations.”91 Apparently, some degree
of “professional mastery” had already taken up residence in the Soviet capital, and in
those who had been beyond the USSR’s borders. The all-USSR Orgburo acknowledged
that some chapters of the new creative union were more important than others: an
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Orgburo member was sent to Leningrad oblast’s first congress, since it was considered a
“major organization.”92
•••
Before presenting and analyzing member comments on the document, I will
briefly present the key points of the draft bylaws and point out which sections of it
proved most significant in subsequent discussions. The first section, labeled “Goals and
Tasks of the Creative Union,” specified that the Journalists’ Union of the USSR was a
“creative organization of journalists,” open to professionals who worked in radio, print
journalism, or publishing houses. Its first major goal was explicitly ideological: to “bring
about the active participation of Soviet journalists in mobilizing workers’ strength for the
victory of Communism in the Soviet Union.” Professional development, or the “raising of
the ideological level and professional mastery of journalists, to develop their creative
initiative,” was second to this national mission. The draft bylaws proclaimed the
dominant position of workers in the Soviet state and that their social progress was a key
aspect of any profession’s work. Clauses about “instilling in journalists…the spirit of
fidelity to the motherland, and passing on the creative experience of the older generation
to youth,” portrayed both national and professional pride a part of the professional’s
knowledge base. As in Jurgen Kocka’s formulation of professional development in the
German case, Soviet creative union members were expected to take particular pride in
“their work for society and the common weal,” even as they pursued a specialist
knowledge base.93 Subsequent clauses further concretized the notion of professional
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mastery, mentioning both “ties to the masses,” especially worker and peasants’
correspondents, and expertise in “style and genre” as key objectives. Genre work became
much better organized in the years after the organization’s inaugural congress, as we will
see in chapter five. Another point in this section was even more central to the
organization’s operations and rank-and-file responses to it: the responsibility to
“strengthen and increase ties with journalists abroad in the service of preserving peace in
the world.” Elite journalists frequently traveled abroad, while rank-and-file journalists
presented foreign travel as a privilege they were frequently denied. Cultural diplomacy
activities were such a major part of creative union work that they feature as the main
subject of chapter four. The creative union’s responsibility to “carry out a defense of
journalists’ rights in accordance with the laws on labor, to actively resolve matters of
journalists’ labor and salary,” was a responsibility that rank-and-file members took very
seriously. Though the bylaws commentary contains few references to Soviet labor laws,
many of the comments on the bylaws concerned material benefits and improvements to
working conditions.94
The next major section of the draft bylaws dealt with the rights and obligations of
members, and the reciprocal obligations the creative union guaranteed to protect. These
sections included one of the major topics of debate both within the all-Union Orgburo
and in subsequent rank-and-file discussions—the criteria for membership, which bodies
made membership decisions, and what was necessary to remain a member in good
standing, as well as grounds for expulsion. The main criteria were status as a
“professional journalist,” signified by an unspecified amount of “work history and
94
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experience” (stazh i opyt) in publishing, print, radio, or an information agency. In
addition to an application and letter of reference from their place of employment,
prospective members should also present “published correspondence or articles,
possessing independent significance.” The lack of specificity about these two points, and
what should replace them, would be a major point of contestation even during the
inaugural congress. The Journalists’ Union’s all-USSR presidium originally retained both
the rights to review all new membership applications and make final decisions in
expulsion cases. Members could be expelled for bylaws violation, commission of crimes,
for severing ties with the profession, or not paying membership dues. To remain in good
standing, members were obligated to follow the bylaws and pay dues, while endeavoring
to “consistently raise their political and ideological level,” work to improve Soviet
publications, and aid young journalists in their professional development. Members had
the right to participate in the organization’s activities and to receive “all manner of help”
from the organization when carrying out their professional duties. Again, the insistence
that journalists themselves could set standards for admission and expulsion confirms its
professional status, as does the allusion to material “help.” The relative brevity of this
section, and the nonspecific nature of this “help,” would be another major topic of
discussion, with rank-and-file journalists seeking to expand these privileges.95
In addition to detailing standards for membership and philosophical goals and
objectives, the draft bylaws also described the creative union’s organizational structure
and the various committees or commissions that would “carry out its goals.” The creative
union was responsible for the administration of the Central House of Journalists in
95
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Moscow, frequently used for seminars and meeting space. Smaller houses could be set up
in other urban centers. It also set up “creative commissions,” organized by genre, and a
separate commission for cultural diplomacy. The creative union was the official
representative body for all Soviet journalists at international events, and, as per
Kraminov’s original vision, would oversee “the exchange of delegations with foreign
journalists.” The bylaws officially established the creative union’s oversight of
publications and any other public gatherings or events dedicated to “journalists’ exchange
of work.” The Journalists’ Union was structurally similar to other creative unions, though
its financial structure remained distinct. Its main governing body when all-USSR
congresses were not held was the presidium of its executive board, which met monthly
and had a secretariat to oversee routine operations. It was obligated to hold all-USSR
Congresses once every four years (a rule that was routinely broken throughout its history)
and plenums twice a year. In addition to its republican branches, the executive board
could also create branches for each krai, oblast’, and autonomous republic, which would
in turn elect governing bureaus at its conferences. These bodies were responsible for
overseeing financial matters and overall policy adherence. Individual newspapers,
information agencies, or publishing houses would elect an “authorized representative” to
the oblast’, krai’, or city body—these members were responsible for collecting dues and
keeping both the governing body and the rank-and-file members informed of each others’
activities.96
The Union’s financial support was primarily from member dues, with some profit
sharing from newspapers, reflecting the Orgburo’s inability to create and manage a
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separate financial fund akin to those operated by the other creative unions.97 Like these,
the Journalists’ Union was legally distinct from the both the Soviet state and the
Communist Party. Though Kirill Tomoff makes much of this distinction as part of his
argument that composers frequently maintained agency as musical experts, I have found
little evidence that this juridical separation had much practical effect for the Journalists’
Union—largely because of its high levels of Party membership and close association with
the Central Committee.98
•••
A lengthy discussion of the Journalists’ Union’s bylaws might, at first glance,
seem like excessive attention to a text that had little relevance to the organization’s actual
operations. Instead, the draft bylaws formed a major part of the all-USSR Orgburo’s
domestic activities from its inception until November of 1959 and served as the basis for
a national, perhaps even all-Soviet, conversation about what journalism was and what
privileges and responsibilities accompanied journalistic work. I refer to this period as the
bylaws debate to emphasize its contentious and multifaceted nature. This is not to argue
that Soviet journalism from earlier eras lacked professional attributes: “mass journalism”
was recognized as socially significant work and came with some privileges, as did work
as a war correspondent. Historicizing professions requires tracing their developmental
trajectory, and I argue that the bylaws discussion was distinct stage, a moment in which
journalists deliberately and consciously examined their role in Soviet society, and
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advocated for many of the attributes scholars associate with the category of the
“profession.”” Newspapers themselves have long been acknowledged as key to the
development of nationalism in the European and Soviet contexts. Just as newspapers
could create “imagined communities” among otherwise dissimilar readers, the draft
bylaws encouraged journalists all over the Soviet Union to think of themselves as a
unified group. In the absence of a continuous study of the profession from 1939–56, it is
impossible to state with certainty when this professional consciousness emerged—for a
brief time, however, the Journalists’ Union provided the forum for its articulation.99 In
her study of Polish journalists, Jane Curry argues that the formation of professional
associations, and a period of debate about standards for entry, is an essential
professionalization stage.100
Analyzing the wide variety of comments, concerns and criticisms rank-and-file
journalists submitted to the Orgburo requires addressing the methodological problem of
interpreting opinions offered in a Soviet context. Stephen Kotkin’s framework in his
study of Magnitogorsk offers one solution: while it is true that Soviet citizens had to learn
to “speak Bolshevik” in order to achieve their social and political goals, they also had few
other lexicons available. Though the Journalists’ Union was formed in a period of
comparative openness to Western culture, thanks to events like the 1957 World Youth
99
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Festival, and the permeability of the Soviet Union’s new borderlands, most journalists
who commented on the bylaws worked on local publications, a group that infrequently,
as they themselves lamented, had the opportunity to travel abroad and so had little
context for international comparisons.101
To extend Kotkin’s metaphor further, it would be surprising, to say the least, if
journalists lacked fluency in the Bolshevik tongue, since newspapers themselves
contributed to the Soviet political lexicon. Demographic data reveals close overlap
between Party membership and membership in the Journalists’ Union.102 In some contrast
to the Composers’ Union, Party members were strongly in the majority. At the time of
the inaugural congress, about a third of the Soviet Union’s journalists belonged to the
creative union—though this number would increase in subsequent years.103 Senior
members of the Journalists’ Union also had close ties to the Central Committee, the
cultural diplomacy apparatus, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Though the
Journalists’ Union, like the other creative unions, was juridically distinct from the Party,
its agency in media matters was closely linked to it, unlike the agency of composers,
which depended in part on their sophisticated understanding of music theory, a skill set
most political figures lacked.104 Comparison to the literary field reveals more
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similarities: as of its 1959 congress, nearly seventy-six percent of the Writers’ Union
membership consisted of members or candidate members of the Communist Party.105
Though there is no study of the Writers’ Union analogous to Tomoff’s, these
demographic data suggest that close association with the Party was more common for
creative workers who produced written texts.
Considering that journalists were so closely tied to the Party apparatus, how then
are historians to determine whether journalists’ opinions on the draft bylaws are
representative or express any sense of professional distinctiveness? In my discussion of
journalists’ responses and critiques of the draft bylaws, I take a position similar to Susan
Reid’s interpretation of Soviet comments on the American exhibition in Moscow in 1959.
Namely, that the search for an untainted “authenticity” is less useful than determining
which scripts or elements of official ideology historical subjects chose to employ. And,
despite their high levels of Party membership, journalists did not have fixed access to the
parameters of acceptable or unacceptable commentary: as many historians have pointed
out, these parameters shifted as often under Khrushchev as they had under Stalin.106
Though very little in the bylaws commentary could be considered subversive, journalists
were also open about their dissatisfactions with the document—and, by extension, their
social and material position. And, while participants criticized the document they were
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offered, they also proposed substantive additions to it: some were ideological, while
others lacked explicit references to Marxist doctrine and could be classified as
“professional” concerns. Others point to a kind of Soviet social contract, where being a
professional journalist meant reciprocal obligations on the part of state institutions—an
extension of Vera Dunham’s “Big Deal” where the state promoted the cultured pursuit of
material benefit as a means for increasing social stability in the postwar period.107
The bylaws, like the Journalists’ Union itself, did not create Soviet journalism,
but they were the impetus for the new, deliberate thinking about its meaning—with clear
implications for professionalization. Though the aspirations journalists expressed may
seem unrealistic, perhaps even utopian, in light of the structural and political limitations
on professional agency in Soviet life, they should be understood as a product of their
historical context. Most of the bylaws comments were generated in the early years of
Khrushchev’s rule—a period of great optimism among intellectuals. In her analysis of
Polish journalistic professionalization, Jane Curry posits that political and structural
limitations may in fact “sharpen and make more urgent the move to
professionalization.”108 Envisioning the bylaws commentary as an expression of both
urgency and hope helps explain the ambitious scope of participants’ remarks. In the final
analysis, the rank-and-file conversation about the document should be seen as the grassroots equivalent to the Orgburo meetings years earlier: an opportunity for journalists to
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discuss, with relative frankness, their sense of professional identity and their hopes for
increased social standing.
•••
The main discussions of the draft bylaws took place from late 1957 until the
ratification of a final document at the creative union’s inaugural congress in November
1959. In August of 1957, a draft of the document was published in the creative union’s
trade journal.109 The Orgburo also sent copies to all the newly formed and incipient
branches of the Journalists’ Union and requested that all feedback on the document be
submitted by February of 1959.110 This process was not a formulaic gesture, as the
responses were not only categorized and archived, they were discussed at the inaugural
congress itself, the subject of chapter three. The records do not often include dates or
name contributors. In the account that follows, I have supplied the geographic origin of
comments in cases where this was specified. The Moscow oblast’ bylaws discussions
occurred in the fall and winter of 1958, as local chapters prepared for their first
conferences, and it seems likely that other comments originated around this time.111 In
their efforts to define the profession and the goals of the creative union, Orgburo
members and rank-and-file journalists devoted a great deal of time to questions of
membership. These discussions generally concerned who could join the creative union,
what categories of expertise defined membership, and which individuals or bodies had
the right to make these decisions. While elites in Moscow had the first opportunity to
consider these issues, rank-and-file journalists also weighed in during the subsequent
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bylaws debate. Proponents of an inclusive creative union—at both the elite and grassroots
levels—supported including worker and peasant correspondents, freelance journalists,
and the less experienced. They viewed the organization as a means to develop members’
potential. Those who championed a more exclusive organization placed more stress on
seniority and genre expertise, and frequently suggested closer scrutiny of written output
and work histories—essentially, creative union membership was presented as a
recognition of existing expertise rather than a means to cultivate it. Rank-and-file
journalists devoted particular attention to the grounds for expulsion, with particular
concerns about factual accuracy and writing standards that they felt the original document
neglected—along with a sustained interest in the moral conduct of prospective members.
Many of these proposals would have empowered local journalists to make more
membership decisions than higher-level bodies. Membership questions touched on more
than standards for entry or expulsion, however—both elites and rank-and-file members
were acutely aware of the material dimension of Soviet professional status. The latter
group expressed more dissatisfaction with trade unions and the more established material
position of writers and composers, while elites were most concerned with the logistical
challenges of funding such a large organization. Though the bulk of these issues were
resolved only later—many remained topics of discussion well into the 1960s—they
demonstrate the extent of professional consciousness at all levels of the journalism
profession.
The Orgburo and the local organizations often had sharply contrasting visions of
the Union’s purpose and function, given that even Pal’gunov, the head of the
organization, reported conducting “explanatory work” with journalists who were not
62

certain of the organization’s value. These first explanatory efforts saw elite figures
defend their view of the creative union as a body that offered real possibilities for selfimprovement. Local comments, on the other hand, raised an issue that would become
central to the later bylaws debate: the provision of material benefits and status.
Pal’gunov held a special meeting devoted to the draft bylaws in September of
1957—the first recorded public event of this type. His audience was particularly
concerned about the requirement that journalists should have written works of
“independent significance,” since apparently many of those present had written a few
short pieces. Other comments were more self-interested: journalists from Ivanovo wanted
to know what “privileges and advantages” the Union would provide them, or asked that
the organization “propagandize” itself, implying that its purposes were unclear.112 Other
local proposals were franker still: a report from Tul’skaia oblast’ stated that, “among the
journalists of the district there is not a particular wish to join the union.”113 Kaliningrad
journalists hoped that the new creative union would also have its own trade union,
claiming that the trade union for cultural workers “…in many respects does not satisfy
journalists.”114 This critique of trade unions and direct references to privilege demonstrate
that many journalists embraced the creative union as a source of material benefit.
The number of questions, concerns, and complaints apparently prompted
Pal’gunov to launch into a lengthy defense of the creative union’s value:
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What will the Journalists’ Union be and what advantages will its members
receive? The Journalists’ Union has as its main goal the development of
the initiative and raising the professional mastery of journalists, conveying
and distributing the leading experiences of journalists, the union will carry
out the ideological and professional growth of journalists, and the
establishment of a publishing house will aid in the release of work by
young talents…The Journalists’ Union has major goals in the realm of
developing and strengthening ties with journalists from the peoples’
democracies and with journalists from capitalist countries. Trips abroad
organized by the union play a major role in the development and
strengthening of these ties. On these trips, together with workers from
central press publications, representatives of the district-level press also
take part.
Pal’gunov also reiterated that there could be no overlap or combining of the
organization with the existing trade union, and refused to allocate funds for Leningrad’s
House of Journalists.115 Though the process of drafting bylaws, creating an organizational
structure, and establishing relationships with local chapters in many respects mirrors that
of the Composers’ Union and the other creative organizations established in the Stalin
period, the effort here was unique. At least in the known literature on the other four
creative unions, there is no directly analogous attempt to explain—and even, perhaps,
defend—a creative union to its local representatives. Pal’gunov, like others before him,
relied on arguments about professional development and cultural diplomacy in his vision
of the union and its purpose, arguing that the projected publishing house would help the
organization develop young talents. His claims that local journalists were fairly
represented would be challenged throughout the bylaws debate. Though Pal’gunov’s
response to these early complaints was relatively brief, it was only the opening salvo in a
long conversation between the union’s leaders and rank-and-file members.
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Indeed, defending the Journalists’ Union’s importance would prove to be an
ongoing theme. An undated and unattributed draft speech for the Leningrad branch of the
Journalists’ Union in the Orgburo files was heavily dedicated to the task of persuasion.
The speaker argued that the new creative union “unites that group of the intelligentsia
which works for the Soviet press…and perfects the quality of published materials.” In
contrast to this elevated vision of the organization’s capabilities, the speaker also
admitted to serious organizational weaknesses, the worst of which was that “among some
journalists, there are still some comrades who need to have the Union’s meaning and
significance explained to them.” As in other materials from this period of the bylaws
debate, the organization was something to be argued for, explained, and defended. The
description of different skeptical groups is particularly telling: even those who already
received a membership card were among them, because they “lacked an internal
understanding of why they had become members,” or saw membership as “an
unnecessary formality… they joined the Union only because they feared being left
behind. But having taken this step, such journalists did not find their place in the union,
they did not even lift a finger. They criticize everything and everyone, beginning with the
very foundations of the organization. They want everything handed to them on a platter.”
The Journalists' Union was portrayed as something that should penetrate the
consciousness of its members, and failure to celebrate its appearance was equated with
laziness and social and political inertia. Indeed, these “unconscious” journalists had
apparently “failed to grasp the simple truth that the Union was creative and independent,
and a demanding approach to it is not appropriate for its goals and objectives. The Union
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is absolutely necessary for us, if we wish to grow and perfect our journalistic work.”116
The language here made these “demanding” journalists seem blind to the less tangible
benefits of creative union membership and overly materialistic.
•••
After membership questions, the most frequently discussed clause of the draft
bylaws concerned members’ rights and responsibilities. Journalists were deeply
concerned both with defining the scope of their responsibilities and with formalizing the
union’s obligations to its members. In this section, I focus on journalists’ expectations of
the creative union—their expectations of themselves and their colleagues feature more
prominently in my discussion of the moral qualities necessary for membership. Many
journalists hoped the new organization would give them parity with other creative
professionals, especially in material and social terms. Since the bylaws served as a
formal acknowledgement of professional status, journalists believed that their new status
should convey the same set of advantages that their literary counterparts enjoyed. While
membership debates were split between more inclusive and exclusive views of the
organization, material support proposals displayed more consensus: all of the suggestions
would have expanded the creative union’s social obligations. This range of obligations
was diverse and comprehensive, from social insurance and support funds to foreign and
domestic travel; proposals in the latter category were especially extensive, and I present
several of them here.
One amendment to the “goals of the Union” section stated that it should be
concerned with members’ rights, whether that meant intellectual property, housing, labor,
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“legal interests,” or “cultural and quotidian needs.”117 Even the requirement that Union
members should pay dues was debated extensively, introducing questions of economic
justice. There were multiple proposals that dues should be based on income, with some
arguing that pensioners should pay reduced rates or be exempt.118 Other discussions of
social support included explicit critique of existing structures, in particular of the Trade
Union for Cultural Workers. A radio journalist from Astrakhan argued that the main
function of the trade union was the payment of dues and that members could receive help
if they found themselves unable to work. The new union, on the other hand, needed the
means to send its members on “creative business trips.” 119 This proposal’s explicit
contrast between inactivity as a precondition for trade union material help, and the more
active and complex working conditions of journalists, used social value and professional
status to demonstrate material need. Despite these complaints, journalists remained
mostly dependent on the trade union for their material support over a decade after the
creative union’s establishment.120
The clearest professional aspiration in commentary on the bylaws was both
material and social: to achieve equivalent status and resources to that of the other creative
unions. Several participants focused on the Writers’ Union as the most salient point of
comparison. There were multiple proposals for the creation of a Zhurfond, which would
be equivalent to Litfond and funded by a percentage of the authors’ earnings.121 One
journalist from Astrakhan’ wrote: “It should be written in the bylaws that our
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organization is a professional creative organization…in my opinion our union should be
constructed exactly like the Writers’ Union and the Composers’ Union.” This view was
shared by a TASS correspondent who argued: “it would be better if our union would
receive greater independence, in the manner of the Writers’ Union and other creative
unions, where, in essence, the function of a trade union and a creative union is
combined.”122 Another journalist noted that the draft bylaws mentioned journalists as
“subjects of the labor laws” but that there was no mention of journalists’ rights as
“authors and as subjects of copyright law—this protection should be extended to
journalists as well as writers.”123 Though most proposals stressed equality and parity
with other institutions, one proposal from Belgorod oblast’ was particularly noteworthy,
as its author stated that the Journalists’ Union should “have the right to recommend its
members for membership in the Writers’ Union.” Though there was overlap between the
two organizations, both in membership and in overall mission, this comment suggests
that the two organizations were equivalent or perhaps even that the Journalists’ Union
should serve as a gateway to its more prestigious literary counterpart.124 There were also
numerous proposals advocating that the Union should have its own newspaper or reform
its journal, some of which explicitly mentioned that the Writers’ Union had its own
newspaper, Literaturnaia gazeta.125
In some cases, comparison to other creative unions was made in more legalistic
language, situating professional rights in an existing system of labor relationships.
Several proposals urged the creative union to take an interest in copyright issues.
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Various Ukrainian branches of the Union argued that the Zhurfond issue closely related
to the overall problem of the Union’s relationship to “the labor conditions and everyday
life needs of journalists, just as is written in the bylaws of the other creative unions.”
They proposed a more explicit reference to the creative union’s defense of its members
based on “the legal code on labor and copyright” and would have obligated the creative
union to be similarly attentive to leisure, health, working conditions, and other “cultural
and quotidian needs.”126 Georgian journalists advocated clarifying the “relationship
between the journalists’ union and the trade unions,” while other proposals argued that
journalists should have assistance according to all the laws affecting creative workers.127
Other concerns were far more practical, as multiple local chapters proposed that the
Journalists’ Union should offer housing help.128 While debates about standards for entry
into the creative union concerned moral character and writerly skill, proposals about the
effects of membership were focused on practical benefits and legal rights. These
comments, together with the ones above about the Writers’ Union, demonstrate the
importance of legal and social rights to journalists’ self-perception.
Other assistance proposals focused more directly on leisure and travel, with the
implication that these, too, would reduce inequality between creative groups in Soviet
society. Amendments concerned with education, though less numerous than others, were
similarly focused on the creative union’s capacity to develop its members’ potential, an
issue that would become increasingly important after the inaugural congress. Soviet
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tourism was often expected to be an edifying experience, physically or mentally. Bylaws
comments reveal that rank-and-file journalists also presented travel as a valuable
opportunity, and that they hoped the creative union would improve access to it.129 One
proposed amendment would have had the creative union guarantee journalists the ability
to travel once or twice a year, “according to their own wishes or if the district Orgburo
deems it necessary.” Urging the availability of increased vacation time, journalists from
Novosibirsk argued that travel and additional time off would “very much help
understanding of the life and creative growth of journalists and the Soviet Journalists’
Union.” Journalists from Moscow oblast’ expressed similar views about the importance
of travel: they argued for special funds to assist their “needy counterparts” and that the
organization should “subsidize the creative travel of members” to allow them to master
specific genres.130
The history of the other creative unions demonstrates that professionals did
consider access to leisure and travel beneficial to their creative output—especially writers
and composers. Prokofiev and Khatchaturian both used Composers’ Union retreats at
Ivanovo, and Pasternak was closely associated with his dacha at Peredelkino. As they
envisioned more productive creative futures, journalists thought in similar terms.131 This
language of material benefit and cultural uplift, which owed much to Soviet traditions of
privilege and patronage, extended beyond the domestic realm: a journalist from Moscow
oblast’ argued that, “it’s time to end the existing state of affairs that when the Soviet
Union’s social ranks of journalists are represented in foreign exchange that it not be the
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same narrow group of people like comrades Sofronov, Gribachev, Adzhubei and a few
other people; it is not acceptable to give anyone a particular monopoly in this realm.”132
Proposals from a 1958 gathering at Moscow’s Central House of Journalists included a
similar grievance.133 In the years after the inaugural congress, creative union elites were
continually compelled to respond to the issue of unequal access to foreign travel.
Commenters also proposed that the new organization take a more active role in university
journalism departments, since graduates were “as a rule not prepared for newspaper
work.”134 The push for more specialized training that journalists themselves controlled
was another area where rank-and-file journalists could envision their new creative union
as an agent of greater professionalization.135 The final bylaws made no specific mention
of either travel or higher education, but journalists’ expectations here were not
unjustified—the organization’s work in both areas features prominently in later chapters.
Iasen’ Nikolaevich Zasurskii, a renowned teacher and administrator in Moscow
University’s Journalism department from 1956 to the present day, became active in both
the creative union’s cultural diplomacy and its domestic work.136
•••
Though the proponents of the inclusive model for the creative union were the
majority—and their vision was ultimately expressed in the final bylaws—other
participants advocated greater selectivity. Several of these requirements would have
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increased the responsibility of existing members to scrutinize potential candidates. These
commenters were concerned that overly expansive standards would diminish their
prestige and the organization’s stated commitment to quality writing. Supporters of an
exclusive model suggested that the criteria for membership be as strict as that for the
Writers’ Union, or that the union offer “candidate membership.” The importance of
reading and writing as an evaluative standard was clearest in a proposal that potential
members should have to present their work for review ensure that it met the bylawimposed standard of having “independent significance,” and “look through the lines to
see if the person is a real journalist or not.”137 Other commentary on the importance of
writing skill was more concerned with areas where the draft bylaws were too broad. A
member conference at Moskovskii Komsomolets, the Moscow oblast’ Komsomol
newspaper, argued against the clause which stated that those who worked in publishing
houses could be potential members with a laconic formulation that stressed writing above
all else: “It has long been known that a person who does not write is not a journalist.”138
There were a variety of solutions offered to ensure that the Journalist’ Union properly
screened prospective candidates. These included an interview process, “talking with
people, finding out what a man does, what his plans are for the future.”139 Other
proposals which called for a more personalized review process were more critical: “It is
as easy to end up (popast’) in our Journalists’ Union as in the Red Cross Society, not only
should a comrade be recommended by the newspaper, but also by senior journalists, who
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should be present and explain why this person is worthy of membership.”140 The
importance of recommendations from senior colleagues was echoed in multiple
proposals. Though creative output and character concerns were mentioned most often,
others referenced technical skills, such as photography or typing.141 Admissions debates
also reflected the complex structure of the Soviet state: while the draft bylaws only gave
the Moscow all-Union body the right to admit and expel members, rank-and-file
journalists argued that they were more qualified to handle admissions than senior officials
unfamiliar with the candidates. Many also argued that each newspaper or publication
should be a “primary organization” of the creative union, below the oblast’ or krai
chapter, to allow for more discussion of creative matters and greater local influence.142
Despite the wide variety of views on membership criteria, the diversity of comments
point to a coherent set of interests: all proposals for extra screening would have given
senior journalists more access to information about their potential colleagues, just as
appeals for more local initiative would have empowered organizations outside Moscow.
The issue of primary organizations would come up again at the inaugural congress, and
acquire new urgency in the creative union’s second decade, as we will see in chapter six.
•••
Despite the acknowledgement that the responsibility to join the new creative
union was not something every journalist embraced, one of the fundamental critiques of
the draft bylaws was its relative imprecision about eligibility requirements. The
supporters of an inclusive model stressed the value of diverse experiences—especially
140
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contributions from authors who had other work experience outside of the mass media.
Some commenters were quite insistent that membership need not be restricted to those
who held staff positions at a publication: “nonprofessional journalists can work for
publications…our organization is creative and to keep out our regularly contributing
authors is not necessary.”143 In Moscow oblast’ and elsewhere, there were several
proposals that asked the creative union to ensure that journalists who did not hold staff
positions were still treated fairly.144 Others wanted to open membership to “older,
experienced journalists who actively participate in the press, even if they do not currently
work in periodical press publications.” For these commenters, age and experience were
positive contributions rather than obstacles.145 Journalists who were freelance, or not on
staff, were in fact eligible for Journalists’ Union membership, though their applications
sometimes included phrasing that distinguished them as “regular” contributors.146 Other
members wanted to ensure that membership remained open to journalists who worked in
“party, soviet and social organizations, and also those engaged in academic and teaching
work, if these journalists have not ceased their creative activity and actively participate in
the work of newspapers, journals, radio and television, and if they have the
recommendation of a print publication and local organization of the Journalists’
Union.”147 The meaningful work of Soviet journalists could include a multitude of other
socially responsible forms of employment, as long as they were also accompanied by
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serious writing. 148 A similar proposal argued that journalists should not replicate the
exclusive membership practices of the Writers’ Union, claiming that the Journalists’
Union was supposed to be “a more mass organization. It would be appropriate if we
opened more widely, even now, the doors of our union to workers’ correspondents, who
have an inclination toward our work and to those have barely been professional
journalists for five minutes. This will be the right thing. Then we’ll have the opportunity
to cultivate cadres.”149 The relationship between journalism and literature—and the way
this relationship reflected social status—was a frequent discussion topic in the
Journalists’ Union. This proposal was unique in its attitude to the Writers’ Union—as my
discussion of material privilege will show, most journalists envied, rather than
disparaged, the greater social prestige attached to belles-lettres. The positive attitude
toward the legacies of journalism during industrialization was more common. This
explicit proposal about the “cultivation of cadres” suggests that at least some proponents
of the inclusive model saw the Journalists’ Union as an opportunity to open the
profession to the less skilled.
A particularly spirited defense of the inclusive policy appears in the draft speech
from Leningrad. Some journalists supposedly asked whether the creative union should
take “only leading journalists, to propose to the rest that they improve their
performance?” In response, journalists were reminded that the organization was “a mass
organization…We need journalists of different quality and different genres… there is no
doubt that in embrace of the Union the creative growth of these people will be faster than
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before.” Paradoxically, the solution for those who were skeptical about the Union’s
suitability for the journalistic “masses” was membership, not exclusion.150
The new creative union also confronted one of the legacies of “mass
journalism”—the use of workers’ and peasants’ correspondents—that is, factory workers
and peasants who wrote for newspapers and reported on the progress of particular
campaigns or conditions in their workplace.151 In the draft bylaws, they were not listed as
one of the groups eligible for membership—an omission the Orgburo would directly
address. The official journal for these contributors, The Worker-Peasant Correspondent,
published a long letter on the subject, which was discussed in an Orgburo meeting in
April of 1958. The author, an M. Mamontov of Moscow, argued that the early view of the
organization as limited to “professional journalists…is obviously incorrect.” Instead, the
new creative union should have been open to those who “had not broken ties with their
main profession—workers, collective farmers, engineers, doctors, economists and the
like, who for a period of years systematically write articles about their specialty in
institutional journals…in both form and content their work is often on a higher level than
articles of some professional journalists.” If this vision for the organization were not
followed, it would become a “narrow caste of professionals.” The solution was to accept
all those who “systematically publish original work…regardless of where they work.”
Confronting this particular legacy of “mass journalism” put questions of exclusivity and
elite status in particularly stark terms. Mamontov’s claim that the “nonprofessionals”
could produce better work is not unexpected, given the veneration of ties to the “masses”
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in Soviet culture and the privileging of workers. In this more inclusive vision,
nonprofessionals still had skills the Union could help them develop, and professionals
could in turn be helped by those who were their equals in union membership but not
actually employed as full-time members of their profession.152 Similar proposals were
filed in comments to the draft bylaws.153 The traditions of mass journalism decisively
shaped the Journalists’ Union’s ultimate form, as the Orgburo ultimately decided to
accept applications from those who “actively and continually for a number of years
continue to produce qualified articles and feature stories in newspapers, journals and on
the radio,” regardless of their employment status.154 The importance of connections to the
“masses”—one of the main and enduring legacies of Stalinist journalism—complicated
the professionalization project: in the Soviet context, to be a “professional” journalist
could not be separated entirely from questions of class and support for workers.155 Rankand-file calls for an inclusive organization were more successful than the arguments for
material support and social status—though both issues would remain subjects of debate
into the 1960s
•••
Though much of the bylaws commentary was devoted to questions of creative
output and employment status, other commenters were concerned with the personal
qualities that their profession demanded. This emphasis on morals and ethics fits with the
overall interest in morality and interior life that was characteristic of Khrushchev-era
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social policy.156 Several commenters argued that the “journalist should be a person of
high moral character” or “a model of conduct and moral relationships” and generally “be
brave, principled and conscientious in fulfilling their duties.” The responsibility to
ensure that workers, worker and peasant correspondents, and young journalists had the
proper ideological “upbringing” was a common theme.157 One commenter also protested
readings of the document that put other concerns ahead of the ethical dimension: “as the
bylaws are written, if you don’t pay your dues, you’re expelled. But if you behave
outrageously and act up, or get drunk, but pay your dues, you could stay in. This is
unfair.”158 The concern with justice and higher principles than mere money is not
unexpected in a society that denigrated materialism and excess, at least in public.
As the last comment suggests, questions of ethics and moral responsibility were
often considered during discussions of the grounds for expulsion from the creative union.
Being convicted for an “anti-social crime not befitting the calling of a Soviet journalist”
was the only reference to morality and expulsion in the draft bylaws. These kinds of
crimes could be wide-ranging, with unstable parameters, particularly if they fell under
statutes against hooliganism or other matters relating to leisure and private life.159 Several
journalists did call for a more professionally specific set of criteria. In one participant’s
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words, “The formulation ‘crimes of an anti-social character’ should be expanded, after all
we have our own particular crimes, plagiarism, for example. It should be written down
that plagiarism in any form is punished in only one way: expulsion from the Union.” In
addition to plagiarism, others wanted the list expanded to include “slander, libel, and
distortion of facts.”160 A proposal from Moscow oblast’ argued that the Union should
have the right to disqualify journalists from membership for “serious violations of
professional ethics.”161 As early as 1958, the Orgburo did expel journalists convicted of
plagiarism, and warned others who failed to properly cite material.162 Even proposals that
called for expansive and wide-ranging understandings of journalists’ responsibility relied
on moral justifications, such as one from Latvia that essentially set up journalists as
privileged investigators of crime and illegality. In the proposed addition, journalists
would “have the right to conduct investigations and verifications of cases of socialist
morality and persons living beyond their means, provided those persons had not yet been
sentenced, and in consultation with the proper authorities, including the police, the Party,
and the prosecutors’ office, with the exception of cases where the accused belonged to
one of these organizations.” Apparently, this proposal would “immeasurably raise the
role of journalists and the press overall, but such rights would only be given to
completely morally upright journalists, non-drinkers and the generally morally
worthy.”163
The interest in more specific criteria for expulsion, including plagiarism, slander,
and other offenses against facticity was specifically mentioned at the Journalists’ Union’s
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first all-USSR Congress, suggesting that even the senior Orgburo members recognized
the importance of a professional code of conduct.164 The Krasnoiarsk branch of the
Journalists’ Union was interested in more information about expulsion cases as well,
though with a greater emphasis on rehabilitation and clarification of procedure than
punishment:
It would be good to point out, at least briefly, what kinds of measures of
discipline exist for union members who have committed some sort of
crime. As written it turns out that a journalist can be expelled from the
Union without any kind of prior measures being taken, such as discussion
at a meeting, warnings, remarks and the like. It’s obviously necessary also,
to show whether the Presidium’s decision is final or whether the expelled
member can appeal to a higher body.165
A similar proposal from Novosibirsk said that having only a single form of punishment
was: “inappropriate. We need other measures of rehabilitation, such as censure or
warnings about expulsion from the union.”166 This vision of the organization suggested
that its disciplinary mechanisms needed to have clearer stages—this language and
procedure also closely mirrored the Party’s practices, and those in place in newspaper
editorial boards, demonstrating that Union members brought their prior institutional
experiences into the new organization.167
The criteria for membership and exclusion that rank-and-file journalists offered
left the role of the Party and socialist ideology unquestioned and, in some cases,
expanded upon it. Though the new creative Union rested on an ideological foundation,
fidelity to Marxism-Leninism was not the only measure for success or failure. This is not
164
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to say that terms like “slander” were not mobilized in ideological ways, especially during
literary controversies.168 The range of comments above indicates that professional and
ideological values overlapped but were not equivalent.
•••
The final version of the bylaws closely resembled the original draft, though with
some important fine-tuning of ideological language, organizational goals, and
membership requirements. In the opening section on the organization’s objectives, the
new document explicitly mentioned journalists who worked in television as potential
members, and specifically mentioned the creative union’s goal to “actively participate in
the education and re-education of journalism cadres,” which would be a significant
priority beginning in 1962. The concerns about moral and ethical conduct raised in the
bylaws debate also appeared in the new document, as the creative union pledged to
concern itself with “ethical violations…incorrect and careless use of facts,” and their
mistaken interpretation. At the same time, the new document was more explicitly
political as well as professional—the creative union was also dedicated to “struggle
against bourgeois ideology and revisionism,” language which highlights both Cold War
tensions and Khrushchev’s criticisms of his former allies. The organization’s obligations
to workers’ and peasants’ correspondents were now more specific, as the creative union
would “assist party organizations in arranging education for workers’ and peasants’
correspondents,” and maintain its ongoing commitment to letters from workers.169 The
cultural diplomacy responsibilities remained largely unaltered, though the final bylaws
168
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made more specific mention of the creative union’s relationship to the MOJ and its role
as the representative of Soviet journalists to that body, and highlighted the importance of
fostering exchange with journalists from socialist countries.170
Though the section on membership would remain a subject of debate at the
inaugural congress and in subsequent years, the final version of the document did clarify
some of the requirements. Similarly, the section on rights and responsibilities, while less
comprehensive than bylaws participants hoped, decisively established the creative
union’s material and cultural obligations to its members. Membership was explicitly open
to any journalist “consistently contributing” to the mass media, provided the individual in
question also possessed “a mastery of journalistics.” The reference to work of
“independent significance” was removed and replaced with the statement that a
prospective member had to present “published work.” Local bodies now had explicit
discretion over membership decisions and expulsions, though expulsions had to be
ratified by the all-Union governing board. Members of the creative union now had the
explicit right to comment on the creative union’s activities with an eye to improving
them—this would become a central feature of the organization’s plenums, as we will see
in chapters five and six.
As part of the creative union’s joint responsibility with the trade unions, members
could expect “constant help” from the creative union as they carried out their work, and
all of the “cultural and material-quotidian” services the organization had available. The
description here is in some contrast to the expansive hopes for material gain expressed
during the bylaws debate. Indeed, the reference to what the creative union had at its
170
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disposal highlights an important problem: in the absence of Zhurfond, what the creative
union had available rarely satisfied rank-and-file members, as we will see later.171 The
creative union’s organizational structure also corresponded closely to that in the draft
bylaws, merely clarifying the procedures for the creation of local organizations and the
convocation of conferences. These clauses also confirmed the practice of electing a
“designated representative” to oblast’ or republic level bodies from each publication or
news agency, rather than establishing “primary organizations” made up of all journalists
working in a particular place.172 This policy, like the final formulation on material
benefits, went against the wishes of many participants in the bylaws debate. Both issues
would be revisited in various forums in the decade to come, pointing to the continuous
nature of the creative union’s effort to represent and support professional journalists.
The establishment of a creative union for journalists under Khrushchev initially
grew out of the new institutional needs that accompanied superpower status: a
Journalists’ Union would strengthen the Soviet Union’s ability to influence foreign
journalists, especially through the MOJ. Since it was founded on a dual mandate of
cultural diplomacy and domestic professional development, the new creative union
provided an unprecedented opportunity for journalists to think critically about their goals
and needs: while the initial proposals came from media elites in the Orgburo, debates
about the bylaws were ultimately a more “Soviet” process, with journalists from all over
the country offering opinions about what the new creative union should be. This process,
which did not occur with the formation of the other creative unions, provides a unique
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opportunity to study not only the self-conception of journalists but also their views of
Soviet society and social hierarchies.
The contours of the bylaws debate, with their contested and multifaceted nature,
offer productive insights into the Soviet vision of professionalization in the Khrushchev
era. Journalists at all levels believed strongly in the social significance of their work—
and that an appropriate relationship to facts and writing were the cornerstones of their
profession, which should structure both standards for entry and grounds for expulsion.
The volume and variety of revisions to the draft bylaws reinforce the consultative aspect
of journalistic professionalization, in contrast to that of other fields. More importantly,
rank-and-file journalists were clearly willing and able to offer their own visions of the
social and material security that was their due—to be a Soviet professional was to
embrace a commitment to reflection and work toward higher ideals, as the use of moral
language in discussions of membership status demonstrates. At the same time,
professionalization had a distinctly practical dimension: participants expected material
privileges and advantages as recognition for their mental labor. They also hoped that
these advantages would reduce the perceived inequalities between creative professionals,
especially the high stature of writers. The scope of these desires demonstrates that
journalists shared in the spirit of optimism that gripped the Soviet intelligentsia in the
1950s and 1960s.
The contours of the bylaws debate offer a working definition of Soviet creative
professionalism. Written output and moral character were essential to journalistic success
and should serve as standards for entry into the creative union. Participants’ specific
mention of slander and libel demonstrate that journalists had a strong sense of
84

professional ethics apart from ideology. The insistence on moral character as a
membership criterion demonstrates the importance of public mission to journalists’
professional identity—these issues would become prominent themes of creative union
work in later years. Additionally, bylaws debate participants accepted that creative
organizations would provide material benefits and offer opportunities for professional
advancement, such as education and training. The main disagreements concerned the
extent of a creative union’s material obligations, and how strict membership standards
should be. Supporters of Zhurfond and those who frequently referenced the Writers’
Union essentially argued that professional status imposed as many obligations on the
creative union as it did on members. In expanding material benefits, education, and
travel, the creative union would enable members to improve themselves and their quality
of life. Those who concentrated on exclusive membership policies felt that creative union
membership should recognize achievements rather than potential, and that the creative
union should be closed to freelance journalists, worker and peasant correspondents, or
any individual who lacked writerly skill. The victorious proponents of an inclusive
model, like the supporters of Zhurfond, envisioned the creative union as a resource for
the talented few.
The all-USSR Journalists’ Congress, held in November of 1959, was the official
and public conclusion to the Orgburo’s work, including ratification of the bylaws.
Though it formally concluded the bylaws debate, the congress—discussed in chapter
three—showcased unresolved tensions about journalists’ responsibilities and the creative
union’s purpose which remained prominent in later years. The creative union’s
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formation period, then, is crucial to understanding journalists as social and political
actors.

86

Chapter 2
Reporting De-Stalinization: 1956 and Newsroom Values at Komsomol’skaia pravda

While the Journalists’ Union was an important site for debates and discussions
about the meaning of professional identity, especially during its incubation period, a full
portrait of journalists’ institutional lives also requires extensive study of their workplaces.
In this chapter, I focus on the staff members of Komsomol’skaia pravda, the official
organ of the Communist Youth League or Komsomol (hereafter KP, as in previous
chapters). KP had an audience in the millions and aimed much of its coverage at
younger readers.173 Several journalists who were active in the creative union had lengthy
careers there, including Aleksei Adzhubei, Iurii Voronov, Dmitri Goriunov, and Boris
Pankin. Goriunov was editor-in-chief from 1950 to 1957 and replaced by Adzhubei in the
summer of that year. When Adzhubei was appointed editor-in-chief of Izvestiia,
Voronov, who had been a senior editor for some years, was appointed editor-in-chief, a
position he held until the summer of 1965. Many former KP staff have written at length
about the unique work environment and their efforts to innovate under various editors.
The paper had a complex institutional position, since it was supervised closely by the
Komsomol Central Committee as well as the Communist Party’s Central Committee. In
this chapter, I refer either to the Komsomol Central Committee or the Russian acronym,
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TsKVLKSM, to prevent confusion with the Party apparatus.174 KP editorial meetings, or
letuchki—I employ this term or the singular letuchka throughout the dissertation—are an
invaluable source base. These gatherings offer a clearer window into the challenges
journalists confronted after Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s personality cult at the
CPSU’s Twentieth Congress in February 1956, an event known as the Secret Speech,
though it soon became well known both globally and domestically.175
Historians have recently devoted more attention to the ways in which different
social groups confronted de-Stalinization, and my case study points to journalists’ active
participation in the reform project, especially during Party and editorial board debates.
Khrushchev’s denunciation of the personality cult presented interpretive challenges for
historians, and efforts to criticize Stalin’s wartime mistakes were particularly
controversial. Stephen Bittner’s overview of cultural life in the Arbat has demonstrated
that debates about reform often reflected generational divides, which only deepened when
it became clear that the scope of the reform agenda was rarely clear-cut, a diversity of
opinion which also features in Vladislav Zubok’s wide-ranging study of the intelligentsia
after Stalin. Uncertainty and debates about reform were not exclusive to intellectuals—
rather, ordinary citizens expressed confusion about amnesty and broader questions of
culpability.176 Though previous studies of journalism have pointed to new opportunities
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for media elites as the Party actively sought journalists’ help in shaping the “new socialist
person,” my work points as much to conflict and uncertainty as increased harmony. The
political importance of media work allowed journalists like Aleksei Adzhubei to rise to
prominence, but these responsibilities also created opportunities for friction.177
My work demonstrates the importance of 1956 as an interpretive crisis for
journalists’ professional values, as they responded to domestic upheaval after the Secret
Speech and foreign policy crises in Eastern Europe. While most KP staff felt a special
responsibility to influence public culture, they heatedly debated the extent of their
authority when criticism caused conflict with political officials. Journalists, for all of their
proximity to the Party (and in KP’s case, the Komsomol), confronted many of the same
issues as other members of the creative intelligentsia, since they had to both interpret and
transmit policy at contentious moments. While the creative union was part of a national
conversation about professional rights and responsibilities, its proximity to the Central
Committee and long incubation period meant that many of the more intense debates
about social reform took place in newspapers. In this chapter, as in the larger dissertation,
I have adopted some approaches common to other journalism histories: the selection of a
thematic period, choosing a specific organization to focus on, and tracing political change
through print culture and professional development.178
KP journalists had complex institutional lives and accrued material benefits from
their work: they enjoyed relatively high salaries and other advantages vis-à-vis ordinary
citizens, such as access to housing and consumer goods as well as influence with
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officials. Many journalists managed to publish critical or theoretical works in the field,
which served as a supplemental income source.179 The other key aspect of journalism as a
profession, familiar from chapters one and two, is the importance of specialized and
recognized expertise, which allows the group in question to set standards for entry and
determine success and failure. For KP journalists, letuchki were a critical forum for
discussing these kinds of professional issues. Held weekly, they were often devoted to
specific content, though discussions often included evaluation of entire departments and
assessments of recent trends. Though senior editors could use the meetings to discuss
new policy directions, the staff member who acted as “weekly critic” (dezhurnyi kritik)
often did the most to set the tone, tying the most recent coverage to the paper’s political
and creative goals.180 In these records and others I employ in this chapter, journalists are
usually identified with first name only and not by the department in which they worked—
where this information is available, I have supplied first names and specific positions.181
To properly theorize this chapter, I draw extensively from the work of other
journalism scholars, and from Barbie Zelizer’s incisive critical summary of academic
approaches to the field. In focusing on the letuchki, I draw on the long-established
sociological practice of the newsroom ethnography. Much of this literature, in Barbie
Zelizer’s words, examines how journalists “decided what was newsworthy, how, and
why,” and I follow KP journalists’ efforts to respond to the first year of de-Stalinization.
These sociological approaches make journalism less mysterious by assuming that it was
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produced by individuals pursuing particular objectives and needs. There are key priorities
that drive an event becoming news—such as its relationship to elite individuals and
nations. As they craft news stories, journalists are driven by “news values”—in the case
of Americans, a commitment to monitoring the health of democracy or taking an interest
in “responsible capitalism.” While American “news values” were essentially liberal and
capitalist, KP’s newsroom was focused on socialist progress. At the same time, Zelizer’s
characterization of cultural studies describes much of my own approach and the concerns
of my protagonists. KP journalists functioned “not only as conveyors of information but
also as producers of culture, who impart preference statements about what is good and
bad, moral and amoral, and appropriate and inappropriate in the world.” Even when
Soviet journalists made direct “preference statements” about an article or event, they
revealed their assumptions about the nature of the press and Soviet society. KP journalists
felt a strong responsibility to engage and inform young readers, or to criticize social ills,
which became particularly challenging during periods of political tension.182
Any serious attempt to analyze debate and dissent in a Soviet context must
address the persistent historiographical questions about the nature of autonomy within
state socialism—a comparative frame which expands the case study’s stakes and
necessitates comparisons to other fields, including Soviet science. The search for agency
and embryonic civil society has taken Soviet historians in a variety of directions,
including the nature protection movement, which retained some authority even under
182
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Stalin. As is now known, environmental experts were able to use their scientific expertise
to defend their own interests, even in periods of profound political upheaval. These
scientists, like composers, were more protected from official scrutiny due to the technical
expertise their fields required.183 While journalists were less shielded from oversight,
letuchki were an officially sanctioned site of sociability and debate.
Though journalists often expressed a sense of inferiority toward writers,
examining the letuchki as a space for sociability points to another distinction between
journalism and literary activity. When Solzhenitsyn or Pasternak undertook controversial
literary interventions, they did so as “lone individuals.” KP journalists debated the merits
of controversial articles with relative openness, and took diverse positions on social
problems. The paper’s official overseers might have preferred that it serve as one of its
“naked transmission belts of regime values,” following Douglas Weiner’s
characterization of the totalitarian ideal of social activity. Instead, journalists used the
letuchki to make their own value statements, though such efforts were seldom without
consequences. When KP journalists stressed their role as investigators and the importance
of “bravery” in the face of social ills, conflict with authority increased.184 There was one
setting where journalists were more likely to recapitulate Party policy than to debate the
nuances of genre politics or audience needs—the meetings of the newspaper’s
Communist Party group. Though these meetings were not entirely free of debate,
especially at heated moments in the de-Stalinization process, they were somewhat less
contentious than the letuchki. The diversity of journalists’ institutional lives, like other
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aspects of post-Stalin society, cannot be adequately described using the traditional
distinction between “dissent” or “the state.” Both Party meetings and letuchki were statesanctioned gatherings, but in the latter setting, journalists more freely aired their own
anxieties and uncertainties about policy.185
•••
In this chapter, I discuss two major events in 1956 and their repercussions for
journalists: Khrushchev’s denunciation of the personality cult in February of 1956, and
the uprisings in Hungary and Poland eight months later. At both points, journalists were
responsible for presenting ideological issues to the public and negotiating a broader crisis
of authority—one in which reading practices and the veracity and accessibility of
information were of critical importance.
Efforts to explain the Secret Speech to various members of the public included
frank discussions of journalism and newspapers and their perceived failings under Stalin.
One of the better-known Party activists tasked with such explanations was the historian
Anna Pankratova, a longtime Party member who came back into political favor after
Stalin’s death. Pankratova gave a series of talks explaining Khrushchev’s speech and its
implications for Soviet history. She prepared a detailed report for the Central Committee,
and these records provide key insight into “the dilemmas of de-Stalinization.”
Pankratova’s audience was especially concerned with making sense of the recent past and
assigning responsibility for recent excesses.186 As the full report has been analyzed in
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other works, I present only the most pertinent comments here. Pankratova was asked to
clarify a recent statement in Pravda that “our successes produced the cult of personality.”
Others complained about press coverage of agriculture, or a lack of information about
meat and bread prices for propagandists. One questioner even linked Stalinist excess to
the hierarchical nature of the Soviet press, asking, “How to liquidate the cult of
newspapers, especially Pravda and Izvestiia, which, although they present things
incorrectly (vystupiat nepravil’no), you don’t prove it, they don’t correct themselves.”187
For part of Pankratova’s audience, the Soviet mass media was in some way responsible
for the recent ideological errors and broader social ills of Stalinism.
At the first KP letuchka after Khrushchev’s speech, on March 5, traveling
correspondent Solomon Garbuzov celebrated the new possibilities the new policies
offered: “for us, workers on the ideological front, the Party congress is an event of the
very greatest significance. We must reexamine a great deal and re-evaluate many values,
reject many beliefs and customary forms, and find new ones.”188 Garbuzov embraced the
Twentieth Congress as an opportunity which intensified professional responsibilities.
Soviet society was a dynamic organism refreshed and energized by the new policies. KP
journalists had to balance their support for positive renewal of Soviet traditions with their
interest in a reform agenda. Garbuzov hoped the newspaper could become more
“critical…I am not afraid of this word. We should show more of the difficulties which
people undergo…what impedes fulfilling the five year plan, and not limit ourselves to
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victorious reports.”189 His connection between criticism and courage would become a
central theme for KP journalists in the coming months. This nervousness was partly
founded in the reactions of KP’s target audience: some young people, particularly
students or the intelligentsia, displayed “unbelievable skepticism…which is starting to
corrode young souls.” The solution to this was an emphasis on heroism and romance
(romantika) attached to daily accomplishments. Recent coverage of the Virgin Lands was
lacking in this area: while it “would have been interesting” in the past, it was no longer
sufficient after the Twentieth Congress because “it should be directed at the future, at
tomorrow, better depicting the heroic feats of youth, about which Khrushchev spoke with
gratitude at the Party Congress.”190 The problem of convincing and inspiring
disenchanted youth clearly had particular resonance for KP journalists. Young people’s
varying responses to the possibilities and limits of reform is a well-studied aspect of the
period.191 What is striking here is the image of the young reader as suffering from a kind
of spiritual crisis, and journalists’ unique responsibility to combat it.
Other discussions of reader relationships concerned the Secret Speech itself,
demonstrating as much anxiety about the new policies as confidence in reform. At the
March 5 editorial meeting, a worker in the letters department named Babanov described a
recent set of correspondence containing questions about the Twentieth Congress. In the
letter, the reader pointed out the omnipresent discussion of personality cults in the mass
media, including Pravda’s recent editorial about the dangers of personality cults to the
ideological integrity of Marxism-Leninism. In discussions with colleagues, the letter
189
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writer struggled to satisfactorily define the phenomenon. Diverse definitions tended to
arise in conversations about the topic, as one person said, “bosses, who conduct
themselves arrogantly in society, that’s a personality cult. A known person comes, that is,
a boss, and he never says hello, and absolutely, people, who want to show themselves
better and more cultured than everyone else.” The reader then asked KP to address the
problem in more depth. Other readers provided examples from books where Stalin
himself spoke against personality cults, while permitting his own public adulation.
Despite Marx, Engels, and Lenin having clear opinions about the problem, “for some
reason there is silence about them.” This reader was particularly concerned with
Politburo member Anastas Mikoian’s speech promising fidelity to Lenin, when Stalin
himself had made a similar promise in 1924.192
Babanov’s readers cited Pravda rather than KP, as the paper had confined itself to
reprinting Pravda material on personality cults rather than producing original material.193
The sense of confusion here is palpable: on the one hand, readers could conflate mere
rudeness with the worst of Stalinist excess. On the other, they were well aware of the
former importance of the Stalin cult and could express skepticism about a reform project
directed by Stalin’s close associates, who had not properly explained the roots of past
failures. Journalists had a direct responsibility to enlighten, and readers could, and did,
cite the press as justification for their own confusion. In his detailed Begriffsgeschichte,
D. M. Fel’dman explains that G. M. Malenkov was the first major political figure to use
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the term “personality cult” after Stalin’s death, seeking a term that unambiguously
referred to Stalin’s self-aggrandizement but did not name him.194
At a March 26 letuchka, Peter Bondarenko, the paper’s correspondent in
Voronezh oblast’, described his own experience with reactions to the speech: “Now,
when you go through the raions, the collective farms, and to institutions, there are a great
may different conversations about the recent speech…a great many rumors, people
understand these things differently.” While most people correctly apprehended the
speech’s meaning, there were still “demagogues” who declared, “а foreman is also a
person”—interpreting the policy as a challenge to all concentrated authority rather than
just Stalin’s. These mistakes were caused when, after the speech was read, the agitators
responsible did not “explain to people that they are wrong.”195 Journalists struggled to
control reactions to the new policies and ensure they were expressed in ideologically
appropriate ways. The questioning of dictatorial rule could threaten social stability, and
authority figures—journalists included—had a responsibility to limit the possible
meanings of the new policies, rather than allow them to multiply. On the whole,
Bondarenko viewed the shift as full of potential for journalists, as Khrushchev’s policies
had increased popular intolerance for dishonest bureaucrats, which might inspire his
colleagues to “develop the struggle with such people…to examine more harshly and more
bravely, despite rank and position.”196 The renewal of critical capacity was celebrated as
an unqualified good, despite his earlier reservations about the presence of “demagogues.”
Despite these calls for a substantive intervention in the debate about the meaning of the
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personality cult, KP’s main publication on the matter was its earlier reprint of Pravda’s
editorial.
•••
A newspaper case study allows for examination of journalists both as editorial
board members and as members of the Communist Party. Where the March 5 letuchka—
and those after it—featured some open acknowledgement of de-Stalinization’s
challenges, the Party meetings were somewhat more formulaic and concentrated on
journalists’ responsibilities to improve themselves in response to the new policies. On
March 14, 1956, the Party meeting was dedicated to the “results of the Twentieth Party
Congress and the objectives of the editorial board’s Communists.” While Goriunov’s
speech was not preserved, the responses to his remarks remain on record. Sergei
Gus’kov, a member of the paper’s Komsomol department, openly denounced Stalinist
journalism: he called the personality cult a “restraining phenomenon” which had
particularly deleterious effects on the press. Under Stalin, newspapers were “put out for
the leadership, for a narrow circle of persons, maybe even for one person.” But not all of
the past was suspect: Solomon Garbuzov defended the ongoing relevance of KP’s work
from the 1920s and early 1930s. This description of newspapers as rhetorically devoted to
the masses but actually directed at the leadership is reminiscent of Matthew Lenoe’s
conclusions about the impact of limited paper supply on Stalinist newspapers,
specifically, that journalists communicated more with managerial elites more than the
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wider public.197 At the same time, Gus’kov was free to criticize Stalin’s personal
influence on newspaper content.
The paper’s mission to reach youth was a major discussion topic during the rest of
the March 14 meeting, along with the volume and type of reader correspondence.
Gus’kov advocated an expanded effort to engage youth in “active struggle.” Coverage of
construction projects was lacking, as was a strong defense of young people’s rights; a
large volume of the paper’s correspondence concerned employment or improper
dismissal from jobs. Letters themselves took up over half the workday of more qualified
staff members, which left little time to consider new content.198The problem of high
correspondence volume and its effects on work quality would become a key theme at
Journalists’ Union seminars. In a related comment, editorial board member Grigorii
Osheverov was unsatisfied with the number of published letters, especially since many of
them touched on problems of “violations of revolutionary legality.” The newspaper
needed to be more “collectivist” as well as “democratic.” The latter goal would be
accomplished through readers’ conferences.199 Gus’kov was particularly concerned with
an increase in youth misbehavior in some areas of Moscow and growing reader concerns
with cases of “economic mismanagement.”200 What is particularly striking here is the
limited attention to Stalinist excess or the complexities of the recent past—after a formal
denunciation of the personality cult, Gus’kov could return to broader social objectives.
The cultivation of reader relationships would allow journalists to continue their struggle
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against social ills. While this investigative role would become controversial later in the
year, at this point, it was presented as an unqualified good.
Some remarks at the March 14 meeting were more inflammatory: Valentin Kitain,
of the information department, complained that a recent letter on youth issues in the
Komsomol Central Committee had been “closed”—rather than available for publication
or wide distribution—which “impeded the conduct of a struggle with hooliganism,
openly and loudly.” Problems of censorship were clearly viewed as an impediment to
journalism’s didactic mission, a theme which I will revisit in chapter five.201 Aleksei
Adzhubei, then an assistant editor, was concerned with KP’s “pettiness of material.” In
his view, not all of the newspapers’ weaknesses could be blamed on Stalin and his
personality cult, and the newspaper should concentrate on increasing its “collectivism in
work on material…and general interest.”202 Adzhubei is often closely identified with the
renewal of journalism after 1953, though his statements here were formulaic and general
rather than radical prescriptions for improvement.
Ekaterina Shatskaia, who worked in the department of students and young
pioneers, was concerned with the quality of Party work itself, arguing for reform on the
micro-level to accompany the recent national changes. Most disturbingly, Party work
lacked authenticity: “We still do not speak openly about what worries us, we speak about
this not at party meetings, but in the corridors. But now the time has come for brave
utterances, we need not be afraid to criticize.”203 Shatskaia clearly believed in the
importance of collegiality and sociability, but Party meetings were somehow devoid of
201
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substance compared to less official interactions. The limited value of such official events
to individuals’ social lives is familiar from memoir literature and interviews about the
late Soviet experience. Anthropologist Aleksei Yurchak describes how ideology became
increasingly “performative” rather than “constative,” after Stalin’s death, though most of
his research subjects grew up in the 1970s rather than in the early years of deStalinization. In practice, merely referring to ideological work could serve as cover for
less orthodox pursuits, and people increasingly felt that their authentic lives were outside
of official spaces. In one example, students routinely skipped class by claiming
Komsomol responsibilities.204 While it would be ahistorical to extend Yurchak’s
framework into the late 1950s, his discourse analysis does provide a useful way of
comparing Party meetings to letuchki: Party meetings were more about performance of
ideological doctrine, while letuchki provided spaces for journalists to openly discuss the
ways in which their official lexicon was in flux after the Twentieth Congress. Goriunov
advocated greater “openness” in his concluding remarks at the March 14th meeting, which
he believed would improve both Party work and newspaper content.205 This lent official
credibility to Shatskaia’s hopes for a rejuvenated critical atmosphere, though the value of
such open discussion would become a subject of heated debate later in the year.
After the final remarks, members of the Party group voted on a formal resolution
responding to the Twentieth Congress. In this resolution, ideology and professional skill
were directly linked: “it is the obligation of every communist to perfectly know his work,
to deeply study the questions which he puts on the pages of the newspaper, to raise his
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professional mastery.” The presence of a study group and “creative meetings” indicated
some progress, though the events were infrequent. Members were exhorted to conduct
more intensive study of foreign languages and camera work—attendance and preparation
for such classes was poor. The Party group should pay more attention to the leisure and
everyday life of its members.206 The decisions were almost entirely affirmative:
approving the change in Party policy and making notes about the necessary changes to
content. The use of “professional mastery” proves that this term appeared in a variety of
contexts when journalists spoke about their obligations and practices. Many of these
prescriptions for improvement, especially leisure, language training, and formal study of
professional practice, would become central to the creative union’s domestic mandate in
later years, as I will show in chapter five. Their importance at KP as early as 1956
demonstrates that journalists’ workplaces generated practices and professional values
which later became part of the bylaws debate.
•••
In the weeks and months after the Twentieth Congress, KP journalists became
increasingly anxious that their coverage had become too negative, even as they continued
to celebrate the Party’s new direction. Most editorial board members agreed that
successful journalism work required an enduring commitment to facts, and stressed the
importance of truth telling to exposing and correcting social weaknesses. What was
unclear—and would remain so, until a definitive rebuke from the Komsomol at the end of
1956—was the precise balance between criticism and more affirmative coverage that
focused on social progress. The terms of debate reveal clear intersections between
206
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journalism and literature, particularly the dominant conventions of the socialist realist
novel—a return to genre conventions was often invoked as the solution to too much
negativity.
At a letuchka on March 19, Il’ia Shatunovskii, the paper’s well-known
feuilletonist, took a distinctly celebratory tone in his opening remarks on the Twentieth
Congress but expressed concern about the paper’s recent direction. He noted all of the
“great changes” in the newspaper, which he attributed to the Twentieth Congress and its
new policy directions, which restored Leninism and recognized the “collective wisdom”
of the Party and the Soviet people. Aside from this formulaic celebration of doctrine and
the relationship between the Party and the masses, Shatunovskii further commented on
the professional implications of policy: “the role of our newspaper, as a collective organ,
where thousands and thousands of people can heatedly discuss various question, draw
conclusions, exchange opinions….in struggling to bring the decisions of the party
congress to life, we should not allow even the smallest falsehood, to instill in youth a
spirit of truth.” To do this, Shatunovskii argued, was to “teach youth, and all our readers,
to critically think about a phenomenon, to themselves arrive at the correct and important
thoughts and conclusions.”207 Shatunovskii invoked several popular discourses about
Soviet young people: their capacity to reason and their status as living symbols of
ideological growth. The needs of young people produced their own professional
responsibilities—an unwavering commitment to factual accuracy and unambiguous
analysis of social life. During the Hungarian crisis, his colleagues felt burdened by this
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responsibility, and would become particularly anxious about lasting consequences
stemming from failures to reach young audiences.208
Shatunovskii’s portrayal of the newspaper as a site for debate and critical thought
was particularly common in discussions of reader letters and management of reader
response, as we will see in chapter five. Though he applauded the “bravery” evident from
the growth of criticism, Shatunovskii claimed that Soviet journalists could not
responsibly “embellish” reality; rather, they should “keep in mind the great significance
of a positive example for our youths’ upbringing, for the formation of their
worldview.”209 The balance between the newspapers’ critical mission and mission of
didactic uplift would remain an issue in later years: KP journalists, particularly future
editor Iurii Voronov, expounded on this topic at creative union seminars. A more
successful article allowed the newspaper to continue to “discipline bureaucrats” and still
contained “the image of a person, who struggles for this. I repeat, we should craft our
critical materials on a high literary level…in articles of a critical type we do not pay
attention to form.” He did approve of the paper’s recent focus on questions of youth
leisure.210
Shatunovskii was not known as a champion of the changes in journalism under
Khrushchev—other colleagues painted him as unpleasantly ideologically rigid.211 Given
this fact, his support for disciplining bureaucrats demonstrates the extent to which
criticism was a new part of official policy, which some KP journalists would embrace
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with more enthusiasm than others. Shatunovskii’s concern for the proper language and
form in critical materials was not his only meditation on journalism’s “literary”
qualities—he lamented the absence of the “positive hero” from KP’s coverage. In doing
so, he evoked one of the socialist realist novel’s main conventions—production novels
depicted the development of such “positive heroes” as they struggled to complete a
particular task.212 In his view, the absence of such heroes made it difficult for youth to
know exactly whom they were to emulate. More recent rubrics, unlike past successes,
tended to describe “initiatives, more than people themselves.” Depictions of productive
innovation were successful, as far as they went, but did not depict “spiritual qualities.”
Shatunovskii presented the ocherk, sometimes translated as a feature story, as essential to
this project and criticized his colleagues in the editorial board for neglecting the genre,
including Adzhubei.213 Shatunovskii clearly regarded genre traditions as a stabilizing
influence for the paper’s target audience.
A TsKVLKSM report on newspaper work contains many of the same themes as
Shatunovskii’s address, though its imprecise dating makes it difficult to determine
whether Shatunovskii was echoing official Komsomol concerns or anticipating them.
Rather than reprinting the materials of other newspapers, the Komsomol leadership urged
KP to produce original material on the personality cult. It was more important than ever
for the newspaper to discuss problems of nationalism and “cosmopolitanism” as more
foreigners were entering the Soviet Union and Soviet citizens were traveling abroad.
This same report highlights the growing attachment to moral questions, and changing
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notions of Soviet personhood. While hard work was an essential Soviet value, qualities
like honesty, love for family, and respect for women and elders, among others, tended to
be depicted “shallowly” in newspapers. A focus on production plans obscured questions
about young people’s thoughts and feelings. Friendship among Komsomol members was
not depicted enough. Foreign influence was portrayed as a threat to Soviet identity, while
reference to “cosmopolitanism” evoked postwar Stalinist xenophobia, demonstrating the
clear limits of openness to the outside world.214 This report points to differing views on
foreign contact across Soviet organizations—while creative union members would be
expected to pursue cross-cultural contacts, their readers were considered more vulnerable.
Indeed, as I discuss in chapter four, cultural diplomacy was an anxious process even
when it involved professionals who were presumed to be reliable. Shatunovskii’s
assessment of genre, together with Komsomol policy, demonstrates a growing interest in
subjectivity: the production of evolved persons now mattered as much as factory output.
The development of the ocherk and the proper approach to moral and spiritual matters,
here closely identified with the Twentieth Congress, became an enduring theme of
creative union work, as I will discuss in chapter five.
Аt a letuchka on March 26, 1956, a staff member named Sechin discussed recent
examples of “positive heroes” in KP, which resulted in a lengthy conversation about
genre and the nature of successful stories. He praised a recent piece by ocherkist Elena
Rusa’kova as a meditation on heroism even if it purported to be a book review. The
article’s protagonist was particularly inspirational, and might become as important to
youth as Pavel Korchagin, the protagonist in the Socialist Realist classic, How the Steel
214
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Was Tempered. In short, the “review” was akin to an “excellent ocherk about the young
Soviet person.” Allan Starodub, a senior member of the information department, shared
this assessment, describing Rusakova’s particular success in her “direct address to a
young reader…to our young people.”215
Rusakova’s article, titled, “Sergei Chekmarev, a Person” appeared on March 24,
and described his poetry and diaries, previously published in the literary journal Novyi
Mir. The piece opened with a meditation on the difficulty of writing about a “beautiful
person,” particularly after his death. But though words might fail a reviewer, the work
itself made it so that you “feel a friend is standing next to you, who you have known and
who has been dear to you for a long time, and from whom you will never be parted.”
Rousakova encouraged the reader to imagine Sergei’s Moscow childhood: eating his
breakfast porridge, going to school with friends, and especially overjoyed at the chance to
take part in demonstrations—even enjoying lectures on international affairs. Though the
diary does not state this directly, the author imagined Sergei particularly stricken with
grief for Lenin, and finding his poetic calling precisely in response to this great national
tragedy.216
The young poet went on to study in a special course on cattle and meat raising but
was inspired by life itself for his subject matter—he studied hard and edited his student
newspaper. Еven unrequited love did not diminish his dedication to work, as he left his
sweetheart for a career helping collective farm workers with their cattle. On assignment,
he was tireless even in bad weather and dedicated to political work. He overcame small
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setbacks: when assigned to teach a course for local farmers, he at first resorted to
“trickery” and made sure a senior colleague took the hardest questions but soon grew
more confident. Though he strove for excellence, this was not out of “conceit,” which he
“detested,” and instead he acted out of obligation to others. Unsurprisingly, the local
villain, a kulak who had caused the death of one of his farm hands, was one of Sergei’s
adversaries. Sergei, despite being a Muscovite and more educated than most of those
around him, genuinely loved his life and his community and did not experience
“boredom” or think himself “above others,” and continued to write his poetry, though
such boredom or ennui was a common experience. While some young writers believed
working on a small circulation newspaper would hamper creativity, Sergei’s life showed
otherwise. It was not those with a “petty soul” who grew as artists, but those who
“participated in life, not as an observer, but directly in the moment.” They then acquired
the “creative tone that is called uniqueness.” Sergei’s tragic death in 1933—it is unclear
whether he suffered an accident or was murdered by an enemy—put an end to his
promising career, and Rusakova mourned the loss of such an exemplary Communist.217
It is not difficult to understand why Rusakova’s article received praise: she
described not only Sergei’s labors but also his “internal world.” The reader was openly
encouraged to identify with Sergei and imagine him as a participant in the reading
experience. Sergei was continually contrasted with those around him, whether those are
archetypes, like a young writer who does not labor as Sergei did, or the collective farmer
who does harm where he did good. Sergei overcame his own fears of teaching, and the
pain of unrequited love, to become an exemplary member of his community—small
217
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moments of personal growth likely meant to evoke the struggles of the “positive hero.”
Many of Sergei’s attributes—his humility, his love for labor and art in equal measure,
and his ability to put work ahead of a personal life—were the exact traits aspired to by
Stalin-era diarists who were inspired to “work on themselves” and embody the new
Soviet person. Sergei’s participation in mourning for Lenin and collectivization
effectively “wrote him in” to important periods of the revolutionary past, as a person with
deep connections to these significant traditions. Though diarists had done this for
themselves, attempting to give their identity documents greater historical depth,
Rusakova undertook this work for the dead Sergei.218 The young man was remarkable
less for his distinctiveness than his embodiment of the Soviet enlightenment project—the
search for inspirational examples of socialist personhood and social progress, a cultural
value first developed under Stalin, remained a key newsroom value in 1956.
Other authors did not make use of the same opportunities Rusakova had. At the
March 26 letuchka, Starodub pointed out KP had written only a typical response to a
recent film depicting a young hooligan’s struggles with the law and self-improvement,
and exhorted his colleagues to make more of an effort to review films, plays, and books,
and suggested soliciting reviews from readers. Traveling correspondent Vladimir
Chachin returned to the problem of the positive hero, noting, “the “hero of our times, of
1956, is not in the newspaper. Who should this hero be? First of all the working class, our
builders and our Komsomol leaders.” Chachin had investigated a recent incident in
Bratsk, a Siberian city, in which a Komsomol brigade leader had been murdered by
218
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hooligans, and he considered it a particularly suitable subject for a story.219 Starodub’s
arguments tied the issue of competitiveness to a broader set of journalistic values: KP’s
pursuit of its target audience and ability to write about topics they found relevant—in the
case of Ozerov’s film, KP had missed an opportunity to discuss a “newsworthy” cultural
event. At the same time, the references to literature reinforce the close association
between creative fields—many “production novels” featured the martyrdom or heroic
sacrifice of a hero to fulfill a central task, just as Chachin’s story did.220
•••
Unrest in Eastern Europe during the fall of 1956 was a major foreign policy
challenge for the Khrushchev regime, and KP journalists found themselves particularly
disoriented, not only due to the rapid political developments there but their lack of access
to reliable information. In late October 1956, inspired by the recent governmental change
in Poland, Hungarians advocated for the replacement of hardliner Erno Gero with the
moderate reformer Imre Nagy. The early Budapest demonstrations included open
gestures of defiance against Stalinism, including toppling of statues and demonstrations
in which protestors quickly took control. The Soviet leadership, specifically the members
of the Central Committee’s presidium, voted in favor of armed intervention. The entry of
Soviet troops into Hungary resulted in further deaths and an ongoing crisis. Khrushchev
was momentarily prepared to begin negotiations, but a major attack on Party headquarters
in Budapest contributed to a “crisis of confidence” and decision to end the rebellion
through force. William Taubman’s account emphasizes Khrushchev’s sleeplessness,
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anxiety, and repeated efforts to ask colleagues for advice. On November 5, 1956, Soviet
troops decisively ended the uprising, and more than twenty thousand Hungarians were
killed.221 Since Khrushchev himself vacillated as to his course of action, the tumult at the
November 5 letuchka is unsurprising. Though the initial conversations in the editorial
board focused on the Hungarian events, the unrest there served as a catalyst for
discussions of Soviet society’s response to the Twentieth Congress, the competitiveness
and timeliness of Soviet media, and the proper place of criticism. Just as the creative
union was formed in response to international needs and became a forum for larger
debates about professional rights and privileges, the Hungarian events forced KP
journalists to evaluate their response to domestic social questions.
Vassili Khomus’kov, a sports journalist, began his weekly review with a thorough
critique of the newspaper’s foreign affairs department. Though Hungarian events had
“begun to take up more space in the newspaper,” the coverage itself was “badly, if not to
say abominably, depicted. And I am not afraid to say that we have put Komsomol’skaia
pravda and its materials in an awkward position before readers…we have generated
doubts.” The papers had accurately described the initial tumult but informed readers
improvements were visible, which was an outright contradiction of Pravda’s description
“that the reckless scheme had not failed, but that events continued to develop.”222
Khomus’kov’s comments point to the informational hierarchy of media work: KP
journalists had made a serious error in contradicting the nation’s flagship publication. His
critiques were borne out by evidence: on October 27, the only pieces on Hungary were
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reprinted TASS reports announcing the defeat of “counterrevolutionary” forces.223 In an
impassioned appeal to audience needs, Khomus’kov stated, “it is easy to write empty
TASS-like informational pieces about events, worrying not only to youth but to our
whole people, but about such controversial events we do not have the right.” KP had
simply reprinted Pravda’s response to Polish events, which either demonstrated KP’s
incompetence in foreign affairs, or a need for the editors to ask TASS directly for better
material.224 Khomus’kov clearly considered his publication’s reliance on Pravda
embarrassing, and appealed to the paper’s authority figures to address imbalances. The
evocation of readers’ rights attests not only to the depth of professional obligation but
also the profound sense of failure.
KP’s network of subscribers was considered particularly vulnerable in light of the
increased propaganda pressures in the Cold War. Reminding his colleagues of KP’s
subscriber network of more than two million, Khomus’kov stated:
To consider the reader, his tastes, interests, ethical undertaking (zakonnie
stremleniia) is necessary…It’s impossible to devote only five lines to the
Hungarian events, when the situation is so fraught. Why can we not give a
correct evaluation of events with our conclusions? It is no secret that in the
editorial board people are asking each other, what’s going in Hungary?
What events are there? We tried to hush them. These kinds of errors are
dangerous. There, where our correct propaganda does not reach, there are
no empty places. In these places there is the kind of propaganda that is
extremely disadvantageous for us.225
Readers were now seen as complex beings, with triumphs beyond the realm of labor, but
while taking these subjective developments into account, KP journalists had to confront
an expanded media universe, in which their audience might turn to foreign sources if
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their own work was less than compelling. Journalists did not always have more
information than the public they sought to enlighten; Khomuskov’s disapproving tone
suggests that he viewed such hallway conversations as journalists indulging in rumor
rather than professional fact finding. Journalism’s preoccupation with facts and
conveying the “truth” was particularly challenging in a Soviet context, where information
was tightly controlled.
In his remarks at the November 5 letuchka, Allan Starodub was equally concerned
about foreign broadcasting, especially the Voice of America’s presence in Novosibirsk,
and the BBC’s “broadcasting so called ‘objective information.’” While some VOA
programming was crude, other pieces were “intelligent, and one needs to delve into them
deeply in order to refute them…why do we not speak out about the unmasking of these
programs Our people, especially young people, listen to them.”226 Starodub’s comments
present foreign media influence as a truly national problem for Soviet media managers,
since he presented evidence from outside the capital. His mocking of “objectivity” would
become an increasingly common critique of the media in Western democracies, as I
discuss in chapter four. Rostov correspondent Boris Ivanov, responding to Starodub, saw
a need for “wide-ranging…and reliable information” aimed at Soviet audiences, rather
than focusing exclusively on refuting foreign media.227 These exchanges further
demonstrate the domestic implications of international events: foreign media was
dangerous not only because it was ideologically false but also because it could undermine
public trust. The contrast between the anxieties here and those from the creative union’s
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Orgburo is particularly instructive: though all the members of the Orgburo were senior
journalists, what we might term media managers, their responsibilities did not involve
this kind of day-to-day debate about the meaning of events. As we will see in chapter
four, when the Journalists’ Union’s Orgburo responded to the Hungarian crisis, there was
no substantive mention of domestic news making. Instead, media elites concentrated
much more on the uprising’s implications for cultural diplomacy. At this early stage,
journalists’ efforts to grapple with the more serious complexities and tensions of the
Khrushchev era still took place in the newsroom rather than the creative union.
•••
The rest of Khomus’kov’s weekly review at the November 5 letuchka involved
another kind of authority crisis: the extent to which journalists could or should provide
negative information about Party and state officials. He was particularly concerned with
the article, “At Luzhniki Everything Ought to be Beautiful,” devoted to the problematic
conditions at Moscow’s Luzhniki sports stadium. The October 23 article described
Luzhniki as an important achievement and hopes for a future Olympics there. Though the
stadium was of an impressive size, the article’s authors sarcastically lamented the neglect
of “minor details” such as suitable tennis courts and football fields. In October, the
football field closely resembled a “marsh,” and it was doubtful a match between the FRG
and the Soviet Union could take place there: repairs had required six days of intense
work. Тhe problem was an overly “experimental” drainage design, chosen by the State
Committee for Physical Culture and Sport. Their chair, Romanov, had ignored a letter
about the unsuitable playing conditions at the stadium, and others simply claimed,
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“nothing terrible had happened,” which the authors characterized as “indifference to
athletes’ needs.”228
Khomus’kov stated, “I consider it my duty to inform the collective about the
events developing from the publication of this article, as they shed light on the
relationship to our critical materials on the part of certain bureaucrats, some of whom
occupy high-ranking posts.” At a recent press conference for both Soviet and foreign
journalists, the head of the national committee for Physical Culture, Romanov, who
featured in the article, had been put in an awkward position. An American journalist had
asked about the possibility of holding the 1964 Olympic Games in Moscow, and
Romanov had responded in the affirmative and praised the new sports facilities. In
response, another journalist asked how Romanov felt about KP’s article, presumably well
aware of the stark contrast between his outlook and the paper’s position. Romanov was
described as “hedging” and defending his earlier remarks. The tension intensified, as
another journalist asked whether Romanov believed the newspaper had “lied, or
slandered.” Romanov, “understanding that it was impossible for him to heap offense on
the newspaper, that there were representatives of the Soviet press there, began to state
that at Luzhniki everything is fine, but KP wishes it were excellent, it’s the conflict of the
good with the excellent.”229
Strikingly, though foreigners were present at the press conference, it was Soviet
journalists who made Romanov’s position most difficult. This view of events suggests
that while officials were in a superior position, they too hesitated to create an adversarial
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relationship between the state and the mass media. This is in some contrast to episodes
discussed in chapter four, where creative union leaders were primarily anxious about
foreign reactions to Soviet initiatives. Privately, Romanov expressed significant
disapproval—he asked why he had not been informed in advance about the article, and
spoke with both Goriunov and Adzhubei about it. Khomus’kov was careful to stress the
ongoing nature of the problem: these kinds of stories and issues were occurring “in many
departments with highly ranked and lower ranked bosses, who we are criticizing to some
extent, and who are concerned not with the essence of the question, not with the effort to
make things as good as possible, but only with living peacefully. Incidentally, the
Committee did not send reactions to the article to us. We must critically and seriously
speak out in the newspaper with our materials and carry out active measures toward the
people we criticize.”230 Khomus’kov demonstrated that KP journalists—and not just
Adzhubei, however closely he is associated with changing standards—felt obligated, if
not always empowered, to criticize the mistakes of authorities for the sake of social
improvement. The official reaction to the piece, in addition to confirming the limits on
journalistic autonomy, reinforces Mark Hopkins’ point that in the Soviet media system,
Party and state officials could function like senior management in a media corporation,
alert to controversies and seeking to assert “social control” through indirect means, even
as official censorship structures remained in place.231
In his response to Khomus’kov’s weekly review from November 5, editorial
board member Sokolov evinced no particular fondness for bureaucrats but expressed

230
231

RGASPI M-1, op. 32, d. 821, l. 67a.
Zelizer, Taking Journalism Seriously, 53.

116

concern that, “we ourselves often provide fodder for conversations, by publishing some
so-called controversial articles. When we begin to cast stones at one or another
bureaucrat, a person, possibly occupying a high post, we set fire to unhealthy passions
around the higher-ups and those below them.” 232 Unbalanced criticism was rooted in the
wrong kind of “class struggle” between officialdom and citizens.233 Romanov was not the
only official to feature prominently in recent weeks: KP had singled out the children of
Foreign Trade Minister Kabanov, who were engaged in criminal dealings. Тhe article,
“Once More On Mold,” written by Shatunovskii and Starodub, received a great deal of
reader response—five hundred readers had written about the case, praising the
newspaper’s decision to cover the subject and encouraging the paper to “more sharply
pose the question about the responsibility of parents for the upbringing of their
children.”234 Despite this curiosity, it was unlikely there would be serious consequences
for the wrongdoers, which amounted to the newspaper “giving rise to unhealthy
conversations.” If his colleagues were prepared to print contentious articles, “let them
also have the bravery to ask Comrade Bulganin how the Council of Ministers reacts to
this Minister, but if we are not brave enough, we need not print the article, so as not to
enflame passions.”235 These examples demonstrate that as clashes with authority
increased, so did journalists’ anxiety. These kinds of debates were less prominent in the
Journalists’ Union, even after its inaugural congress, when creative seminars became
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more sophisticated. “Courage” was clearly part of how journalists defined their
professional success in settings more distant from official scrutiny.236
Boris Pankin was more concerned about limits on creativity than with avoiding
controversy, including those set by journalists’ own fears. “There are other matters where
no one blocks us from speaking out and we put up limits for ourselves. In our heads there
is an editor or a censor, who says, ‘this is not allowed, don’t print this.’” In connection
with recent corruption cases like Kabanov’s, he complained that the coverage did not
reflect the widespread nature of such criminality. Pankin had felt like “Don Quixote” in
championing this view, though he was now supported by phone calls from readers asking
about the lack of follow-through. The Komsomol Central Committee, particularly First
Minister Shelepin, “often interferes with our bravery,” and the Komsomol Secretary had
similarly restricted the Kabanov story.237 Pankin was, as we will see later in this chapter,
particularly willing to criticize elites in the name of social improvement. While others
invoked reader response as a possible sign of social disorder, Pankin used it to vindicate
himself. His reference to a kind of “internal censor,” along with Shelepin’s interference,
points to a central tension in assessing journalistic agency. While it is clear which
articles, or international incidents, merited official scrutiny, it is impossible for any
historian to ascertain when a journalist might have exercised restraint prior to publication.
The repeated references to “bravery” in clashes with officialdom, combined with
Pankin’s reference to inner turmoil, demonstrate that criticism of authority was both vital
to journalists’ sense of success and potentially destabilizing.
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•••
Debates about the value of criticism became particularly heated at the November
19 letuchka, in part due to a lengthy and pessimistic speech by propaganda department
assistant Vadim Komolov, in his capacity as weekly critic. Komolov was disturbed by the
paper’s lack of a clear “political line,” which could have severe consequences:
I believe that the state of our collective…expresses, in a sense, what is
happening in the social life of our society…in the life of our country, and
importantly, in my view, in peoples’ minds, very great shifts are
occurring. Another matter, that might be connected with the practical
liquidation of the remnants of the personality cult; we did not always act
intelligently, therefore something is spilling over in a not entirely correct
and acceptable form…I am certain that this process is logical, necessary,
and a colossal service on the part of the Party, to have willingly begun a
decisive struggle with bureaucratism, and raised a great many questions
which have long worried millions of people.238
Though he clearly felt obligated to praise the Party’s new direction, Komolov
presented the Twentieth Congress as a disorienting challenge for all of Soviet society,
with specific repercussions for journalists’ public responsibilities. For him, deStalinization required questioning existing values and priorities—a shift in subjectivity as
much as policy. His claim that KP’s efforts to grapple with the new reality were “spilling
over” rather than being channeled emphasized the newspaper’s lack of control in contrast
to the Party’s role as a benign and enlightened guiding force.
Komolov’s greatest concern was the danger of criticism, which he connected not
only to the newspaper’s stability but also to social unrest as a whole. He reminded his
colleagues to be:
a responsible collective…if we begin to speak about our editorial life, we
find a series of leftist tendencies…It’s not important to us now whether
238
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something is published or not. We should be interested in the internal
intensity of our comrades, to say something sharp to ministers, to thieving
bureaucrats…it seems to me that many comrades have grouped
themselves around this line.239
Where in earlier weeks, journalists like Pankin had portrayed criticism as valuable—
though difficult to sustain in the face of political opposition or indifference—Komolov
viewed it as almost unprofessional, particularly when some individuals prioritized
critique over publication. The characterization of his own colleagues as “leftists” was an
inflammatory rhetorical move: in Soviet political discourse, characterizing opponents as
“leftists” or “rightists” was to portray them as deviants.240
Komolov was emphatic about the political and professional consequences of the
paper’s more critical direction:
At the last letuchka this line practically became the main one…We
decided to invite the secretary of the Central Committee here, to speak
honestly and openly with him. There is internal dissatisfaction with Iurii
Petrovich, who removes materials…this is not the path which can lead the
newspaper in the necessary direction and which will truly give us the
opportunity to pointedly (po-ostromu) pose questions in our newspaper. I
wish to emphasize that I completely support this wish of my comrades,
subjectively, because it expresses…the progressive wish of people to
begin to speak out pointedly…it is in its spirit absolutely correct, but in
reality it is pseudo-revolutionary, because it is superficial and can satisfy
only the petty-bourgeois and philistines, and not true critics of all our
insufficiencies.241
Komolov presented the November 5 meeting as a defining moment: the critique of
Voronov and the Komsomol leadership was a disturbing inversion of existing hierarchies.
While he claimed to understand what drove his bolder colleagues—calling them
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progressive instead of “leftist”—he plainly considered them fundamentally impractical
and misguided. Though Komolov evoked the Twentieth Congress in referencing the
“remnants of the personality cult,” his assessment of recent trends as “philistine” drew on
older discourses: in the Russian and Soviet context the struggle took on a particular
meaning—avoiding philistinism was essential to escaping European degeneration. Before
the October Revolution, the intelligentsia viewed itself as the social group most capable
of staving off this process—cultural consolidation under the Bolsheviks changed the
terms of debate. Though many of the revolutionaries themselves could have been
considered “bourgeois,” they deployed the term to describe their intellectual opponents.
Stalin himself had used this language of degeneration to describe dangers facing the Party
in the late 1920s.242 Komolov positioned his colleagues as poised on the brink of
degeneration if they continued to insist on criticism at the expense of other concerns.
It would be fundamentally inaccurate, however, to portray Komolov as an
apologist for Stalinism. He openly disapproved of colleagues who advocated a return to
past practices:
I am deeply convinced that if we employ the method of turning the screws,
which was compromised long ago, if we take this line as an order from the
Party…we will be making the most terrible mistake. In my view such a
rightist line is more terrible than any kind of leftist mistake…why? The
fact is that such an understandable line goes directly against the internal
dialectic which the struggle with the remnants of the personality cult is
undergoing. It is impossible now, after the Twentieth Congress of the
party…to act with the old methods, to stigmatize, to condemn, to obstruct,
to stick on labels.243
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However afraid of “leftist” approaches Komolov might have been, to reject the Twentieth
Congress was the more profound error, since it represented a clear rejection of historical
logic and misinterpreted the Party’s position. Komolov’s main anxieties were about his
colleagues and not about policy itself, as evidenced by his positive statements about the
Party’s decisions. Though he referred to separate ideological “camps” at the newspaper,
he distinguished this from Stalinism’s more brutal ascription processes—implicitly
rejecting ideological purges or violence as “compromised.” Before the meeting ended,
Komolov spoke again and clarified that he had not meant for the terms to apply to
individuals—a gesture which points as much to the complex history of applying political
labels in the Soviet context as it does to his personal repentance.244
There were a variety of responses to Komolov’s claims and anxieties, pointing to
the diversity of opinion within the editorial board. Boris Pankin took issue with the rightleft characterization, claiming that, “if one drew a diagram…it would be an entire series
of sharp turns, strange, incomprehensible jumps up and down, and the like. We are
currently experiencing a downward fall.” In reference to critical materials, Pankin noted
that at the previous meeting, Voronov seemingly supported a strident approach to social
questions, but articles about students were withdrawn from the paper. Though Voronov
was not editor in chief at this point—he assumed the position in 1959—his status as a
senior editor apparently gave him some influence over publication. Pankin described
himself as “personally bewildered” about which approach to take, arguing that “tactical
shifts” about criticism should be comprehensible. “Today we speak about criticism, and
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tomorrow we withdraw it without any explanation.” These inconsistencies were
damaging the newspapers’ standing with Soviet youth. While there was certainly a “left
or demagogical wave, on the other hand, there are people who want to think, to look at
things independently.” Pankin believed that most readers were well intentioned and was
afraid that if more conservative voices prevailed, “good Soviet people” would be
mischaracterized and criticism would disappear from the paper.245 In this view, criticism
was fundamental to journalism’s public mission: in arguing for a clear policy on its use,
he positioned himself as a defender of an intellectual and reflective Soviet public. At the
same time, his statements about uncertainty demonstrate that even those to the “left” of
Komolov were disoriented by recent developments.
While his more anxious colleagues supported class-based ascription, Pankin
argued that an overly cautious approach to criticism would wrongly condemn the
innocent readers who wished to understand their world. His arguments, then, link
“critical literacy” to the production of an informed Soviet public. This connection
between reading practices and citizenship, most clearly articulated in Jurgen Habermas’
concept of the public sphere, is a subject of significant debate in journalism studies,
especially for political scientists. While some scholars embraced Habermas’s conception
as important to evaluating journalistic success and failure, to others, as Barbie Zelizer
writes in her overview of political science scholarship, “the abstract nature of Habermas’s
views made them difficult to apply to journalism in concrete ways.” As part of this trend,
communications scholar John Downing lamented that the imprecision of the terms “civil
society” and “public sphere” made them particularly difficult to apply to the
245
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democratizing states of Eastern Europe, including post-Soviet Russia. Debate about these
terms and their utility has long persisted among scholars of both imperial and Soviet
Russia—in her study of the press in the late nineteenth century, Louis McReynolds
argues that the new popular press did in fact contribute to the emergence of a civil society
and public sphere.246 The difference between McReynolds’ subjects and my own is not
only chronological but ideological—while Habermasian approaches to reading and public
opinion assume the cultivation of democratic and liberal subjects, Pankin’s optimism
about the Soviet public assumed the presence of informed socialist readers. As he sought
to reassure his colleagues, Pankin presented criticism as a tool that cultivated Soviet
values rather than endangering them.
Supporters of Pankin, such as Natalia Aleksandrova, searched for less
inflammatory moral categories that would clarify the paper’s position:
We should say very thoughtfully what all these clamorous phrases are
worth, and on the other hand we should make note of a very important
theme, answering people’s questions, what they are thinking about. Why
should we be afraid of discussion?…we should have a very clear line,
about which questions we should speak out about, where we should
criticize students, where we should support them. In this respect Pankin
was right.247
Aleksandrova’s distinction between the “demagogue” and the “student” would become
increasingly important as journalists turned their attention to university politics and the
reception of literary texts.
The problem of criticism and moral evaluation became more acute during the
remainder of the November 19 meeting, as the editorial board moved beyond initial
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Komolov’s remarks into a heated discussion of student unrest at Moscow University.
Vladimir Chachin felt that journalists were more than able to deal with the problem of
students but that policy discussions were beyond their purview. Journalists could reform
youth because they had more practical experience than university professors. Real
discussions of social issues and policy should come from the Central Committee, with
journalists as committed assistants.248 Even as he defended professional experience over
academic credentials, Chachin’s emphasis on the Central Committee as the proper site for
discussion maintained existing hierarchies of authority. Gus’kov agreed with Komolov’s
view of the newspaper’s “political line” and criticized his colleagues who blamed
authorities when their work was not published. He believed that the problems with
student life were explained by a lack of workers and collective farmers among the student
body, and that there should be “more workers’ children, from production, and from the
collective farms” in universities. “Еxplanatory work” would correct some problems, and
it would not be inappropriate if some segment of the students withdrew from their
studies.249 Gus’kov’s characterization of students relied on the central trait of the
Marxist-Leninist state: its use of class categories to identify sources of reliability and
danger. The suggestions here amount not only to “ascribing class” but also to a potential
purge of the student body.250 Though newer scholarship points to a great diversity of
student opinion about de-Stalinization, these views indicate that some KP journalists saw
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students as an “essentially oppositional group”—a viewpoint which would come to
dominate the historical literature on higher education under Khrushchev.251
As they considered the ideological reliability of students, KP journalists also
discussed recent proposals to restructure university admissions on a class basis, as a
means to prevent future unorthodox behavior. KP sociologist Boris Grushin claimed that
the majority of students “were very healthy” and stated that the proposals for a classbased approach to student admissions would not be a “panacea for all ills.” Worker
students would not hesitate to speak out against bad faculty members, and university
problems pre-dated events in Hungary.252 Grushin placed student unrest in the context of
existing social ills, rather than blaming foreign problems for infecting a previously
healthy body politic. Endorsing Grushin’s less militant approach to student issues, Valerii
Ganiushkin took a different approach, claiming that upheaval was national: “in the
working class such processes of re-evaluation of values are happening, not with such
deep feeling as in the subset of students we call demagogues. It seems to me, that we
must write about and touch on these controversial things that are happening in the
workers’ environment.”253 This corrective demonstrates a more nuanced understanding of
Soviet society—while the dominant position of workers was unquestioned, Ganiushkin
argued that the social changes after the Twentieth Congress were so far reaching that not
even the most traditionally reliable group remained immune. Though it is unlikely
Ganiushkin meant to evoke German philosopher Friederich Nietzsche, his values-based
language presented Party policy itself as the source of uncertainty and unpredictability—
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a frank assessment that few other colleagues would make. In later years, the Party did
introduce class-based admissions quotas at universities along with requiring Komsomol
membership.254
•••
Further discussions about youth reliability, at both the November 5 and November
19 letuchki, were closely tied to reading practices and the reception of texts—specifically,
the challenges posed by students’ reading of both Soviet ideology and Vladimir
Dudintsev’s novel, Not by Bread Alone. The novel depicts the struggle of a young
engineer, Lopatkin, who has invented a superior mining method but is opposed by older
superiors and arrested under false pretenses. Though he becomes a successful inventor,
the bureaucrats who oppose him remain in power and he resolves to fight them rather
than pursue fame.255 In his case study of Novyi Mir, the journal where Dudintsev’s work
was published, Denis Kozlov indicates that readers reacted strongly to the novel, either
supporting it or seeing it as threatening to the revolutionary legacy. The novel served as a
central cultural touchstone for discussions of reform and social ills, though readers
continued to draw on Stalinist moral categories in their responses. The majority viewed
the novel in starkly positive or negative terms, “as a battle between mechanistically
defined forces of good and evil.” Though Kozlov makes note of editorial debates about
the novel at Izvestiia and Literaturnaia gazeta, KP is absent from his evaluation.256 In his
investigation of Soviet universities, Benjamin Tromly points out that taking a position on
Dudintsev’s text became an important political and philosophical act for students: “taking
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the side of Dudintsev rhetorically was also a way to make a statement about oneself.” In
their own stances on the novel, KP journalists betrayed their own anxieties not only about
the novel but also their responsibility to mitigate any damage to the Soviet body politic
that resulted from it.257
On November 5, the same meeting that involved heated discussion of Hungary, a
journalist named Sokolov admitted that the art and literature department had failed to
appreciate the publication of the novel as a cultural event, and, “It was now obvious that
“we should come out with a publisistika article on the thoughts that are lavishly laid out
in this novel.” He argued that the newspaper leadership had hesitated to do this, singling
out Goriunov and Adzhubei. Only an article in Trud, VsTSPS newspaper, had motivated
them to take a more active stance. This case, he argued, was a clear cut sign of KP
“refusing a conversation on a controversial subject…”258 In this version of events,
Adzhubei and Goriunov failed to display real leadership, exercising the “internal
censorship” Boris Nankin mentioned during his criticisms of Voronov. The omission is
particularly interesting given that Dudintsev had previously been a correspondent for the
paper, where he had reported on scientific subjects similar to Lopatkin’s exploits.259 As
discussion of the novel occupied more time at both editorial board and Party meetings,
several journalists reflected on this past association, in ways that demonstrate the fraught
nature of the novel’s reception in light of the Hungarian crisis.
The November 19 letuchka whеre Komolov vented his feelings about criticism
also featured intense discussion of Not By Bread Alone. Komolov was concerned that
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when it came to the novel or “other topics which worry students, it is possible that we
will not be up to this task. This is a real danger.” Describing a recent discussion at
MGU’s department of Marxism-Leninism which had gone awry, he argued that debate
provoked disorder because “we for many years have not been taught to really defend the
party line.” If there were no “discussion clubs” or other forms, journalists courted the
larger risk that “these demagogues will become heroes of the leftist crowd.”
Condemnation of the unhealthy would ideally come from the public rather than the
newspaper or the Party. Komolov felt that closer collaboration, including with the
Komsomol Central Committee, would result in a series of “biting and important
pieces.”260 Komolov’s sense that a proper response to Not By Bread Alone was an
important test for his colleagues reflects not only longstanding Russian and Soviet views
about the value of literature but also the novel’s fraught political fate in the autumn of
1956, as discussed in detail in Vladislav Zubok’s study of the postwar intelligentsia.
Konstantin Simonov, one of Dudintsev’s early champions, was forced to withdraw his
support for the text when it became apparent it was too controversial in light of
Hungarian events. Student arrests and expulsions would follow throughout November
and December of 1956.261 As later discussions will show, Komolov’s colleagues shared
his concern about the text’s destabilizing power.
Though he noted that “contradictions” would arise in the aftermath of the
Twentieth Congress, Kotenko was still alarmed by recent social developments. His
remarks at the November 20 meeting centered around dangerous political opinions that

260
261

RGASPI 98-M, op. 1, d. 177, ll. 50–3.
Zubok, Zhivago’s Children, 75–81.

129

were voiced during discussions of Dudintsev’s novel. He claimed that at one recent
event, a young man had cited Lenin’s claims that the dictatorship of the proletariat was an
evolving phenomenon and that recent events showed it was time for political change.
Kotenko considered this “an attack on the very foundations of the revolution.” In
explaining these phenomena, Kotenko blamed “influence from abroad,” and directly
accused Grushin of ignoring this. For all his doubts about students, Kotenko showed
great sympathy for “our poor acquaintance, who is very upset and suffers most of all,”
though he considered the novel as original less for its literary achievements and more for
its “bravery in phrasing the question.” He felt that the excessive focus on Dudintsev “cast
aside” the similar efforts of writers like Ovechkin and Tendriakov.262 Where the less
alarmist members of the editorial board argued that the tensions in Soviet society were of
long duration, others fell back on more prevalent traditions of xenophobia.
What is striking about this discussion of Dudintsev is the lack of attention to the
plot, themes, or characters—while it is difficult to imagine (if equally difficult to prove)
that none of those present at the meeting had read the novel, it is clear from this
discussion that its content was now almost irrelevant in light of the controversy. The
greater concern, for Kotenko and others, was not Dudintsev personally, or even the value
of his text—but rather that the novel somehow created space for broader critique of the
Soviet project. Kotenko even attempted to argue that the novel was nothing remarkable
and that Dudintsev’s work should be considered in comparison to earlier efforts—as if to
deprive the novel of any real analytical power, however strongly some members of
society had reacted to it. Kotenko’s claims demonstrate that even as Soviet journalists
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shaped public culture, they were also bound by its enduring tropes and categories: his
fears of foreign contamination drew on much older political traditions, as Komolov had
in invoking “right” and “left” factions at the paper. Though both journalists were striving
to contribute to an invigorated Soviet project, they relied on stark moral categories, much
like the novel’s other readers.263 Despite his xenophobia, Kotenko even referred to
Dudintsev with sympathy and also called him “brave,” even as he sought to downplay his
novel’s significance. Dudintsev’s work was inspired by real events, and Kotenko’s
description of him was the same epithet ascribed to all journalists who campaigned for
social reform in the face of official opposition. Kotenko reserved his sharpest criticism
for the novel’s readers, showing some sympathy for the author and acknowledging that
he possessed an important professional quality. This relatively measured approach to both
the author and novel is something of a departure, perhaps due to Dudintsev’s history at
the paper.
Voronov’s concluding remarks represented not only his views on what to do
about the perceived crisis among Soviet students but also the problems of criticism and
Dudintsev’s novel—demonstrating that all of these issues were related to the larger
problem of how to make sense of the new politics. Voronov argued for a middle ground
towards students, insisting that while sharp criticism of some views was necessary, it was
also important to engage in “patient explanations.” Voronov argued that the problems in
higher education could be explained both by class background and also а generally
diminished Party presence. In closing, Voronov noted that not all the discussions of Not
By Bread Alone were adequate ones—he considered it “very telling” that Dudintsev had
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personally appealed to the Komsomol, asking him to “speak out in KP against his ‘so
called defenders.’” Voronov’s closing remarks here demonstrate a consistent
unwillingness to commit to one camp or the other inside the editorial board, though he
would later take sharply critical stances at great personal cost during his tenure as editorin-chief. His reliance on class-based explanations for unrest glossed over the possibility
that official policy had provoked dissatisfaction among young people.264 Voronov’s
assessment of Dudintsev’s other supporters clearly reflects the unpopularity of
liberalization and criticism at that particular moment—problems that would only
intensify in the months to come, as the Party and the Komsomol responded not only to
the Hungarian events but also to a controversial article by Boris Pankin on youth leisure
issues.
•••
The Komsomol Central Committee, as one of KP’s major supervisory bodies,
presented its own views on the Hungarian events and students’ ideological health. Many
of the concerns raised in this November 1956 report would take on new urgency in the
months to come, as the paper continued to take controversial stances. The TsKVLKSM
rebuked KP for failing to publish recent Party decrees on the struggle with bureaucratism.
KP’s work on the personality cult was another major concern, especially among Soviet
youth:
Among some young people, especially students, an incorrect opinion is
developing. As though the Party and the Central Committee undertook
nothing in this policy, and if they are undertaking them now, this is the
result of pressure from below or from outside—this last view has in mind
the events in Hungary and Poland. There is an attempt among youth to
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exaggerate the significance of the events in Poland…a view toward
following their example in some matters.265
This foreign focus was “muffling” the extent of Soviet efforts to improve society.
According to the Central Committee, these disturbing tendencies would not exist if KP
had “in a timely manner conducted active propagandizing of the Twentieth Congress’
decisions…not remaining silent, but showing how fruitfully the decisions of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union аre developing the recovery of social life in our
country.”266 If Soviet youth found the official approach to de-Stalinization unsatisfactory,
it was journalists’ responsibility to correct—prescriptions that present the newspaper as a
tool for presenting policy as much as a means for shaping personhood. As some KP
journalists had, the Komsomol Central Committee associated foreign events with deStalinization’s domestic reception. If the newspaper did not educate audiences correctly,
foreign revolutions might spread and damage the reform project, especially since young
people were already undervaluing the Party’s accomplishments in this area. Though the
portrayal of the Party as “reactive” on questions of reform may well have been more
accurate, officials preferred to emphasize their own leadership of historical forces.
Boris Pankin’s article, “How the Torch Was Snuffed Out,” about a youth club in
the city of Kaluga, was considered even by its champions to be a departure from
journalism tradition, and its publication resulted in serious criticism from the Komsomol.
The story proves to reveal much about the political reception of professional values as the

265
266

RGASPI M-1, op. 32, d. 821, ll. 96–8.
Ibid.

133

nature of criticism under Khrushchev.267 Pankin was eventually to become KP’s editor
and an active figure in the Journalists’ Union, but at the time of his article, he was a
recent university graduate. His story concerned a youth club in the district of Kaluga,
about a hundred miles southwest of Moscow. Inspired by movements in other major
cities to improve leisure conditions, the local Kaluga newspaper had encouraged
Komsomol members to start a youth club. When local bureaucrats were slow to respond,
young people seized the opportunity and assumed that the authorities had “trust” in them.
Pankin interviewed a sympathetic young worker, who studied in the evenings and was
interested in the outdoors. He had seen a poster promoting the new Kaluga Torch youth
club, and expressed confidence that boxing training would make him well able to cope
with any “hooligans” who might attend. Despite the obvious need for youth
entertainment, the local Komsomol had shut down the club, citing “too much
independence” on the part of the club’s founders. Аs it turned out, the Komsomol
authorities had merely been waiting for the Kaluga obkom to express disapproval of the
enterprise. Though he had met none of the participants, party secretary Pavlov
characterized the club as a site for “bad influence.” Pankin accused the local authorities
of “cowardice.” Pankin’s story pitted young heroes who were eager to improve their
community against local authorities who ignored their positive effects out of a reflexive
fear of change—a more emotionally appealing story than the earlier critical piece about
Luzhniki.
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Pankin described his original inspiration for the story in his memoirs. He had
acted on reports from future poet and bard-musician Bulat Okudzhava, who was working
as a schoolteacher in Kaluga. In the story’s original version, Pankin had followed
standard protocol and not named the officials implicated in the club’s closure. It was
more common to use coded phrasing, such as “senior comrades,” or to use names but not
rank—this was done to avoid tension between the Party and the Komsomol, which
Pankin described as “the worst sin on earth.” This “sin” was magnified in Pankin’s case,
since his story involved the head of an oblast’ party in a major urban center. When
Goriunov told him to “call them all by their names” Pankin was in shock, since he had
expected the story to remain unpublished.268 Pankin’s comments further illustrate KP’s
delicate political position—its responsibility to defend youth interests without
antagonizing authorities, especially Party officials. Pankin reflected on the Khrushchev
era as a whole as he recalled the article’s reception: great potential for social tumult was
well underway before 1956 and only intensified when Khrushchev personally embraced a
reform agenda. Invoking Ehrenburg’s classic “Thaw” metaphor, Pankin described
recurring “freezes” throughout the period and connected the metaphor to a popular
Russian folktale when he called the Kaluga authorities “Father Frosts” (dedy morozy).
Pankin both embraced the Thaw metaphor and noted its limitations; his description of the
Kaluga crisis emphasized the importance of local recalcitrance despite Khrushchev’s
personal enthusiasms.269
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Pankin’s piece was generally well-received by colleagues. At the December 17
letuchka, critic Natella Lordkipanidze of the literature department described it as some of
the weeks’ best material because Pankin had done more to “work out everything
completely and tell the reader about everything. Sometimes it happens that a person goes
to the localities, sees some kind of defect, everything is clear to him, but when he sits
down with his pen, he doesn’t have the strength to describe things, the ability to think and
to rethink, the author doesn’t do this.” Pankin’s piece was the only one to criticize the
local party secretary and “explain what the problem is, to put a dot on the ‘i.’”270 Pankin
was singled out not only for his investigative ability but also for thoroughness and critical
risk taking, though he had done so only with Goriunov’s support. Approval of the article
was not limited to the letuchka: the editorial board later formally recognized the work as
among the best published that month.271
•••
Literary controversies and the Hungarian crisis were major discussion topics at
KP Party meetings, with members expressing more intense fears of foreign influence and
disdain for intellectuals. Even as they affirmed Party policy, KP journalists remained
frustrated about their inability to maintain a clear understanding of domestic and
international events. Though these gatherings took place after the publication of Pankin’s
article—which appeared on December 9—discussions of criticism did not mention it
specifically, as official censure from the Komsomol did not occur until January. The
general tone of these events, however, points to increasing anxiety about the proper place
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of criticism and an intensified ideological rigidity. On December 16, 1956, Ekaterina
Shatskaia delivered the review report (otchetnyi doklad) and focused on the “ideological
struggle,” both the particular challenges in Hungary and “slander” in the foreign press in
the aftermath of the Soviet invasion. Along with these foreign challenges, Shatskaia was
also concerned about the consequences of domestic de-Stalinization. Letters continued to
come in about the nature of the personality cult, and the policy needed more explanation:
“the widely used term ‘Stalinism’ in the West, is an effort to present the personality cult
as the outgrowth of an entire system.” While the party had “bravely” introduced the issue
of the personality cult, well aware that ideological enemies would attempt to exploit it,
further attacks could not continue.272 Shatskaia raised practical concerns as well. Travel
demands on senior journalists were detrimental to newspaper content, since people like
Voronov and Shatunovskii had less time to address “internal themes.”273 As the creative
union would, KP journalists clearly struggled to balance domestic audience needs with
the pressures of superpower status and cultural diplomacy. Controlling the concept of
“Stalinism” highlights the central tension of Khrushchev’s reform agenda: how to
condemn Stalin’s greatest excesses while maintaining the Soviet system’s overall
integrity.
In his response to Shatskaia’s report, Goriunov argued that there was a “notable
liveliness” in creative materials due to Party policies that prompted a “critical reevaluation of many premises.” But this optimism was limited, since capitalist forces were
“organizing counter-revolutionary declarations and attacks on socialist countries.”
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Intellectuals such as Konstantin Simonov, Evgenii Evtushenko, and Ol’ga Bergolt’ts
were said to have “caught onto the [anti-Soviet] mood of the West.
In a lengthier discussion of Dudintsev’s novel, Goriunov declared:
To simply reject it outright is impossible. But the author clearly
оverreached. His good hero is too isolated. Drozdov and others are
depicted in a lively way, the positive is depicted weakly. We cannot look
at this novel and evaluate it separately from the political situation. Now
Dudintsev’s novel has become a banner in the hands of demagogues and
nihilists…criticism must strengthen us, and not weaken us.274
Goriunov connected domestic literary politics and imperial governance struggles, while
the evaluation of Dudintsev’s novel presented Lopatkin as a positive hero who lacked
social support and thus was overshadowed by Drozdov. The writer Konstantin
Paustovskii had reached a similar conclusion earlier in the fall: Dudintsev’s great success
was forcing his audience to confront that the Soviet Union “had many Drozdovs.” Other
analyses point out that while the novel follows much of socialist realism’s genre
conventions, Lopatkin was guided more by individual mentors than the Party.275
In his reaction to Goriunov’s analysis at the December 16 Party meeting, foreign
correspondent Kamil’ Devet’iarov pointed out the novel’s shifting reception: at earlier
editorial meetings and planning sessions, Goriunov had “generally highly valued
Dudintsev’s novel.” According to the stenographic record, Goriunov interrupted to deny
this but said nothing else. Devet’iarov averred that though he found uses of the novel by
“demagogues” distressing “as a patriot and as a Communist,” he regarded Dudintsev as a
victim of bad timing, declaring, “the novel has not a few literary qualities, but the tragedy
of the author and his work is that in the current circumstances the novel does not work to
274
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our advantage. I think that if Dudintsev’s work had appeared at another time, for
example, a little earlier, it would have been received differently.”276 Devet’iarov’s
remarks point to the complexity of Goriunov’s position as editor and his responsibility to
track political paradigm shifts—though he was now obligated to condemn Dudintsev, he
had previously shown enthusiasm about the work. Though he defended his own
ideological credentials, Deviat’iarov offered a careful defense of the text: it was
dangerous only when juxtaposed with recent external events, rather than on its own
terms.
The December 16 meeting eventually featured more substantive critiques of KP
as a organization: Khomus’kov declared that keeping up with reader letters left the staff
“оverburdened” and their inability to pay proper attention to correspondence might result
in “readers losing trust in the newspaper.” Literary secretary Sof’ia Finger claimed that
journalists were poorly informed about events abroad, a state of affairs Goriunov had
done little to remedy since he had not spoken enough about his recent trip to Poland.
While the editorial board was supposed to be a “creative organization,” it was starting to
resemble “an office.” Starodub felt strongly that it was “not acceptable for a journalist to
turn into a bureaucrat, who should wait out the clock” (otsizhivat’ ot sikh do sikh). In
support of these assertions, Allan Starodub argued that, “journalists should be well
informed, but we know everything based on the newspapers.” The local raikom only
invited journalists to meetings sporadically, rather than according to clearly discernible
procedures.277 Starodub and Finger’s arguments reinforce the importance of knowledge
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and information to journalists’ self-concept: their own leaders and Party institutions had
failed them in this regard, which resulted in feelings of powerlessness. At the same time,
in detailing the large number of tasks journalists were expected to perform, Khomus’kov
and Finger linked their busy schedules to the health of society and, presumably, to the
health of a profession, since bureaucracy endangered the vitality key to journalistic work.
Aleksei Adzhubei acknowledged that recent events had been “a serious trial for
workers on the ideological front.” Adzhubei had recently returned from Australia and
contributed further to the xenophobic atmosphere by describing enhanced anti-Soviet
activity there. Adzhubei underscored the value of “timeliness” (operativnosti),
expressing concern that “we frequently delay counterpropaganda.” Despite the MarxistLeninist basis of Soviet journalism, bourgeois journalists were frequently more effective.
Adzhubei called for greater student participation in the newspaper, so that their
ideological guidance could be more closely supervised.278 Adzhubei’s language here was
stridently polarized, presenting the outside world as continually prepared to attack the
Soviet Union. His comments about timeliness, like those at the November 5 letuchka,
demonstrate the increased political weight of this particular newsroom value during
political crises.279
The Party meeting’s closing resolutions affirmed the close links between domestic
professionalism and international events. The problems in literature and art were
remarked upon at some length, particularly the “extreme polemics” that suggested that
real literature had ceased to flourish in the 1930s, which cast the entirety of socialist
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realist doctrine into doubt. The literature and art department had remained “mute” on
these matters. Though a recent and problematic issue of Novyi Mir had received some
attention, efforts needed to be more consistent. The newspaper had failed to lead a
significant discussion about Dudintsev’s novel, despite the fact that “discussions are
happening in factories and student auditoriums, conversations, and we are not helping
youth to correctly understand this work.” The student department had failed to support
these young people in their demands for healthy educational reform, and “demagogues”
were insufficiently criticized.280 The references to Novyi Mir underscore the journal’s
growing significance and its identification with controversies. Where KP journalists had
heatedly debated the distinctions between “demagogues” and healthy young people in the
letuchki, the Party meeting treated these terms as fixed and knowable categories.
At the last party meeting of 1956, held on December 25, members discussed a
recent letter from the Central Committee entitled, “On The Strengthening of Party
Organizations Among the Masses And the Crossing Incursions of Anti-Soviet Enemy
Elements.” The letter, essentially the Presidium’s official response to the Hungarian
events, described the need for intensified Party activity in response to recent foreign
events and ongoing ideological attacks against the Soviet Union and the need to defend
Socialist Realism.281 The letter’s militant tone was approved and embraced by several
Party members at KP’s meeting, prompting Tovia Karel’shteina to remember the
newspaper’s struggles against Trotskyites in the 1930s. She saw the most recent Central
Committee letter as an important educational opportunity for the younger generation,
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unfamiliar with these struggles and those with the kulaks and SRs. Adzhubei discussed
his recent meeting with students at the Moscow Energy Institute, who had expressed
pride in Soviet performance at the Melbourne Olympics. Referring to a recent incident in
which a letter from these students had found its way to the BBC and claiming that
students did not understand the grave mistake this represented, Adzhubei reminded his
colleagues of the need to conduct more “upbringing” among youth. “It is necessary to
show in the newspaper, how to unmask scoundrels, how to fight them.”282 Where Party
meetings earlier in the year had celebrated the achievements of the Twentieth Congress,
the December meeting featured Stalinist tropes and increased xenophobia.
Karel’shteina’s references to the 1930s point to the endurance of Stalinist political
culture, as do Adzhubei’s use of a “mask” metaphor.283 Proper evaluation of the
Hungarian events, then, required some embrace of the past—especially the search for
hidden enemies. The search for the positive hero that spring had been focused on finding
and celebrating the best in Soviet society. Now, with mounting fears of foreign and
domestic unrest, heroism meant an unflinching willingness to purge the body politic.
Adzhubei’s vision of a re-educated youth emphasized hostility to foreign influence as
part of socialist personhood, where Rusakova had focused on the cultivation of domestic
virtues in her profile of the young poet Sergei. As we will see in chapter five, the
eradication of dangerous trends and cultivation of a new, healthier vision of the Soviet
self was an important part of journalism’s public mission, one which Adzhubei embraced
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with some enthusiasm. His harsher tone here only underscores the deep sense of crisis as
KP journalists sought to make sense of recent upheavals.
Garbuzov’s response to the letter returned to the problem of timely information
and access that had featured so prominently during the Hungarian crisis. In order to
conduct effective counterpropaganda, journalists needed current access to “white TASS”
bulletins—news items reserved for senior officials and privileged elites. Garbuzov was
careful to claim that, “we need to know about dangerous utterances not because they are
interesting for us, like Philistines, but in order to provide resistance, refutation.” Kotenko
felt KP journalists needed to make more of an effort to “quote demagogues…I am of
course not talking about counterrevolutionary sayings,” and to take a more active role in
debates, rather than merely evaluating phenomena.284 What is most notable here is the
cautious approach to unorthodox information sources, both foreign and domestic—both
men claimed that professional duty obligated them to access and even recapitulate
otherwise unacceptable ideas. Il’ia Shatunovskii’s reading of the letter tied its lessons to
the problem of criticism, arguing that with “unqualified” efforts in this area, “we give
fodder to enemies and to demagogues.” He urged a critical stance toward those who
“bowed and scraped before the West” and criticized articles which took the “tourists’
gaze” rather than more serious critical views of foreign cultures, evoking the antiWesternism of the Zhdanovschina.285 Attacks on criticism and xenophobia were mutually
reinforcing tendencies, as they had been during the November debates about criticism
and the Hungarian crisis.
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For his part, editor-in-chief Goriunov argued that the problem with
counterpropaganda was not so much informational access as a tendency toward
“footdragging…or a lack of political acuity,” and called for a return of the positive hero.
He defended an ideological approach to information, claiming, “we must not give way to
facts…we often look at facts from a small point of view, and not from the “state point of
view.” Small deficiencies should not prevent journalists from producing positive
material.286 These prescriptions strongly evoke the dialectics of the master plot. Minor
insufficiencies could no longer be allowed to obscure a focus on the radiant future that
lay within all aspects of Soviet reality. Facticity as a journalistic value—so important in a
defense of criticism—was best subordinated to political and ideological concerns. This
shift, while clearly attributable to international events, was likely related to the fallout
from Pankin’s article as well.
•••
Extensive negative official responses to the “Torch” article forced KP journalists
to re-evaluate their approach to tendentious political issues, demonstrating the ongoing
consequences of earlier upheavals. At a January 1957 letuchka, Goriunov described sharp
critiques of Pankin’s work and the paper as a whole, comments that were “sufficiently
sharp…that recently the newspaper writes about the negative more clearly than about the
positive.” Plenum records indicate that the article about Kabanov’s children, “Once More
on Mold,” was also mentioned. The newspaper was further criticized for not taking an
“offensive position” toward the capitalist world and neglecting the efforts to improve
popular living standards after the Twentieth Congress. KP continually failed to
286
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sufficiently celebrate the revolutionary past, which was critical if young people were to
properly contextualize the Soviet Union’s accomplishments.287 In improperly balancing
positivity and criticism, KP had failed its young audience. The paper was also criticized
for its foreign content, and Goriunov declared, “It seems to me that this reproach is fair,
because often empty and thoughtless materials about foreign life appear. In conjunction
with the growth of Soviet tourism, ‘fluff articles’ lacking a class-based approach have
appeared.” 288 In this argument, the presence of actual foreigners somehow obstructed the
proper ideological evaluation of the outside world.
Pankin’s article was singled out for special criticism. In the official view, the
editorial board had “poured oil with this article, at a time when in many institutions of
higher learning (vuzakh), demagogues were speaking out. We should ponder this. But the
material does not strike me as misguided (oshibochnim). But I understand comrades who
are obligated to inform about the circumstances in which one or another critical item is
published.”289 The use of “demagoguery” effectively conveys the extent of professional
failure: rather than enlightening or informing youth, Pankin had supported young
deviants and their destructive impulses. While he acknowledged the views of his
ideological superiors, Goriunov did not repudiate the decision to publish. This
conciliatory note was not his last word on the matter; he considered it “nonsense” for
people to argue that criticism had degenerated into “carping.” He further defended
journalism’s social mission, declaring, “newspapers have always had the obligation to
reveal problems and help to correct them. But the fact that there is such boasting,
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superficial criticism, ending in a brawl, it’s true that we must dispense with this.”290
Goriunov clearly maintained a steadfast belief in criticism as a journalistic value, even at
a time that required admitting fault and the value of balance. Аt a letuchka in the spring
of 1957, Goriunov reiterated that plenum participants had “unfairly” criticized the article,
particularly in claiming that the newspaper had “paid tribute to sensationalism.” The
Kaluga authorities had “allowed overcaution…and it was necessary to correct this.”291
The language here reinforces the extent of Pankin’s—and Goriunov’s—transgression:
sensationalism was a frequent critique of “bourgeois” journalism, suggesting Pankin had
followed foreign rather than Soviet values.
Pankin’s article remained a subject of controversy in later months. On March 9,
1957, Kaluga Komsomol secretary, O. Sazonova, wrote to Komsomol All-Union
Secretary Aleksandr Shelepin to complain that some of Pankin’s assertions “are incorrect
and do not reflect reality.” In particular, Pankin mischaracterized the attitude toward the
club as “negative,” and his critique of the work methods in Kaluga was unfair. Even
worse, though steps had been taken to correct matters, KP had not reported on them,
despite urgings at the recent Komsomol plenum. A recent article revisiting the issue listed
only recent measures, which the Kaluga authorities viewed as an effort to “show the
obkom and the gorkom in an incorrect light,” an assertion readers in Kaluga ostensibly
supported. Goriunov had clearly failed to take into account the criticisms from the
Komsomol plenum. As for Pankin, while he had “objectively described the errors”
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involved, he privileged the perspective of the club’s “initiators.”292 While Kaluga leaders
were forced to admit their initial error, Pankin could still be accused of exaggeration.
While Sazonova did not challenge the initial assessment, she argued that the follow-up
had distorted matters by ignoring recent developments.293 Pankin had further disregarded
traditional hierarchies of authority and reliability, in trusting the youths of Kaluga more
than Party and Komsomol officials. Pankin’s failures related to a journalistic value that
was frequently at issue during 1956. As we saw earlier, Adzhubei’s concern about
timeliness was expressed in terms of competitiveness with foreign media. In Pankin’s
case, he had equal responsibility to closely monitor the domestic situation in Kaluga to
ensure his reporting remained accurate.
A TsKVLKSM memo from May of 1957 showcased KP’s diminished status in
the eyes of Komsomol officials after the Kaluga controversy. While criticism was
obviously important, since “youth expect help from their newspaper…in their struggle
with all that impedes their normal work and living,” an excess of criticism could “lead the
reader to incorrect conclusions.” In the last four months of 1956, the newspaper had
written twice as much material about negative incidents as about positive achievements.
Citing recent foreign interest in stiliagi including their being christened “Russian teddy
boys,” the same Komsomol report accused the newspaper of encouraging “slander of
Soviet youth” by publishing too many critical materials.294 The report’s timing, together
with the previous controversies, suggests the increased importance of any imbalance
between celebratory and critical material after the troubling events in Eastern Europe.
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The attention to “style-chasing” in the foreign press is well known to historians of youth
culture, as is its official condemnation as a sign of moral decay and masculinity in
crisis.295 Journalists’ increased negative focus had not only damaged Soviet youth but
also focused international attention on a deviant minority rather than successful
achievements.
However much KP journalists prized criticism, their Komsomol media managers
clearly felt journalists had failed in their political duty to guide readers. The mention of
stiliagi reveals an acute sensitivity to the Soviet Union’s foreign standing. While
international responsibilities could stimulate institutional restructuring—as in the creation
of the Journalists’ Union—foreign policy setbacks could also curtail domestic journalism
efforts. Adzhubei succeeded Goriunov as editor-in-chief only months after the Pankin
controversy. Though he is closely associated with journalistic innovation at Izvestiia, his
colleagues lamented the absence of strident critique during his editorship.296 The Kaluga
episode was clearly a setback, though nothing like a “re-Stalinization” of the paper:
Pankin was not fired or disciplined, while Goriunov retained his senior posts in the
Journalists’ Union and was promoted to TASS director not long after.
•••
Examining 1956 through KP letuchki and party gatherings demonstrates that deStalinization was an interpretive crisis for journalists as they sought to communicate with
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and shape the Soviet public. KP journalists were forced to confront not only the reception
of political texts, like Khrushchev’s denunciation of the personality cults, but also the
reception of their own work, with its increasingly critical stance toward corruption and
bureaucracy. Discussions of criticism and the Hungarian events demonstrate how much
Soviet journalists prized factual accuracy and “bravery” in the face of official resistance.
Conveying and controlling information was now more challenging, as KP journalists
confronted both domestic censorship and increased broadcasting from foreign news
agencies. The Komolov episode serves as a crucial reminder of the diverse array of
possible responses to reform.297
Though they worked in particularly tense political circumstances—especially as
the uprising in Hungary unfolded—KP journalists’ principal objectives and goals overlap
somewhat with our understanding of journalism culture in other contexts, including
Western democracies. KP journalists had essential goals familiar from communications
scholarship on newsmaking and newsrooms: they saw themselves as dedicated
investigators with a clear social mission.298 This comparison of KP to other news cultures
is not meant to elide or obscure a fundamental distinction: KP journalists’ interest in the
cultivation of an informed socialist public rather than a liberal one. Rusakova’s profile of
Sergei Chekmarev brings this home—though the young man was held up as an
exemplary individual, his dedication was meant to inspire a wider audience to work for
the good of a collective. More critical pieces, like those attacking bureaucrats, were
designed to bring about a better future by correcting existing deficits. Though there was
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essential agreement about journalists’ commitment to a socialist utopia, de-Stalinization
gave rise to increasing debates about how to achieve it: through strident criticism, as
Pankin and Goriunov sometimes advocated, or through the cautionary approach of
Komolov and his supporters. The idea of the newsroom as a source of “social control” is
especially useful here. Sociologists argue that journalists form their behaviors based on
approval from colleagues or superiors at least as much as from their belief in abstract
values like objectivity. The role of peer influence was particularly disturbing to Komolov
and his supporters as they felt the editorial board was drifting from Party guidance.299
At the same time, the ultimate resolution to this issue points to another difference
between Soviet journalists and their Western counterparts—there were more
opportunities for proponents of more relaxed newsroom values to be disciplined, given
the close relationship between KP and the Komsomol. Though I have repeatedly
emphasized the extent to which journalists felt some inferiority vis-à-vis writers, they
were active participants in literary controversies, particularly the uproar after Novyi Mir’s
publication of Not By Bread Alone. Journalists who took critical positions or championed
reform could find support from colleagues at letuchki, even at moments of increased
anxiety. This was in some contrast to the more procedurally rigid atmosphere of Party
meetings.300 At the same time, the response to Pankin’s article reinforces that journalism
was more legible to authority figures than other kinds of creative work, which, combined
with its political importance, made political intervention more likely.301 As others have
noted, while Adzhubei oversaw the paper’s coverage 1957 World Youth Festival, his
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editorship was characterized by a more cautious approach to criticism than Goriunov had
taken.302 The consequences of the Kaluga Torch article, like the reception of Not By
Bread Alone, demonstrate the constant interactions between foreign and domestic
politics.
KP’s relationship to the Journalists’ Union is a more central theme in later
chapters, though the editorial board did respond to aspects of the conscious
professionalization process. Iurii Voronov’s editorship featured the only significant
mention of the creative union during a letuchka: the organization’s formation was
heralded as nationally significant, and the weekly critic quoted Khrushchev’s
characterization of journalists as “the party’s lieutenants.”303 KP would undertake more
critical campaigns under Voronov, with more serious consequences. The continually
fraught relationship between newsroom values and ideological goals proves that while
Soviet journalists were “conscious professionals,” they were as vulnerable as other
intellectuals to political interventions and sudden paradigm shifts.
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Chapter 3
The Party’s Lieutenants: The Public Establishment of the Journalists’ Union

1959 marked a turning point in the Journalists’ Union’s development: all local
chapters held their first congresses in February and March, and the first all-USSR
Congress was held that November: this marked the achievement of the Orgburo’s initial
mandate—congress preparation specifically involved finalizing the Journalists’ Union’s
structure. This was also the concluding stage of the bylaws debate, as the final version
was ratified at the end of the congress. This is not to suggest, however, that any of the
inaugural events resulted in a consensus on all of the issues raised in earlier debates:
differing visions of the organization were readily apparent, at both the Moscow oblast’
conference and the all-USSR one which followed it. The main unresolved issues were
still those of membership and social standing, whether the Journalists’ Union’s own
standards were sufficiently high and would result in equal professional status with
writers. The public gatherings were, in part, a celebration of professionalization. But the
celebration was afflicted with a central tension: journalists viewed their creative union as
an achievement, yet continually expressed doubts as to whether the organization was
sufficiently exclusive in its membership standards. Though they had the same ideological
and political responsibilities as their central newspaper counterparts, oblast’ journalists
were less celebratory and more critical about the advent of the new organization. In the
analysis that follows, I describe the main issues at both the all-Union Congress and the
oblast’ conference, and their implications for the professionalization project. This
meeting suggests that rank-and-file journalists had yet to embrace the organization and
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that material concerns were a major basis for their dissatisfaction with it. The two
gatherings were distinct in scale as well as in tone: local journalists continued to focus on
what the Journalists’ Union should do for them, while the all-USSR Congress was a
larger scale elaboration of journalists’ global and domestic responsibilities. Though both
meetings acknowledged the organization’s remaining imperfections, the inaugural
Congress was more focused on an idealized vision of journalism and the Soviet reading
public.
While the oblast’ conference, like much of the bylaws commentary, focused on
the Journalists’ Union as a domestic body, the all-USSR Congress in Moscow celebrated
Soviet superpower status as well. The superiority of socialist journalism to its
“bourgeois” variant was a central theme there, along with Khrushchev’s foreign policy
and his recent successful trip to the United States. Speeches from senior journalists,
together with demographic data, highlight one of the Journalists’ Union’s distinguishing
features: the active role of senior Communist Party members in the organization’s
hierarchy, and the high percentage of party members in the organization as a whole.
Khrushchev himself spoke at a reception for congress participants in the Kremlin,
acknowledging the dual mandate of the organization and journalism’s essential
contribution to the party’s work. His participation, and that of other senior media
managers, underscores the close relationship between the creative union and political
leaders, further complicating any attempt to discuss journalists as independent from the
Party.
The more celebratory aspects of the all-USSR Congress included a keen
awareness of the Soviet Union’s progress since the revolutionary period: the
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organization’s leaders readily acknowledged the ways in which Soviet newspapers and
their readers had evolved. Part of public professionalization was an explicit
acknowledgement that “mass journalism” was the product of another era. The popularity
of new genres, and the frequent references to a new “contemporary reader” suggest that
one of the positive effects of articulating a new professional identity for journalists was to
meet the challenges of a more literate and sophisticated public, and perhaps to bring that
public into being. The practical realities of reaching an audience had changed from the
Stalin era, and the reader’s role as both consumer and creator of newspaper content was
also given a new emphasis.304
The relationship between journalism and literature was another major theme of
the inaugural congress. Even creative union elites like Aleksei Adzhubei found
themselves acknowledging, implicitly or explicitly, that belles-lettres had a higher social
and cultural status in Soviet life. Adzhubei, and others, clearly felt that journalists
belonged to the creative intelligentsia—with its attendant focus on reading and writing as
political and social practices. Congress participants argued that distinctive aspects of
journalistic writing served a crucial social function, no less meaningful than that of
literature. The ocherk, as a descriptive story devoted to individual growth, was
considered particularly important. For congress participants, journalism’s relationship to
its distinctive traditions and the literary heritage was a vital professional question rather
than an abstract discussion.
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The public inauguration of the Journalists’ Union was in many ways an extension
and elaboration of the deliberate and self-reflective professionalization that the Orgburo
had begun in 1956. The shape of the creative union’s domestic mandate was contested in
various ways—the events at inaugural congress suggest that some aspects of this
contestation proved easier to solve than others. Journalists could, and did, engage in
cultural diplomacy, and they could recruit members, however reluctant, to give the new
organization a domestic base. Debates about who was a “professional” would prove
harder to resolve. Though all speeches at the inaugural congress were triumphalist in
tone, they revealed the tensions and ambiguities in the Soviet media institutions along
with their achievements.
•••
While they had been overseeing the preliminary discussions of the bylaws, the
Orgburo members had finalized the Journalists’ Union’s structure and prepared for the
first Congress of the Journalists’ Union of the Soviet Union. Their decisions regarding
structure demonstrate how the Orgburo sought to ensure that the creative union achieved
both its domestic and international goals. Many of their decisions reveal efforts to
strengthen the autonomy and agency of the Journalists’ Union, especially financially,
while still demonstrating the centrality of Party directives to the organization’s activities.
The earliest form of the organization envisioned commissions on creative work,
international connections, information organs, military and sport reporting, publication
work, and a commission for labor and everyday life issues. These commissions were
intended to avoid duplication of the work of local organizations, which were primarily
organized around genre-based sections. The Orgburo members debated whether this
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number and articulation of commissions was sufficient—some wanted to add a
commission for journalists writing on cultural matters, for instance. Kraminov, on the
other hand, protested that organization could be broken down essentially into creative
work, international connections, publishing, and labor and daily life—genre should be
reserved for the local organizations alone. Kraminov argued that “special effort” should
be made to improve the “material and everyday life state of journalists”—a view the
other members supported. Ultimately, Pal’gunov supported the four-commission view.
By April of 1958, the Orgburo transformed itself into a Secretariat, which would be the
“executive body” of the new organization and resolve day-to-day issues; more
“principled matters” would still be settled by the Orgburo.305 The Journalists’ Union’s
first plenum was originally scheduled for March of 1959 and discussed the Union’s goals
after the Twenty-First Party Congress, the work of lecture groups, the Central Journalists’
House in Moscow, and the attendance of Orgburo members at republic-level congresses.
Throughout this study, most plenums involved the participation of senior members of the
organization: its president, secretaries, and senior members of various commissions. Its
members also prepared reports on the initial membership data and labor and daily life
issues.306 The Union also increased the number of creative sections that reported to the
creative commission to include radio journalists, a local press section, and a section for
work with workers’ and peasants’ correspondents.307
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Though local journalists were frequently critical of the all-USSR body’s attention
to their material needs, the newly formed secretariat did undertake some preliminary
measures in this area before the local congresses. They ensured that journalists would be
compensated at the same rate as writers, composers, and artists for delivery of speeches,
and Pal’gunov petitioned the Council of Ministers to rule that a Sovnarkom decree from
1930 about additional housing for other creative workers should apply to journalists as
well. It is apparent even from brief descriptions of these meetings that dues were rarely
considered sufficient to cover both the union’s international obligations and its domestic
work—there were preliminary proposals to ensure that the royalties from publications
staffed by journalists went to the Journalists’ Union rather than the Writers’ Union, which
would reduce the Union’s “abnormal” dependence on the state budget, though the
outcome of these proposals awaits a more systematic study of creative unions and the
state economy in the postwar era. The Journalists’ Union continually struggled to
establish its equality with other creative unions, and dissatisfaction with this perceived
lack of parity existed at all levels of the organization.308
The Orgburo also spent a great deal of time on the scheduling and planning of the
Journalists’ Union’s first congress. This was originally scheduled for as early as the fall
of 1958, but the event was pushed back multiple times and ultimately did not occur until
November 1959. Many of these schedule changes were implemented to avoid conflict
with other events: the sixth session of the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet Union’s central
legislative body, in March of 1959, and again when a Party plenum was held in October
of that year. The major Secretariat meeting for planning the congress took place in
308

GARF f. 10124, op. 1, d. 11, ll.126–8, 482.

157

January of 1959. Pal’gunov, Goriunov, and Kraminov jointly drafted a speech,
“Concerning the Activities and Goals of the Journalists’ Union of the Soviet Union.” P.
P. Erofeev reported that branch conferences and republican congresses were proceeding
successfully, and included discussions of journalists’ goals in light of the Twenty-First
Party Congress and their responsibility to propagandize the CPSU’s most recent set of
goals. By April of 1959, congresses had occurred in twelve union republics, and in sixtynine krai and oblast’ of the RSFSR, with the rest to occur by the second half of April.
Underscoring the close ties between the party and the new creative union, the Orgburo
reported that party secretaries had taken part in these events.309
The Moscow oblast’ journalists’ conference, held in February of 1959, is my
main source for understanding how the Journalists’ Union took shape outside of its allUSSR Orgburo. Local conferences were centrally directed and their content determined
in advance—the all-USSR Orgburo provided the blueprint for the structure of a local
conference as early as 1958: chapters were to report on their work, discuss the bylaws,
hold elections to their central bodies, and also elect representatives to the republic level
congress and the all-USSR Congress, a structure which Moscow oblast conference
closely mirrors.310 Perhaps most significant, however, are the speeches of journalists
themselves about their hopes for the new creative union, particularly because these hopes
were largely unmet. Local journalists were more frank in admitting that whatever
“professional mastery” was, they did not possess it to the degree that their counterparts at
central newspapers did, and argued that the Journalists’ Union should provide them with
309
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more opportunities to grow and develop. Many of their criticisms were more direct
formulations of grievances from the bylaws debate, with a particular stress on the poor
quality of creative development opportunities, inconsistent material help, and unequal
access to resources, especially foreign travel and leisure.
Once all present at the March 1959 Moscow oblast’ conference had been
reminded of their ideological and political responsibilities to the goals of the Party and
the planned economy, Pankratov, the oblast’ party secretary, spoke in more detail about
the Journalists’ Union, and the need to improve newspaper content to better “form public
opinion.”311 Journalists were expected to use particular genres in service to this objective:
“the reader expects from you, comrade journalists, quality examples of literary mastery,
smart publisistika, articles, correspondence pieces, good feuilletons and feature stories,
deep in content and sharp in form.”312 Ideally, even newspaper editors would not lose
their connection to writing, so that their leadership would not have a “purely
administrative character, just as rank and file journalists were to avoid becoming
“apolitical everymen” who lacked the necessary theoretical appreciation of MarxismLeninism.313 At creative union gatherings,“ professional mastery” was often employed as
shorthand for expertise in a particular genre, or the ability to produce pieces that readers
would enjoy—this became increasingly common after the inaugural congress. The
content of more detailed criticism of local newspapers reveals that the particular
Khrushchev-era focus on the socialist person was now passed on to the creative union.
The newspaper was likened to a “beautiful garden” with a clear theme, content, and а
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lack of “monotony.” The “person, cultivator of riches on earth, should have a central
place in this garden.” Though oblast’-level journalists frequently complained that they
lacked the same material privileges as their more prominent counterparts in authoritative
publications, they were held to similar standards of creativity.314
At its inaugural conference in March of 1959, the Moscow oblast’ chapter had
433 members, represented by 130 delegates. P. P. Erofeev was the all-USSR Orgburo
member in attendance, and Komsomol and Party secretaries also attended. In an
acknowledgment of the Party’s authority, the Central Committee was symbolically
elected to the conference presidium. The organization’s development was the major
theme of the opening address: V. N. Golubev, the branch president, celebrated the
Union’s creation as a sign of the “unceasing concern” of the Party. Golubev described the
local Orgburo’s main accomplishments, focusing on membership work. The available
demographic data reveals the prevalence of close ties to the Party and the Komsomol, and
notable gender imbalance. Only twenty percent of the members were women, and only
thirty percent were without party affiliation. The Orgburo’s other successes were
primarily in the material realm: determining the average salary level for journalists and
providing them with funds in case of leave from work, illness, or retirement. Accounts of
organizational successes were usually quantitative in nature and often described more
mundane activities, such as the fact that “many oblast’ newspaper workers” had visited
their less established counterparts at raion newspapers for “seminars, consultations,
reviews of newspapers, and the like.” The local conference, more than its all-USSR
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counterpart, reveals that the new creative union developed gradually, despite the lofty
expectations laid upon it.315
The most productive and revealing aspect of the oblast’ conference were the later
speeches, after the official celebratory program of the Party and the Orgburo had been
presented. The speaker assigned to go over the bylaws discussion brought up many of the
same issues which featured in the national comments, particularly the importance of
economic and material questions. The speech touched on the question of membership
dues but also stressed the appropriateness of amending the bylaws to reflect the union’s
responsibility for matters of housing and working conditions and for assistance in
meeting journalists’ “cultural and quotidian needs.” There was also particular interest in
making the bylaws more “concrete” vis-à-vis the organization’s obligations to local
journalists. This summation of complaints and aspirations in a public forum suggests that
it was considered entirely appropriate for journalists to be concerned with questions of
equality of status and material support. Discussions at the oblast’ conference also
provided significant elaboration on the issue of membership. One speaker was more
openly critical of the draft bylaws, particularly the requirement that an individual should
have attained a certain number of years of work (stazh) to be eligible for membership.
“You can work a lot and not turn out to be a journalist. If, instead, the Union made it a
question of skill level (uroven’) they would then create a ‘stimulus for journalists’ and
they would also place more ‘demands on themselves.’”316
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In this vision of the organization, expertise was not a function of seniority but
more a matter of will and self-discipline. The same speaker devoted even more attention
to questions of parity with other creative professionals:
In another paragraph [of the bylaws], there is a great deal said about what
the journalists should do, but not about their rights. They have the right to
be selected, to participate in elections and be present when their expulsion
is discussed. At the same time, we have creative unions for composers,
artists, writers, and the like. Of course, one can argue how much our union
is’ creative’ compared with theirs, but it seems to me that people of
creative labor have a right to additional living space. Obviously a
journalist who occasionally cannot work at the office, when there are five
or six people in the room, when there’s smoke, needs additional living
space. It seems to me that we should also talk about leave from work, so
that comrades might at least receive creative leave, because for some
comrades there is very little time for creative labor.317
This speech brings member concerns about their creative union’s “junior” status
relative to other fields into sharp relief—the very status of journalistic work as “creative”
was uncertain. Though this may be read as a rhetorical gesture, acknowledging the
privileged position of writers (and secondarily, composers, and artists), the relative lack
of codified material privilege highlights real disparities along with the practical realities
of Soviet life. The evocative description of the newsroom as crowded and smoky makes
the case for an inextricable link between a materially privileged private life and
successful creative labor. Access to time off was similarly framed as key to productivity.
The fact that this critical approach to the draft bylaws took place in a public forum
suggests that journalists did indeed have some rights guaranteed by the bylaws or not—
the right to critique their creative union and offer suggestions for its improvement.
Several speakers expressed hope that the “young creative organization” would participate
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in discussions about royalties, labor conditions, and “the establishment of funds for
helping journalists.” One speaker explicitly called out the head of the oblast’ party
committee for his lack of attention to differing salaries from raion to raion, and
complained that local newspapers could not retain university graduates because they were
unable to offer competitive salaries.318 The director of the oblast’ publishing house even
critiqued the Union for taking too long to “gestate,” even longer than an elephant or a
human, leading to a lengthy neglect of journalists’ material needs.319
In addition to their expectations of material assistance, oblast’ and raion
journalists were also quite frank about their vision of an ideal relationship with visiting
consultants from higher-level publications and with the all-USSR organization. The
editor of The Podol’sk Worker admitted openly that very few of his colleagues had joined
the Union at first, and though this “did them no credit,” he mentioned it anyway, which
made many participants laugh. He complained particularly that “not one journalist” from
the capital had stopped by a raion newspaper, or if they had, it was for purely “utilitarian
purposes…give me a topic, give me someone’s address.” These journalists should be
more sympathetic and offer help—the Orgburo should assign these trips to members and
give them concrete topics to discuss.320
Other raion-level newspapers complained that they were simply not getting
sufficient attention or that seminars mostly consisted of journalists sitting and “chitchatting.” This was particularly disappointing to journalists who hoped they would be
able to use the new organization to “raise their mastery.” Similar critiques were leveled at
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the content of activities at the Central House of Journalists in Moscow, which were said
to consist of lectures or film series that were never relevant to a non-Moscow audience.321
Other speakers were far more concerned with the logistical problem of reaching more
distant journalists—seminars were always held in Moscow, and it was difficult for local
journalists to take time off and participate, since they had to be “jacks of all trades” and
constantly produce material in various genres. They advocated that lectures or work
evaluations take place on a rotating basis.322 The monopoly “major” journalists exercised
over foreign travel was brought up again.323 The assistant editor of the oblast’ newspaper,
The Leninist Banner, judged the criticisms of the oblast’ organization to be fair in many
cases and agreed to create a visiting lecturers’ group on the model of the central Orgburo.
But he also went on the offensive, noting that many of those journalists who accused the
Journalists’ Union of neglecting their needs had been slow to join it.324 This local
window into the organization suggests that journalists may indeed have had unmet
expectations but that their relationship to the Journalists’ Union was far more utilitarian
than the elevated language of “professional mastery” suggested. While journalism was
acknowledged as central to the Soviet Union’s governance, its creative union had yet to
acquire the prestige associated with literary writing.
P. P. Erofeev did not limit himself to symbolically representing the all-Union
Orgburo at the oblast’ meeting: he delivered a lengthy address and made a particular
effort to resolve local concerns. Though his responses to the criticisms leveled at the
organization were largely cosmetic, his speech does provide a useful sense of what
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expectations the all-USSR body felt it could actually meet. Erofeev’s responses are
surprisingly revealing about the Journalists’ Union’s ongoing challenges in fulfilling its
domestic mandate. The oblast’ journalists hoped the new organization would bestow
professional privilege and allow them to attain specialized knowledge. Erofeev
acknowledged the legitimacy of these desires but cautioned that they would be unlikely
to materialize quickly. His response to the complaint that it took a year and a half for a
conference to occur compared journalists to their creative counterparts once again, but
this time in order to stress their rapid development: the Artists’ Union had taken over a
decade to convene its first congress, as had the Composers’ Union. Erofeev admitted that
the new organization might have been too enthusiastic in its initial review of
applications—its 18,000 members included people whom “it is difficult to call
journalists… sometimes they have written things, sometimes they are respected and
known authors, but not journalists…but all those we have taken in, we are obligated to
educate them to be real Soviet journalists.” Exactly what this “realness” would consist of
was never specified, and the complaint that membership was too inclusive was persistent,
resulting in an amendment of the bylaws in 1966.325 Erofeev also took some steps to
defend the practice of sending primarily elite journalists abroad, essentially privileging
expertise over egalitarianism: it would be preferable to send someone to Spain who had
been before and had experience, to ensure that the best work was produced. He did claim
that local journalists were also sent on trips but did not provide specific examples.
Instead, he focused attention on the near-completion of a leisure resort that was under
construction in Varna and on the positive work of Soviet journalists abroad through the
325
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MOJ.326 Local journalists were thus encouraged to take pride in their organization’s
international reach, even if they did not participate in it directly or directly benefit. As we
saw in chapter one, the sheer size of the Soviet mass media presented challenges to
professionalization that distinguish it from the other “creative professions.”
Though he did not respond to specific criticisms of the content of professional
seminars available to oblast’ journalists, Erofeev proposed that the Orgburo schedule
lectures at the Journalists’ House in Moscow in advance, rather than wait for demand
from below and risk that lecturers were unavailable. He presented the trade union as the
most likely source of material support for journalists, citing the Union’s lack of an
“independent financial base.” All-union Orgburo members had long been aware of this
problem—to explain ongoing organizational challenges, Erofeev provided this
information to oblast’ journalists. Journalists in Cheliabinsk had gotten funds for a
lecture series from the trade union, and the Moscow oblast’ journalists were encouraged
to exploit this same resource. Erofeev also engaged directly with the problem of
professional rights—he admitted that the bylaws needed to be fine-tuned but argued that
it was not fair for journalists to think solely in terms of what they might receive from
membership, suggesting that they should appeal to the local party committee concerning
issues of everyday life, housing, and material support. Firmly asserting the professional
rather than material focus of the Orgburo’s work, Erofeev declared, “We are the heads of
newspapers. We cannot resolve this matter!”, although he did promise “other kinds of
help” as well—a vague formulation which seemed calculated to reassure his audience
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with platitudes, in the absence of concrete plans or financial resources.327 Erofeev
presented a more “conservative” interpretation of what a creative union could provide—
housing issues were beyond the new organization’s scope, especially since its leaders
were experts in creative tasks only. His remarks reflect the key distinction between the
Journalists’ Union and other creative unions—the former’s shared jurisdiction with a
larger trade union, which compensated for its lack of an independent financial fund.
The oblast’ conference demonstrates that the Journalists’ Union’s contested
nature extended well into its “established” phase. Though party leaders and senior
journalists all agreed on their profession’s social and political importance, there was far
less certainty that the new creative union was truly helping journalists achieve their goals,
with some indications that rank and file journalists did not yet see the organization as
completely necessary. Whatever doubts they may have had about the Journalists’ Union’s
effectiveness, it is clear that Moscow oblast’ journalists felt that their profession entitled
them to a certain standard of living and that they should not be ignored by their more
privileged colleagues. On the local level, “professional mastery” partly functioned as
shorthand for material and social privilege and professional skill, many of the attributes
frequently addressed under the rubric of “professionalization.” However flexible their use
of this term, oblast’ journalists clearly articulated a more expanded and powerful version
of their creative union, like other participants in the earlier bylaws debate.
•••
After numerous delays, the all-USSR Journalists’ Congress took place in
November of 1959. The event’s timing makes it a particularly useful snapshot of the
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Khrushchev era: much of the proceedings were devoted to the economy, the successful
overcoming of the Stalin cult, and achievements in diplomacy. As they celebrated
Khrushchev’s recent trip to the United States that October, participants were also
reminded of the importance of professional ties with colleagues and competition with
“bourgeois” journalism.
The congress’s timing, three years into the Khrushchev “Thaw,” raises the
question of journalists’ professional agency and the extent of continuity with Stalinist
cultural politics. While the formation of a creative union for writers was partly intended
to increase Party control over cultural output, studies of the music profession have argued
that even under Stalin, the nature of musical expertise afforded the Composers’ Union
agency even in moments of particular xenophobia and cultural restrictiveness, since Party
elites depended partly on musicians themselves to set the terms of discussion and
debate.328 The Central Committee’s prominence in the proceedings, and the
overwhelming number of party members among the delegates (and in the Journalists’
Union as a whole), makes questions of professional expertise more complicated than for
the music field. While it is true that senior political figures felt not only qualified but also
obligated to discuss newspaper content and encourage editors to pursue certain topics, it
is difficult to discuss these two groups in isolation or even to treat them as distinct:
Adzhubei’s personal relationship to Khrushchev is only one example of a longstanding
pattern—Lenin’s sister Maria and leading Bolshevik theorist Nikolai Bukharin feature
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prominently in the history of the early Soviet press.329 The all-USSR congress, like the
bylaws debates that preceded it, demonstrates that journalists used the formation of a
creative union to discuss their responsibilities in the current ideological climate, one
which some historians have characterized as an ideological “void” that journalists were
uniquely positioned to fill with content of their own.330 Most of the speakers were acutely
aware of questions of change and continuity: Leninist traditions served as a rhetorical
touchstone to a revolutionary past, yet presenters also acknowledged the Soviet Union’s
complex political and social evolution since that time. In the end, the congress was a
moment of resolution for organizational and procedural questions but left other more
fundamental tensions unresolved.
Rather than recount the entire event, I have concentrated on some of the more
analytically rich speeches from the congress, usually those from senior members of the
media establishment or the Party. The speeches highlight the creative union’s dual
mandate, as most of the participants confined themselves either to foreign or domestic
aspects of journalism work. On the domestic side, P. P. Erofeev and Pravda editor Pavel
Satiukov represented the creative union’s governing board and discussed the
organization’s recent accomplishments, most notably its membership drives and the
culmination of the bylaws debate. Aleksei Adzhubei, who by this time had left KP for
Izvestiia, concerned himself with the literary and moral dimensions of
professionalization, while M. S. Kurtynin, head of the creative union’s Leningrad branch,
focused on genre. Boris Polevoi and Aleksei Surkov, representing the Writers’ Union,
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provided further reflections on the relationship between journalism and belles-lettres. M.
G. Semenov, the editor of satire journal Krokodil (The Crocodile), and KP editor Iurii
Voronov concerned themselves with reader relationships and how to use genre to reach
audiences, as did Central Committee member Leonid Il’ichev, representing the Agitation
and Propaganda department. As befit their status as senior creative union members, both
Satiukov and Erofeev, with further input from Iurii Zhukov, discussed Soviet
journalism’s mission in the context of the Cold War—a topic which Il’ichev also
addressed. Khrushchev himself closed the congress with a speech entitled, “The Soviet
Press Ought to Be The Strongest and Most Militant,” in which he celebrated the
relationship between journalism and the Party while presenting both domestic and
international policy objectives.
Though they addressed distinct topics and represented different aspects of
journalistic and political work, the above participants touched on a few key issues,
though often from contrasting viewpoints or in ways that highlighted ongoing tensions.
While Satiukov and Erofeev both celebrated the creative union’s establishment, they
acknowledged organizational imperfections and unmet aspirations from the bylaws
debate. Similar contrasts emerged in conversations about genre, readership, and
journalism’s social status. Where Safronov and Polevoi celebrated the relationship
between journalism and literature as fruitful and beneficial to both creative fields,
Adzhubei took a more critical stance toward literature, expressing concerns that
journalists regarded their own work as less prestigious and neglected the rich heritage of
early journalism and defending journalism’s artistic worth. Voronov and Il’ichev took
generally optimistic stances in their remarks on social progress and the new demands to
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reach sophisticated readers, as did Kurtynin, who saw genre work as key to the creative
union’s future growth. In contrast, Semenov was skeptical about reader tastes,
particularly about satire being misinterpreted or misused.
Attitudes toward foreign policy and peaceful coexistence were similarly diverse.
Khrushchev, as befit his role as Soviet leader, was optimistic about the fruits of peaceful
coexistence, while maintaining a tone of contempt and hostility for certain ideological
enemies, especially West Germany and other “imperialists.” Both Zhukov and Il’ichev
were concerned that peaceful coexistence not compromise Soviet values, especially given
the growth of foreign propaganda towards Soviet audiences. Satiukov, though equally
critical of imperialism, took a slightly more celebratory tone as he addressed the
successful work of the MOJ and the overall decline of “bourgeois” journalism. The
speeches at the inaugural congress highlight an important distinction between public
professionalization and the more private newsroom setting: unlike in the KP letuchki,
where staff members could admit to uncertainty or dissatisfaction with authority, all
creative union members who presented at the event generally supported Khrushchev’s
positive portrayal of the relationship between journalists and officials. This relative
consensus is understandable given the setting and the political profile of key participants.
Like KP journalists, however, congress delegates still confronted tensions and
ambiguities in the cultural sphere— especially in their discussions of the creative union’s
membership statutes and the relationship between journalism and literature.
***
The opening of the inaugural congress on November 12 was recognized as a
nationally significant event, especially through articles in the central press. The media
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coverage placed journalism at the center of all aspects of the Soviet project—and the
creative union as a critical part of its continued development. It seems far from
coincidental that Orgburo member L. I. Leont’ev was awarded the Order of the Red
Banner of Labor on November 10, just before the congress opening. Literaturnaia
gazeta’s extensive coverage of the proceedings included pieces by Boris Polevoi and
Anatolii Safronov, both of whom had been members of a journalists’ delegation to the
United States three years prior. Polevoi compared journalists to the “military
intelligence” of the literary community, always at the forefront of major phenomena in
Soviet society, with their “hands on the pulse of the people.” He argued that in the West,
journalism was viewed as a “dirty profession” as exemplified by Guy de Maupassant’s
Bel Ami. The novel’s protagonist is overwhelmingly ambitious and engages in a series of
love affairs to advance his career, never displaying remorse for his behavior. In contrast,
for Soviet writers, the journalist was their “friend and brother.” The exact nature of the
relationship between journalists and writers, and the importance of superiority to the
“bourgeois” journalist would form a major part of the public celebration of the
Journalists’ Union. Safronov continued the military metaphor, likening journalists to
soldiers. He highlighted the celebratory nature of the Congress events, and that the hall
was filled with journalists of all ethnicities and backgrounds. Pravda’s editorial
emphasized the centrality of newspapers to the people’s everyday life (narodnyi byt’),
and the creative union’s new responsibility to ensure that content always improved and
remained faithful to the best Leninist traditions. Izvestiia’s unsigned editorial put even
more emphasis on the “spiritual” bond of Soviet people with the mass media, and the
importance newspapers had played during Khrushchev’s visit to the United States. The
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Journalists’ Union was a sign of professional growth and the Party’s appreciation of their
work.331
The opening proceedings, though largely ceremonial in nature, also provide key
insight into the significance of the new organization. Politburo members, particularly
hose who had supported Khrushchev in the “anti-Party” coup of 1957, were present at the
events. These included notable figures such as L. I. Brezhnev, K. E. Voroshilov, A. M.
Mikoian, M. A. Suslov, and E. A. Furtseva. All of the longstanding members of the
creative union’s Orgburo were elected to the Congress’ Presidium, along with the heads
of all Republic-level Union branches. The addition of journalists who were not as active
in the Orgburo itself demonstrates a greater inclusion of those closely associated with
Khrushchev personally and a more sophisticated press in general: Khrushchev’s son-inlaw, Aleksei Adzhubei, now editor of Izvestiia, his close colleague and replacement at
Komsomol’skaia pravda, Iurii Voronov, and Pavel Satiukov, the editor of Pravda were
all elected to the Congress Presidium and to leadership positions in the new governing
board. Several secretaries in the Writers’ Union were also elected to the Presidium,
including Konstantin Fedin (then head of that body), Alexander Tvardovskii, editor of
Novyi Mir, the journal most closely associated with the “Thaw” in literature, and Mikhail
Sholokhov, the writer of the Cossack-themed epic The Quiet Don. The film director
Sergei Gerasimov, who would win a Moscow Film Festival prize for his 1967 film, The
Journalist, represented his profession. Senior members of the Komsomol, the head of the
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all-USSR Council for Trade Unions, and the head of the Central Committee’s Agitation
and Propaganda Department, Leonid Il’ichev were included as well. In a move which
highlights the creative union’s close ties to the diplomatic establishment, М. А.
Кharlamov, head of the Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was elected
to the Congress Presidium and also became a member of the Union’s executive board.332
The first addresses to the congress stressed both continuity with Bolshevik
tradition and the revolutionary accomplishments of the Khrushchev era, while
reaffirming the importance of a close connection between print professionals and the
Party leadership. The opening speaker was Viacheslav Karpinskii, an Old Bolshevik and
the first editor of the newspaper for peasants, Bednota, who had been a close associate of
Lenin’s. Though Karpinskii was presumably selected to speak due to his own impeccable
revolutionary pedigree, his son Len was also politically active in the years after the
Twentieth Congress: he had headed the Komsomol’s Agitation and Propaganda
Department and worked at Pravda beginning in 1962.333 Karpinskii’s rhetorical goal was
mainly to celebrate the new organization’s mandate and to remind his audience of
Lenin’s legacy as the “first Bolshevik journalist.” The first substantive speech fell to
Satiukov, who spoke on the theme of “Soviet Journalists—Seasoned Assistants of the
Communist Party.” In keeping with his speech’s title, Satiukov was effusive in his
gratitude to the Central Committee for sending special greetings to the delegates. Where
Karpinskii had celebrated the Leninist press, Satiukov expanded his laudatory reach to
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include the “mass journalism” of the 1930s, with its reliance on workers’ and peasants’
correspondents and journalists’ wartime contributions. Satiukov was the first, though far
from the last, to celebrate Khrushchev’s recent trip to the United States and the approving
letters received from Soviet citizens. His catalogue of important subjects for journalists
was tied to policy issues: economic matters, particularly improvements in housing, and
the influence of literature and art on workers.334
•••
The bylaws and their ratification were, of course, a major topic on the Congress
agenda. Though most of the journalists present celebrated the All-USSR Congress as a
watershed event, it may more properly be seen as the closing arguments in the three-yearlong “case” for a particular vision of the new creative union—an attempt to provide final
answers to the main questions of professionalization, and to prove that the new creative
union had found its proper form, and place in the Soviet institutional landscape. These
speeches also provided the most useful empirical data for comparing the Journalists’
Union to existing organizations. As reported by Satiukov, seventy-seven percent of the
Journalists’ Union’s 23,000 members held full or candidate membership in the
Communist Party—a figure which is much higher than for other creative unions, as far as
can be determined from available data, and which suggests that the rhetorical habit of
referring to journalists as the Party’s “lieutenants” or “assistants” should be taken
seriously. Indeed, both P. A. Satiukov and A. I. Adzhubei were members of the Central
Committee and took an active part in its deliberations. Demographic data on creative
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union members’ educational levels demonstrated that the increasing literacy and
sophistication of the Soviet public was also apparent in the journalism profession:
seventy percent had some form of higher education, with the remainder having at least
partially completed secondary school. One figure, however, somewhat discomfited even
the otherwise celebratory Satiukov: women made up only twelve percent of the
Journalists’ Union’s membership. To make up for this imbalance, he discussed at length
the role of women in the revolutionary press, especially Lenin’s wife Nadezhda
Krupskaia, his sister Maria Ulianova, and the Old Bolshevik Comintern Activist Elena
Stasova. Along with Orgburo member Maria Oviasinnikova, editors of journals for
women such as Krestianka and Rabotnitsa were singled out as heirs to this tradition,
along with prominent Izvestiia columnists Liubov’ Ivanova and Tatiana Tess.335 While
the relative under-representation of women in journalism (and their status in creative
unions overall) remains a topic for further research, my findings suggest that women
were influential in some aspects of the Union’s activities, especially in the years after the
inaugural congress. Both Tatiana Tess and Liubov Ivanova feature prominently in chapter
five.
In his address to the congress, P. P. Erofeev focused on the bylaws debate and its
results as one of the new creative union’s more impressive accomplishments. He
reminded his audience that the bylaws were the “law of the Journalists’ Union’s internal
life, and are adopted to clearly and precisely define its goals.” Though, as I have noted
previously, legal scholars do not consider such documents to have had the force of law,
they have nevertheless been analyzed at some length in various branches of legal
335
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literature.336 Erofeev presented creative unions as integral to social life. He affirmed
Maksim Gorky’s argument that just as the Writers’ Union was supposed to represent the
“interests of literature as a whole” rather than those of individual writers or a small group
of intellectuals, so too was the Journalists’ Union responsible for “journalism as a
whole.” This example suggests an affinity and shared responsibility between one of the
Soviet Union’s more established and elite creative unions and its newest member—
perhaps an attempt to convey authority it did not yet possess. Though other speakers
would stress the distinctions and possible tensions between “literature” and journalism,
Erofeev was more concerned with confirming that “purely professional interests” would
remain the responsibility of the trade union for cultural workers, to ensure that the
Journalists’ Union would embrace its broader cultural mission.337 This vision of the
Journalists’ Union as purely “creative” was, as we have seen, not entirely popular with
some rank-and-file members, and thus might be read as a conservative gesture designed
to defend existing organizational structures.
In order to demonstrate that the Journalists’ Union had made some strides in its
creative work, Erofeev discussed some successful seminars and exhibits and a pending
contest for the best feature story about “people of the seven year plan.” He demonstrated
a growing commitment to what might be called “professional development,” describing
how Journalists’ Union members were increasingly seeking letters of reference from their
colleagues in the organization as they applied to educational institutions and the
Orgburo’s greater involvement in university admissions decisions. Though he defended

336
337

A. I. Schiglik, Tvorcheskie soiuzy v SSSR.
Pervy vsesoiuznyi s’’ezd, 89–92, 154.

177

the existing distinctions between trade and creative unions, Erofeev also lauded the
changes in the bylaws that reflected the joint relationship between the creative union and
the trade union and the “significantly expanded clause” on the rights and responsibilities
that membership conferred. As local journalists had advocated, district level
organizations could now take in members without confirmation from Moscow, though
the central body retained the final say in expulsion cases. The argument that each
publication should have a “primary” branch was decisively rejected, with Erofeev
defending the existing practice that each publication could elect a representative to the
higher body.338
Erofeev claimed that amendments in the bylaws which emerged during the
drafting and critique process were more consistent with Soviet society’s democratic
nature—for the historian, they confirm that the process of bylaws construction was not
one sided or “totalitarian” and that media elites took an active, if not always consistent,
interest in the views of rank-and-file journalists. The discussions about membership
criteria confirm that the commentaries on the draft bylaws were read and studied, as
Erofeev noted that “heated debates” had taken place about this particular clause. He
essentially summed up the “inclusive” and “exclusive” membership models, and argued
that the victory of the “inclusive” model was not cause for significant concern: Erofeev
assured his audience that the Journalists’ Union would not “lose its creative character and
by being оpen to those people who had written only a few brief news items by chance,”
since its members were only one-third of the sixty thousand journalists who currently
worked in the entire Soviet Union. The tension over inclusion of workers’ and peasants’
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correspondents was also addressed at some length, since apparently the decisive factor
was not “who works where, but how each wields mastery of language and proves himself
in his capacity as a journalist.” Though most participants in the bylaws debate supported
an inclusive membership policy which would embrace workers’ and peasants’
correspondents, Erofeev’s defensive stance suggests that some journalists felt that
professional privilege outweighed other concerns. In a different argument for high
standards, the editor of a multi-circulation daily newspaper from Gorky reaffirmed that
the Journalists’ Union should only accept “worthy people” as members, not those
“skimmers” who were only after monetary gain and a membership card. The creative
opposite of a “skimmer” was apparently the “activist,” who regularly composed work in
his area of expertise and produced “qualified articles.”339 Erofeev apparently felt some
need to argue that relative inclusiveness did not diminish the importance of membership.
The legacies of mass journalism complicated the new creative union’s “professional”
mandate and required attention to output and frequency of contribution rather than a
specific level of professional attainment. Fidelity to existing practices, both those of mass
journalism and the elite history of other creative unions was not without its tensions, even
at a moment that essentially closed the bylaws debate. The implication that some
journalists regarded the creative union as a source of money rather than a real
commitment would become a recurring theme in later years. The inclusion of workers’
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and peasants’ correspondents remained a contentious issue as well, as we will see in
chapters five and six.
•••
Perhaps as a reflection of the complex nature of its international activities—which
were conducted together with a whole series of governmental organizations as well as the
Central Committee—most of the prominent journalists who spoke at the congress
addressed domestic issues, especially the nature of journalistic expertise and social
standing. M. S. Kurtynin, the head of the Journalists’ Union’s Leningrad branch, focused
particularly on the importance of genre as a signifier of professional achievement. He
also suggested that the Journalists’ Union undertake more publishing projects and
improve its trade journal to better provide examples of the superior work. The ideals and
aspirations in some of the speeches were often as relevant as concrete proposals:
Kurtynin’s claims about the importance of “observation…the ability to look at the
essence of events, and find the most significant and interesting phenomena in social life”
was a theme taken up at length by Aleksei Adzhubei, then editor of Izvestiia.340 Adzhubei
reiterated that the “ability to see thoughtfully and clearly…this means one is a master of
his work.”341
Though he shared Kurtynin’s interest in increased creative activity, Adzhubei
reflected more deeply on the social value of reading. He opened his address by quoting an
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American journalist who averred that Russian toilet paper was of poor quality because
the paper budget was all spent on books and notebook paper—an expression of “concern
about the people’s spiritual outlook.” Adzhubei called these words “fair,” and expressed
his deep pride that Soviet press workers served “the most comradely reader in the world.”
Adzhubei lamented that despite recent successes, “we rarely think about the journalists’
‘kitchen,’ about our profession,” and agreed with Kurtynin that this issue needed more
attention.342 Adzhubei’s deep pride in the place of reading and writing in Soviet culture
serves as an important reminder that journalists, as members of a creative profession,
were also committed to enduring values of the intelligentsia—reading and writing was
often central to intelligentsia self-presentation, especially in the postwar period.343
Interest in genre was important to creative members not only as a means to reach
a more sophisticated professional status but also to engage with audiences and form their
consciousness. Concern with reader tastes and interests was not unique to Khrushchevera journalism: the discipline of “reader studies,” particularly prominent during the
1920s, was simultaneously engaged in determining public tastes and shaping them. These
efforts to shape an “ideal reader,” and to create literature and newspapers in response to
expressed interests, declined somewhat during industrialization, as newspapers became
far more focused on mobilizing Party and industrial workers rather than the “masses”
they purported to serve. The renewed interest in readers—particularly as objects of
sociological study—points to significant changes in professional objectives between
Stalinist and Khrushchev-era journalism. At the same time, the views of the reader
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expressed by creative union leaders were perhaps more reflective of the hopes and
anxieties of journalists themselves than of the actual reading public. I introduce these
themes here to suggest that the creative union was persistently engaged in efforts to shape
the socialist person, even before its domestic work was well organized and consistent,
and point to important thematic continuities between the inaugural congress and later
years.344
Kurtynin’s interest in genre and the selection of appropriate topics was shared by
Krokodil editor Semenov, though, as befit the latter’s interest in satire and social ills, he
drew more pessimistic conclusions. Semonov reminded his audience that Soviet satire
had not been and never could be “apolitical,” citing a recent Khrushchev speech as
support. The problem came with appropriate choice of subject: too often, he claimed,
journalists argued that particularly bloody or violent crimes were the perfect subjects for
a feuilleton. But these grisly stories lacked the necessary “moral and ethical” dimension
to truly engage audiences. Semenov’s critique here came close to accusing some satirists
of “sensationalism” without content—a common accusation leveled at “bourgeois”
journalists, suggesting that failed Soviet journalism could resemble its ideological
opposite. While he was certain that a greater focus on morality and ethics could remedy
this problem, he provided no examples that substantively defined the boundary between
wholesome entertainment and sensationalism.345
In contrast to Semenov’s anxieties, Iurii Voronov, Adzhubei’s successor at
Komsomol’skaia pravda, celebrated the Soviet Union’s superpower status and the
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increase in responsibilities that accompanied it—drawing a sharp contrast to the period
when foreign correspondents had less to report, or capitalist politicians debated whether
to grant the Soviet Union diplomatic recognition. Just as the international environment
had changed, so had the Soviet reader: In 1950, Komsomol’skaia pravda had received
50,000 reader letters. Five years later that number had increased to 80,000, and in 1958,
188,000, with the figure set to increase in 1959. Though he saw these quantitative
increases as clear indicators of social progress, Voronov was equally careful to
demonstrate that the correspondence had undergone more fundamental changes: readers
addressed the editors “more openly, as a friend.” This tonal shift allowed journalists to
write more on “moral and ethical themes” which readers were especially fond of. In the
revolutionary period, KP’s readers had been preoccupied with the moral appropriateness
of wearing necktie. As proof of growing sophistication, Voronov described a recent
popular story concerning “the spiritual world of the contemporary person.” Both
Semenov and Voronov presented the moral and ethical dimension as essential to truly
reaching audiences—the creative union’s genre seminars would also reflect this
preoccupation, as we will see in chapter five.346 While Voronov presented reader
relationships as an unqualified good, Semenov was more skeptical. Improving satire was
not limited to self-discipline and choice of subject, however: journalists also had to deal
with the “demanding” attitude of the public toward satirical publications—including a
hypothetical reader who called Krokodil before his plumber when his water was out.
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Even the near-sacred relationship between journalists and readers could serve as a target
for mockery.347
These two views of reader relationships and correspondence serve as important
reminders that the carefully crafted public messages for journalists could contain
ambiguities and contradictions, especially when it came to the different ways of
“constructing” the new Soviet reader. Semenov’s public was needy and confused, in need
of careful management and equally careful choice of topics. Voronov’s younger
readership had transcended the more mundane questions of the revolutionary period and
attained real sophistication in its tastes, and he celebrated the growth in reader letters
without reservation or qualification. Problems of archival access to reader letters prevent
historians from definitively proving which editor was “right”—indeed, the more
interesting issue may well be that two prominent and politically reliable newspaper
editors could maintain and promote such distinct visions of the same audience. Though
all speakers at the congress agreed that a connection with the “masses” was essential to
their work, there was no consistent vision of who those masses were. What is
unambiguous is the vision of professional responsibility each editor espoused: whether
readers were enlightened or materialistic, the committed journalist would seek out
opportunities to influence their tastes.
Adzhubei’s reflections on reader engagement were more focused on professional
failures than problems of public taste: he was disturbed that journalists could fail to
appreciate the deeper philosophical implications of the news items they produced,
especially their ability to engage reader emotions. His attention to the specifics of the
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journalistic writing, which included not only examples of improvements to inspire his
audience but also areas of potential improvement, indirectly points to distinctions
between journalistic practices and literary ones—a theme he would take up at great
length. Adzhubei wanted to provide an “example of how we often miss facts that are
important for a journalist.” One day, a short correspondence piece passed his desk about
a woman who had excelled at harvesting sugar beets in Kyrgyzstan. While the piece
described the physical conditions in the fields and the traits of the individuals involved,
“the piece was not touching, there was no portrait of a person, we did not know what this
woman is thinking, why she enjoys success.” As it turned out, the woman in question was
a war widow who had survived her husband’s tragic death and found solace in her
work—a story which could have truly inspired readers. Adzhubei assured his audience
that the majority of them could “reach a universal truth,” which would allow them to “lift
up hundreds of people to the very best, to feats for the glory of communism.” They would
do this for readers like the collective farmer who said, “the newspaper for me is an
academy, I meet all sorts of people there, from the man of state to our simple worker.”348
Though he did not explicitly invoke the genre, Adzhubei clearly shared
Voronov’s interest in moral and ethical issues, as he urged his colleagues to look for the
deeper resonance behind each story. His interest in the laboring war widow points to the
specificity of journalism—the capacity to inspire readers by introducing readers to real
individuals they could relate to and be inspired by. His reflections on heroism added
another dimension to the professional interest in facts, as well, since an individual’s
motivation and personal history was as crucial to grasping the real meaning of an event as
348
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a biography or description of working conditions. In quoting the farm worker who called
the newspaper his “academy” which introduced him to the nation, Adzhubei encouraged
his colleagues to remember their responsibility to create a sense of common identity in
readers.349 Adzhubei’s interest in emotions and the individual’s internal world would
continue, as he was essentially the keynote speaker at a creative seminar on genre in
1964.
Concern with readers was not limited to newspaper editors. Leonid Il’ichev, the
head of the Central Committee’s Agitation and Propaganda Department, spoke at length
about audience needs during his address to the congress. His presence and participation
serves as an important reminder that in the Soviet Union, reader issues were not only a
professional concern but also a matter of policy. Il’ichev reminded his audience that
journalists were “first and foremost social and political actors.” He also drew the most
explicit contrast between Stalinist journalism and contemporary needs. His vision of
party and propaganda work that was “mass” and “popular” in character was meant to be a
departure from past practices by reaching a more socially diverse audience. In earlier
periods, “the main forms of party enlightenment were directed primarily at party
members, candidate members, the non-party aktiv, and the intelligentsia…life itself
shows us that it is past time to expand the scope of propaganda, so that it reached every
worker, every collective farmer, every intellectual…in a word, the matter is not
ideological work directed at a comparatively small group of the population, but the entire
Soviet people.”350 Where planned economics had once forced journalists during the NEP
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and industrialization to direct their content toward party activists, the new journalism
would be far more catholic in its approach.351 Il’ichev expressed concern that “bourgeois”
sociologists were devoting more attention to the cultural development of workers, their
relationships with each other, and their productivity than socialist experts were. He
considered the growth of moral and ethical themes in journalism a generally positive
development, but he argued that questions of theory and social science were equally
deserving of attention—essentially arguing that both scientific and emotional approaches
to the reader were necessary. The evolution of social science in this period is most closely
associated with sociologist Boris Grushin’s Institute for Public Opinion, under the
auspices of Komsomol’skaia pravda. ll’ichev’s speech here indicates that the “scientific”
approach to social matters had widespread support in the Party352 In part due to the
prominence of KP journalists in the creative union leadership, sociological study of
newspaper readers would become a crucial theme for the organization’s domestic
creative work in later years, as I will address in more detail in chapters five and six.
•••
Though participants in the inaugural Congress discussed diverse paths to audience
engagement, it is clear that media managers like Il’ichev and editors like Voronov and
Adzhubei agreed that journalists’ professional success depended on diversifying their
approaches to readers and understanding their needs. While it was obvious that
journalistic skill depended on the written word—both producing it and interpreting the
work of readers—creative union members had to confront the immense cultural prestige
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of literature in Russian traditions and the historically close links between belles-lettres
and newspaper work. Aleksei Adzhubei regarded this issue as a significant obstacle to
professionalization, as he felt that journalists’ sense of inferiority held them back from
attaining excellence. His defense of journalism contrasted sharply with the positions
taken by Writers’ Union secretaries Boris Polevoi and Aleksei Surkov, who focused on
the potential for collaboration and mutual enrichment. Beginning his reflections on
professional recognition, Adzhubei remarked that, “We rarely name those real
newspapermen (gazetchikov) who spend their whole life on the newspaper, who
sometimes sit editing other people’s work for sixteen to eighteen hours a day.” This
desire to see the hard work of some journalists acknowledged, however, did not mean the
loss of humility. Adzhubei envisioned a newspaper where people “celebrated the success
of others, and were proud that the newspaper was completed, even though perhaps their
own name is not in print.” While modesty was a laudable personal quality in individual
journalists, Adzhubei considered the profession as a whole to be undervalued. His vision
of conscious professionalization was, more explicitly than most, a call for journalists to
recover their self-respect. He railed against the prevailing view that “any person with a
pen in his hand can be a journalist…we must propagandize the idea that journalism is a
creative profession, a calling. To be a journalist one must have particular qualities, and
work long and hard.” This was a matter of more than composition and wording; it was a
serious time commitment to which journalists could devote years of their lives to create a
journalism which “helps our great cause, supports it, and stands up for it.” In an
interesting choice for a journalist closely associated with departure from Stalinist
traditions, Adzhubei argued that this kind of journalism was visible in 1930s
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Komsomol’skaia pravda’s coverage of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station construction
project.353
Adzhubei’s vision of the profession as a “calling” evokes the nineteenth-century
view of socially responsible literature promoted by Vissarion Belinskii and should be
read as an argument that journalism was deserving of equal respect. Though Adzhubei
was one of the champions of a politically engaged critical journalism, especially the
genre of publisistika, his renewal vision here also relied on the traditions of the first Five
Year Plan. Aleksei Alexandrovich Surkov, secretary in the Writers’ Union and director of
the Gorky Institute for World Literature, supported Adzhubei’s sense of professional
pride. Surkov himself had worked as a journalist in the 1920s after his demobilization
from the Civil War and later as a war correspondent. Any claims that work in newspapers
was somehow inferior were not to be tolerated, especially given that writers like Pushkin,
Belinsky, and Nekrasov had been journalists, and that Gorky and Maiakovskii had always
maintained their relationships with newspaper work. He hoped that the new creative
union would learn from the mistakes of its literary predecessor.354
As he continued his defense of the profession, Adzhubei argued against the view
prevalent among young journalists that journalism was a path to “real literature,” and
insisted to great applause that, “newspaper art is no less complicated and responsible than
belles-lettres. I very much respect the writers in the Congress’ presidium, but I also
respect the newspapermen who want to be newspapermen and who do not think that
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journalism is the first step to becoming a ‘real writer.’”355 The writer and former war
correspondent Boris Polevoi sought affinities between the two creative fields, where
Adzhubei had drawn clear lines. Polevoi argued that while it was an “axiom” that
newspaper work was good training for literature, newspaper editors should consider
literature “absolutely necessary for newspapers, especially the genuine, cultured Soviet
newspaper of the builder of communism.” Both Adzhubei’s approval of Gorky’s
journalism, as well as secondary literature on journalism during industrialization, indicate
that Polevoi was correct to point out a history of fertile cooperation between the two
cultural fields. The history and possibility of cooperation, however, did not erase
rivalries: V. S. Plaksin, a delegate from Gorky, complained that few writers were truly
familiar with journalists and knew them only through “hearsay.” Even worse, some
cultural works, plays, and stories “portrayed journalists as caricatures…as superficial
people.” The new creative union’s responsibility to make connections between
institutions, writing practices, and professional roles was clearly a tension for Polevoi, as
well—he reminded all those present that he attended the conference “not as a guest, but
as a delegate,” and that there were newspaper pieces he had written during the war he
was just as proud of as his novels. In arguing for its own relevance, the new creative
union had to contend with established cultural traditions and practices both within and
outside Soviet newspapers. Even today, many members of the Journalists’ Union of the
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Russian Federation also belong to its Writers’ Union—demonstrating that Adzhubei’s
vision of separateness and superiority would prove difficult to realize.356
While he addressed journalism’s historical relationship to literature, Adzhubei’s
speech was also devoted to issues of continuity and change in journalistic practice.
Adzhubei celebrated observational nuance as a hallmark of the new press environment:
“more and more in our material, there is the viewpoint of a particular journalist, and not
some sort of general journalist. We are not afraid to say, ‘I thought, I saw, I encountered.’
There was a period in journalism, when this was not еncouraged.” Adzhubei is most
closely associated with the recovery of distinctive authorial voices, and his own words
here read as a subtle celebration of a less Stalinized press.357 His closing example of how
best to depict the lives of laboring people and be true to the view of a simple farm worker
who saw the newspaper as his “academy” suggests a more complex relationship to both
literature and the recent past. Maksim Gorky’s feature stories about Dneprostroi and the
canal there were his main solution to the inability of contemporary journalism to depict
the world of labor.358 Even for Adzhubei, the canonical father of socialist realism was a
revered figure. What is most striking about Adzhubei’s speech, however, is how closely
he linked a renewed journalism to a new vision of cultural achievement, one where
journalists embraced their distinctiveness. Both his celebration of the “I” and his call to
arms encouraged journalists to see themselves as possessors of specific skills and worthy
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of respect—making him one of the more striking elite voices in favor of a new kind of
professional standing in the context of the new creative union.
Adzhubei is often considered an instrumental figure to the founding of the
Journalists’ Union due to his prominence as an editor and close relationship to
Khrushchev. And, though he was not a member of the Orgburo, his speech here, more
than many others, indicates that the Journalists’ Union was not so much an attempt to
create or re-define a profession as it was an attempt to advance a particular argument
about journalism’s meaning and social function. His speech reads as an answer to those
rank-and file-journalists who sought parity with the Writers’ Union—though his
argument was less about material advantage and support and more about moral and social
value. Adzhubei, as both a journalist and political figure, was no doubt well aware of the
social and political weight attached to literature and thus aware of the legacy he claimed
for his own profession. In his interpretation, journalism work required skill and a social
conscience, and young professionals should not regard their work as inferior to belleslettres.
•••
Though I have thus far concentrated on domestic considerations, the all-USSR
Congress also addressed the global responsibilities of journalism as a whole—a topic
mostly relevant to the senior journalists who held important bureaucratic positions in
addition to their status at newspapers. Overall, the speeches on international affairs
revealed the close relationship between journalism and foreign policy—both the
responsibility of journalists to interpret and understand it and the influence of Cold War
politics on standards of journalistic success and failure. Pavel Satiukov’s remarks
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highlighted the importance of ideological struggle with “bourgeois” worldviews to the
self-definition of Soviet journalism. Clearly, the Cold War gave new weight to this
enduring paradigm.359 These discussions also highlight the close relationship between
creative fields and policy objectives and the limits of professional agency for media
professionals. Ideological fluctuations and definitional struggles were a key part of Soviet
political culture: in the 1920s, as Stalin struggled with his ideological rivals, Party
members found it difficult to determine the “general line” and status of political figures,
and often depended on Pravda editorials. Kirill Tomoff has argued that composers, as
creative union members, had some ability to define who was a “cosmopolitan” during
Zhdanov’s postwar anti-Western campaigns. Much of Soviet society was engulfed in
similar interpretative uncertainty after Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s excesses at
the Twentieth Congress. In contrast, which journalism was “bourgeois” was largely
determined by the Cold War’s fixed ideological and geographic parameters, limiting
journalists’ interpretive flexibility.360 Satiukov’s expectations for journalists are similar to
those found in more recent sociological scholarship on journalism as a profession,
especially newsroom ethnographies—a scholarly literature focused almost entirely on

359

Much of the historical literature on the “bourgeois” as the antithesis to the Soviet has its origins in
studies of NEP society and culture in the 1920s. See, for example, Eric Naiman, Sex in Public: The
Incarnation of Early Soviet Ideology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Michael David-Fox
makes a similar argument in Showcasing, 12–27. More recent scholarship on the Cold War itself highlights
the prevalence of the Soviet “revolutionary imperial paradigm,” a combination of Marxist-Leninist
ideology with Russian messianism (both ideologies set Russia up in opposition to a Western “other”). See
especially Vladislav Zubok and Constantin Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War (Cambridge,
Harvard University Press, 1997), 4.
360
On the general line and cultural politics, see Epic Revisionism: Russian History and Literature as
Stalinist Propaganda, Kevin Platt and David Brandenberger, eds, (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 2005), 19–20; On the disorienting aspects of de-Stalinization, I refer specifically to Miriam Dobson,
Khrushchev’s Cold Summer.

193

Western democracies, with some recent exceptions. I further explore these affinities—
and their limits—in chapter five.361
In his discussion of newspaper content, Satiukov argued that one of the main
responsibilities of Soviet journalists was to provide meaningful and accurate
information—a process which apparently required as much emotion and sensitivity as it
did logic. In contrast to the “sensationalism” of bourgeois coverage, Soviet journalists
would draw their information from the “everyday life” of their citizens, “their creative
initiative and good deeds, which characterize the high spiritual qualities of the person
from a new world.” In order to capture these qualities, journalists would need “a clear
mind and a warm heart.”362 Despite the elevated language and ideologically tinged
appeals to ordinary people, Satiukov’s interest in information and its transmission also
reveals parallels with the journalism he denigrated. He singled out the failure of the
Moscow city newspaper, Vecherniaia Moskva (Evening Moscow), to immediately report
on the successful launch of a Soviet moon rocket, joking that the newspapers’ former
editor and the American Vice-President Nixon were the only two people on earth who
had not believed in the launch’s success. The importance of timeliness as a value in
determining and shaping news is well established in sociological and communications
literature on journalism—though the failure to report on a Soviet rocket launch likely
carried different penalties than similar omissions would in the West.363
Satiukov devoted considerable time to cataloging Soviet journalism’s successes
since the Journalists’ Union had formed, along with demonstrating “bourgeois”
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journalism’s declining influence. He singled out the MOJ and its leisure house in Varna
on the Bulgarian Black Sea as a site of cultural cooperation. He also discussed the
competitive aspect of socialist journalism at length, claiming that newspapers in France
and Austria had shut down at the same time as Soviet ones thrived. He offered a classic
Marxist-Leninist interpretation to explain declining newspaper sales in the capitalist
West. The key explanatory factor was not, of course, the developing popularity of
television but rather the growth of advertising in place of more substantive content.
Satiukov also decried the growth of media empires under the Rockefeller and Hearst
families as a sign that objectivity was threatened by market forces. The notion of
bourgeois “objectivity” was vehemently attacked, with supporting quotations from the
writings of educational philosopher and former University of Chicago president Robert
Hutchins on press responsibility at a meeting of the American Association of Newspaper
Editors in Washington in the spring of 1955. Hutchins himself was a dedicated critic of
newspaper monopolies and especially concerned that American newspapers were failing
to inculcate democratic values in their readers. Satiukov argued that “objective”
journalism existed in limited circles in the United States, as exemplified by their fair
coverage of Khrushchev’s visit, and that similar “objectivity” could be found in anticolonial journalism in the developing world.364 Claims about objectivity were more than
a discussion of professional values; they were also a declaration of political and social
superiority. The sharp binary here serves as a reminder that definitions of “bourgeois”
journalism were much less flexible than other political terms.365
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Pride in Soviet journalism’s international reach was as important as the elaborate
description of bourgeois journalism’s decline. While heaping additional praise on
Khrushchev’s success in the United States, which he had personally witnessed as a
delegation member, Satiukov also stressed the increasing numbers of “internationally
experienced journalists” (zhurnalisti mezhdunarodniki) and placed several Orgburo
members in their ranks: D. F. Kraminov, B. L. Leont’ev, and Iu. A. Zhukov, along with
Aleksei Adzhubei, Izvestiia foreign correspondent Melor Sturua, and others. The high
value placed on international expertise throughout the Journalists’ Union’s incubation
process demonstrates its importance to the organization’s working definition of
professional success. Though few journalists could or did achieve the international stature
of Adzhubei or Zhukov, these men were clearly meant to serve as inspirational examples.
Other speeches indicate that all delegates to the Congress were expected to embrace the
international aspects of creative union membership, including its front organization, the
MOJ. Its president, the French communist Jean Maurice Hermann, celebrated its origins
as an anti-fascist organization. Hermann expressed pride that the MOJ was the “first
victim of the Cold War,” in light of the schism between it and the IFJ that emerged in the
late 1940s. P. P. Erofeev credited Khrushchev’s foreign policy of peaceful coexistence
with adding new significance to the Journalists’ Union’s mandate to promote “friendship
and cooperation between peoples.” Erofeev supported this contention with empirical
data: the Journalists’ Union had tripled its number of foreign delegations, from five in
1959 to fifteen in the coming year. And, presumably in answer to local complaints about
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equity in representation in professional travel abroad, Erofeev noted that half of the
representatives on these trips were from local publications.366
While the Writers’ Union was established at a moment of internal cultural
consolidation, and represented state interest in bringing various literary factions that
claimed to represent “proletarian” literature under state control, the Journalists’ Union
was defined by the Khrushchev policy of “peaceful coexistence” between capitalism and
socialism.367 The importance of this concept to journalists’ domestic and international
agendas was stressed repeatedly. Its most interesting articulation, however, came from
Iurii Zhukov, then the head of the State Committee on Cultural Connections Abroad,
which was one of the major Soviet agencies responsible for promoting foreign exchange
and cooperation among intellectuals in the postwar period.368 Zhukov sought to refute the
idea that peaceful coexistence signified any kind of meaningful relaxation in the
ideological Cold War, even after Khrushchev’s visit to the United States. He was
particularly concerned with the United States Information Agency’s activities. He cited
the large portion of its budget marked exclusively for “psychological warfare,” its large
number of foreign correspondence posts abroad, and its radio programming and
publications. The overall aim of his remarks was to demonstrate the Soviet Union’s
continued vulnerability. Zhukov also touched on the problem of limited opportunities for
dialogue: Soviet literary figures had a responsibility to find a common language with all
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proponents of peace, even if their other ideological viewpoints were hostile.369 D. F.
Il’ichev struck an even less conciliatory note in the international portion of his address,
arguing against those in the “bourgeois world” who were only in favor of peaceful
coexistence so long as this ensured the preservation of capitalism as a system. The
solution to this misunderstanding was to illuminate the logic of history and the inevitable,
and indeed already accomplished, victory of socialism. Though Khrushchev himself had
spoken about the need for “concessions” on both sides, Il’ichev insisted that
compromises in trade and international politics in no way extended to the ideological
realm. This lengthy excursus on Khrushchev’s foreign policy demonstrates that the
inaugural congress was both a professional celebration and an ideological refresher
course on the cultural Cold War.370
Zhukov’s battle plan put a particular onus on Soviet information agencies, since
the official state news agency Sovinformburo received thousands of requests per year for
information about the Soviet Union for use in foreign newspapers, especially after
Khrushchev’s visit to the United States. Zhukov claimed that the Philadelphia Inquirer
drastically increased its circulation after publishing Sovinformburo material on
Khrushchev’s foreign policy. Success in the project of Soviet journalism now depended,
in theory, on the ability to reach foreign audiences as well as Soviet ones. The
relationship between writers and news agencies was also an important aspect of this
project. Though writers like Il’ia Ehrenburg, Aleksei Surkov, and Nikolai Tikhonov
regularly contributed to the news agency’s work, other writers were delinquent in their

369
370

Pervyi vsesoiuzny s’’ezd, 125–30, 139.
Ibid., 204–7.

198

responsibilities: Boris Polevoi had not provided a promised article for a Chinese
newspaper, and Konstantin Simonov was similarly behind. An editor from Sverdlovsk
had even prevented his employees from writing for the foreign press, despite warnings
from the local party organization. Though Zhukov celebrated the high-level
accomplishments of internationally expert journalists, his speech indicates that a sense of
responsibility toward a global public was extended toward all journalists, not just those
who had attained fame and renown. Local delegates protested that journalists who had
traveled abroad, especially in recent delegations to the United States, did not present on
their experiences outside of Moscow or the Russian Republic.371
Whereas various participants in the bylaws debate had focused on the Journalists’
Union’s domestic responsibilities and their relationship to professional identity, the allUnion Congress’s elite nature made it a more appropriate setting to discuss the
international aspects of conscious professionalization. This included establishing a
professional ideal, the zhurnalist-mezhdunarodnik, and his opposite, the “bourgeois”
journalist, and reminding the delegates that their audience was now global. The
Journalists’ Union’s dual mandate determined the content of Soviet professional identity,
just as international concerns had led to its creation.
•••
The all-USSR Congress concluded with a variety of ceremonial speeches and
gestures: the reading of congratulatory telegrams from the other creative unions, approval
of resolutions on the Orbguro’s work, and protest of the unlawful imprisonment of the
Greek Communist Manolis Glezos. The more significant exercise was the ratification of
371
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the final version of the bylaws, which would be in effect until the Journalists’ Union’s
Second Congress in 1966, and the election of a governing board and secretariat. Though
these processes confirmed the close ties of the Journalists’ Union to the party apparatus,
certain personnel changes also suggested an increased role for reform-minded journalists.
The new governing board’s ninety three members included all senior members of
the all-USSR Orgburo, the secretaries of the republic branches, and the heads of some
oblast’ branches, including Moscow and Leningrad. Other significant additions included
Aleksei Adzhubei, Melor Sturua (both of whom worked at Izvestiia, the former as editorin-chief, the latter as a special correspondent), M. A. Kharlamov of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and the dean of Moscow State University’s journalism department, E. L.
Khudiakov.372 At the plenum convened after the all-USSR Congress, Satiukov was
elected as the head of the Journalists’ Union’s executive board. From the original
Orgburo, Pal’gunov, Burkov, Goriunov, Kraminov, and Erofeev were elected secretaries,
along with the heads of the other Union Republic branches, Adzhubei, and Kurtynin.373
The continued presence of international experts and the addition of younger figures
closely associated with Khrushchev’s commitment to revolutionary renewal
demonstrated that the Journalists’ Union retained its original structure but that the
creative ideals it promoted could evolve. Several of the major creative seminars under
the new governing board would focus far more on the socialist person than on mass
journalism.
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The conference formally concluded with the ratification of the creative union’s
bylaws. As I discussed in chapter one, the changes to the document were less substantial
than rank-and-file members had previously advocated. The document did not establish
Zhurfond or substantive material benefits to members. The proponents of a more
inclusive membership model were more successful: the final bylaws explicitly included
freelance journalists and worker and peasant correspondents. The document also made
more overt references to professional ethics, as slander and libel were added to the
grounds for expulsion from the creative union. The ratification process did include an
open floor vote with an opportunity for commentary. During this time, a journalist from
Kemerovsk brought up the issue of local representation, which was prominent during the
bylaws debate. He argued for the creation of primary organizations of the creative union
below the raion-level, since the current practice of each publication electing
representatives to the higher body. The head of the Moldovan chapter of the creative
union argued that this was unnecessary and would produce redundancies: that journalists,
unlike other creative union members, already had ties to their workplaces and party
groups, so a journalists’ union chapter for every publication would be redundant.
Following this exchange, the bylaws were unanimously approved.374 Though this policy
would later be reversed, as my discussion of the 1966 Congress will show, it
demonstrates the complicated nature of imposing a creative union on an already-existing
professional and party structure.
•••
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Though the presence of senior journalists who were also active Party members
goes some way to demonstrate the close relationship between the mass media and the
governing elite, the most convincing piece of evidence is perhaps the participation of
Khrushchev himself in the events of the congress. The Soviet leader delivered an address
to the delegates at the Kremlin after the event’s formal conclusion. In his remarks,
Khrushchev recapitulated many of the same themes as the editors and Party elites who
had presented over the previous three days: the close connection between journalism and
foreign policy, the value and meaning of peaceful coexistence, and the importance of
genre and reader relationships.375
Khrushchev took great pains to stress his own dual responsibilities, similar to
those of the new creative union. He described his “astonishment’ at economic successes
and then turned to foreign affairs. He described a Western view that “it is as though the
Soviet Union changed its politics, and therefore it is easier to talk to us. This is of course
untrue. We were born communists, live as communists, and do not die, but will move
forward as communists!” Similarly, though Western observers argued that he had created
peaceful coexistence, the doctrine actually originated with Lenin. He also insisted that
“the people of capitalist countries are not our enemies, but our friends!” and the real
enemy was the “imperialist circles, who rule in many countries. He also expressed pride
that the Soviet Union had enough rockets to “wipe all of our presumed enemies from the
face of the earth,” though this was only to defend the “struggle for peace” by having the
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adequate means to resist those who sought war.”376 Like Il’ichev and Zhukov before him,
Khrushchev worked to ensure the proper interpretation of his foreign policy, insisting on
his fidelity to Leninist ideals and assuring his audience that opposition to the exploitative
aspects of capitalism remained essential to his worldview. In some respects,
Khrushchev’s rhetoric was the most militant, as he exulted in the size of the Soviet
arsenal while insisting that it should never be used.
Khrushchev also connected journalism to foreign policy, acknowledging that the
Cold War was about print culture competition as well as military and economic issues. In
a discussion of his personal reading habits, Khrushchev admitted that while it might seem
strange or awkward that he read capitalist newspapers more than Soviet ones, this was
because “it’s good for us to know what’s happening in the capitalist world, what they are
saying about the Soviet Union.”377 This kind of surveillance activity was in fact an
important function of the Journalists’ Union, which tended to closely monitor the
attitudes of foreign guests or the effectiveness of its international activities. Khrushchev
also weighed in on more heated subjects, such as the relationship between writers and
journalists, though his conclusions also carried serious implications for questions of
professional identity and expertise:
We call writers the Party’s assistants (pomoshniki). I hope that writers will
not be upset with me, if I say that you, journalists, are not only trusted
assistants, but actually the party’s lieutenants (podruchniki), active fighters
in her great cause. Why lieutenants? Because you are always close at
hand. As soon as we need to explain and carry out some decision, we turn
to you, and you, like the most reliable transmission belt, take the party’s
decisions and carry them to the heart of our people.378
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This vision of journalism would seem to support the long-held view of the Soviet press as
a sterile mouthpiece of Party policy—transmitting party directives and propaganda
directly from the Kremlin to newspaper subscribers. This recognition of journalistic
expertise seems far more circumscribed than that enjoyed by composers. It is certainly
true that journalists were not, and could not have been, acknowledged as masters of
knowledge that the political leadership did not possess—there was too much overlap in
authority between the two arenas for such a claim to be credible.379
Rather than limit himself to praising journalists, Khrushchev was equally
concerned with possibilities for improvement, offering his own thoughts on audience
engagement:
Sometimes you pick up a newspaper, read it and set it down. And then you
don’t remember what is in it. I tell you this so that you do not put on airs.
You need to prepare the newspaper intelligently, and prepare it on a
different day from the one where you compose it. A real leader should
anticipate which subjects and themes he should ask for. He should be able
to choose not only a subject, but also to select experts (masterov), so that
the theme should be so developed, that, like they say about a well cooked
lunch afterward you want to lick your fingers.380
In this view, the successful journalist would be contemplative and thoughtful, and
know well the skills of his employees and how to employ them to maximum effect.
Leading journalists would engage their own analytical skills in a quest to inspire lasting
values in readers rather than fleeting impressions. The importance of journalists’ own
inward focus to successfully engaging audiences would become a major theme of
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creative union work after the Congress as well. Though his very presence at the event
indicates the political value—and supervision—of journalists, Khrushchev’s speech
nevertheless imparted journalists with significant qualities of contemplation and political
foresight. He affirmed the centrality of journalism to the Soviet project and to society at
large—even implying that journalists were more valued than writers. Though the elite
nature of professional status and its accompanying material benefits were unresolved
issues, the all-USSR Congress concluded with unambiguous declarations of journalism’s
cultural and social value.
•••
In my first chapter, I described the Journalists’ Union’s status as both
organization and argument, as well as that argument’s extended elaboration during the
bylaws debate. The Journalists’ Union, however, was an argument that also took place in
a public forum: the Journalists’ Union’s inaugural Congress in the fall of 1959. Here,
more contrasts can be drawn between journalists and other creative union members: the
characterization of journalists as always “close to the Party” is more accurate for them
than other groups, given that senior journalists also had careers in the Party apparatus.
The ability of journalists to connect to the public, and their responsibility to do so,
connects my study of the journalism profession to persistent historiographic debates
about the nature of creative work in a Soviet context. While Kirill Tomoff rightly points
out that the search for professional separation from political figures is both
counterproductive and impossible in a Soviet context, the composers he studies had more
ability to shape the political process than journalists did, as their work was less accessible
to oversight.
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Journalists’ close association with the party did not mean a straightforward
resolution of professional questions. Journalists may have sometimes been a policy
“conveyor belt,” but they also strove to determine who the most privileged members of
this transmission team were and to defend their own social relevance against that of more
established creative unions. The Congress delegates and speakers continued to argue and
debate the boundaries of professional belonging and the social standing of journalists visà-vis their literary counterparts. The internationally themed discussions of responsibilities
were in some sense more straightforward, given the strict opposition between “socialist”
and “bourgeois” journalism, though they highlighted the challenges of ‘peaceful
coexistence” and the heightened political charge attached to mass media activity in a
Cold War context.
Questions of continuity and change are also visible in the first three years of the
Journalists’ Union’s existence. Demographic data and the bylaws commentary
demonstrate that journalists had become more educated and politically active since the
1930s. The Union’s architects drew explicit contrasts between the Soviet public of the
Stalin era and their own readers, and even made some comments about the relative
capacity of journalists to assert themselves as authors. My examination of journalists as
social and organizational actors as well as individual authors demonstrates that the
Journalists’ Union is key to understanding exactly how journalists conceptualized their
various responsibilities.
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Chapter 4
Cold War Professionalism: Journalists, Institutional Change, and Cultural
Diplomacy

In 1959, the Journalists’ Union, in a joint undertaking with the MOJ and the other
socialist creative unions, opened a leisure resort (dom otdykha) in Varna, Bulgaria, near
the Black Sea. The resort was a source of great pride, treated as a tangible sign of the
Soviet Union’s growing international prestige and commitment to cultural diplomacy.
But by July of 1960, Soviet journalists, along with their socialist colleagues, had begun to
conduct themselves in troubling ways. The resulting incidents, though not without comic
undertones, were interpreted with the utmost gravity. One journalist, A. M. Khorobrikh,
got so drunk during a “carnival” organized for guests that he “could no longer stand, and
when he fell, bashed his face in.” (Ne smog derzhatsia na nogakh,i pri padanie razbil
sebe litso). Khorobrikh was apparently so caught up in the celebratory atmosphere that
the decision of Bulgarian colleagues to lead him away did not dampen his spirits. When
left alone, he crawled out a window and appeared again in the public hall, this time with
his “pants down to his knees.” A colleague from the same newspaper in Leningrad, P. P.
Pirogov, was also a heavy drinker and became overly familiar with a female Polish
colleague, staying out late with her in a local bar. In addition to these sins, Pirogov
accepted payment for a contribution to a Bulgarian newspaper—a practice guests had
been warned against, presumably because it was overly mercenary for committed
Communists in a recreational setting. For others, the local area offered different
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temptations; L. P. Kafanova was “needlessly distracted by walking around stores and
other commercial matters” and confessed to her “thoughtless” conduct. This particular
episode suggests that the greater availability of consumer goods in Bulgaria was of some
interest to guests—but that this fascination could be interpreted as political unreliability.
The resort’s Bulgarian director, far from being a paragon of socialist civility, did
little to improve matters. He kept the resort bar open until early in the morning and had a
jazz orchestra that played “exclusively Western dances.” He even led off the dancing
every evening with a Polish partner in an especially “immodest” manner. Apparently, the
revelry would end with him inviting Polish women back to his room to view
“pornographic films.” This association with dancing, jazz, and alcohol was not a new
Soviet anxiety. These discourses were particularly common in Khrushchev-era
campaigns against youth who were seen as overly Western in their dress and
comportment, the style-chasers, or stiliagi. These young people, like the resort-goers,
were often fond of “bourgeois” jazz. These unorthodox leisure pursuits came to an abrupt
end: the resort director was fired after a Bulgarian Communist Party investigation.
Khorobrikh, due to his public intoxication, was reprimanded at a Party meeting, had a
warning placed in his Party file, and was fired from his job. Pirogov received only a stern
reprimand with a warning.381 The Soviet consul in Varna brought these incidents to the
Central Committee’s attention, demonstrating that leisure-related mishaps were of great
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political import.382 As part of its response to these scandals, the Journalists’ Union
reminded local chapters of its high expectations:
Be especially careful in selecting candidates…as the international leisure
resort is not only a place for relaxation, but also a distinctive place,
bringing together and protecting progressive journalists from all over the
world, bringing about the expansion of international ties of journalists and
the cause of strengthening global peace and friendship.383
The Varna episodes demonstrate that media managers had a particularly exalted
vision of cultural diplomacy; even leisure activities were expected to advance Soviet
values and international prestige. The journalists selected for such travel, on the other
hand, were more interested in the possibilities such recreation afforded: whether that
meant consumer goods, parties, or more intimate personal encounters in a resort
setting.384 Though media managers channeled their anxieties through investigative reports
and procedures, they were no less acute for their formality. Though the creative union
was founded with an explicit cultural diplomacy mandate and actively pursued
engagement with the outside world, interest in openness did not mean relaxed vigilance.
•••
In this chapter, I demonstrate that journalists, through their work as creative union
members and in other institutional settings, were active participants in the cultural
diplomacy aspects of the Cold War. In so doing, I contribute to the growing
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historiographical literature on the Soviet Union as a world power, and the pursuit of new
kinds of global engagement under Khrushchev. Though Soviet leaders actively pursued
cultural diplomacy in the 1920s and remained a priority in the interwar period, most
recent literature on these efforts focuses on the expansion of foreign contacts after
1945.385 The Soviet Union’s new postwar borders, especially the acquisition of Western
Ukraine and the Baltics, created new opportunities for the movement of goods, people,
and ideas—which became particularly challenging at moments of global crisis, such as
the Hungarian uprising in 1956. I discuss the impact of the Hungarian events on the
creative union’s cultural diplomacy mission, as well as the broader interest in cultural
contacts with fellow socialists in Eastern Europe.386 Recent research has demonstrated
that Soviet interests in the Eastern bloc, especially in the two decades following the war,
was driven by interest in constructing an “empire of friends” based on ideological
compatibility and cultural exchange.387 Though exchange with Eastern Europe is only a
part of my analysis, the MOJ’s commitment to “progressive” journalism also rested on a
conviction that professional status and political orientation were more important than
nationality. The organization’s efforts to advance this vision—and oppose the
“bourgeois” journalism supported by capitalists and imperialists—form a crucial part of
this chapter.
Khrushchev actively pursued engagement with the West as part of peaceful
coexistence, through initiatives like the 1957 World Youth Festival and the 1959
385
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American Exhibition. Though hosting foreigners was a risk, Khrushchev and his
supporters were confident in the Soviet system’s competitiveness—and so were many
Soviet citizens, judging by their response to the American Exhibition, in which many of
them declared that the Soviet Union would surpass American achievements.388 The
creative union’s sustained expansion of its cultural diplomacy mandate—of which the
Varna resort was an important part—should be understood as part of this broader
institutional and political history. As we saw in chapter one, Kraminov’s belief that the
Soviet Union was losing foreign influence in the MOJ was a crucial factor in the
formation of the creative union. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, these journalists with
international experience found themselves heading up new cultural diplomacy agencies
or advocating for the reform of existing institutions. The elite figure of the internationally
sophisticated journalist, or zhurnalist-mezhdunarodnik, was integral to cultural diplomacy
work. For this group of journalists, the ability to represent the Soviet Union abroad and
work closely with visiting foreigners were essential professional skills. As we have seen,
several members of the Journalists’ Union’s Orgburo were considered zhurnalisty
mezhdunarodniki—creative union efforts to improve work with foreigners were nearly
always focused on cultivating enough qualified international experts for major
international undertakings—and ensuring that their behavior while abroad was a source
of pride rather than embarrassment. Though Soviet media elites continually stressed that
their work was more sophisticated and detailed than “tourism,” journalists’ efforts to
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engage with foreign visitors and understand other countries did involve leisure and
cultural pursuits.389
As the MOJ had its own organizational history and structure, separate from that of
the Journalists’ Union, some attention to its formation process is crucial background for
this chapter. Soviet histories of the MOJ note its origins in the tumultuous atmosphere of
wartime Europe and the aftermath of victory over the Axis powers: anti-fascist journalists
held four congresses pledging their cooperation in the fight against Hitler—the MOJ’s
formal creation dated to June 1946, at an International Congress of Journalists held in
Copenhagen that June. Participation in this meeting involved twenty-one countries,
including the USSR, the United States, and England. By 1947, at the organization’s
second congress in Prague, tensions were on the rise between socialist and capitalist
journalists over moving the organization’s headquarters from London to Prague. By
1948, American and Western European journalists formally disassociated themselves
from the MOJ, a period which Soviet sources refer to as a “schism” in the journalist’s
cooperation movement, culminating in the formation of the International Federation of
Journalists, based in Brussels. At the MOJ’s third congress in 1950, held in Helsinki,
Finland, French journalist Jean-Maurice Hermann was elected president, a position he
would hold for over two decades. By 1952, splits in the international journalists’
movement had adversely affected the MOJ’s standing: it lost consultative status with
UNESCO that year and only regained it in 1969. At the time of Kraminov’s memo
advocating the creative union’s formation, the MOJ had approximately sixty thousand
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members. By 1981 these numbers would increase to one hundred fifty thousand, though
precise figures are disputed and difficult to trace.390 The MOJ took political stances in
favor of “progressive” journalists—this involved a vocal commitment to pacifism, work,
and leisure rights and protesting political persecution of the press. Over time, its agenda
became increasingly anti-colonial—a process that would have profound impact on the
Journalists’ Union’s cultural diplomacy initiatives.391 In addition to its Executive
Committee, which usually met on a yearly basis, and its congresses, the organization also
had a secretariat, composed of vice president, secretaries, and a treasurer. The secretarygeneral was traditionally a Czech journalist. Throughout the period of this study, a
Journalists’ Union member, often though not always the creative union president, was
also an MOJ vice-president, as indirect recognition of the Soviet Union’s management
role. One of the MOJ’s secretaries was also a creative union member—these
representatives feature prominently in the narrative, as they often reported to both the
creative union and the Central Committee.392
Many of the key figures in this chapter are familiar from previous episodes. Boris
Polevoi’s American trip was an important catalyst for institutional change, and Leonid
Il’ichev, who spoke at the inaugural congress as a member of the Agitation and
Propaganda Department, also oversaw the creative union’s creation during his time at the
MID. In the years before the inaugural congress, the Orgburo leadership assumed much
390
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of the responsibility for the MOJ, and senior members like Kraminov, Boris Burkov, and
P. P. Erofeev remained involved in later years. Afterward, senior members of its
secretariat occupied similar roles: including union president Pavel Satiukov, Aleksei
Adzhubei, and M. A. Kharlamov, who had previously worked at the MID press
department. The involvement of senior newspaper editors—some of whom had personal
relationships to Khrushchev—further demonstrates the political value of journalism in the
Cold War.
Cultural diplomacy was inextricably linked to promoting and expanding the
Soviet Union’s ideological interests and global dominance. Though I do discuss SovietAmerican rivalry as part of the MOJ’s work, many of my findings connect to Soviet
initiatives in the developing world—the cultural aspects of what Odd Arne Westad has
termed the “Global Cold War.”393 I explore this theme through the MOJ’s rivalry with
“bourgeois” journalists and efforts to bring in new members. In so doing, I significantly
expand historical knowledge of “front” organizations and their operation. Cold War-era
scholarship on these bodies stresses their usefulness for the Soviet leadership, as
organizations not directly connected to communist parties but generally sympathetic to
Soviet ideological positions. This made them able to operate in “parallel” to its foreign
policy establishment. The amount of Soviet monetary aid to these organizations was
substantial, though to my knowledge no coherent analysis of these subsidies exists.394 My
work on the MOJ, rather than refuting the view of front organizations as extensions of the
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political apparatus, aims to provide it with more nuance. While the Central Committee
closely monitored its work, as did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID), the creative
union assumed primary responsibility for the MOJ. The proper management of the front
organization was a continual source of friction and anxiety. Soviet representatives to the
MOJ frequently criticized the creative union’s leadership and decision making, and
petitioned the Central Committee with their own visions of the organization. Though few
of these proposals resulted in significant changes, they demonstrate the high political
value attached to cultural diplomacy and the continued drive for improvement. The
creative union’s critics often employed the language of moral failure or laziness to argue
for higher standards or increased oversight.
One of the MOJ’s most important undertakings was its responsibility to host
World Journalists’ Meetings: gatherings in a major world city dedicated to discussions of
professional concerns and the political issues of the day. These gatherings were open to
non-MOJ members, though the main participants were close to the organization and
Soviet journalists always had leading roles. In this chapter, I discuss three of these events,
the meetings in 1956, 1960, and 1963. While the first two focused on rapprochement with
the West, participants grew increasingly concerned with the developing world and
managing the consequences of the Sino-Soviet split. The MOJ thus serves as an
important barometer for Soviet foreign policy objectives and views on global politics.
•••
Examining cultural diplomacy efforts prior to the Journalists’ Union’s formation
proves that journalists played significant roles in this arena even in the absence of a
creative union. Journalists’ travel abroad had lasting domestic implications for the Soviet
215

approach to cultural diplomacy and the political status of journalists. Boris Polevoi’s
autumn 1955 visit to the United States, as part of a journalists’ delegation that included
Aleksei Adzhubei, had lasting repercussions for Soviet cultural diplomacy. In late
November of 1955, Polevoi composed a lengthy report of his journey. The trip was a
monumental undertaking: in thirty-three days, the delegation visited New York,
Cleveland, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, and Phoenix, before concluding their journey
in Washington, D.C. Polevoi made special note of the delegation’s visit not only to
newspapers and radio and television broadcasting stations but also to the journalism
departments at Columbia and at UCLA. Both media managers and journalism professors
expressed interest in furthering foreign exchange. As part of their efforts to
“propagandize” the Soviet way of life, the delegates made media appearances and gave
press conferences—Polevoi thought that audiences were generally “sympathetic” to the
views expressed at these events. He was especially pleased that the audience for a final
televised press forum in Washington numbered five million people. Even more
fortuitously, two “betrayers of the motherland”—presumably émigrés known to his
audience, as they were referred to only by their surnames, Volkov and Koriakov—did not
have their “provocative” questions read by the moderator. As Rosa Magnusdottir has
noted, Polevoi was quite frank about the weaknesses of the Soviet position as
representatives of socialism to the West: knowledge of the United States was not current,
and interactions in which Soviet representatives put too much stress on racial inequality
could prove alienating. As far as future efforts to host foreigners, Polevoi suggested
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providing more detailed information about Soviet life, and that poor service on Aeroflot
flights could have “political” repercussions.395
The logistical challenges of providing hospitality that would meet foreigners’
expectations would prove to be an ongoing theme for the Journalists’ Union.
Magnsudottir’s analysis only gestures to the domestic implications of Polevoi’s visit.
Polevoi did not limit his criticism of Soviet cultural diplomacy to the problem of limited
Soviet knowledge of American life. In a separate report to the Central Committee written
in December 1955, he and his colleagues wrote in scathing terms about the conditions of
TASS’s Washington and American bureaus. He was particularly critical of the recall of
qualified correspondents and their replacement by those who “had never worked in
America and did not know the country” or who only spoke Spanish. TASS
correspondents were too timid with American colleagues for fear of inciting conflict,
where Polevoi thought that they should “conduct themselves without embarrassment” and
not avoid political debates. Polevoi insisted Soviet TASS workers were underpaid,
especially in comparison to their American counterparts and those who worked in
embassies. In a particularly damning point which showcases his own professional pride,
Polevoi complained that journalists’ pay was more like that of chauffeurs than to that of
diplomats. This relative poverty impaired their ability to socialize, which “compromised
them.” He also claimed that the dilapidated automobiles TASS workers drove was
comparable to “representatives of a major American agency going around Moscow in a
pre-revolutionary carriage.” To conclude his report, Polevoi asserted that “strengthening
395
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correspondents’ cadres in a country like America, has, in our view, important political
meaning.”396
The Central Committee took Polevoi’s concerns quite seriously, as Presidium
member M. A. Suslov was among those who suggested that action be taken on the report.
TASS director Pal’gunov forwarded his agency’s response to the case in March of 1956,
which disputed many of Polevoi’s allegations. Pal’gunov’s assistant, the report’s author,
assured the Central Committee that TASS foreign correspondents were now driving a
new Ford, and that salary discrepancies between American and Soviet TASS employees
were due to American income tax. Polevoi’s complaints that the new workers were
inexperienced were met with reminders that the experienced journalists had been recalled
because they had been abroad for over five years, with assurances that new
correspondents would be sent shortly. TASS workers did make less than their
counterparts who performed similar functions in embassies, and agency director
Pal’gunov had made unsuccessful efforts to correct it. Proposals to send Pal’gunov to the
United States to review the work of telegraph agencies there, or re-education courses,
were ultimately not pursued.397
The effects of Polevoi’s report reached far beyond the media establishment. In
January of 1956, the administration of Moscow University and the Central Committee’s
Science and Education Department requested that Polevoi speak about American
journalism training, particularly at Columbia University, so that these practices could be
studied and emulated. In March of 1956, the Minister of Higher Education advocated
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that Soviet embassies popularize Soviet higher education abroad, by recruiting “qualified
and erudite” professors and students to speak to curious foreigners. Soviet universities
and other learning institutions would be encouraged to set up regular correspondence
with their capitalist counterparts, as they had in Eastern Europe, and to send scientific
literature abroad without prior censorship. The Ministry of Culture provided a list of
similar proposals.398 In a report to the Central Committee in April 1956, an assistant to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs asserted that ambassadors had already begun preparing
speeches about foreign policy for universities along with film screenings, press
conferences, and exhibits. More ambitious proposals included sending embassy personnel
on trips to “establish useful practical cooperation with Americans, in particular for the
support and strengthening of ties with those who were favorably disposed to members of
Soviet delegations that have visited the United States.” The extent and detail of these
responses demonstrates that Polevoi and his colleagues were seen as crucial sources of
information for improving the Soviet Union’s image in multiple contexts.399
Polevoi’s visit was the catalyst for significant restructuring of cultural diplomacy
agencies. The All-Union Society for Cultural Connections Abroad (VOKS) was
established in 1925. In his definitive account of cultural diplomacy and VOKS, Michael
David-Fox describes the great care that cultural diplomats took to present a positive and
enlightened image of Soviet life to foreign visitors. In his conclusion, he argues that the
shuttering of VOKS and its replacement by the State Committee for Cultural Connections
Abroad (GKKS) was intended to “regularize” foreign exchange and also increase the
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influence of the Central Committee. Archival records make clear that Polevoi’s visit to
the United States was a crucial factor in bringing about this institutional change. In
March of 1956, Leonid Il’ichev, then head of the MID Press Department, proposed that
VOKS be “restructured, dispensing with its institutional character and turning it into a
purely social organization.” In practice, this meant that the organization should be staffed
“not by bureaucrats, but notable Soviet social figures, artists, musicians, writers, athletes
and trade union activists.” Ideally, the organization would also organize its departments
by country, rather than the previous arrangement according to “questions.” A restructured
VOKS would be better able to facilitate bilateral cultural and scientific exchange,
tourism, student visits, and youth festivals.400
Though detailed research into these proposals is beyond the scope of this study,
Il’ichev’s memo does much to explain the central role for journalists in the restructured
cultural diplomacy apparatus. For the first four years of its existence, the GKKS was
headed not by a “bureaucrat” but by Iurii Zhukov, a senior member of Pravda’s editorial
board who also took a leading role in the formation of he Journalists’ Union, as we saw in
chapter one. Some of Il’ichev’s other proposals indicate a cautiously optimistic approach
to the outside world, including the relaxation of Soviet censorship of foreign information
sources, particularly foreign correspondents. He suggested regularized information
exchange with foreign correspondents via the MID’s Press Department, and was
particularly frank about freedom of information. He suggested that Soviet institutions,
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provided that their work “did not have a specifically secret character,” prepare for more
discussion with foreign journalists.
Il’ichev was even relatively optimistic about sharing information:
As far as censorship is concerned, at present it rarely…interferes with the
content of information passed on by foreign correspondents, and operates
only for the purposes of compiling reports about transmitted articles. It’s
doubtful that the time is ripe for its cessation, since there is not another
means for timely interference into crude and slanderous pronouncement
than that which currently exists.
The problem of combatting “slander” from abroad would continue as the GKKS and
Journalists’ Union expanded their cultural diplomacy roles, as we will see below. As part
of his interest in relaxing tensions, Il’ichev suggested allowing foreign correspondents
access to the Central House of Journalists and increasing circulation of publications in
English and French.401
In addition to advancing a new vision for the cultural diplomacy apparatus,
Il’ichev submitted a series of suggestions for the new creative union in March 1956.
Given his earlier suggestions that VOKS needed to become less “institutional,” his
interest in the new creative union suggests that it was not only a reshaping of the
journalism profession but also a reflection of a broader impulse to make cultural
initiatives more effective. Il’ichev described a Journalists’ Union that “would establish
working relationships with all analogous institutions which desire this.” In addition to
facilitating the exchange of printed materials, the new organization should host
delegations and ensure that they visited interesting places—major cities, factories, and
collective farms. When necessary, the creative union “could conduct press conferences

401

RGANI f. 5, op. 16, d. 748, ll. 96–7.

221

with the participation of foreign journalists,” and its trade journal could also promote
exchange. Il’ichev’s suggestions, with their reliance on conditionals, stress the embryonic
nature of the Journalists’ Union at this point—and that the preliminary response to
Kraminov’s initial proposal had not yet resulted in a concept of organizational structure
or practice.402
Il’ichev’s proposals combined concrete description with ideological and strategic
objectives. The Journalists’ Union should “enter into contact with international
organizations of journalists, influence their activities, in the needed direction for
strengthening and increasing the role of the press in the struggle for peace and
diminishing of international tensions, against disinformation and slander, against the
subornation of the press, and for the complete freedom of journalistic activity.” The
creative union would represent Soviet interests in UNESCO and other relevant
international bodies.403 Though cooperation was clearly one of his major goals, Il’ichev
also stressed the importance of competitiveness and increased knowledge of ideological
enemies: the Journalists’ Union should analyze the foreign press, including professional
training practices, together with “bourgeois propaganda methods against the Soviet
Union and the people’s democracies.”404 This vision demonstrates that the development
of international expertise and successful defensive strategies against ideological
opponents would be a key part of journalistic responsibility in the creative union. By
summer 1956, an article appeared in the creative union’s trade journal lamenting the lack
of foreign language skill in the profession as a whole, since this presented major
402
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obstacles to conducting interviews and making personal contacts.405 Dossiers on
journalists who went abroad referenced to language skill, prior foreign travel, and
ideological reliability.406 These specific qualifications suggest that the international
dimension of “professional mastery” was easier to measure and define. In the first months
and years of its existence, the Journalists’ Union took on a management role vis-à-vis the
MOJ, and increasingly sent its own delegations abroad in addition to hosting foreign
guests—demonstrating that Il’ichev’s vision of the creative union’s international mandate
would prove formative. As I will show in later chapters, the overwhelming primacy of
cultural diplomacy would become a source of friction between elite and rank-and-file
journalists.
•••
During the period of my study, the Journalists’ Union frequently hosted shortterm foreign guests and reported on their activities. These efforts significantly expanded
over time: in 1958, the organization hosted only twenty-eight foreign journalists. By
1964, it hosted nearly seven times that number: 194 guests in all.407 The creative union’s
most important responsibility, however, was its oversight of the MOJ and the World
Journalists’ Meetings, and I devote the remainder of this chapter to this theme. Though
the MOJ, like the creative union, was formally dedicated to open cultural exchange,
journalists were highly anxious about cross-cultural encounters, as they offered many
405
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opportunities for political misbehavior, as we saw in the opening anecdotes about the
Varna resort. Both MOJ journalists and diplomatic officials frequently appealed to the
Central Committee to discipline the creative union or alter the organization’s policies,
especially after mishaps in Varna. Though these efforts rarely succeeded, they attest to
the great political value of cultural diplomacy and the place of journalists within such
efforts. The World Journalists’ Meetings further illustrate the extent of these anxieties,
while serving as an important political and cultural barometer. In the creative union’s
first years of existence, the organization concentrated on lessening Cold War tensions in
Eastern Europe. After the Hungarian uprising, creative union members displayed more
anxiety about Eastern Europe, and increasingly focused cultural diplomacy efforts on the
developing world. When the 1960 World Journalists’ Meeting was less successful, MOJ
representatives appealed to the Central Committee for redress. As a result, the 1964
World Journalists’ meeting was meticulously planned and thoroughly devoted to the
developing world. Creative union leaders took great pride in the Soviet Union’s increased
stature in newly independent nations and persistently articulated their hostility to both a
capitalist media system and to colonialism as a whole. Although the World Journalists’
meetings featured fewer obvious mishaps than the drunken antics at the Varna leisure
resort, Soviet media managers did not relax their vigilance, especially in the face of rising
tensions with China. The 1963 meeting showcases the extent of the MOJ’s
transformation—while it has originated as an anti-fascist organization and spent its early
years focused on Soviet relations with Western Europe, it became truly global over time.
Just as the Journalists’ Union was formed in a moment of institutional and political
transformation, the MOJ altered its own priorities under the creative union’s leadership.
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The Varna leisure resort and the World Journalists’ meetings were major
priorities in the early months of the creative union’s existence. At one of the Orgburo’s
first meetings in spring of 1956, Kraminov took the lead in discussions of the
international mandate, since he worked closely with the MOJ as the editor of its
publication, The Democratic Journalist. He informed the Orgburo that the Bulgarian
Journalists’ Union had agreed to provide space on the Black Sea for an international
leisure house for journalists (dom otydkha)—the house in Varna became a major project.
Kraminov also presented plans for an international meeting of journalists (vstrecha) in
Helsinki that summer. The event was to be dedicated to questions of mutual cooperation
between professionals, “defense of interests,” as well as questions of leisure and material
well-being. The Soviet Union and China were the main financial backers—as a
reflection of the creative union’s relative poverty, additional funds were solicited from
the all-Union Council of Trade Unions. The Helsinki meeting also provided an
opportunity to invite participants to the Soviet Union to familiarize them with the
country—this became common practice after major MOJ events. At that time, the
Orgburo relied chiefly on Inturist for assistance with visas and guides. Other Orgburo
members were more focused on Cold War strategy than on logistics: as part of meeting
“preparation,” Iurii Zhukov suggested that the central newspapers, Pravda, Izvestiia,
Trud, and Komsomol’skaia pravda, all prepare applications for visas to the United States.
Zhukov felt that the possible denial of entry visas “could put a trump card in our hands
during discussions of international ties between journalists.”408 Visas and entry-exit
permissions were a common pitfall of journalistic work in the Cold War—certain
408
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particularly emotional cases involved American journalists married to Russian women
who had been effectively trapped in the country during the political tensions of the
Zhdanovschina and the Doctors’ Plot. Zhukov’s reasoning here demonstrated that this
practice had strategic implications, and that no opportunity to embarrass the United States
was considered trivial.409
Ongoing preparations for Helsinki included detailed discussions of the Soviet
delegation’s goals and its composition—representing the Union republics as well as the
RFSFR. Though some proposed that Kraminov serve as the delegations’ head, Maria
Ovsiannikova suggested that Pal’gunov was a more appropriate choice, since he
“indisputably” represented the Journalists’ Union, which would help the organization
“create authority.” Ultimately, Pal’gunov became the delegation’s head, with Kraminov
and Boris Burkov as representatives of the Orgburo. Dimitri Goriunov suggested that the
delegation include more journalists with knowledge of foreign languages who were also
zhurnalisti-mezhdunarodniki, which resulted in the inclusion of Ogonek editor Safronov,
among others. The parameters of this debate demonstrate a desire to ensure that only the
most reliable and qualified experts represented the new organization. Ovsiannikova also
felt that the creative union should strive to increase international knowledge among its
broader membership. Specifically, few Soviet journalists “had a complete understanding
of the MOJ” because writers had attended more meetings of the organization in the past
than had journalists. To correct this, more materials about the organization needed to
appear in the press. Ovsiannikova’s assertion would seem to have some merit—
Konstantin Simonov, a representative to the MOJ prior to 1956, was and is considered a
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writer and literary figure more than a journalist. The importance of the MOJ in early
Orgburo debates reinforces that while the bylaws debate contributed to “conscious
professionalization” the Journalists’ Union’s cultural diplomacy required a specifically
international form of expertise.410
•••
The June 1956 world journalists’ meeting in Helsinki, with two hundred
participants from forty-six countries, was the subject of stories in both the central press
and Sovetskaia pechat’. In Pravda, the event was heralded as the first of its kind, uniting
journalists of varying political convictions and religious faiths from across the globe.
Though reporting on later international meetings would place an even stronger emphasis
on the developing world, coverage of this first event highlighted speeches delivered by
delegates from Mexico and India, along with the enthusiastic reception of Kraminov’s
speech on the importance of material concerns to carrying out journalistic work. Primary
documents from the MOJ’s self-published history indicate that many of these speeches
were sharply critical of the effects of “commercial demands” on journalism work—a
critique of capitalist press ownership, which was a common theme at such events.
Kraminov’s more detailed discussion for the trade journal attempted to convey more
atmosphere than information: “discussions…which took place in multiple languages, by
the way, unanimously stressed that journalists could do much to improve friendship
between peoples.” Kraminov also explicitly contrasted this unity with the efforts of the
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“Atlantic bloc” of journalists to remain separate from progressive journalists and prevent
Latin Americans from participating. Kraminov accused an American foreign
correspondent named Keyford of spreading “calumnious libel” about the Soviet press,
which was spurned by a Pakistani delegate as “primitive.” The participants roundly
condemned efforts to “bring the Cold War into the international meeting hall.” Kraminov
stressed that cooperative efforts were continuing, as several participants in the gathering
were invited to visit the Soviet Union and China.411
The concluding documents of the international meeting were also published in the
trade journal—including a special resolution urging UNESCO to issue special
“international cards” identifying journalists as members of their national organizations to
confirm the “professional credentials of the holder.” Other goals directed at UNESCO
included the creation of an “international journalism center” and special courses for
journalists—these goals help account for later Journalists’ Union participation in
UNESCO education projects. Improved freedom of travel for journalists, including
access to entry and exit visas and travel discounts to facilitate movement, were also major
goals. The resolutions explicitly condemned the “artificial” division of journalists into
separate organizations along “Cold War” boundaries—a direct condemnation of the IFJ
and MOJ schism. This call for unity, as we will see later, was most likely a reflection of
the relatively relaxed atmosphere in the international arena during that summer, as the
Hungarian crisis in 1956 would significantly complicate matters for the MOJ. A more
lasting legacy of the Helsinki meeting was the plans to build a leisure house on the
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Bulgarian Black Sea to facilitate international contacts. The event demonstrates that the
openness to cultural diplomacy that had inspired the creation of the creative union
quickly took concrete organizational forms and produced definitive results. The
continuation of these international meetings, and the broader commitment to engagement
with foreign journalists through leisure and tourism, demonstrates that the Helsinki
proceedings should indeed be viewed as a foundational moment in the creative union’s
history, though perhaps more for its establishment of organizational practices than for
any definite achievement of its ideological goals.412
•••
The Orgburo’s work in the wake of the Helsinki meeting reveals the importance
its leadership attached to capitalizing on the gathering’s successes and the potential for
disaster in any missteps. Most of the perceived setbacks were related to logistics and the
creative union’s recent establishment, typical of any new organization that lacks an
extensive budget or regularized procedures, the manner in which these setbacks were
interpreted provides insight into the professional values of Soviet cultural diplomats at
this moment. Anxieties increased mere months after the Helsinki gathering—while its
initial objectives were focused on global unity, events in Hungary and Poland that fall
resulted in increasing concerns about the stability of the Eastern bloc and future prospects
for cultural exchange.
According to the Orgburo’s review of events on July 18, 1956, work in Helsinki
was generally considered “successful and productive.” Pal’gunov suggested that the
meeting’s results should be “popularized” through a series of speeches at the Central
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Journalists’ House, along with articles for the central press. These should “touch on the
problem of those people who hide under the calling of a journalist, so as to engage in
subversive activity.”413 The stress placed on this theme serves as an important reminder
that the increase in cross-cultural encounters under Khrushchev was not in itself a sign of
trust. Indeed, foreign correspondents, especially from capitalist countries, were often
accused of espionage during stays in the Soviet Union. So too were Western journalists
perceived as having too much sympathy for the Soviet cause. Pal’gunov’s connection
between journalism and espionage has some basis in fact—as Dina Fainberg points out in
her study of foreign correspondents, the Novosti news agency, founded in 1961, was
considered particularly useful to the KGB, since there were taboos or outright bans on
recruiting from central newspapers.414 Despite these allusions to espionage, Soviet efforts
to host guests after the conference were also generally successful—though the “absence
of an apparat” meant that too much time was taken up with logistics. As a result, visiting
foreign delegates mostly conversed with Orgburo members by phone rather than
experiencing more “personal contact.”415 As we have seen, the belief that personal
contacts were key to success had first appeared in Polevoi’s 1955 report on his U.S. visit,
and had clearly become an evaluative standard for the creative union as well.
During the rest of the July 18 meeting, Orgburo members did not content
themselves with the initial success of Helsinki; rather, they drew up a set of detailed
proposals to determine the optimal structure for international efforts. This included
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planning between ten and twelve various itineraries for foreign journalists, with attention
to their specific needs, cities and locations of potential interest to them, and provision of
opportunities to talk with ordinary people. Working with VOKS and Inturist, the
Journalists’ Union would provide short handbooks “about important sites that could be
interesting for foreign journalists and foreign tourists in general.” In addition to setting
up regular exchange with the people’s democracies, the Orgburo also identified particular
countries from the capitalist world which merited increased contact: the United States,
England, France, India, Japan, Egypt, Brazil, and Argentina. Pal’gunov was particularly
attentive to the possible reception of any invitation directed to journalists from the
capitalist west—“great caution” was needed in approaching the United States and other
countries to avoid the impression that Soviet journalists were “people who are trying to
force such correspondence on them.” To that end, rather than making “establishing
correspondence” the goal, the objective became “to encourage correspondence with
journalists’ unions.” In cultural diplomacy, it was important that the Journalists’ Union
not appear aggressive or desperate.416
The Orgburo’s early cultural diplomacy efforts coincided with periods of major
international upheaval that had particular implications for the MOJ—specifically, the
unrest in Poland and the suppression of the Hungarian uprising in the fall of 1956.
According to Оrgburo records from December 1956 concerning a conversation with MOJ
president, Czech journalist Iaroslav Knobloch, the MOJ and the Journalists’ Union
needed to strengthen unity among socialist journalists’ unions, where relations had
become “rocky.” The “collapsed” Hungarian journalists’ union received ten thousand
416
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dollars to strengthen its remaining “progressive” elements—it is unclear why the
currency gift was in dollars rather than rubles. Knoblokh advised caution: while he
approved of a Polish proposal to have a joint meeting with the Soviet Journalists’ Union
and the other people’s democracies, the interested parties should undertake the work
rather than the MOJ. To address the “schism” in the socialist bloc, the Journalists’ Union
should organize a meeting of prominent journalists, perhaps with elections to its
governing board as the “pretext.” In Knoblokh’s view, the “renewed Cold War” and
complicated situation in these countries left the MOJ with a single goal: the creation of a
single international journalists’ organization. The Helsinki meeting had been a positive
step in this direction. UNESCO could be of some help with this goal, as the MOJ was
working to establish “consulting status” as a nongovernmental organization. Some
members of the IFJ also supported MOJ’s efforts at ending the Cold War between the
cultural organizations—Knoblokh suggested that MOJ should continue to pursue
cooperation when opportunities arose. Like Pal’gunov, Knoblokh viewed “personal
contacts” as key to this undertaking and suggested focusing less on the “political aspects”
of the matter. As these proposals demonstrate, the events of 1956 left the MOJ and the
Journalists’ Union with a dual mission: to restore harmony in the socialist bloc while
continuing efforts to bring journalists from the capitalist world closer to the Soviet Union.
Pal’gunov reminded Knoblokh that the MOJ should act, particularly in dealings
with the Poles and the Yugoslavs, “as if nothing had happened.” The latter reference
would seem to be in reflection of Yugoslavia’s support of the 1956 uprisings. Despite his
earlier exhortation to act as though the status quo were already in place, Pal’gunov
reiterated that it was clear the Poles were hoping to use the prospect of organizing
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journalists’ meetings to make MOJ a “mouthpiece for the Polish experience.” Pal’gunov
said that MOJ need not facilitate such events, and cooperation between socialist
journalists should occur through bilateral agreements between countries rather than the
front organization. Nevertheless, the MOJ should see that meetings that took place were
“sympathetic” to the Poles. Sentiment and personal touches were clearly not reserved for
cultural diplomacy that involved capitalists. Pal’gunov’s suggestion that cooperation take
place without the front organization’s direct intervention can be read in two ways: not
only as an effort to avoid imperial overreach on the part of the MOJ and its Soviet
managers but also as a part of a larger goal to ensure that the MOJ did not become a
“client” to a smaller socialist state, similar to Kraminov’s alarm at the prospect of an East
German leadership for the organization two years prior.
At this same December 1956 meeting where Knoblokh and Pal’gunov expressed
anxieties about Eastern Europe, Kraminov took a more hopeful view of the international
situation, though he too drew lessons from the failed revolts. He noted that the “fruitful”
nature of the Helsinki gathering was particularly apparent in countries like Japan, India,
and Italy and also in Latin America. Kraminov approved of the “progressive” views of
the journalists involved and suggested an increased effort to work with Americans, since
this relationship “to a significant degree influences the establishment of ties with
journalists from capitalist countries.” While he acknowledged the capitalist world’s
importance, the MOJ had historically devoted little attention to the socialist bloc. Given
that journalists there were frequently “from the ranks of the intelligentsia, it is natural that
they cannot entirely free themselves from the influence of former ideology.” In order to
address this problem, Kraminov suggested that the MOJ send a representative to Hungary
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to clarify the situation there. Though more detail would require a separate study, the
episode conclusively demonstrates that the Journalists’ Union was clearly dedicated to
managing the socialist media empire according to the Soviet definition of regional
stability.417
Тhe aftermath of the failed Hungarian revolution also complicated the MOJ’s
work in the developing world. In March of 1957, preparations for an MOJ executive
committee meeting included plans for a journalists’ congress directed at Asia and Africa,
to be held in Bandung, Indonesia—a formal resolution in support of such a conference
was adopted during the Helsinki meeting and signed by thirty journalists from Asia,
Africa, and the Middle East. Orgburo members approved the proposal, especially since
journalists from Central Asia could participate. However, due to “negative reactions” in
Hungary, along with a tense situation in Indonesia, the MOJ and the Orgburo agreed to
put aside these plans. To facilitate future meetings, they decided to establish a Committee
for Cooperation Among Journalists to be managed by a French communist and with a
separate address from the MOJ. This clandestine approach was designed to avoid
“negative” views of the committee’s work—creative union leaders were acutely aware
that the MOJ was not viewed as ideologically neutral. This cooperation committee
included Western journalists, Eastern bloc journalists, and journalists from Latin
America, North Africa, and Asia. MOJ president Jean-Maurice Hermann was a member,
as was noted Soviet writer and journalist Konstantin Simonov. Though Kraminov had
originally wished to schedule one earlier, in 1958 or 1959, the next World Journalists’
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Meeting occurred in 1960, in Baden, Austria.418 Along with preparing for this event, the
Journalists’ Union leadership was forced to grapple with continuing scandals in the Varna
leisure house.
•••
The leisure resort (dom otdykha) for journalists that eventually came into being
near Varna on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast was a major MOJ-creative union joint
project, first discussed in the Orgburo in the spring of 1956. As mentioned above, the
project gained more support in the context of the World Journalists’ Meeting in Helsinki.
In April of 1958, Kraminov, in his capacity as an MOJ vice president, wrote to the
Central Committee to advocate that the Soviet Union formally and financially back the
project. Ideally, the leisure house would host journalists from all over the world, not just
socialist countries, and would command a budget for some subsidies to pay for visits.
While the Bulgarian Journalists’ Union had already authorized most of the costs for the
resort’s creation, the other socialist creative unions were expected to contribute to its
furnishing and upkeep. Kraminov requested two hundred thousand rubles from the
Ministry of Finance, to ensure that the house had a furnished kitchen and camera
equipment. He took pains to describe the popularity of the resort project—when the
matter was debated at Helsinki, Soviet representatives were not the main voices in favor.
Kraminov portrayed the project as truly multinational, as all the socialist creative unions
supported the project, along with others in Latin America, Asia, and Western Europe.
Several of these national organizations had already authorized financial contributions or
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had made proposals to do so. Because of this wide base of support, Kraminov argued that
“it would be impossible to justify the Union of Soviet Journalists’ nonparticipation in the
house’s construction…this would create a bad impression among journalists from other
countries.”419
As he had in 1954, Kraminov relied on the importance of international standing
and authority to defend Soviet commitment to cultural diplomacy. The need for
international contacts and prestige had driven the formation of the creative union and
were still motivating factors for expanding its role in future undertakings. According to a
February 1959 report from Pal’gunov, written а few months before the house opened, all
creative unions who were members of the MOJ had participated in the project, and the
requested funds had been granted in accordance with a 1958 decree of the Council of
Ministers. Expenditures by other creative unions increased as completion neared, in a
way that reflected badly on the Soviet Union: China had contributed five hundred
thousand rubles, Czechoslovakia three hundred thousand, and the GDR four hundred
thousand, all sums greater than the two hundred thousand rubles Kraminov had initially
requested. As a result, the Orgburo requested an additional one hundred fifty thousand
rubles from the Ministry of Finance to supply the resort with a variety of consumer items,
presumably intended to increase the comfort of guests: radios, refrigerators, televisions,
vacuum cleaners, down pillows, and a piano.420 Following Kraminov’s apparently
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successful lobbying for these items, the costs of cooperation, in both rubles and prestige,
continued to mount.
The incidents of drunkenness and avarice that opened this chapter were not the
last time the Central Committee was required to intervene in disputes involving
misconduct in Varna. In October of 1960, mere months after the first scandals, more
problems developed. Visitors to Varna continued to pursue pleasure and enjoyment as
much as enlightenment or professional development, despite what their superiors might
have preferred. Because no trips to Sofia or other destinations were included in their
twenty-day stays, journalists used more creative methods to expand their leisure
opportunities. They personally called Bulgarian newspapers or the Bulgarian Journalists’
Union asking for tours. More brazen journalists even placed such calls from Moscow.
According to a member of the RSFSR’s Agitation and Propaganda department, an M.
Tiurin, such practices were “impermissible,” since they imposed extra financial and
personal burdens on Bulgarian colleagues. Even worse, “these visits provide almost
nothing in the way of practical work exchange, and not infrequently become simple
pleasure romps or drinking binges.” The internationally active Soviet professional was
not supposed to seek too much personal enjoyment, particularly by circumventing official
channels. The Central Committee was not the only body concerned with this issue;
Journalists’ Union records indicate that the organization’s leadership had also been made
aware of the problem during visits with Bulgarian colleagues.421
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Tiurin offered his own set of solutions for wayward journalists, while reiterating
his exalted vision of the Varna resort’s potential. He recognized that it was better to meet
the demand for more travel than to ignore the problem: he suggested spending seventeen
days in Varna, using the extra three days for trips around Bulgaria organized via
Balkanturist, slightly increasing the cost of the journey. Turin made a point of saying that
the Soviet ambassador to Bulgaria approved his plan. Raising another issue, Tiurin noted
that the system of selecting visitors was problematic: some visitors to Varna, though they
were selected by the Journalists’ Union, “had no relationship to press work…and
sometimes made up thirty to forty percent of guests.” Others “lowered the standing of
Soviet journalists” in unspecified ways. Тiurin was also concerned with the Varna
resort’s diplomatic mission: each group tended to socialize with its own members, and
“no work was undertaken to bring them closer.” If this were corrected, journalists could
not only become more knowledgeable about the socialist press but also become more
familiar with those who were “politically doubtful, often with a pro-Western orientation,”
presumably with an eye to increasing their support for the Soviet cause. Though the
earlier Varna scandal had concerned the dangers of foreign influence and possible
subversion of socialist values, Tiurin clearly saw the resort as key to cultivating future
allies.422
In response to Tiurin’s report, the creative union undertook a series of corrective
measures, which P. P. Erofeev reported to the Central Committee. To resolve the travel
issues, the creative union introduced a five day Inturist-sponsored Bulgarian tour and to
improve “cultural work” for the guests. Erofeev attached an MOJ resolution containing
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specific resolutions to attract more “capitalist” journalists to Varna and to take similar
measures on behalf of journalists from the developing world. The resolution also urged
member organizations to contribute materially to the resort’s upkeep by providing
literature and entertainment for guests. The document also affirmed the organization’s
vision of the resort as a place for “political work among journalists, international
seminars, meetings, and the like.” In a comprehensive response to Tiurin’s initial
complaint and the proffered reform proposals, the Agitation and Propaganda department
approved the creative union’s new plans and informed Tiurin personally about the results
of his initial letter.423 MOJ records indicate that by summer of 1960, the leisure resort
was hosting a wide range of guests, including visitors from England, Austria, Brazil,
Indonesia, Guinea, Chile, and Cameroon. In the same communiqué, the authors noted
with satisfaction that, “some Western journalists, visiting Bulgaria, admitted that the
creation of the leisure resort was a major achievement for the MOJ.”424
Unfortunately for the Journalists’ Union leadership, early measures to establish
prophylactic procedures did not prevent further misadventures. A year after Tiurin’s
memo, in the fall of 1961, the Journalists’ Union Secretariat received additional reports
about “abnormal” conduct among Soviet journalists in Varna and repercussions reached
all the way to the Central Committee. This time, the worst cases involved theft and
pursuit of consumer goods, with other simple moral lapses. The theft incident involved
two journalists. One, named Dolgashev, an employee of the Moscow oblast’ newspaper,
The Leninist Herald, had stolen a dress. Another, named Niurin, had accepted scarves as
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gifts from Bulgarian colleagues. Even worse, a masquerade ball held at the resort
included “salacious scenes which bordered on the pornographic.” The offending skit
depicted a woman with a prop lock between her legs, with paper chains. “Half naked”
men, each wearing a headdress with the name of a Soviet newspaper, tried to open the
“lock” with a long key. Ultimately, the one from Izvestiia won the day. The content of the
skit played on journalists’ views of themselves as virile and masculine. Another scene
involved a fat man losing weight as a result of an enema that a nurse had neglected to
remove in a timely fashion. In addition to complaints about these lurid performances, the
report noted that other guests of the resort returned at late hours, made noise, and
attempted to enter the house through their neighbor’s balconies.425
The author of this particular incident report, an official in the MID Press
Department named Sergeev, not only echoed earlier anxieties about moral depravity and
consumer goods but sought to limit the creative union’s control over the leisure resort.
Sergeev was especially concerned with stopping “pilgrims” from going to the countryside
“consumed by the search for consumer goods,” and sought to end unauthorized contact
between Soviet and Bulgarian journalists. He recommended appointing a leader to whom
all group managers would report and that “any of the slightest violations of the norms of
conduct” would be discussed at a Party meeting. Sergeev argued that trips to Varna
should cease after October because the conclusion of resort season would give guests “a
great deal of free time,” presumably increasing the likelihood of misbehavior. Sergeev’s
position at the MID demonstrates the political importance attached to the Varna leisure
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house. He clearly believed that the diplomatic apparatus should have more say over the
creative union’s international undertakings.426
These incidents, and Sergeev’s report, spurred a series of defensive responses
from various parties involved. The appointed leader of the tour group that included the
wayward journalists, a V. Medvedev, defended most of his charges and said that they
behaved “worthily, with discipline and restraint.” The group leader denied that any
actions of a few “unethical” journalists reflected poorly on him. He argued that
responsibility rested with the local chapter who had recommended the unworthy
members of the group, and that the Journalists’ Union was perfectly capable of choosing
its own leaders for trips to Varna. Medvedev also calculated his own contributions:
though he was “in need of a rest as the others,” he organized excursions and looked after
a visitor who fell ill. He also claimed that he had advised Niurin not to travel to the
countryside, absolving himself of responsibility for the scarf incident. When the side trip
was discovered, Niurin was disciplined at a Party meeting and instructed to make a gift of
his wristwatch to the Bulgarian who had given him the scarves. Medvedev also defended
the carnival as mostly “inoffensive” in its content. He suggested that the spectators, many
of whom were Party members, would have spoken up about inappropriate content, and
noted that many of the performers were also Party members.427
A more active participant in the stage play, V. Ozerov, editor of the journal
Voprosy literatury, argued that active participation in leisure activities such as the one in
question helped dispel the perception of Soviet journalists as “gloomy, dry and boring
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people.” The sketch some had considered “pornographic” depicted its participants as
knights in medieval costume rather than stripped naked, and the Izvestiia knight was
“beautiful and elegant.” After he trounced his opponents, the young woman “threw
herself onto his neck.” The scene with the enema was a “an inoffensive sanatorium joke.”
While Ozerov admitted that reactions to jokes could differ, the criticisms struck him as
“puritanical.” He characterized Sergeev as trying to “show comrade journalists in a bad
light and demonstrate his vigilance,” painting the official as overzealous and perhaps
moved by a desire to impress his superiors at the expense of honest and innocent
professionals. The other group leader confirmed Ozerov’s version of events and argued
against the need “artificially” to control how journalists spent their time. In addition to
defending the content of the stage plays, he also approved the response to the major
incidents, noting that the other guests had been appropriately disapproving of errant
colleagues.428
In his report on the case, Journalists’ Union Secretary I. Dzhirkvelov defended
creative union autonomy and supported his colleagues’ efforts to discipline the
delinquent. He explained that Niurin had received the woven scarves because of a
longstanding relationship between his Briansk newspaper and the Bulgarian one. As for
the theft case, when the crime was discovered, Doglaschev and his wife were
immediately sent back to the Soviet Union. The journalist was fired and expelled from
both the Party and the Journalists’ Union. Dzhirkvelov explained that the leisure house in
Varna operated on a twenty-four-hour schedule and did not have the usual “leisure
regime,” partly because the Bulgarian Journalists’ Union was fulfilling the mandate from
428
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the 1956 meeting in Helsinki. It was not advisable for Soviet journalists to be subject to a
more disciplined regime because this would set them apart from other journalists and
counter MOJ policies. He argued that canceling fall trips would harm the resort’s budget
and that the incidents were not the fault of the season but should be blamed on local
Journalists’ Union chapters.429
As others had, Dzhirkvelov blamed those lower in the creative union hierarchy,
while defending the authority of the Journalists’ Union to decide policy in Varna. The
Central Committee’s Agitation and Propaganda Department review confirmed the
appropriateness of disciplinary actions. As for the accusations of pornographic content in
theatrical productions, there was “insufficient evidence” to support Sergeev’s claims,
since closer review of the program content suggested there was “nothing objectionable.”
The reviewers accepted Dzirkvelov’s rationale for keeping the resort open in the fall and
affirmed the creative union’s decision to exercise more care in candidate selection. The
report’s authors added that the Central Committee itself would take these matters “under
control.” The second Varna scandal affirmed the need for careful screening and swift
punishment for any misconduct—but the episode concluded in a way that did little to
actually change the authority and autonomy of the Journalists’ Union.430 Later references
to the leisure resort suggest that the search for perfect representatives of Soviet print
culture remained problematic, though no major scandals took place after the fall of 1961.
In 1964 and 1965, the Journalists’ Union Secretariat emphasized the need for “careful
selection of candidates.” The object was to send only “the most authoritative journalists,
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preferably those who spoke foreign languages, and to instruct them in detail so that they
might worthily represent Soviet journalists.”431
•••
Varna was not the only challenge the new creative union faced in the international
arena. As part of its efforts to monitor the MOJ, the Journalists’ Union assigned some of
its own personnel to staff the organization. These individuals either served as assistants to
the general secretary or were known as the Soviet “representatives” to the MOJ. These
individuals were frequently anxious about the MOJ’s future, and dissatisfied with the
creative union’s leadership of the organization. In this section, I provide a brief history of
these complaints—usually extensive representative correspondence and the Central
Committee. Though some of the criticisms had more lasting effect than others, these
incidents offer unique insights into the mindset of cultural diplomats, both their views of
Soviet tactics and of the outside world. These representatives wished for an activist
creative union which would manage and direct the front organization and were
continuously worried that poor behavior on the part of creative union leaders would cause
serious political damage. Like other cultural diplomats, these officials were both
interested in increased exchange and alarmed at the prospect of any ideological
contamination that might result from relaxed vigilance.
In February of 1959, assistant to the MOJ general secretary, Mikhail Petrov, was
satisfied with some aspects of the MOJ’s work but scathing in his assessment of the
creative union’s Orgburo. Petrov argued that although the MOJ might be considered
“passive” compared to other front organizations such as the International Council for
431
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Trade Unions, it regularly conducted organizational work and took action with relation to
the affairs of the day, such as Algeria, American aggression in the Middle East, and the
political situations in the Belgian Congo and Cuba. The Bulgarian and Vietnamese
Journalists’ Unions, along with the Germans, worked tirelessly, and the MOJ’s ties with
Latin America had only strengthened over time.432 Despite these accomplishments, the
MOJ’s work “lacked fighting spirit and singleness of purpose.” The greatest weakness,
encouraged by poor leadership, was the sense that the MOJ was overwhelmingly an
organization of socialists. Out of sixty thousand members, only about nine hundred were
from capitalist countries. And most apparently sought simply to “traverse the wide world
on someone else’s money.” At worst, they were “spies.” Petrov claimed that such
“individual members”—in contrast to collective membership through affiliate
professional organizations—were common in front organizations. Petrov accused his
bosses of being more interested in access to visas than in doing ideological work to
protest against “slander” in the bourgeois press. He aimed his invective at the “cults”
around such journalists as the “Alsopites, Lipmannites and Drew Pearsonites, but the
member unions of the people’s democracies are seen as cash cows (doinikh korov), since
it is well known that…only countries from the socialist camp pay MOJ membership
dues.”433
In mentioning access to visas, Petrov presented his colleagues as more interested
in the benefits of foreign travel than in truly advancing the Soviet cause. At the same
time, the MOJ itself was vulnerable to infiltration from ideological enemies. By naming
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specific American journalists known for their criticism of the Soviet Union, Petrov
demonstrated his preoccupation with ideological contamination, even as he also
condemned Western journalists for only contributing to the organization’s expenses.
Alsop was a notorious figure for more than his anti-Communism: while working as a
Moscow correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune in 1957, he had been caught in
a compromising position with a young man who was a KGB agent. Rather than submit to
blackmail, Alsop reported the incident to the State Department and was recalled.434
Petrov was particularly concerned with “studying and knowing the enemy,”
especially media organizations he claimed were backed by the United States that the
MOJ did little to combat. He singled out the IFJ and the International Press Institute (IPI),
founded in 1950 at Columbia University and dedicated to problems of freedom of the
press. Petrov was also sharply critical of the MOJ’s French president, Jean-Maurice
Hermann, though he was a potential candidate for the Lenin Peace Prize. Petrov argued
that he was an unworthy candidate for the honor and should also be replaced at the MOJ,
citing Hermann’s inappropriate reactions to the 1956 unrest in Hungary.435 Petrov
presented the MOJ as besieged from all sides—its poor leadership and infiltration by
greedy capitalists weakened its capacity to advance the Soviet cause. He presented
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increased vigilance as the solution to this problem and went on to argue that the creative
union’s leadership failed to appreciate the extent of its failures.
Petrov was particularly scathing in his assessment of the Journalists’ Union’s
Orgburo, both its financial contributions and its overall capacity to host guests. He
claimed that Pal’gunov, Goriunov, and Burkov “loved to speak about journalistic unity”
but that they could not “overcome their narrow sectarianism,” which prevented them
from taking advantage of opportunities to increase international support for the Soviet
Union. A second World Meeting of Journalists failed because the Journalists’ Union did
not commit to paying its share of the funds. A similar gathering for economic journalists
also failed to materialize—Petrov was particularly critical of this, since it had particular
support “among bourgeois journalists” and the MOJ still received letters about it.436
Though Petrov was wary of too much foreign infiltration, he did not hesitate to castigate
colleagues who missed important opportunities for exchange with their ideological
opposites.
The creative union’s efforts to expand its financial and political support for
journalists in the developing world expanded in the year before Petrov’s report, though he
pointed to inadequacies in this area as well. At its 1958 Congress in Bucharest, Romania,
the MOJ’s Secretariat decided to conduct a solidarity day on September 8, the
anniversary of Czech journalist Julius Fucik’s execution by the Nazis. According to
Dmitri Goriunov, the MOJ requested that all progressive journalists make anti-war
statements and “intensify their struggle for peace,” while making monetary contributions
to a solidarity fund. The Journalists’ Union’s Orgburo requested permission from the
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Central Committee to hold festivities in Moscow, Leningrad, and other major cities, to
“strengthen the international solidarity of journalists.” A “voluntary” (though presumably
compulsory) collection of funds would be deposited in the Soviet Union’s state bank, to
be spent on medical expenses, vacations to the Soviet Union, coats, shoes, and food for
needy international journalists. Goriunov also requested that the holiday be publicized in
the mass media. All of these requests were granted by the Central Committee.437 In the
Journalists’ Union’s report on the first solidarity day, the main stress was on encouraging
foreign journalists to speak about their impressions of Soviet life and for Soviet
journalists who had been abroad to reciprocate.438 The solidarity fund and the hosting of
World Journalists’ meetings expanded the creative union’s international responsibilities
and financial burdens and the political pressure it faced from the Central Committee and
the MOJ itself.
According to Petrov, the Journalists’ Union also did not provide funds for the
International Journalism Solidarity Fund in honor of murdered Czech communist Julius
Fucik and was late with its dues payments to the MOJ. Another egregious failure of
hospitality apparently took place in September of 1958, when seventy visiting
Czechoslovak journalists were abandoned at the train station—Orgburo members refused
to meet them or take their calls. Petrov claimed that this news reached “all of
Czechoslovakia…and neighboring countries.” Petrov urged the Orgburo to pay greater
heed to the MOJ’s decisions and cease its policy of “noninterference” in the organization.
It should take steps to organize the delayed international meetings and to meet its
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financial responsibilities to the MOJ.439 The Central Committee apparently
communicated with Pal’gunov and passed on Petrov’s complaints to the International
Department. Some of these weaknesses, especially in financial matters, may be attributed
to the creative union’s relatively new status. Petrov clearly felt that any lapse in
hospitality had great political import—he presented the abandoned Czechoslovak
journalists as an international incident rather than a logistical mishap.
The major organizational changes Petrov called for largely did not come to pass:
Hermann remained MOJ president and the creative union retained much of its
organizational control of the organization. Iaroslav Knobloch was replaced by Jiri
Meisner at a July 1960 Executive Committee meeting, over a year after the initial
complaint.440 In 1960, the Journalists’ Union did increase its support for the International
Journalism Solidarity Fund. Beginning that year, the Journalists’ Union would contribute
seventy five thousand rubles to it, specifically to financially support “progressive
journalists and their families” in their pursuit of leisure or education.441 The main
organizational shift in the MOJ, away from Europe and toward the developing world,
occurred after another Central Committee intervention, in response to the less-successful
World Meeting of Journalists held in 1960. Petrov’s replacement proved to have his own
complaints about the creative union’s performance. Where Petrov was concerned about
relaxed vigilance vis-à-vis capitalists, his successors worried that the creative union
leadership was overly dismissive of the MOJ’s mission.
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The second world meeting of journalists—the follow-up to the inaugural event in
Helsinki—took place in 1960 in Baden, Austria. Where the Helsinki meeting had raised
the hopes of further cooperation with the capitalist world and received substantial press
attention, the MOJ focused more on the developing world in Baden. Based on press
coverage, the Baden meeting was less significant than its predecessor. On October 19,
Khrushchev’s greeting to participants appeared in Pravda, referencing the “professional
and moral duty” of all journalists to come out in favor of disarmament and “against
colonialism and racism.” That same day, a short description of events was published on
the last page of the newspaper, which recorded only that representatives of seventy-five
countries and forty-five journalists’ organizations were present, that Khrushchev’s
message was met with applause, and that four years had passed since the last such
gathering.442 As at Helsinki, criticisms of capitalist journalism were couched in Marxist
and class-based language of the struggle against “newspaper monopolies.” In other ways,
the rhetoric had changed over four years to reflect the MOJ’s shifting focus: new stress
was placed on the anticolonial aspect of international solidarity and on providing
education and technical training for journalists from less-developed nations. There were
renewed calls for a “Bandung conference” of journalists from Asia and Africa. Clearly,
Soviet media managers understood the symbolic power of Afro-Asian summits, first
visible at the original 1955 Bandung conference.443 The delegates were also concerned
with appropriate financial support for the MOJ’s activities, since the IPI in Zurich,
“supported by Rockefeller” had over a million dollars at its disposal. The IPI had begun
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to fund educational initiatives in Ecuador under the auspices of UNESCO and to run a
seminar in Dakar, Senegal.444 Though the shift toward the developing world became a
lasting priority for the MOJ, more significant initiatives in this area occurred years later,
suggesting that the Baden meeting primarily laid the groundwork. Tensions with China
were first visible there, as the Chinese delegation criticized president Jean-Maurice
Hermann and the Indian delegations for not taking strong enough stances on colonial
issues, while others noted that the MOJ should take a stronger management role of the
International Committee for Journalistic Cooperation, which coordinated the meetings. In
response, the Soviet MOJ secretary, Mikhail Shatskov, explained to his Chinese
comrades that the official goal of the conference was to concentrate on “unifying” rather
than “divisive” issues.445 The prospect of superior Western funding for cultural
diplomacy, along with China’s leadership challenge, would become persistent concerns.
The Baden meeting’s limited results ultimately became a source of friction
between MOJ secretary Shatskov and the creative union leadership, as Shatskov was
particularly resentful of Danil’ Kraminov’s mismanagement of the gathering and
provided a lengthy description of his grievances in a long letter to the Central Committee.
Kraminov gave the impression of ill-preparedness, not sharing his plans for the event
with Shatskov or with the MOJ’s Czech president, Czechoslovak journalist Jerzy
Meisner. In contrast, the MOJ had prepared for the event far in advance. Its leadership
publicized the meeting in newspapers and sent official announcement letters to member
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organizations along with contacting individual journalists. The positive responses to this
activity were all published in the MOJ newsletter, Democratic Journalist.446
Austria had been the only Western nation willing to host the gathering, and
planning and visa procurement had gone well—though the IFJ refused to participate in
the events and the MOJ had to use both dollars and socialist currency to cover expenses.
Nevertheless, in Shatskov’s account, the Soviet Journalists’ Union, along with other
socialist organizations, had failed to help publicize the meeting and had offered no
guidance regarding organizational improvements following from the Helsinki meeting or
made any detailed suggestions for the agenda. Although the Journalists’ Union
Secretariat had formed a committee dedicated to the Baden meeting, including Kraminov,
this body had never met. The Journalists’ Union Secretariat records support this claim:
the preparatory committee was described, but Baden was not mentioned again until the
1960 annual report. According to Shatskov, the only journalist who wrote about the
meeting in the Soviet press was Aleksei Adzhubei, while the committee’s ostensible
chair, A. A. Vishnevskii, had to be “begged” to provide information regarding Soviet
participation. The situation had only grown more dire as the event approached, as
Kraminov was “too busy for MOJ matters” and Satiukov was absent from Moscow. By
fall of 1960, Shatskov was forced to appeal to the Central Committee’s International
Department, particularly because the senior official from the Agitation and Propaganda
Department was unavailable.447
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The situation was no better in Baden itself, as Kraminov, rather than taking time
to go over draft resolutions with his fellow representatives, instead hosted a long
discussion about issues relating to the Korean Peninsula. As a result, the meeting as a
whole achieved only a “general discussion,” rather than the articulation of any specific
shared goals or joint statements. Though this did not reflect badly on its outcome and
befitted the event’s “democratic” nature, Kraminov’s own behavior caused serious
misunderstandings. Presumably while in a state of intoxication during dinner (Shatskov
mentioned “practically no bottles of Stolichania or Georgian cognac remaining”),
Kraminov interrupted the toasts to the MOJ’s organizational success with the declaration
that, “The MOJ does little” before downing his glass. In embarrassment, the MOJ’s
Czech president, Meisner, then asserted that the MOJ had gathered journalists from sixty
countries and “with more help from member unions could of course do more and better.”
Kraminov’s behavior caused particular confusion among journalists from Eastern Europe,
who subsequently asked Shatskov to clarify the situation. Meisner threatened to resign
and return to work at his newspaper, and one German MOJ secretary also threatened to
leave his “thankless job.” 448
Shatskov described Kraminov as generally delinquent in communications and
resistant to all efforts to involve him in practical preparations. When he did contribute, he
often made ignorant suggestions that Shatskov belittled and used to defend the MOJ’s
existing arrangements. In one incident, Kraminov had proposed the creation of an MOJ
monetary fund—perhaps a sign that he was so ill informed about the organization that he
did not know one already existed. As a kind of rebuttal, Shatskov noted that the existing
448
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fund had already offered important assistance to journalists from Madras, India, and
induced them to support the MOJ rather than remain “neutral.” Moreover, Kraminov had
offered no leadership regarding the status of the existing solidarity fund—an institution
which “personified the brotherly support of our journalists for their impoverished
colleagues from the capitalist world.” More significantly, Kraminov’s behavior left
foreign journalists confused as to the future fate of the International Committee for
Cooperation Among Journalists, specifically what kind of work the institution might
conduct after the Baden meeting. Shatskov accused the entire Soviet delegation of
“isolating itself” rather than socializing at meals. Тhe Soviet journalists also assumed that
the MOJ would fund much of their personal expenses as well as trips for guests from
Baden to Moscow and did not contribute translators or typewriters during the process.
Shatskov concluded his tale of grievances with more personal reproaches for Kraminov.
Just before the latter’s departure to Moscow, Shatskov requested that they schedule a
discussion of the MOJ’s objectives and was rebuffed. Boris Burkov viewed a
conversation as unnecessary, stating that it was “clear we need to strengthen the Soviet
part of the MOJ.” Burkov noted that most of the matters had been settled in spring, and
that while no one was accusing Shatskov of anything serious, he “lacked flexibility.”
Dissatisfied in general, Shatskov asserted that he had “done all in his power” to advance
the organization and the Soviet cause.449
To further bolster his case against the leadership of the Journalists’ Union,
Shatskov provided proof of the publishing activity to promote the meeting, the MOJ’s
449
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letters to other journalistic organizations, the Journalists’ Union’s Secretariat protocols,
his own letter to the Department of Agitation and Propaganda, and reports of Czech
journalists’ preparatory work. These records run to over thirty pages—clearly, Shatskov
was anxious to demonstrate that if Baden had gone badly, the blame lay squarely with the
Journalists’ Union.450 Yet Shatskov’s confrontation with the creative union was
ultimately something of a draw. In January of 1961, when Journalists’ Union leaders
reviewed the case with the International and Agitation and Propaganda departments of
the Central Committee, it was determined that the Journalists’ Union had done more
work than Shatskov’s complaints suggested. The organization had conducted most of its
major preparations for the Baden meeting during an MOJ Executive Committee meeting
in Leningrad. Additionally, the Journalists’ Union had hosted several participants before
they traveled to Austria—similar visits for delegates had been arranged after the Helsinki
conference and would be again at the next world meeting in 1963. In Baden, Soviet
journalists “did a great deal of work” to ensure that the meeting achieved its main goals.
Delegates met often with colleagues, contrary to Shatskov’s claims. Though this work
was considered satisfactory, it was admitted that failure to attend to Shatskov’s requests
and monitor Kraminov’s behavior was “a serious weakness” on the part of the
Journalists’ Union. As for Kraminov, while some of his criticisms of the MOJ were
accurate, it was observed that he had used some “sharp expressions” which gave offense
to foreign communists, most notably general secretary Meisner and his East German
colleague. The Central Committee instructed the Journalists’ Union to “exercise greater
influence over the MOJ, and increase the international ties of the organization with other
450
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nations, especially journalists from Asia, Africa, and Latin America.”451 This incident,
like those involving the Varna leisure resort, resulted in no significant changes to the
Journalists’ Union leadership: Kraminov retained his position in the Journalists’ Union,
and Pavel Satiukov remained its president until October of 1964. In general, the
repercussions from Baden were indirect: preparations for the next World Meeting, in
1963, were far more extensive.
•••
The MOJ began a marked shift of its initiatives toward the developing world at its
fifth Congress, held in Budapest in 1962. There, the Journalists’ Union delegation noted
that the developing world was “more and more uniting around the MOJ, expecting active
support of their professional interests….” Specific activities included round table
discussions, representation at the 1960 world meeting in Baden, and other “personal
contacts.”452 Most importantly, a UNESCO representative had attended the conference,
and considered proposals about restoring the MOJ’s membership. Journalists’ Union and
Central Committee records indicate that the creative union routinely sought participation
in UNESCO activities, particularly through the Center for Journalism Education (CUEJ),
in Strasbourg, France, which had a special focus on training journalists from developing
countries and was founded by UNESCO and the French government. In an undated
report, Soviet representatives to UNESCO strongly advocated increased Soviet
participation in this program, since journalists from the United States and England
regularly took part, and Soviet foreign correspondents based in Paris could attend
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meetings. Since the Composers’ Union had taken active roles in UNESCO international
work, it was thought that journalists could follow suit. Even before he became dean of
MGU’s Journalism Department in 1965, Iasen’ Zasurskii was often a representative to
the program’s administrative council. In a 1962 report sent to both the creative union and
the GKKS, Zasurskii made special note of the Strasbourg Center’s interest in African
journalism, his personal friendships with Africans, and the general interest in Soviet
literacy campaigns in Central Asia and the development of a multilingual press there.
Zasurskii’s efforts serves as a micro-level indicator of the broader shift in the Journalists’
Union’s activities away from Europe and toward the developing world.453
Expanded uses of the Solidarity Fund also demonstrate this shift: In 1962, the
MOJ undertook plans to construct a “school” for journalists from developing countries.
Periods of study were to be accompanied by trips to the Soviet Union, so that students
could get work experience in the Soviet mass media. There were also proposals to
increase the fund’s financial stability through publication of books and memorabilia,
including stamps, postcards, and photo albums, as well as sporting events and
performances.454 Solidarity funds were also used to send delegations to Asia, Africa, and
Latin America, sending well-known journalists to give lectures and talks, and organizing
study programs at Moscow University.455 One of its more famous beneficiaries was
Franco-Algerian journalist Henri Alleg, who became internationally known for his
experiences of torture at the hands of French paratroopers during the Algerian conflict. In
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1962, the solidarity fund paid for Alleg’s son to attend a Pioneer camp.456 A year later,
the solidarity fund would cover educational costs for journalists from Honduras to attend
courses at Moscow State University in 1963. Funds were also allocated so that a
journalist from Kenya would have a coat and hat during his stay in Moscow, with similar
expenditures a few months later for Nicaraguan journalists.457 Investments in educational
initiatives were another major project, including schools in Budapest and Algeria. The
dean of Moscow University’s journalism department was a member of the Budapest
school’s administrative board.458
1962 was an important transition year for the MOJ: preparations began for a third
world meeting of journalists—this one to focus on Africa and the Middle East and
intended to achieve greater stature than its predecessors.459 The 1963 meeting was
planned carefully and had a unique structure: participants traveled through several North
African and Mediterranean countries by steamship, rather than converging in a single
European city. Preparations began in July of 1962, in parallel to preparations for the fifth
MOJ Congress in Budapest.460 In January of 1963, Kraminov, apparently still a
mezhdunarodnik in good standing despite his earlier run-ins with the MOJ leadership,
oversaw preparations in Rome—the journey was originally scheduled to begin there and
to last for about two weeks. An international journalists’ committee, consisting of
participants from Mexico, India, Algeria, China, and Indonesia, along with Jean-Maurice
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Hermann and a Soviet Journalists’ Union member, was responsible for organizational
planning. It was hoped that about two hundred fifty journalists from eighty to ninety
countries would ultimately take part in the event. Journalists would be able to board the
steamship Lithuania in several cities, with planned stops all along the Mediterranean and
North Africa. Subsequent press coverage made much of the delegates traveling together
and the reception they received at various stops. Notable figures would be invited to the
opening event in Rome, including Soviet cosmonauts and American astronauts. The stop
in Algiers was to focus on anti-colonialism and efforts to establish an “independent
national press.” Though the itinerary focused on developing countries, the meeting’s
working languages remained Western: French, Spanish, English, and Russian. The
Journalists’ Unions of states where stops took place were in charge of arranging
entertainment and relevant professional contacts, and publicizing the meeting in the local
media. The meeting’s main mandates concerned questions of ethics, other professional
concerns, and international cooperation.461 Final preparatory discussions were scheduled
for August and September, and TASS and Novosti correspondents were instructed to
publicize the event in the countries where they were accredited. In June of 1963, MOJ
representatives reminded the Journalists’ Union of the special anti-imperial focus, and
that the Soviet delegation had a special responsibility to ensure that events “took place
under the banner of unity…the struggle for peace and the full liquidation of
colonialism…uniting journalists not only from the socialist camp, but from the world
over.”462
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The slogans under which this meeting took place demonstrate that the relative
relaxation of tensions at Helsinki had been something of an aberration. The creative
union’s preparations for the conference were extensive and aimed at both showcasing
Soviet accomplishments and reducing opportunities for embarrassment or ideological
contamination. Instructions to Soviet delegates stressed that the principles of peaceful
coexistence did not extend to acceptance of capitalist ideology and that journalists from
developing nations should be reminded of the “methods of the reactionary bourgeois
press.” At the same time, the Soviet delegation was encouraged to seek out and interact
with capitalist counterparts in order to promote Soviet foreign and domestic interests
more effectively. Boris Burkov and Dmitri Goriunov headed the Soviet preparation
committee, while Pavel Erofeev was in charge of reporting from the meeting of socialist
journalists’ unions in Budapest. Тhis was a gathering separate from an official MOJ
congress dedicated entirely to world meeting preparations—it had originally been
scheduled to take place in Moscow. The following month, MOJ general secretary
Meisner reiterated the intended itinerary and reported that there was growing interest
from Africa and Asia due to the meeting’s anticolonial agenda.463 Before the Lithuania
began its journey, a meeting of the International Committee for Cooperation Among
Journalists was held in Naples. The ship’s final official itinerary began in Algiers and
ended in Beirut, with stops in Tunis, Tripoli, Alexandria, Piraeus, Famagusta, Istanbul,
Varna, Costanza and Odessa.464
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The internal “work plan” for the 1963 gathering demonstrated increased attention
to detail compared to the Baden meeting. Adzhubei, Satiukov, and Goriunov were
expected to oversee press conferences and the speeches that Soviet delegates delivered,
along with meetings between participants and social and political actors. Kharlamov,
Satiukov and Adzhubei were responsible for arranging a visit between meeting
participants and Khrushchev during their stay in the Soviet Union. Goriunov and Burkov
were to ensure that Soviet foreign correspondents were active participants in the
proceedings, and that material about them appeared in the local press of various countries
included in the itinerary. All participants were to be provided with published literature
about the Soviet mass media and the Journalists’ Union, and an appropriately stocked
library with Soviet political material and fiction. Creative union personnel were charged
with consulting with the Ministry of the Navy to ensure that all entries and exits from
major ports occurred on schedule. Journalists were also placed in charge of monitoring
the luggage of delegates and guarding against the “entry of anti-Soviet literature and
other material which disrupts friendship between peoples”—the journey was an occasion
for paranoia despite its stated goals of openness. No detail was too small for attention:
participants and local dignitaries were to be provided with souvenirs, including postcards
of cosmonauts and the steamship itself, and menus, food, and laundry service were all
provided for.465
The extensive preparation process demonstrates how much the Third World
Meeting was seen as an opportunity for the Soviet Union to enhance its prestige via the
representatives of its print culture. Participating organizations were sent a survey to fill
465
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out to describe the status of newspapers and journalists in their country.466 The
Journalists’ Union’s own answers are illuminating both in terms of quantitative data and
the obvious effort to use the survey in order to highlight the superiority of the Soviet
system. Figures included the yearly circulation of newspapers and journals. Particular
accomplishments of the Soviet model, as revealed by the survey, included the large
number of letters from readers, and that the press operated according to the “Leninist
principle of peaceful coexistence.” These ideological foundations were apparently the
“secret” to the international stature and accomplishments of Soviet journalism. The
results of the survey also offer insight into journalism’s status as a profession in the
Soviet Union, four years after the creative union’s inaugural congress: the number of
journalists whose “principle employment” was in the mass media now numbered fifty
thousand, of whom some thirty five thousand were members of the creative union.
Survey questions regarding professional standing and trade union membership presented
the creative union as both argument and evidence of an alternative structure for Soviet
print culture in comparison with that of the west: one creative union was sufficient for all
journalists, because the Soviet Union “lacks antagonistic classes, and unites all journalists
in their common cause to serve the people.” Most journalists were also members of the
Trade Union for Cultural Workers which, when formed in 1963, replaced the trade union
for newspaper workers created in 1917—this continuous history of trade unions would
seem to demonstrate that the Soviet Union had always given journalists collective
representation. By this accounting, the trade union, too, was responsible for supporting
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the “professional mastery” of its members, in addition to providing for their working
conditions and leisure.467
The characterization of requirements for membership in the creative union
continued the emphasis on writing and qualitative output discussed above in chapter one:
“the only condition for Journalists’ Union membership is that one always works honestly
and writes truthfully.” The moral language here echoes that of some of the bylaws, which
were also referenced in the report on survey questions about work experience for creative
union members. Though the survey stressed the privileges of a Journalists’ Union
membership card, such as travel, leisure, or attendance at creative seminars, the Soviet
response stressed that, “before the law, all journalists, like all Soviet citizens, are equal.”
In response to the question about a “moral or ethical codex” that governed professional
behavior, both the “Moral Codex of the Builders of Communism” and the Journalists’
Union bylaws were presented as foundational documents. (The former document was
adopted at the Communist Party’s Twenty-Second Congress in 1961, and consisted of
twelve principles which affirmed the importance of respect, hard work, collectivism,
ethnic tolerance, and “solidarity with all the workers of the world”). In presenting the
Journalists’ Union to the world, the particularities of socialist morality and Soviet
subjectivity were as central as the specifics of professional journalistic work. Answers
about educational attainment stressed that Soviet people were “in general people of
intellectual labor.” Although presentation of a particular diploma was not a requirement
for work in journalism, most Soviet journalists had some kind of higher education. In
response to questions about job security, the answers fit Soviet views on work: loss of a
467
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job could occur only with trade union consent and most often in cases where the print
organ itself was “liquidated,” the overall size of staff was decreased, or the journalist was
somehow found to be incompetent. Unemployment, as per official views on the matter,
was nonexistent.468
The description of “advantages” journalists received reads almost like an
advertisement for the Soviet welfare state’s more privileged members: journalists
received stipends on business trips and free transit during those trips, as well as access to
additional housing comparable to those of other creative unions, though journalists
received no particular tax advantages. Again, factual description mingled with rhetoric in
the description of social position. “The answer to this question would be incomplete, if no
mention were made of the deep respect Soviet journalists enjoy among the people. His
honesty and faithful service to the people, his hostility to ideological opponents, to
everything that impedes the people’s forward progress, his certainty of the victory of
communism in the Soviet Union, is well known and is a major source of pride for the
Journalists’ Union of the Soviet Union.” The language here is even more elevated than
that of the Journalists’ Union’s inaugural congress: journalists are presented as a source
of national pride without specific references to a “public” or “readers”—they belong to
the entire public and serve its broader purposes.469 The idealized vision of journalism
presented here, as a deeply respected profession with social protections, working for a
literate and sophisticated audience, demonstrates that the “conscious professionalization”
discussed in chapter one had been projected onto the world stage.
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•••
The effects of the Sino-Soviet split were increasingly felt at creative union and
MOJ events, particularly in the lead-up to the World Meeting aboard the Lithuania.
These issues would occupy a central place in Soviet analysis of the event itself, both in
press coverage and in internal correspondence between the creative union and the
Communist Party. In 1963, the long-planned Afro-Asian Journalists Congress in
Bandung finally took place, nearly eight years after it was first delayed due to
international tensions over Hungary. As a sign tensions were mounting, the KGB
notified both the Central Committee and Boris Burkov, in his capacity as Novosti
director, that the Chinese might seek to publish damaging articles in the Algerian press in
connection with an upcoming speech by president Ahmed Ben-Bella.470
The Journalists’ Union had originally planned to send a ten-person delegation to
Bandung and to send Kraminov on a trip to North Africa and the Middle East to improve
Soviet prospects at the congress. At Bandung, the Chinese forcefully denied Soviet
representatives any leadership role, despite the efforts of the Mongolian an Indian
delegations. Kraminov’s absence from the conference due to illness was also thought to
have weakened the Soviet position. The controversy apparently extended to the
involvement of the Indonesian government, as the assistant minister for Foreign Affairs
publicly opposed Soviet participation and Indonesian delegates who wanted to take a
conciliatory stance were hesitant to act without word from Sukarno, whose personal
opposition to Soviet prominence at the conference was confirmed by the Polish
ambassador. Even IFJ representatives in Luxembourg had recently expressed suspicion of
470
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the Bandung meeting, since it lacked participation from India and the Soviet Union—this
suggests that the Sino-Soviet split complicated the traditional bipolar rivalry between the
two organizations. While the Bandung Conference was not ultimately a major setback—
the MOJ expanded its contacts in Africa—the situation confirmed the importance of the
upcoming third international meeting to Soviet efforts in the developing world.471
In keeping with the increasingly tense international climate, the third international
meeting, like its predecessors, was the topic of major correspondence between the
creative union and the Central Committee’s Agitation and Propaganda department, from
the planning stages to retrospective discussions. The Journalists’ Union’s formal travel
request for the delegation indicates that some of its most senior members attended,
including Satiukov, Adzhubei, Goriunov, Burkov, Kharlamov, and Erofeev, and
secretaries of republic-level journalists’ unions. Similar travel requests were made for
film and radio personnel, including director Sergei Gerasimov, who would go on to direct
a 1967 film about a foreign correspondent. Journalists’ Union secretary Vishnevskii
noted that they all had been chosen “in view of the meeting’s importance,” and requested
that the Central Committee also send a representative. P. A. Naumov, head of the
International Department, was chosen to fulfill this role.
The 1963 World Meeting on the steamship Lithuania received sustained attention
in the central press, in another sharp contrast with the Baden gathering. From September
23 to October 19, twenty articles appeared in Pravda covering its various stages.
Izvestiia published nine articles on the subject, several written by Adzhubei himself. The
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more extensive Pravda coverage contained more detail of the events and reception at
each location where the Lithuania docked, with special mention of Satiukov’s arrival as
leader of the Soviet delegation. Pravda’s special correspondent indicated that the meeting
in Algiers would be the “most representative,” as the delegations to events at that stop
included substantial numbers from Africa and Asia as well as Europe. Special emphasis
was placed on the participation of “journalists who were, not long ago, under the colonial
yoke” and of representatives of nations still struggling for independence. The broader
goal of reducing international tensions and the “Cold War” was presented as a unifying
aim among participants. Articles about the Algerian events stressed that whereas the
Baden gathering had been devoted to the independence struggle, now Algeria was on its
own “path to socialism,” with its government ministers and national press as leading
figures in the gathering. Pravda’s special correspondent to the meeting rhapsodized about
the Algiers’ beauty and its symbolic value as a site of resistance.472
Izvestiia coverage was more essayistic, offering jabs at the “Western press,”
which supposedly considered the gathering to be somehow not “free” or “voluntary,”
while describing the beauty of the Italian landscape as participants boarded the boat. At
the official opening reception, Satiukov read Khrushchev’s greeting to participants. Much
attention was paid to the speeches of Cuban and Arab journalists about the struggles for
press freedom and for broader world peace and against “neoimperialism.” A Mongolian
journalist spoke about the dangers of the Sino-Soviet split to the greater cause of Asian
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unity, portraying the Chinese as “schismatics.” Algerian president Ben-Bella’s greeting to
participants was, like Khrushchev’s speech, met with “thunderous applause.” Ben-Bella
spoke in support of the planned 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and used the forum to
defend his own agricultural policies and economic reforms.473
Emphasizing the theme of mutual cooperation and solidarity, Pravda coverage
contained many anecdotes of journalistic cooperation—with special mention of a
proposal from a Kenyan journalist to study Mongolia’s wire service in preparation for a
new project in his own country, as well as the attendance at the meeting of the editor of
L’Humanite and a renowned Laotian journalist, and the telegram of greetings sent by
persecuted Greek journalist Manolis Glezos. The decision to host the next international
meeting in Latin America was also repeatedly communicated. The head of the GDR’s
Journalists’ Union stressed his own country’s work in the developing world as well,
including its own solidarity fund and educational initiatives, some of which took place
under MOJ auspices. A provocative American journalist expressed skepticism about
these initiatives and asked whether the graduates experienced “political re-education.”
This question was met with acrimony and evaluated as an episode that showcased the
meeting’s “democratic” nature and the prominence of journalists from the developing
world within it. Later coverage emphasized that while Canadian, American, and
European journalists were an ideological minority at the meetings, they too participated
actively, though their contributions had more of a “professional character” (delovoi
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kharakter). Later stops in Tunisia and the United Arab Republic similarly highlighted the
role of government ministers in meetings with participants and press conferences.474
At the stop in Alexandria, much was made of the planned participation of Gamel
Abdul Nasser on October 1, the date of arrival in Cairo. Nasser addressed the plenary
meeting of journalists and, as had Ben-Bella, emphasized their value to the broader cause
of peace in the world and his support for the Test-Ban Treaty. Jean-Maurice Hermann
also spoke at this gathering, and the participants sent greetings of solidarity to Kenyan
leader Jomo Kenyatta. Participants visited the Aswan Dam and the Suez Canal. In Beirut,
the delegation was also met by the Prime Minister. In addition to describing the meetings,
Pravda’s coverage presented evocative imagery concerning the presence of the US Navy,
with the “menacing maws of its cannons” evoking memories of the American role in
stemming Iraq’s 1958 revolution and the sharp contrast between this reality and the antiimperialist and pacifist views of meeting participants. Similar imagery was used to
describe the situation in Cyprus, in reference to both British troops and the presence of
the American cruiser Little Rock, described as supporting “American business interests”
in Cyprus’s mines. The article also offered lengthy descriptions of the destruction of
national forests since the island’s colonization and of the struggle of Cypriots for
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freedom. After leaving Cyprus, the Lithuania docked in Varna and Jean-Maurice
Hermann officially closed the meeting.475
The more substantial concluding event for the boat trip was a reception for
participants held in Moscow, an event that was planned along with the boat trip itself.
These gatherings reinforced the importance of anti-colonialism to the MOJ’s agenda, and
the Soviet Union’s status as an inspiring leader for newly independent nations. In October
of 1963, the Journalists’ Union formally requested permission from the Agitation and
Propaganda department for the follow-up event, which would bring together
“representatives of the social leaders of the capital” (predstavitelei obshestvennosti
stolitsi) and foreign guests in the House of Unions in the city center.
The political value of cultural diplomacy was an explicit theme of the planned event:
In the speeches of meeting participants and also in official resolutions, the
most important political problems should be emphasized: the struggle of
peoples for peace and disarmament, for national freedom and
independence, strengthening the unity and solidarity of workers the world
over, the great example of socialist countries, their cooperation in the
course of global development, the growing role of journalists in social life
and in the ideological upbringing of peoples and the building of a new
world.
The request was signed by Satiukov, Goriunov and Adzhubei, and granted shortly
after.476 Journalists’ Union President Satiukov formally requested that the “better known”
among the forty journalists who would be visiting Moscow receive an audience with
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Khrushchev, as their arrival in Moscow was an event of “great significance…and a fitting
conclusion to the International Journalists’ Meeting.” This request was also granted.477
GKKS records indicate that in 1963, sixty-two participants from twenty-six
countries visited the Soviet Union after the third international meeting. These particular
tours were aimed at “familiarizing [the visitors] with the life and achievements of the
Soviet people in the realm of economics, science and culture, with the work of the Soviet
press and allowing them to visit major institutions in Moscow.” It was hoped that these
undertakings would improve the creative union’s working relationship with foreign
journalistic organizations.478 In advance of this reception, Pravda published a selection of
its joint survey with Novosti, asking participants to assess the meeting’s significance and
results, whether they made valuable personal contacts, where the next meeting should
take place, and any other messages they wished to convey to their Soviet colleagues. The
published responses included those from journalists from Mexico, Spain, Bulgaria, and
Mali. All the responses reiterated the importance of anti-colonialism, the Soviet
contribution to this cause, the value of personal contacts formed at the meeting, and the
importance of hosting a future meeting in a developing country.479 The MOJ’s
transformation into an anti-colonial and truly global organization was clearly meant to
endure beyond the 1963 boat trip.
The closing meeting in the Hall of Unions was presided over by D. F. Il’ichev,
and most of the Journalists’ Union governing board took part: Satiukov, Goriunov,
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Erofeev, Kharlamov, Adzhubei, and others. In his speech, Satiukov emphasized all of the
major themes of past press coverage: the third meeting’s greater representativeness and
the duty of all “professional journalists” to work for peace and against imperialism, rather
than limit themselves to “professional problems.” Satiukov claimed that Chinese
journalists did not participate because they believed the meeting would concern entirely
“professional matters,” a misconception that the author called a “regret.” Goriunov
reiterated the anecdote about the American journalist who had insulted the Africans by
suggesting they were ideological puppets, and Adzhubei spoke about the growing
resonance of the Soviet cause in the developing world, especially the importance of
foreign aid to projects like the Aswan Dam. The MOJ’s general secretary asserted that
not even the Western press had been able to remain silent about these recent successes.
As a reminder that the meeting also held domestic resonance, the head of the Moscow
branch of the Journalists’ Union, A. M. Subbotin, spoke about how closely he and his
colleagues had followed the events abroad.480

•••
The official report to the Central Committee on the boat cruise and the Moscow
reception was signed by eight of the Soviet delegates, including Satiukov, Burkov,
Adzhubei, and Kharlamov. While they were pleased by first time participation from
several African and Southeast Asian nations, they were forced to note that some
representatives did not attend “under pressure from China,” and cited the report of Cuban
and Mexican delegates reported that representatives of China’s news agency had also
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worked to discourage Latin American participation, claiming that “there would be no
Africans there, but only Europeans.” More countries were represented at this meeting
than had been in Baden, but the meeting’s main achievements were qualitative: the
MOJ’s representatives were favorably received by political leaders during their travels,
who appreciated their commitment to the cause of national independence. These included
Algerian President Ben-Bella, Gamul-Abdul Nasser in Egypt, and Mali’s first president
Modibo Keita, and PCI members Luigi Longo and Palmiro Togliatti. Ben-Bella’s
participation was of “great significance.” Khrushchev’s written message to meeting
participants also made a favorable impression. Western journalists even declared that
they had “very much wanted to receive a message from President Kennedy, though
unfortunately no such message appeared.” Soviet representatives had appealed to White
House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger, who had initially promised some American
attendance. However, “after a visit to the White House,” Salinger reversed his position
and only a single American observer attended the meeting. Speeches were closely
scrutinized for indicators of ideological reliability: while French journalist Robert Buteau
reacted more “nervously” to strident critique of imperialism and attempted to discuss
“professional” matters, the majority of participants were strongly in favor of a more
“revolutionary” position, and critical resolutions were drafted when Latin American and
African journalists cooperated with socialists. The meeting had diplomatic repercussions
for countries besides the Soviet Union: East German journalists were particularly grateful
for the chance to visit nations in the absence of formal diplomatic relations agreements.
The journalists had originally decided to boycott activities in Italy if the East Germans
were denied entry, though this was ultimately unnecessary. The entire affair was seen as
273

“strengthening the GDR’s international status,” since it took place during one of Konrad
Adenauer’s state visits to Italy, over the objections of the FRG’s embassy.481
The meeting affirmed the Soviet Union’s status as a center of world communism:
journalists critiqued China for “isolating itself” and after discussion with Soviet
representatives about China’s damaging actions, several meeting participants “sent
material to their newspapers in this spirit.” The meeting’s final communiqué was
generally consistent with Soviet foreign policy. The delegation argued that the steamship
meeting had more “international resonance” than previous events, due to the participation
of political figures like Ben-Bella and Nasser, along with Ghanian President Kwame
Nkrumah. In general, the success of the steamship journey showed the “enormous
authority” the Soviet Union enjoyed due to its anti-imperial stance. More importantly, the
“overwhelming majority” of attendees “would write sympathetically about the Soviet
Union in the future.” These reports illustrate the challenges of assessment of cultural
diplomacy efforts: counting guests and noting their nationality provided unambiguous
data, yet descriptions of future results depended on necessarily uncertain qualitative
descriptions of “sympathy” and “support.”482
Тhe delegates’ list of recommendations for the future drew on past
recommendations, such as publicizing the event for nonparticipants and affirming ties
with the developing world. In light of the organization’s new global commitment, it was
decided that that the fourth international meeting should be held in Latin America. Other
proposals reflect a new effort to present the Soviet Union in a positive light and to
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coordinate activities with socialist journalists: the delegates proposed creation of a special
“press group” which would coordinate propaganda efforts among socialist countries to
better popularize their achievements—this institution could be based in Sofia rather than
Prague, presumably to avoid overlap with the MOJ. Delegates noted that the Aswan Dam
had impressed meeting participants, particularly in light of the extent of Soviet aid, which
indicated that “more effective propaganda abroad of Soviet technical and economic aid to
new and developing nations” was needed in both print and films. Both the Writers Union
and Journalists’ Union should ensure that “well-known writers” visited construction sites
and depicted Soviet specialists assisting foreign workers, an extension of the socialist
realist “master plot” to the international stage. The delegates suggested establishing a
“Friendship Medal” for particularly distinguished workers on joint Soviet and foreign
construction projects. The meeting for participants in Moscow and other Soviet cities was
cited as an important positive development.483
Overall, the boat trip devoted to the developing world appears to have been more
successful than its predecessors, particularly since it attracted more political figures than
previous meetings had, while damage from the Sino-Soviet split was kept to a minimum.
It also achieved its stated propaganda focus on colonialism and imperialism and on the
opportunities that Soviet foreign aid offered to newly independent nations. The few
accounts of the MOJ’s activities written by Western scholars have viewed it with varying
degrees of alarm or scholarly detachment: both types of analysis present the organization
as particularly successful at maintaining ties and support in the developing world and at
improving its relationship with UNESCO. My findings indicate that the 1963 meeting
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was a prime example of the MOJ achieving many of its stated goals, with the creative
union playing the main management role.484
•••
A 1965 report from a Soviet MOJ secretary reinforces the transitory nature of
cultural diplomacy success, even after an event as successful as the 1963 World
Journalists’ Meeting. In later years, media managers remained anxious that delegation
visits were overly formal and ineffective. As before, these reform proposals came from
Soviet representatives to the MOJ anxious to improve both the front organization and the
creative union. The document focuses on institutional change as a solution to ongoing
problems, with a pervasive sense of anxiety that current methods were inadequate to the
tasks facing the MOJ. Though the suggested methods reflect new political concerns, the
familiar anxieties make the document a fitting closing episode for this chapter.
In June of 1965, The MOJ’s new Soviet secretary, Efremov, wrote another report
to the Central Committee about the organization’s international position, concentrating
on “strengthening the cooperation of socialist countries in peaceful information sources.”
Unlike the complaints of his predecessors, which focused on finance or personal conduct,
Efremov wanted the MOJ’s work to become more precise and scientific—a stance which
reflects the new interest in social science research in the mid 1960s. Efremov noted that
the MOJ had experienced significant growth despite the Sino-Soviet split, most of it in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. He argued that socialist countries needed to conduct a
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more precise study of which newspapers or media personalities were most popular in
their home countries to better focus efforts. The absence of a real knowledge base
resulted in invitations being issued to journalists who were not necessarily influential
enough to warrant such attention. When guests did arrive in the Soviet Union, work with
them was confined to “theater trips and concerts and toasts at banquets,” rather than
formal study of their published works, with an eye to correcting “misunderstandings
about our countries.” He suggested that the MOJ make more of an effort to counter
Chinese projects in the developing world and increase its study of the Rockefeller
Foundation’s educational programs.485
Despite the institutions of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, there was minimal
coordination between socialist countries in the realm of information, and this also
resulted in waste of funds: if journalists from abroad were already visiting the GDR, it
would be more economical to fly them from Berlin to Moscow than from their home
countries. Efremov advocated expanding existing cooperation agreements between
socialist countries to include schedules of visits and assigning a special liaison between
socialist journalists’ unions. To support his proposals, Efremov cited interest in them
from the general secretaries of the Hungarian, Czechoslovak, Bulgarian, and East
German Journalists’ Unions, along with other MOJ representatives. He claimed that there
was even hope his initiatives would include the United States, citing Lyndon Johnson’s
recent dissatisfaction with journalists’ critique of U.S. government policy—implying that
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increased friction with the government would make American journalists more
sympathetic to the MOJ’s particular vision of press freedom.486
Efremov’s vision also involved changes to the Soviet Journalists’ Union’s
structure and stature. His first proposal involved increased monitoring of the foreign
press, which would require extensive use of foreign correspondents and the MOJ’s own
archives—these tasks, like others in cultural diplomacy, would rely on specialists with
language skills. He also suggested creating an institute on global information under the
auspices of the Journalists’ Union, which could then make recommendations to the Party
and the government. This analytical work would ideally be accompanied by efforts to
“monitor the changes in the opinions of particular journalists.” In Efremov’s view, this
work could be done by foreign correspondents of the central newspapers and news
agencies, as well as by the MID Press Department. Efremov was particularly concerned
about the status of the Journalists’ Union: the MID Press Department needed to verify
that the creative union was always aware of visiting journalists, since “many journalists
visit the Soviet Union, not through an invitation from the Journalists’ Union, but as part
of other cultural or political events and governmental delegations.” Improving the
creative union’s status would fit the most recent party program, as the role of social
organizations was expected to grow during the period of official transition from socialism
to communism. If the creative union was “fully equipped with zhurnalistimezhdunaroniki” and worked closely with TASS, Novosti, and foreign correspondents, it
could assume many of the same functions as the MID Press department.487
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Four things are particularly striking about this set of proposals. First, note the
contrast between Efremov’s assessment of the global media environment and Kraminov’s
original vision for the creative union, dating to over a decade before. Closer ties in the
socialist camp had been an explicit argument for the formation of a Soviet Journalists’
Union. The lack of coordination between socialist journalists discussed here suggests a
certain degree of failure in the accomplishment of this task. Secondly, Efremov’s
audacious vision for the creative union itself is striking: an international expertise so
complete that it might surpass that of the MID, a government body formally devoted to
foreign exchange. But this vision, like that of his predecessors, assumed that new
institutions would automatically solve problems. These proposals also reflect the growing
interest in social-scientific approaches to analyzing social groups and attitudes. While
Soviet sociologists like Boris Grushin were interested in domestic public opinion,
Efremov applied these concepts to the task of supporting the Soviet Union’s global
standing.488 While Efremov’s proposals received no response from the Central
Committee, they reveal that the challenges of cross-cultural encounters during the
creative union’s inception persisted into the Brezhnev era. Although the MOJ provided
the creative union with unique opportunities in cultural diplomacy, it clearly remained in
a subordinate position to other institutions. The call for additional restructuring suggests
that the initial hopes for the new organizations remained—at least in some areas—
unrealized.
Examining cultural diplomacy during the Khrushchev era demonstrates
conclusively that journalists and media managers were key figures in designing and
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implementing new institutions devoted to managing contact with foreigners. Under the
management of the new Journalists’ Union, the already-established MOJ expanded its
scope. The figure of the zhurnalist-mezhdunarodnik was central to this work: familiar
with other cultures, conversant in other languages, and, most importantly of all,
ideologically reliable and with an established journalistic reputation. If rank-and-file
journalists displayed a consciously professional attitude during the bylaws debate,
creative union cultural diplomacy demonstrates that the creative union gave new
opportunities and responsibilities to an elite within the profession.
These expanded responsibilities made for increased anxiety, and with that anxiety
came structures of surveillance and monitoring, especially in the context of the leisure
house in Bulgaria. Privately, the creative union seemed unable to guarantee that expanded
international contacts could proceed without mishap—precisely because its standards for
behavior were so high. Despite these mishaps, the Journalists’ Union retained its
management of the MOJ, and most Central Committee interventions confirmed decisions
the creative union had already made. Though the MOJ was a frequent source of anxiety
for the creative union, it also provided unique occasions to portray Soviet socialism in a
positive light. The three World Journalists’ Meetings discussed in this chapter serve as
important political and cultural touchstones: the first reflects the particular optimism of
the early Khrushchev years, while the second and third indicate a broader institutional
shift of attention away from Europe and toward the developing world. By the 1963 boat
trip, world leaders outside the Soviet Union (though arguably within the Soviet orbit)
recognized and supported the political importance of the MOJ and journalism in general.
Later sources indicate, however, that the search for a perfect model of cultural diplomacy
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would continue, with many of problems continuing unresolved: a sense that institutions
were outdated and that an insufficient number of journalists had the necessary skills to
achieve political goals. Though Soviet media empire had not yet “lost” the Cold War,
persistent anxieties coupled with political challenges prevented the creative union from
meeting its own expectations, either for its own personnel or reaching and winning over
foreign audiences.489
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Chapter 5
Professionalism and Personhood: Genre and Creative Politics Under Khrushchev

The Journalists’ Union’s domestic mandate expanded significantly after the 1959
inaugural congress. In this chapter, I track these developments through the organization’s
creative sections, all-Union seminars, and plenums, as they relate to three major themes:
professionalization and training, creative agency, and Soviet views of personhood and
reader needs. While journalists were conscious of their professional identity, they
struggled to define journalism’s academic nature and how, or if, it could be taught to
future generations. Many of the participants in the organization’s 1962 higher education
seminar are familiar from past chapters or took significant leadership roles in the
Brezhnev era: Boris Pankin offered reflections on KP’s work with young journalists and
his own experiences at the paper, while Izvestiia journalist L. M. Ivanova openly
questioned the value of educational programs. The assistant dean of Moscow University’s
journalism department, Iasen’ Zasurskii, discussed the existing curricular structure and
his hopes for reform. While discussions of higher education necessarily assumed the
value of Marxist-Leninist ideology to programs of study, discussions of existing curricula
and reform prospects were devoted to questions of career preparation, rather than
doctrinal discussions and disputes. Uncertainties about the content and value of
journalism education programs are an enduring subject of debate in the United States and
other modern democracies, indicating some convergence between print cultures rather
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than inadequate Soviet professionalization.490 Discussions of language training and
international expertise were more politicized, since training future international experts
was a particularly urgent task in a Cold War environment.
As in earlier chapters, treating journalists as professionals raises broader questions
of comparison and distinction, especially the appropriateness of treating the Soviet Union
as a “modern state.” Recent studies point out that its leaders, like their European
counterparts, were interested in social reform on a “scientific” or “aesthetic basis” and in
cultivation of expert hierarchies. The key distinctions were those of ideology and method:
Soviet leaders were dedicated to a Marxist-Leninist and collective vision of culture, and
frequently resorted to coercive tactics to achieve these objectives. This vision of
modernity had clear repercussions for the professionalization project: journalists were
always subject to Party and state control and supervision. These limits on agency would
extend to the creative union itself: while rank-and-file journalists argued for an expanded
and powerful organization, its president, Pravda editor Pavel Satiukov, stressed Party
leadership as the guiding principle of creative union work, and rejected more audacious
goals.491
Though Satiukov sought to limit the creative union’s organizational reach, later
creative events featured particularly optimistic and authoritative statements about
journalism’s value. In the interest of analytical depth, I concentrate on a few particularly
resonant seminars dealing with reader response, youth journalism, and the genre of
publisistika. The creative union held a seminar for workers in correspondence
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departments in Аugust of 1963, and participants also discussed the new popularity of
sociological opinion polls, an issue which became more important at later genre seminars.
The youth journalism and publisistika seminars, which I treat in the most detail, occurred
within weeks of each other, in June and July of 1964, and featured open celebration of
de-Stalinization. As the practical and philosophical concerns were similar at both events,
I have adopted a thematic rather than strictly chronological analysis. Though I also
feature remarks from journalists outside Moscow, several of the participants were from
central newspapers and familiar from previous chapters. Aleksei Adzhubei delivered the
opening address to the publisistika seminar, while Voronov and Goriunov both spoke at
length on youth journalism. By this point, Goriunov had left KP to become director of
TASS, while Adzhubei, Khrushchev’s son-in-law, became editor-in-chief at Izvestiia. As
we saw in chapter three, Voronov, a close associate of Adzhubei’s, became editor-inchief at KP after Adzhubei’s departure and remained there until the summer of 1965. The
earlier plenary debates about the creative union’s function, and Satiukov’s insistence on a
limited role for the organization, did little to diminish these individuals’ sense of
themselves as authors with a public mission.
Other major figures at the 1964 seminars had launched their careers under Stalin
but actively participated in debates about professional responsibility and genre politics.
Pravda journalist Evgenii Riabchikov’s participation in the seminar points to both
continuity and change from the Stalin era. Riabchikov had achieved some fame writing
about early Soviet aviation, and had even interviewed literary giant Maxim Gorky. In
1937, he was accused of espionage and imprisoned in a work camp on the White Sea
Canal. Later, he was exiled to Norilsk but returned to KP after the war and was formally
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rehabilitated in 1956, later becoming a Pravda correspondent.492 Riabchikov addressed
the familiar problem of journalism’s relationship to literature, insisting on clear genre
boundaries and that practitioners take pride in their commitment to factual accuracy.
Izvestiia journalist Tatiana Tess devoted her remarks at the publisistika seminar to the
moral and ethical theme. While other members of the creative union were relatively
young and had made their careers during the war or immediately after, Tess was born in
pre-revolutionary Odessa and had been a close friend of the writer Isaak Babel’. She
worked at Izvestiia from 1934 until 1983, the year of her death. She was thus in a unique
position to reflect on journalists’ response to social evolution, which she framed largely
as a search for new genres and reader engagement. These efforts would not only help the
public but would also improve journalists’ understanding of the world and of themselves.
While most of these journalists valorized the letter as a means to improve newspaper
content and to mold audiences, not all remarks on correspondence were positive—at all
three seminars, various participants complained about the high volume of correspondence
and overly demanding approaches to the newspaper.
Since Soviet journalists spoke so frequently about moral qualities and reader
needs, it is vital to understand the ideological framework which determined how these
terms were interpreted and employed. Even as they celebrated de-Stalinization, creative
union members’ conceptions of their work rested on a fundamentally illiberal vision: the
reader they sought to form and cultivate was collectivist in outlook, and questions of
moral formation were not only about individual conscience but the larger good of society
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and progress toward socialism. Where the “mass journalism” of the 1930s was dedicated
to industrialization, creative union leaders moved beyond these issues to include
questions of moral growth. In short, postwar print culture was explicitly focused on an
illiberal collectivist self-fashioning, the formation of a socialist “new person” in harmony
with society. This “socialist subjectivity” has hitherto been identified primarily with the
production of diaries, biographies, and other personal texts. Journalists in the
Khrushchev era were equally preoccupied with identifying such “new persons” and
influencing their development through the newspaper. Existing treatments largely discuss
this trend in terms of Adzhubei’s relationship with Khrushchev and his work at Izvestiia.
As part of my efforts to embed journalists in various institutional contexts, I move
beyond a single publication in this chapter and discuss the creative union as an important
site for discussions of socialist personhood as it related to genre politics and professional
values.493
The desire to understand and convey the inner life of readers was consistently
proclaimed on multiple occasions, but narratives of individual growth were frequently
discussed in terms of their universal applicability. While internal development of
individuals was an official public value—and less contentious than it had been under
Stalin—individual growth was most important when it provided a template for broader
social action. Another key departure from Stalinist subjectivity was the stress placed on
contemplation and voluntary self-actualization. The vision of transformation advanced in
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the creative union depended less obviously on violence and destruction.494 Where higher
education debates pointed to some convergence with other modern states, conversations
about genre and reader interactions were more distinctly “Soviet,” as creative union
members often explicitly rejected liberal notions of the autonomous self and expressed
anxiety that the value of individualism might be misinterpreted. Creative union leaders
argued that successful reader engagement required moral development on the part of the
journalist: journalists should strive to improve themselves and their clarity of analytical
vision, rather than pursue objectivity or distance from readers. As in 1956, the pursuit of
controversial and challenging topics was presented as an important public service, though
censorship remained an obstacle.
More practical discussions of reader needs in the creative union demonstrated the
growing importance of social science methods along with traditional work with letters.
As in the 1930s, Soviet culture remained “radically focused on the recipient” of its
efforts, though the methods used to achieve this focus had changed, as part of journalists’
efforts to understand their more literate and sophisticated public.495 Though concerns
about readers were explicitly ideological, new methods for reaching readers relied on
sociological opinion polls, a method of public engagement common to other, democratic
states. KP’s Institute for Public Opinion (hereafter the IOM) was a major center for these
initiatives, conducting and publishing several major surveys in the 1960s under the
leadership of Boris Grushin. The development of sociology contributed to a new
conversation about professional values in the Journalists’ Union, since sociological
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methods presented new possibilities for reader engagement. The new enthusiasm for
polling presents another instance of Soviet convergence with other states, as histories of
opinion polling in the United States explicitly link construction of and engagement with
sociological research to the development of “modern consciousness,” though American
initiatives were more closely associated with the emerging field of “market research”
than with government bodies.496 Though many of the creative seminars reveal a
fundamental optimism about Soviet society after de-Stalinization, even close associates
of Adzhubei expressed concerns about the proper relationship between the individual and
society or glossed over Stalinist excesses, and celebrations of personhood could focus on
the punitive aspects of reform projects. Responsibility toward readers not only informed
debates over genre and methodology but also lead to frank discussions about the role of
censorship and the responsibility of Soviet journalists to reach the public before Western
media sources could. Like the cultural diplomats I discussed in chapter four, participants
in creative union seminars reflected on the distinctions between Soviet and “bourgeois”
journalism and compared their own effectiveness and authority to that of their rivals.
Though the creative union’s influence over its rank-and-file members remained limited,
its engagement with the philosophical challenges of renewing the Soviet project
increased substantially by 1964.
•••
One of the more significant organizational undertakings after the inaugural
congress was an expanded commitment to higher education. Intervention and control
over these processes is considered a key attribute of any modern profession: increased
496

Igo, The Averaged American, especially 15–22.

288

interest in these matters in the Journalists’ Union further demonstrates the concept’s
applicability to Soviet institutions.497 In 1960, its commission for work with young
journalists heard proposals for restructuring journalism higher education, and committed
to collecting more data on instructors and graduates.498 In March of 1962, the creative
union held a “conversation on the preparation of journalistic cadres.” While some of the
seminar’s main themes reflect the particularities of a socialist journalism model, there
was significant overlap with journalism in liberal democracies, demonstrating the
relationship between “conscious professionalization” of the creative union to our
understanding of postwar Soviet modernity. Like Western journalists, creative union
figures struggled to create educational programs to adequately prepare students for
journalism work—and while some of their concerns were explicitly ideological, many
related to journalism’s uneasy disciplinary fit in the university curriculum—a problem
Western journalists still confront.499 The creative union leadership deliberately sought a
greater influence over education and training standards—a goal closely associated with
professionalization.500 In his analysis of the creative union in the 1970s, Thomas
Remington presents higher education and training as one of the organization’s few
substantive undertakings. Many of the anxieties about admissions standards and
curricular content he identifies originated in the decade after the inaugural congress.501
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Though these initial efforts were more about aspirations than accomplishments, they
demonstrate a sustained interest in controlling and directing the profession’s future.
The opening speaker at the 1962 higher education seminar was Liubov
Mikhailovna Ivanova, who had held a senior staff position at KP before moving to
Izvestiia. Ivanova was candid about deficits in professional training, even questioning its
relevance. The best journalists did not necessarily have degrees: Ivanova “never met a
quality journalist who graduated from an educational institution.” Many working
journalists found their way to the field by cultivating relationships and submitting short
pieces, rather than through training. Programs did not demonstrably yield more qualified
individuals: Ivanova was especially concerned about the length of the “incubation period
from a journalism school or department, to a real journalist.” Though some of her
colleagues disagreed, Ivanova was “firmly convinced that journalism education is
necessary, that we should strengthen and develop it, improve it, and to do this we must
settle many questions.” Skepticism about the value of university curricula is a major
tension in Western academic approaches to journalism, though most analyses of this issue
focus on liberal democracies. Seen in this light, Ivanova’s questions point to a broader
convergence between Soviet journalism practices and those of other modern states.
Though her educational dilemmas may have been at least partly due to the organization’s
relatively recent development, the persistence of such anxieties outside socialist societies
suggests that these uncertainties were fundamental to journalism. These debates further
establish a clear contrast between journalism and musical composition: the status and
value of conservatories was always a part of creative union work and a frequent path to
membership. This suggests—however inconclusively, in absence of a detailed archival
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study—a possible overlap with the Writers’ Union, whose members were not necessarily
products of a particular educational program.502
Though she defended higher education, Ivanova’s descriptions of the ideal
journalist were not rooted in a course of study but rather her conviction that, “a person
grows and becomes a journalist, in spite of the fact that he has a diploma…a person
should achieve party-minded maturity…”503
This vision of professional development relied more on ideology than an educational
program, a theme Ivanova expanded on:
One can distinguish the experienced journalist from the inexperienced by
depth of thought, the ability to evaluate a phenomenon…no higher
education institution can teach us the secrets and knowledge of our
profession. The journalistic profession belongs to those professions, which
makes its own way. I think that this is accurate, but I think that our
journalism departments…produce educated people, who know too much
theory and have too little practice.504
This vision of journalism as a field requiring particular intuitive, perceptive aptitude
closely mirrors the Anglo-American scholarly debate about journalism as a “craft” rather
than a profession. In a review essay devoted to this problem, John Henningham discussed
journalism’s reliance on “tacit” or “mysterious” knowledge rather than directly traceable
to an educational program, similar to Ivanova’s statements above.505 Despite her
skepticism, an increasing number of Soviet journalists held university degrees in the
postwar period, including Iurii Voronov and Boris Pankin, both of whom feature
prominently in this chapter and the larger dissertation. Memoir literature generally
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supports Ivanova’s impression that many young people were recruited through personal
relationships and valued their work experiences more than their diplomas. Voronov in
particular had a habit of supporting university friends in their search for work.506 Though
a serious examination of higher education outcomes and employment patterns is beyond
the scope of this study, key journalists remained skeptical about any clear link between
education and success in the field.
More concrete discussion of admissions, curricular content, and reform fell to
Iasen’ Zasurskii, then аssistant dean of Moscow University’s journalism department, and
to a lesser extent to Boris Pankin, who remained on staff at KP. This portion of the higher
1962 education seminar was, like Ivanova’s opening address, a balance between
describing existing affairs and entertaining reform proposals. Both interpretive strands
highlighted journalism’s ambiguous academic status, along with the field’s political and
social importance in a Cold War environment. Zasurskii was the first to address reform in
terms of admissions and enrollment. While the creative union had taken more interest in
the candidate selection process after the examination stage, “unfortunately, their vote is
not decisive in the evaluation of examinations. We have asked for a long time that the
Ministry of Higher Education introduce a special creative profiling exam, but this
question is still unresolved.” Zasurskii felt that additional “help” from the creative union
would be useful but did not elaborate.507 These descriptions of the candidate selection
process emphasize the creative union’s limited influence, despite its stated commitment
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to future generations of the profession. Zasurskii considered altering admissions
standards: the program typically only admitted students who had two years of work
experience (stazh), but he contemplated waiving this requirement in favor of students
with “an inclination to journalistic work” (sklonnost’ k zhurnalistkoi rabote). For her part,
Ivanova believed journalists were not stringent enough with admitted students, compared
to their creative colleagues. In conservatories, students who did not sing well were
redirected to the program for choir teachers, while journalists who lacked real skill often
left with degrees. Boris Pankin suggested universities intentionally admit too many
students to discourage the less dedicated.508 While there was a clear dissatisfaction with
current admissions practices, the range of solutions reflect the intangible nature of
journalistic success: no clear definition of an “inclination” to journalistic success was
given, yet time in an educational program would somehow determine its presence.
Zasurskii advocated a less strict admissions policy to find this “inclination,” while Pankin
and Ivanova focused on negative reinforcement—a diverse array of tactics that suggests
uncertainty as to the best course of action.
After discussing admissions, Zasurskii described the typical subjects for the early
years of the university program: political economy, dialectical materialism, historical
materialism, history of philosophy, and modern and contemporary history. The Higher
Education ministry had recently introduced required logic courses. Students themselves
decided whether to concentrate in print journalism, radio, television, or publishing.
Elective courses were heavily slanted toward the humanities, especially Russian language
and stylistics. Zasurskii described philology, languages, and literatures as the subjects
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“journalists cannot live without.” More recently, the department had begun cooperating
with the economics faculty on analysis of production centers in factories and agriculture,
and offering lectures on economic topics which commonly interested readers. Zasurskii
argued that future journalists would need an understanding of economic performance and
citizens’ material well-being.509
Boris Pankin supported this increased focus on economics as a corrective to the
humanities’ dominance in the original curriculum, since the existing program produced
journalists who were culture experts. Though he valued these journalists, Pankin
considered economics the “backbone” of journalism. Most journalists who arrived at his
newspaper suddenly found themselves “studying to find out what they didn’t know, what
they did not study in the institute.”510 The prevalence of cultural expertise, and
humanistic training, points to journalism’s status as “mind work”—intellectual and
cultural labor held in high esteem in a Soviet context due to its association with literary or
artistic production.511 At the same time, Pankin’s forceful critique of the existing system
presented the newsroom as more formative than the university. In partial recognition of
this, Zasurskii described the curriculum’s emphasis on practicum programs, typically
begun in the second year, which included a ten-week period at small-circulation or raionlevel newspapers, ten weeks in oblast’ or republic newspapers in the third year, with the
final year including a six-month work period, with evening or correspondence
coursework. Most of this training occurred in Moscow at central publications.512 These
descriptions reveal an unresolved tension between practical or vocational training and
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more abstract humanistic traditions—a lasting legacy for journalism education in the
United States, as well. These affinities had a clear limit, however: Soviet journalists, in
their understanding of practice as well as education, insisted on the centrality of
Marxism-Leninism.513
Zasurskii admitted that more focused programs, including economic
specialization or international affairs, would not lead to “universal journalists” who could
work in the raion press where they would have to cover a variety of topics. Zasurskii
additionally proposed special study for graduates of international relations and economic
programs to “make them journalists” referencing programs in the United States and
Poland.514 These proposals reveal an ambiguity: if successful journalists were made out
of a real “inclination to the work” it is not obvious how someone who originally trained
to be an economist or a diplomat would uncover this intuitive capacity through a course
of study. Specialization further complicated the relationship between professionalization
and education—such programs often made journalists unsuitable for the raion newspaper
would seem to limit rather than expand graduates’ work opportunities. Raion-level
journalists were, on the whole, less educated, and, if Moscow oblast’ is any indication,
they shared Zasurskii’s concerns about graduates’ preparedness for their work, as we will
see in chapter six. Zasurskii’s failure to reconcile the universal and particular goals of
education, like Ivanova’s focus on intuitive aptitude, reveals an ongoing struggle to
define the profession’s relationship to the academy. In his overview of the Soviet press,
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Mark Hopkins points out that these questions—whether to provide specialization by
subject, by genre, or a “liberal arts education”—were discussed as early as 1952, when
Moscow University’s Journalism Department was established.515 As late as 1970—the
year Hopkins’ work was published—Zasurskii and his colleagues continued to struggle
with attracting quality students, as they were still bound to give preference to those with
work experience and established publishing history. The persistence of these issues
indicates the creative union remained unable to exercise sustained influence over
education policy.
Pankin and Zasurskii’s discussion of specialization at the 1962 seminar was not
only about domestic professional preparedness but also reflected the growing importance
of Cold War competition to defining professional stature. Language study was required
for all five years of the journalism program, for about six to eight hours per week, and the
department hosted several foreign students. Though he did not state who supported these
goals, Zasurskii further noted calls for a specialization “on international themes” so that
students could get more exposure to foreign languages and understand how major
international events. This was a marked departure from past practice: many of the known
zhurnalisty-mezhdunarodniki in this study received language training in prewar programs
of study or established their other credentials through diplomatic and war correspondence
work.516 This potentially expanded role for MGU in internationalized journalism
education demonstrates the ongoing importance of international expertise to professional
development and an effort to make this training more systematic than in the past.
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Like Zasurskii, Boris Pankin considered international experience essential, since
most journalists would go abroad within two years of employment—a statement which
confirms the privileged position of journalists from central newspapers. Many of his
colleagues who went abroad “experienced great difficulties with foreign languages.”
Foreigners were surprised and confused when senior journalists lacked this skill—as
always, the possibility of damage to the Soviet Union’s reputation was a key aspect of
cross-cultural encounters.517 Pankin drew on his own international experience to bolster
his points—when he was part of the group accompanying Khrushchev to Austria, he
noticed Western journalists typing their stories and sending them by wire, while “we sat
by the phone and read until we were hoarse”—proof that typewriting was an essential
skill. While he did not directly reference Cold War competitiveness, his choice of
example demonstrates the close link between journalism’s international and domestic
functions—trips abroad still served as inducements to improve, seven years after the
Polevoi delegation’s American trip. As we saw in chapter four, travel abroad and contact
with foreigners was an essential skill for elite journalists, one with many expectations
attached.518 Based on his American experiences, Pankin considered American journalism
students “less cultured and less theoretically literate” than their Soviet counterparts, but
they enjoyed closer connections to senior members of the profession. No matter how
renowned and individual was, “they don’t shrink from coming [to the university, to speak
with students, advise them, and answer their questions.”519 Though he acknowledged
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socialism’s fundamental superiority, Pankin still presented American achievements as a
standard to meet or surpass.
Though the creative union’s seminar on higher education saw leading journalists
express anxieties about university training, these issues point less to a failure of Soviet
professionalization and more to a fundamental debate in the journalism field across
national boundaries. Though Pankin argued that Soviet journalists could learn from
American methods, modern Anglophone media scholars, as well as professionals, have
long expressed dissatisfaction with university training and journalism’s place in the
American academy. Just as professions have long been considered a “modern” social
category, journalism’s fraught relationship to the university points to Soviet convergence
with other print cultures.520 Higher education—and its relationship to the creative union’s
broader mission of professional mastery—remained an important organizational priority
after Khrushchev’s forced retirement in 1964, providing an important point of continuity
between the creative union’s early years and the Brezhnev era.
•••
Most of the creative union’s plenums after the inaugural congresses were
procedural formalities, though the various agendas are important indicators of political
priorities. Аs the organization acquired more members and expanded its scope of activity,
plenums began to touch on more sensitive topics and feature more intense debate. The
first plenum, held during the November 1959 inaugural congress, was focused on global
socialist concerns, such as fraternal greetings to China and protest at the murder of
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Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba.521 The next plenum was held during the
spring of 1961, in anticipation of the CPSU’s 22nd Congress. Plans were made for local
chapters to hold conferences and congresses in December, though these meetings were
ultimately pushed back to the following February. The third plenum was held in
December of 1961 and remained limited to a discussion of the most recent Party
congress.522
1962 was a period of increased creative activity, with creative seminars and more
substantive plenum discussions. In May, the Journalists’ Union hosted a collaborative
seminar with the Writers’ and Artists’ Unions on writing about literature and art. 523 This
increasing specialization was noted in 1962’s annual creative report for the entire Soviet
Union: seminars for literary editors and translators took place in Ukraine, while in
Uzbekistan and Georgia, there were seminars on the nonfiction ocherk and the feuilleton.
The all-Union body endorsed a recent Ukrainian initiative: giving entry and exit surveys
to seminar attendees to assess their needs and the effects of participation.524 Despite this
new interest in subjective opinions, quantitative measures of success predominated: a
hundred Moscow journalists had provided “creative help” to oblast’- and republic-level
colleagues, whereas in the previous year only forty such visits took place. In total, the
journalists engaged in this creative assistance visited sixty-seven cities to the previous
year’s twenty-five.525 A “lecture group” to “propagandize among press workers” on
particular themes, including genre, press history, and international issues, had formed in
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1961, with the explicit goal of establishing ties between skilled “central journalists” and
the localities, though its activity appears to have been limited.526 As part of preparations
for a 1963 plenum on “questions of mastery,” there were planned discussions about thick
journals, international reviews, the journalist and the listener, news and sensationalism,
and the role of the press in increasing popular participation in the new party and state
control commissions.527 By 1962, the creative union had about thirty-five thousand
members.528 Although the plenum on mastery did not ultimately take place until 1965, as
we will see in chapter six, the next two years featured more substantial growth, and
nationally known journalists began to reflect more on professional identity, genre, and
reader interactions.
The creative union’s June 1963 plenum was officially devoted to the struggle
against imperialism, the new Party-state control commissions, and the importance of
ideological work in demonstrating the Party’s recent successes. While president Pavel
Satiukov touched on all of these themes in his address, he spent more time discussing
possible areas of improvement along with rank-and-file requests for a more activist
creative union—effectively continuing debate about the meaning of professionalization.
As in the period of the inaugural congress, some of the calls for improvement would
seem to challenge professionalization: the impulse to “attract the popular masses” to
newspaper work led Satiukov to criticize the “sad fact that in both large and small
newspapers, the overwhelming majority of materials are written by full-time, professional
journalists.” And though their work was necessary to show “the literary image of events”
526
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journalists needed to solicit more workers’ contributions to their newspapers.529 Satiukov
was clearly required to promote Leninist principles of popular press participation, even as
he addressed an audience of elite media professionals in a creative union. His other
suggestions for improvement relied on collaboration more than exclusivity, such as more
coordination between creative unions, to ensure that more literary and musical reviews
were written by experts.530 Even more than at the 1962 cadres seminar, journalism was
presented as a profession dependent on others’ expertise—writers and composers’
knowledge was crucial to properly informing the public about the cultural sphere.531
Satiukov continued to discuss the distinctions between journalism and other
creative fields, focusing first on the Journalists’ Union’s size and membership issues. At
thirty-six thousand members, the journalists’ union was the “most massive” creative
union in the country. This created a special obligation to establish stringent selection
criteria for members, since past practices had involved scandals and errors. In one case,
an editor from Voronezh accepted payment for an article he had not written and then
engaged a chauffeur and a car, presumably with the stolen funds. Rather than recognizing
his mistake, the editor argued that he had not been “shaky on a party line I should have
followed” and asked to be reinstated. Satiukov compared this to Khrushchev’s
denunciation of the writer Viktor Nekrasov, specifically his declaration that writers who
were out of step with the Party did not belong in it, and reminded his audience, “we must
be implacable…judging a person not by his declarations, but by his acts, his practical
activities, bringing the party line to life.” This included the proper relationship to those
529
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who “sought to use our high calling for mercenary ends…careerists. We should purge
ourselves of these people as fast as possible.” As proof the problem was unresolved,
Satiukov cited recent applications to the Moscow city branch by pensioners and a
prosecutors’ assistant, and declared that the creative union should be “freed from this
ballast.”532 This outrage against a journalist who had disgraced his calling demonstrates
the continued importance of moral standards—though this was a major theme of cultural
diplomacy, it was equally prominent in discussions of domestic professionalism. The
desire to combat careerism and materialism presents authentic professionalism as a love
of creative activity for its own sake. Though membership requirements were a major
feature of the bylaws debate, clearly no closure had been reached in the intervening years.
Other speakers at the 1963 plenum echoed Satiukov’s desire for exclusivity and
advocated more serious professional development in the creative union. The head of the
Ukrainian Republic branch, E. A. Lazebnik, lamented that the creative union had
repeatedly put off holding a plenum on “questions of creative mastery.” The event was
finally held in 1965, and Lazebnik himself would deliver one of the major addresses. In
Ukraine, creative work was more robust: the creative union held a very popular seminar
on newspaper and journal editing, where more than two hundred journalists had actually
attended, out of fifty invitees. Like the participants in the cadres seminar a few months
earlier, Lazebnik bemoaned the state of higher education—it provided information about
“theory and practice, what an editorial board does…but how to write, this is studied least
of all.” Though the previous seminar had focused on Moscow University, Lazebnik’s
sentiments indicate that dissatisfaction with journalistic higher education was not limited
532
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to the capital.533 Lazebnik was equally concerned with membership issues and the need
for more selectivity: in the Odessa chapter, some lecturers from the Znanie society—a
“social” or “public” organization (obschestvennaia organizatsiia) dedicated to the
dissemination of political and scientific information—wished to join the creative union
and presented their publication records, which were deemed insufficient for admission.
They had only pursued membership to get a salary increase. Like Satiukov, Lazebnik
noticed an increase in applications from pensioners and policemen and endorsed a more
careful approach to membership for workers’ and peasants’ correspondents.534 These
criticisms demonstrate an increased dissatisfaction with the original membership
model—though a stricter policy would not emerge until the creative union’s second allUnion congress in 1966.
Other speakers at the 1963 plenum discussed their growing dissatisfaction with
the creative union, pointing to persistent tensions between local journalists and the
organization’s elites. A representative from Lipetsk named Bakurov critiqued Satiukov’s
speech for its lack of substance. He argued that the last two plenums had been “conducted
in haste” (na skoruiu ruku) and that this left “practical questions” unresolved, and that
“everyday leadership…is not felt on the part of the governing board.” Because of this,
requests for assistance were often unanswered or delayed past the point of usefulness.
Bakurov had personally requested a visit from journalists who had recently been abroad,
and there was no reply from the creative union. Bakurov considered this particularly
upsetting since Lipetsk was only an eight-hour train journey from the capital. He further
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complained that the creative union’s infrequent plenums were a violation of the bylaws,
and noted the long delay in organizing a publisistika conference, despite the genre’s
acknowledged importance.535 A year earlier, local journalists had held their own
conferences, and journalists in Moscow oblast’ made similar complaints to Bakurov’s. In
response, the all-Union body had agreed to study the grievances in more detail, though no
major alterations were made.536 These critiques highlight the creative union’s struggles to
meet its domestic mandate, a problem Satiukov would directly address in his closing
remarks, though specific reform efforts were not undertaken until 1965, a subject I will
return to in chapter six.
Satiukov’s responses to his critics were extensive—a decisive effort to rebut rankand-file complaints in favor of his own less ambitious vision for the creative union. Since
most of his colleagues had already attended recent speeches on ideology in the Central
Committee, he felt a brief speech was justified. It was not necessary for him to discuss all
major political issues, since, “the majority of our members are active party workers, who
fulfill wide and specific party functions and major political goals” and that the
Journalists’ Union was expected to devote itself to “specific creative problems.” At the
same time, for a “multinational organization,” it would be difficult for any leader to give
specific universally applicable recommendations, and such a practice would be “not
entirely fair.”537
Satiukov went on to describe his limited goals for the Journalists’ Union:
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We are a creative organization, but an organization politically governed
completely and in its entirety by the Party’s decisions, the party line, and
we are the lieutenants of the Party. Therefore, to have as a goal that in the
Journalists’ Union there would be assignment of work, or
recommendations given, is impossible…We struggle for the party line
through creative methods, and other methods for realizing the party line
are conducted through the publications and other bodies, where our Soviet
journalists work… detailed recommendations for specific institutions…
could somewhere tie down the creative initiative of our Union. We are in
favor of its development taking into account the concrete conditions of
individual republics, and taking into account the decisions of the
communist parties, we interpret the line of the Party’s Central
Committee.538
This statement presents a striking contrast not only to rank-and-file desires from
the bylaws debate but also to the relatively expansive vision of the inaugural congress.
Now, Satiukov presented the Journalists’ Union as an organization with a limited scope,
without the power or the inclination to determine national journalistic practices, and only
to discuss “creative questions.” His vision of journalists as “the Party’s lieutenants”
stressed the profession’s limits and the Party’s authority—a more politically active
creative union would be redundant rather than productive. A key difference from the
Composers’ Union emerges here: if the Party apparatus had to “professionalize itself” in
order to properly evaluate music, journalists were already enmeshed in Party structures to
such an extent that even the creative union’s leader advocated a subordinate role.539
Satiukov was more hopeful about the organization’s future, as he discussed the
possibility of hosting a purely “creative plenum,” as a joint exercise between republiclevel branches or the Moscow and Leningrad chapters. He hoped that the creative union
would soon “discuss the problem based on the experience of local and central
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newspapers, to develop an expansive creative discipline.” He regretted the-all Union
body’s inability to meet all local requests, citing his own busy schedule and the demands
of hosting many foreign guests. While there were 288 journalists sent to localities,
satisfying all requests would require over a thousand journalists and more money than
membership dues provided. The Party’s leading role further justified holding fewer
creative events than members desired: “we could hold a plenum every quarter, but there
is no great need for this, because the specifics of our work consists of our close
cooperation with the party organizations.”540 Leadership in the localities would require
more resources and personnel—a logistical problem no doubt compounded by the Soviet
Union’s geography and vast newspaper networks. Satiukov’s mention of foreign guests
and his own busy schedule was a direct acknowledgement of conflict between cultural
diplomacy and domestic professionalization. In his closing thoughts on membership, he
reiterated his dissatisfaction with the more inclusive original model, noting, “it is not
necessary to have a union with a hundred thousand members,” and while there were
many peasants’ correspondents in the Soviet Union, membership for all of them was not
a goal: the “swelling of [creative] unions is not a normal thing.” While there were
currently “a hundred and seventy members in Lipetsk,” fifty “wonderful, professional
journalists” might be more desirable, so that the rest could “stretch toward that goal.”
Satiukov presented an exclusive membership model as an inducement to improvement,
and implied that the earlier inclusive model had somehow violated the spirit of creative
organizations.541 As they had been during the bylaws debate, creative union leaders were
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more willing to recognize organizational limits than rank-and-file members. Though the
organization’s bylaws were not formally amended until 1966, several of the changes
made—which I will address in detail later—correspond to critiques made at this plenum
or during the creative union’s incubation period, reinforcing that professionalization was
always a multistage process.

•••
While the creative union’s membership policies and relatively limited scope were
contentious policies, most creative union members agreed that audience engagement was
a crucial professional value. Discussions about reader interaction focused not only on
traditional methods of correspondence but also the newly popular sociological methods
of gauging reader interest. In this section, I will discuss a 1963 seminar entirely devoted
to correspondence work before moving to the 1964 seminars on youth journalism and
publisistika, which included further discussion of reception issues. Recent scholarship on
reader letters has largely concerned literary politics as a means of analyzing social
change, and I argue that conceptions of the reader were equally critical to journalism
practice and professional identity. Though reader letters themselves are not always
accessible to historians, the creative union clearly considered work with correspondence
part of “professional mastery.”542 Many discussions of reader response concerned the
internal lives of citizens, particularly their moral and intellectual development—a theme
which I first discussed in my KP case study as the staff grappled with the Twentieth
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Congress. While discussions of correspondence and polling were generally optimistic
about the value of reader participation and that Soviet society was progressing, other
kinds of correspondence work were linked to the disciplinary initiatives of the
Khrushchev era, especially popular policing and the new Party-State control
commissions. The new journalism was indisputably focused on personhood and
subjectivity, but this formation process had its punitive aspects, which are more visible
when one turns away from prominent reformers and focuses on practices.
In 1963, the creative union hosted a seminar for senior members of
correspondence departments (otdel pisem) on the republic, oblast’, and krai levels. The
head of Sovetskaia Rossiia’s department celebrated the changes in his job under
Khrushchev. In the Stalin period, letters were “registered” but little else was done: after
“Leninist principles had been restored,” the reader had become more “active” and
correspondence departments were transformed from аn “inert counting house” to a
“creative department, equal to other departments.” This speech should be read as part of
the self-fashioning in response to de-Stalinization more than as a straightforward factual
statement: social histories indicate that petitions and other written exchanges remained
important in Stalinist society.543 At the same seminar, a senior journalist named Chuprin
from Ukraine’s Worker Gazette (Rabochaia gazeta) described the subjective nature of the
reading process: most letters should be read by more than one person, since different
people could be “attracted” to different aspects. The task was a demanding one, as the
newspaper had received about twenty four thousand letters the previous year, an average
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of eighty to a hundred per day. After sorting, letters were categorized into actionable
categories: “‘for future investigation, for action to be taken, for reply or to be left
unanswered.’” Chuprin advocated a particularly cautious approach to anonymous letters.
While there were fewer of them than in the past (possibly because anonymity was more
important in the Stalin era), they were not archived, because “there is no addressee and it
is known how much it is worth to put trust in such a letter.” And although their writers
were presumed to be “afraid of the truth,” they were always examined, despite the
“burden they posed.” After the facts were checked, the majority of them were found to
contain some truth and investigated.544 In her work on petitioning practices during
Stalinism, Sheila Fitzpatrick treats anonymous letters as their own genre, where authors
were more sarcastic or expressed criticism of outsider groups. Chuprin’s skepticism
points to a hierarchy of authorship, where signed letters had more value to journalists,
though he admitted to finding value in anonymous letters, indicating that every member
of the reading public deserved access to journalists’ investigatory powers.545
The process of investigation was described in some detail, particularly the
importance of close interactions between newspapers and other Soviet institutions.
Letters were not usually sent directly to the source of the problem, but rather to “higher
institutions.” For example, if a letter came criticizing the leadership of a local trade
union, the letter was sent to the oblast’ leadership.546 Published letters should indicate the
writer’s party membership and occupation, “in order to attract the corresponding
audience to the letter.” This vision of journalism emphasized a different skill set than
544
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writing, positioning the journalist as a kind of sociopolitical interlocutor, who can agitate
on behalf of the reader. As in Bolshevik and early Soviet journalism, ascription and
categorization on a class basis was essential.547
In her address to the 1963 correspondence seminar, L. M. Emilianova of KP’s
correspondence department turned from the practical to the emotional and subjective
aspects of correspondence work. This was important not only for readers but also for the
journalists who read and processed reader concerns: “Letters take on a great value in this
way…they prompt his specific thoughts, to state his beliefs, his personal feelings on one
or another matter. And to think about a letter, this is important and comprises the
foundation of work with letters.”548 In the 1930s, the discipline of “reader studies” fell
out of favor, as agitators and officials supported public discussions where officials could
direct opinion, rather than the previously anonymous written feedback. This was due to
changing political attitudes: reader studies became suspect as it was increasingly
considered overly “subjective.”549 The recovery of sentiment, authenticity, and the self is
not a new theme for historians of the Khrushchev era—what is instructive here is the
connection between subjective growth and professional practice. The journalist was
presented as both an active leader—an authority figure who selected letters—and as a
reader influenced by another’s words.
Emilianova later argued that journalists had a particular responsibility to
investigate and analyze correspondence, and provided several examples of more
successful articles. Letters themselves might only indicate a “theme” whereas the “task of
547
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the journalist is to uncover content, to show what is important and what is not.” In one
article, “The Unattractive Girl” (Nekrasivuiu devchonku), a young woman wrote in about
her desire to be an actress despite her lack of good looks. Barred from entering her
chosen field, she was without a meaningful occupation (bezdel’nichaet). The paper asked
Stalin Prize winning actor V. O. Toporkov to reply and describe how a good acting career
did not depend on looks, and wanted to start a “conversation, about labor, about activity
in life, about true beauty and fleeting beauty.” The case resulted in five thousand
responses, proving that an “insignificant fact” from a letter could produce a “great
general theme…there are letters which seize on a very small theme, which the reader
might not notice, if a journalist does not help him.” This example, and the careful
scrutiny it required, was part of the rubric “sorting the editorial board’s mail” (razbiraia
redaktsionnuiu pochtu).550 Though journalists could be inspired by correspondence, they
were also presented as more knowledgeable than their readers. Readers could describe
their experiences, but only a truly perceptive journalist could interpret them. Letters could
call attention to more serious failing, as in the rubric “under the judgment of society” (na
sud obshestvennosti). A particularly tragic case involved a young farmer who drowned
while his comrades, former military men, simply watched. The boy’s mother wrote about
her “inability to see these farmers,” and a correspondent traveled to interview the
bystanders about their motives. The material resulted in three thousand letters, at which
point the editorial board had to decide what to do next: “it was possible to publish the
material and conclude with an exclamation point: oh, what a shame…but one must think
more about the theme when the mail comes after such a controversial article.” The
550
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newspaper solicited recollections about heroic behavior and received many responses.551
Readers themselves could provide the inspirational examples journalists so frequently
sought—effectively furnishing examples of the “positive hero” to counter the tragedy of
the drowned young man. As we saw in the KP case study, the ability to identify and write
about exemplary protagonists was an important newsroom value—one which links
journalism to the socialist realist novel.552
Emilianova’s later descriptions of correspondence work emphasized its moral
dimensions and the selection of proper rubrics. One possible form was the selection of
multiple letters on a single theme, which was particularly useful when “subject matter
concerns moral and general human themes, when alone a single good person acted
according to the highest, most humane human law, and a second was a coward…As a
rule, these letters do not go unnoticed, and are discussed in collectives, and in the
family.” Emilianova was particularly encouraged when readers described personal
conversations they had after reading a particularly stirring story in the newspaper. She
argued that moral themes concerning matters which “do not fall under our civil code” or
“do not fall under the codex of our procedural laws, should be discussed by society.”
(obsuzhdeni obshestvennostiu).553 The contemplative aspect of correspondence work had
a clear didactic function, related to what Thomas Wolfe calls the “pedagogical
orientation” of the Soviet press.554 This depiction of the “moral and ethical theme”
presents it as a morality tale, dependent on the contrast between good and evil. In this
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reading of the genre, the ideal article spurred discussion in private life, and might reform
individuals who could not be brought to justice in more conventional ways.
Emilianova was equally candid about the logistical and creative challenges of
responding to letters, while emphasizing that reader feedback was a source of
professional pride and inspiration. KP’s editorial board tried to anticipate materials which
would “spur a response from readers” as befit the “responsibilities of the journalist.” At
the same time, Emilianova “envied” the number of letters Pravda had recently received
after publishing correspondence from a collective farm worker.555 This comparison
presents correspondence as a limited resource for which that all publications competed.
At the same time, Emilianova admitted that not all letters were significant and suggested
burning the more trivial ones, such as housing complaints. In her view, the newspaper’s
ability to truly improve individual situations was limited: “No doubt this [case of
complaint] was already decided by society (obshestvennost’) and decided appropriately.”
When she claimed that at least ten percent of letters involved housing, a voice from the
audience interrupted and said, “no, even more than that.”556
Clearly, journalists found it acceptable to disparage quotidian assistance requests
and treat letters responding to a moral or ethical issue as superior, just as they disparaged
anonymous letters. The sheer volume of correspondence was equally daunting: in the
previous year, KP received two hundred seventy thousand letters, all of which had to be
archived. She suggested the creative union consider petitioning the Central Committee on
this issue. Even worse than housing complaints was the increasing number of letters
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from convicted criminals (osuzhdnenikh). A person who had been convicted of rape, for
example, might have enough time to write “a hundred and three complaints, and a
hundred and three organizations will take up this task.” Work like this made it all the
more necessary and difficult to “sort out” (razobrat’sia) when a “genuine letter” arrived.
The situation was even worse in the winter—possibly because people had more time to
write—and the newspaper could receive up to three thousand letters a day.557 The vision
of the Soviet public is notably less exalted: readers could be more interested in personal
concerns than their own subjective growth, and deviants could impede correct assessment
of “real letters.” Correcting social ills could be time consuming, especially in cases of
bribery or misallocated housing. The problem of social malcontents abusing
correspondence was a major theme in Sergei Gerasimov’s 1967 film, The Journalist,
discussed in chapter six.
Other speakers at the correspondence seminar focused far more directly on the
punitive functions of the press, particularly S. P. Mezentsev, head of the press department
of the Party-State Control Commissions—an institution closely involved with new
policing tactics under Khrushchev. As its name suggests, the new body, introduced in
1962, combined Party and state institutions in an effort to educe corruption and other
social ills. The institutions recruited large numbers of popular activists and have been
treated as an example of increased surveillance and coercion under Khrushchev.558
Mezentsev argued that the press was an “active and mobilized helper” for his institution
and acknowledged the changes in Soviet society since the 1930s. At that time,

557
558

GARF f. 10124, op. 1, d. 194, l. 59–60.
Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia, 292–3.

314

correspondence work had relied on “big organizers, knowing a lot about life. “ This was
in contrast to the “new demands…that workers in the correspondence departments must
themselves be capable of writing (umeli pisat’).” He was particularly pleased that more
newspapers were publishing special rubrics devoted to Party-state control, and that the
organizations were receiving large numbers of letters. In his view, a reduced
correspondence burden would make it “easier for journalists to work” especially if
complaints could be resolved locally.559 Party-state control was presented as a mechanism
appropriate to a more advanced socialist society and have a positive effect on
professional work habits.
Mezentsev argued that newspapers should “provide information for the masses
about the work that the control organs are doing.”560 The new institutions struggled with
the proper relationship between Soviet values and criticism, particularly the “sensational
approach” to poor behavior, which could result in describing “good-for-nothings and
their loathsome face…this must be done, but not through advertising…to look at who is
guilty and how to correct it.” He argued for greater cooperation between “journalists and
specialists…specialists lack experience, but journalists have observations…we should
combine this.”561 Like the discussion on economics and higher education at the 1962
cadres seminar, Mezentsev’s image of the “ideal journalist” emphasized the limits on
professional expertise and the need to collaborate with other experts. As part of this
cooperation, journalists should begin to evaluate “each letter from the perspective of
general party and state interests.” While he admitted that many letters touched on court
559
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cases, housing issues, or people who had been dismissed from their jobs, others could
contain “big questions…significant not only for a given raikom (the party committee for
the raion-level), but that have union-level significance.” These should be sent to the
committee, especially in cases where a local body had been unresponsive. Even
apartment questions could merit attention, if, for example, they concerned a new building
which somehow did not house any workers. This was a more instrumental approach to
correspondence work—journalists sorted letters for another institution, rather than
advancing social progress through writing. Mezentsev also saw correspondence as a
disciplinary tool for moral improvement. A bad factory director would ideally “become
ashamed when someone from his factory appeals to the raion, it should be a blow to him,
it means they don’t trust him, they don’t come to him even one time.” It was entirely
possible, and even desirable, that the flow of letters would decrease over time, as social
conditions improved—a rare admission that less correspondence could be a positive
outcome.562 While correspondence could spur social development through contemplation,
as in moral and ethical pieces, Mezentsev focused on the disciplinary aspects. He freely
complained about journalists who relied on “old methods” of social control, rather than
relying on the new “cooperative groups” which would organize and inform the social
control committees about all the critical materials that had recently been published. These
groups were envisioned as an “intermediary body between journalists and the
committee.”563 Where Emilianova claimed that journalists had a unique capacity to shape
private life, Mezentsev wished to see this inclination harnessed to his institution and its
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reform mission. These preoccupations reinforce an important difference between
Khrushchev-era reform projects and “work on the self” under Stalin—the new reform
agendas intended a subjective transformation without the threat of violence or arrest.564
•••
In June and July of 1964 the Journalists’ Union hosted two significant creative
seminars—a joint seminar with the Komsomol called “The Journalist and the Demands of
Life,” which was devoted to youth journalism issues, and another on the genre of
publisistika. I discuss both events, which took place within weeks of each other, as
arguments for a particular model of Soviet journalism and genre politics, one particularly
dedicated to social reform and a recovery from Stalinism. Journalists were encouraged to
recover their authorial voices in the service of cultivating Soviet subjectivity in their
readers. Unlike in discussions of higher education, which featured some convergence
with Western debates, these conversations about the recent past, genre, and moral and
social development relied on explicitly Soviet cultural values, especially service to a
collective and socialist realist genre tropes. According to creative union records, about
three hundred journalists took part in the publisistika seminar—a third of whom were
from the Soviet Union’s republics, krais and oblasts. The list of participants highlights
the close cooperation between leading journalists and the Central Committee. The head
of its ideology department, A. G. Egorov, took part “along with other responsible
workers from the department,” revealing an ongoing close relationship to the Party
apparatus.565 In addition to this official recognition, the publisistika seminar received a
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great deal of attention in the creative union’s print journal. Though most of its
participants were from central publications, it was clearly considered significant for all
professionals.566
D. P. Goriunov, then TASS director, gave the opening speech at the 1964 youth
journalism seminar, which reviewed the historical and social developments of recent
years. Unlike Adzhubei and Satiukov, who were fired not long after Brezhnev took
power, Goriunov remained in his position until 1967, when he embarked on a diplomatic
career. The introduction is worth quoting at length, as it encapsulates many major themes
of Khrushchev-era journalism:
To avoid a tone of didacticism, refrain from comrades counting on some
kind of instructions, some sort of recipe for how we make a newspaper,
how we deal with one or another problem of the upbringing of youth…we
gather here to exchange opinions, exchange accumulated experiences, and
not to share recipes, instructions or orders…It seems to me, that before
such a qualified audience it is not necessary to speak about the source of
this phenomenon. It must be stated that the creative atmosphere in the
country, in particular in the ideological realm, is connected with the
liquidation of the consequences of the personality cult, very fruitfully
expressed in the development of the Soviet press and Soviet
journalistics.567
Goriunov’s argument was almost an expanded meditation on the creative union’s
commitment to professional growth and social reform. His journalism was inherently
collaborative, rooted in investigation and dialogue. He presented the recent past as a
“liberal age”: journalism had recovered its vitality, its ability to debate central
questions.568 Goriunov’s optimism about the present created a rhetorical distance between
Stalinism and Khrushchev’s rule—without acknowledging the complicity of the current
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leadership in perpetuating the personality cult. Instead, he relegated the difficult work of
comprehending Stalinism to the past, rather than advocating an ongoing recovery
process.
Goriunov presented journalism’s advancements in terms of individual growth and
development, a theme many of his colleagues would also take up. Newspapers “no
longer resembled each other…but had acquired their own particular face…” This
diversity was particularly key to managing the “upbringing of youth” (vospitanie
molodezhi) and “find the correct tone in conversations with their young readers, which
will most of all act on his feelings, on his reason.”569 He presented the reader entirely as
an object to be acted upon, though his stress on both sentiment and intellect reveal an
interest in the moral and ethical aspects of print culture. He was particularly concerned
with finding the proper “tone” for audiences, especially youth, citing their sophistication
and intelligence.570 Most of Goriunov’s examples of journalistic success were tied to KP,
his former workplace: He singled out Vasilii Peskov, who had recently won the Lenin
Prize for his book, Walking through the Dew, and claimed that the paper had trained
eighty percent of the nation’s leading journalists. Peskov had come to Moscow from
Voronezh during Goriunov’s tenure as editor, and Goriunov singled him out for having
“his own face in Soviet Journalism and the Soviet press, not resembling anyone else.”
Peskov was so popular that people as far away as Khabarovsk in the Far East requested
he visit and write about their challenges, particularly the new issues raised by growing
tensions with China. Goriunov viewed this level of adulation as a substantive
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achievement 571 Goriunov praised Peskov as an exemplary individual, who used his
particular talents in the service of national improvement. Other discussions of model
Soviet citizens at these seminars similarly positioned individual talent as essential to
collective progress.
In his address at the publisistika seminar weeks later, Aleksei Adzhubei touched
on similar themes to Goriunov, an unsurprising overlap since the two had worked closely
together at KP. Unfortunately, archival records preserve only a summary of the address
rather than a full transcript. Where Goriunov had focused on de-Stalinization and youth
journalism, Adzhubei expanded on the value of personhood to professional and social
development, taking a positive view of the Party’s connection to journalists. From his
perspective, this relationship was “directly connected with the material and technical
foundations of communism…and the formation of new social relationships, the
upbringing of the new person,” reinforcing that journalists were rhetorically invested in
both material and subjective development.572 Adzhubei’s main subject, the Soviet genre
of publisistika, deserves some explication. Though the term may be loosely translated as
an “essay” or “commentary” piece, the publisist as an author was bound to a higher
calling—to address a particular social or political problem, expound on it at length, and
offer possible solutions. The genre had its roots in famous nineteenth century essays
written by reform-minded intellectuals—both Pushkin and Vissarion Belinskii were
considered publisisty as well as literary figures. This genre, more than any other,
demonstrates the particularity of Russian and Soviet genre politics—publisistika was and
571
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is treated as a distinct art form, and practitioners could be known as publisisty as well as
journalists or writers. A recent Party plenum had designated media workers “the shock
forces of the ideological front,” a calling which reinforced the responsibility of the
publisist to accurately describe Soviet society and its needs.573
Adzhubei, as befit his role as a journalistic reformer close to Khrushchev, stressed
that publisistika as a genre had “suffered serious consequences from the period of the
personality cult.” The Central Committee now recognized what made journalism less
effective: “dry and boring articles…doctrinaire reports…simplification…silence about
difficulties…all of this damages our connection with readers.”574 Adzhubei’s ideal
journalism was active, lively, and grappled with social complexities. At the same time,
their commitment to describing “the truth of life” did not make publisisty “dispassionate
chroniclers of everyday life” (ne besstrastnye bytopisateli).
The obligations he described were extensive and demanding:
To see and correctly comprehend the leading tendencies of developing
events, and, with party minded conviction, express them in the newspaper.
When our publisistika is honest, open, brave, and romantic when it
correctly shows life…the Soviet reader accepts it. He is stern and
outspoken, and does not tolerate literary embellishment. And it is
necessary to always write, imagining the gaze of the person you are
addressing.575
Journalists, in their roles as publisisty, were not limited to description of the present but
could focus on the incipient potential in events, provided their convictions stemmed from
their ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism, just as the Soviet novel was meant
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to depict present struggle with an eye to a triumphant future.576 Adzhubei had a
particularly exalted vision of the ideal reader and the genre he deserved: the brave,
honest, and romantically inclined publisist had to meet exacting standards and pursue a
mutually beneficial relationship with those he wrote for. Adzhubei’s rejection of
“dispassionate” approaches and insistence on an ideologically clear vision reinforces that
Soviet journalists did not aspire to objectivity, even as they insisted on factual accuracy.
The dangers of “embellishment” were also a major theme at the 1964 youth journalism
seminar, as I will show in my analysis of Evgenii Riabchikov’s remarks there.
Adzhubei went on to provide “specific examples” of particularly successful
publisistika, again, in the words of the transcriber, “stressing the idea of the necessity of a
lively, human conversation with the reader. Propaganda of Marxism-Leninism,
publisistika on economic, scientific, and moral and ethical themes, all this should be
completely addressed to the person, to his reasoning and feelings.”577 Readers had both
sentimental and intellectual needs, which developed in an explicitly socialist ideological
framework, as the references to economics and Marxism-Leninism indicate. Tatiana Tess
expressed similar opinions in her remarks, and presented improved connections between
journalists as a positive gain, “made with our labor, our hearts, our thoughts…everything
that we put into our work.” While she did not seek to criticize established traditions,
when she looked back at the past, Tess saw a “sphere that we practically left
unexamined…a person’s internal world…that which we in our work call the moral and
ethical theme.” This involved both the new aspects of personhood and the holdovers from
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the past, personal thoughts, and even “doubts”—describing nearly all aspects of “Soviet
subjectivity,” as Jochen Hellbeck presents it in his case studies of Stalin-era diarists, all
of whom engaged in rigorous descriptions and accountings of internal life, with an eye to
creating a more authentic socialist self. She and Adzhubei shared an appreciation for this
new genre, and Tess even declared that a proper approach to moral issues was just as
important as understanding the process of constructing new hydroelectric stations.
Subjectivity could serve as its own “master plot,” an argument KP journalists had made
in 1956.578
Adzhubei’s description of successful publisistika focused on both knowledge and
reader relationships: “erudition, a great store of knowledge…impressions and а wide
familiarity. Without this equipment the publisist remains at the level of the average
reader, and cannot enrich him, convince him, or captivate, and cannot write
interestingly.” Though all journalists were expected to maintain expertise, Adzhubei
portrayed the publisist as exceptionally skilled, with a specific store of “equipment” and
an ability to engage with any subject.579 These abstract notions of achievement are similar
to Ivanova’s vision of professional development from the 1962 cadres seminar: a
description of journalism as a philosophical outlook as much as a concrete skill set. Тhe
balance between universal skill and specialization posed some challenges to defining
journalistic expertise. While it is clear that engaging use of genre was key to Soviet
definitions of professional development, Adzhubei offered no clear sense of what types
of knowledge were necessary in order to engage in audience persuasion. This tension
578
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persisted into the Brezhnev era, as we will see in chapter six. At the same time, he was
certain that was no longer enough for journalists to aim at “average” readers—authentic
publisitika mattered precisely because it could reach the exceptional. Adzhubei’s vision
of the reader is far more exalted than the portrait from the 1963 correspondence seminar,
where Emilianova and others admitted that audiences were unsophisticated or approached
the newspaper for entirely instrumental purposes. Adzhubei envisioned an exalted future
where all readers were sophisticated enough to appreciate genre use.
In his speech at the Komsomol seminar, KP editor Iurii Voronov explicitly linked
genre to professionalization: Almost as though he were expanding on the creative union’s
bylaws, he described professional challenges as “mastery,” claiming: “it is necessary to
be a journalist in spirit and in mastery (po dukhu i po masterstvu). In spirit means to see
precisely and in a timely fashion, what is currently necessary to write above all…to be a
publisist in mastery, means to be a master of one’s task, to have clear language and the
like.”580 Voronov, like Adzhubei, linked the craft of writing to vision—the ability to
choose a topic and take a position. Absent from this definition is the concept of
“objectivity” so common in academic literature on journalism. This is unsurprising, given
the long-standing Soviet practice of critiquing “bourgeois objectivity” for obscuring
material and class realities, which a Marxist-Leninist approach considered central.
Journalists were now active and developed authors, with specialized knowledge to share
with the public.581 Just as the zhurnalist-mezhdunarodnik, as an experienced international
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expert, represented the pinnacle of excellence in cultural diplomacy, the publisist set the
standard for domestic achievement.
In their addresses at the 1964 seminars, Voronov and Vassili Peskov each stressed
the importance of moral authority to successful creative output. Peskov argued that
journalists needed to develop “good taste” and a “journalistic outlook” (krugozor). These
qualities developed over time, and depended on things like reading habits, visiting
exhibits, and the cultivation of personal friendships. This tactic would have a direct effect
on readers:
In order to speak with a person and teach something, you need to set out
on such a way of life, which would aid in the formation of a person’s
internal world, so that he himself could teach people. Therefore, how we
structure our leisure, where we are, where we spend our time, whether we
sit in a tavern or organize our leisure more widely, this is what our
worldview depends on…and the increase of our spiritual riches.
Peskov saw parallels with the search for the “positive hero,” and much of the reader
response to his book concerned this theme. His hero was a person “whom I love, whom I
can’t bypass without having written about him, a person I should tell people about.”
Peskov argued that journalists, like writers, could serve as these kinds of inspirational
figures.582 Peskov’s catalogue of successful journalism habits reads much like an
endorsement of appropriately Soviet “cultured” behavior. Clearly, a properly ordered
internal world and personal life would yield benefits in the professional realm. The
pursuit of “culturedness” became a middle class value following the sacrifices of the war
as a way to accommodate popular desires for consumer goods and enhanced leisure time.
Officially sanctioned “kulturnost” was often contrasted with the “petty-bourgeois”
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attachment to material gain, to give it greater legitimacy. Journalists, as promoters of
official values, were clearly expected to embody them in their own personal lives, since
Peskov suggested they seek opportunities to “work on themselves.”583 His interest in
leisure, friendship, and personal time serves as another instance where journalists were
both promoters and objects of the new subjectivity—authentic professional development
meant becoming more like the positive hero.
Though he spoke more about the profession in general than particular genres,
Voronov, too, linked positive development to individuality and self-actualization. In his
concluding discussion of “professional matters,” he took as inspiration an epigram from
national literary icon Alexander Pushkin, urging his colleagues to work more inventively.
In his “Travels to Erzurum,” the poet calls his friends and colleagues too “lazy and
incurious” to properly memorialize the recently murdered poet Griboedov, and Voronov
found the epigram equally relevant to understanding recent newspaper content.584
Voronov clearly expected his audience to be intimately familiar with the reference. While
creative union leaders frequently presented journalism as distinct from literature,
Voronov drew from belles-lettres to inspire self-improvement in his colleagues.
Expanding on this point, he urged his audience not to assume that work experience alone
signified creative maturity. While experience might signify “mastery” in other fields,
journalism was unique, as some would leave the Komsomol press because they had
“stopped growing as a journalist…which leads to creative stagnation.” Тhough economic
and moral themes had lasting value, journalists needed to be aware of the pressure to
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constantly come up with “current material,” following Gorky’s example, and to make
their work memorable even if newspapers came out daily. Voronov exhorted his
colleagues to “work on oneself, and remember that journalism demands real knowledge,
no less than other professions.”585 Journalistic expertise was so intimately linked to the
evolution of Soviet society and meeting public needs that professional knowledge was
both a goal for the present and far off in the future. This stress on constant evolution may
go some way to explaining the earlier uncertainties about higher education content and
the preoccupation with an author’s subjective development.
As they expanded on the need for self-improvement and better genre work, both
Adzhubei and Voronov presented conflict and criticism as key to progress. Adzhubei was
distressed that journalistic writing did not adequately reflect the Soviet Union’s
impressive technological achievements, and he declared, “we write about these great
victories in a dry and shallow way.” While publistika had not sufficiently tackled
economic problems, journalists further neglected the social problems and contradictions
that were still a part of Soviet life, a phenomenon Adzhubei regarded as particularly
dangerous. “This inclination to depict labor, life, and everyday existence (byt’) in a
socialist society as an easy matter, which will work itself out…since under our conditions
there are not the strong contradictions of the capitalist world, there is nothing to fight for.
Such an approach…threatens the cause of the upbringing of youth as a generation of
fighters and builders.” In Adzhubei’s interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, progress
toward socialism was not cause for premature celebration but required even deeper
attention to heightened conflict, lest younger generations grow complacent. The problem
585
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was not limited to maintaining a combative spirit, however—Adzhubei warned that if the
diversity of life was not adequately captured by publisistika, “the person (people?) will
start to look for answers from the rumor mongers or the clergy,” and exhorted
zhurnalisti-mezhdunaroniki to portray events “before everyone else and more sharply
than everyone else.” The references to “rumor-mongers” may have been an implied
reference to foreign media sources like the Voice of America—as my KP case study has
shown, Soviet journalists were increasingly concerned with increased access to these
information sources. As others had, Adzhubei argued that the creative union should
concern itself with both domestic and international matters—while it was an unqualified
good that international experts were becoming skilled at political commentary, this was a
key value for domestic journalism as well.586 As Satiukov had at the 1963 plenum,
Adzhubei sought a balance between the creative union’s domestic and international
mandates.
Voronov’s discussion of social conflict and media competitiveness was more
explicitly literary than Adzhubei’s, pointing to overlap between cultural fields. While he
conceded that “absence of conflict” was an important value, he argued for a different
definition of “conflictedness” based on reader reactions, drawing on the earlier adulation
of Vassili Peskov’s work to prove his points: “Conflictedness is conflict of a completely
different sort, when a person writes that he is ashamed that he passed by what Vassili
Peskov saw, when a person has his eyes opened to something…When people say, I’m
ashamed, or they say thank you, this is a very important quality, which we should

586

Ibid., 9–11.

328

teach.”587 Voronov’s reference to “absence of conflict,” which was one of socialist
realism’s foundational principles, requires further contextualization. Literary criticism
from the Khrushchev period demonstrates that the doctrine of “absence of conflict” was
openly re-evaluated: in a speech at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, Alexandr
Tvardovskii, editor of Novyi Mir, the literary journal most closely identified with deStalinization, was concerned that literature that omitted the “difficulties” in Sоviet life
was failing readers. This speech was later cited in a literary encyclopedia entry on the
doctrine.588 Voronov’s belief in the pedagogical value of conflict was reminiscent of
another aspect of socialist realist doctrine: the classic “production novel” tended to depict
a protagonist who had to overcome “spontaneity” and uncertainty and reach
“consciousness” in order to fulfill a goal.589
In her reflections on the moral and ethical theme, Tatiana Tess presented
psychological conflict as key to successful storytelling. In another story about spiritual
poverty, Tess described how a Russian Civil War veteran had written to the Izvestiia
about one of his comrades who had been a deserter. An investigation, after a second letter
from this disgruntled comrade, revealed that the man had been awarded the Order of the
Military Red Banner many years after his 1920 service. Tess personally visited Aleksei
Adzhubei to ask to investigate the affair, highlighting the sense of “responsibility” she
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felt. The story reminded her of the relationship between composers Mozart and Salieri.
The first man, Gronskii, who had written the complaint, spoke more about his enemy
than himself, had a spotty employment history, and did not work even though he was not
of retirement age. The other, Ganzhenko, was a Cossack with an interesting life story
who did not remember the man who was so fixated on him. Tess described it as a classic
story of youthful envy lasting into adult life and claimed she had retold it because it
demonstrated how important it was for journalists to “not only follow facts…for a single
fact can become a source of contemplation…of the new relationships between people, of
the relationship of a person to himself and our relationship to him.”590
Tess’s anecdote contains much that is typical of Soviet morality tales: the
vengeful Gronskii did not contribute to society or have a healthy relationship with his
collective, while the object of his hatred was dignified and free from petty grudges. At
the same time, the episode neatly illustrates the centrality of personhood to Tess’s
personal journalistic values: though the story concerned an important episode of Soviet
history, she concentrated on the internal struggle between Gronskii and his comrade. Her
arguments point to a vision of social progress determined by individual development. For
her, journalism was a narrative with explanatory power. Anglophone cultural studies
scholars have taken similar approaches to journalism, though the idea of narrative and
storytelling has been received badly by practitioners. Communications critic James Carey
called motivation and explanation journalism’s “dark continent”—what it most wishes to
achieve and yet struggles to because of the daily realities of the news cycle. Carey argues
that “to explain is to abandon journalism in the archetypal sense: it is to pursue ‘soft
590
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news,’ ‘trust me’ journalism…from the journalists’ head rather than the facts.” Tess and
other proponents of subjectivity-focused journalism celebrated interpretation without
these reservations—pointing to another divergence between American and Soviet
journalistic ideals.591
Though the new focus on personhood was celebrated as a unique Soviet
accomplishment at the 1964 seminars, Voronov in particular struggled with the disturbing
implications of too much focus on the individual. While he considered the moral and
ethical theme vital, Voronov was quick to condemn poor examples of the genre, such as
an article in Komsomolets Tadzhikistana, which concerned a group of young girls who
returned money they found on the street to the police, even though they were near a
candy shop at the time. Their decision to avoid temptation ostensibly proved that proper
Communist morals were taking root. Readers disagreed, and viewed this as “ordinary
honesty.” While such cases might have been valuable as informational reporting, they
were not suitable for the moral or ethical frame, especially since celebrating such
behavior was more typical of bourgeois newspapers—when such stories were published
in the capitalist world, those involved received awards.592 Clearly, true moral and ethical
journalism had to involve deeper questions—the equation of superficial coverage with
bourgeois practice was a clear rebuke. Returning lost property was presented as typical
behavior: so typical that even bourgeois citizens engaged in the practice. True ethical
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journalism, in this analysis, required focus on exceptionalism that was clearly traceable to
the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideals.
Though he embraced the focus on personhood and moral development as
journalistic values, Voronov remained anxious about their implementation, since the
meaning of individual responsibility could be misinterpreted. As an extension and
improvement of the moral and ethical genre, Voronov suggested introducing economic
questions into the moral realm. He argued that young people should see problems of
waste as “moral,” and youth should be encouraged to relate “to the state as to
themselves.” In his studies of theft and bribery, James Heinzen states that most citizens
viewed such behavior as morally neutral—Voronov clearly found this trend
unacceptable. Another solution was to focus on the problem of “the collective and the
individual,” which befit the spirit of de-Stalinization.
Referencing the recent past, he declared forcefully:
We have struggled decisively and justly with those instances, when the
person brought moral damage…against when there was undeserved
repression, carried out in the name of the collective. However, sometimes
in defending certain students from the collective of the higher education
institution, we forget that my responsibility before society remains, and
the question about my personal responsibility remains primary.593
Voronov presented Stalinist terror as a case of warped individual will. His
narrative glossed over the popular dimensions of the repressions and discussed violence
and death in terms of “moral damage” without naming the perpetrators. However
dangerous evocations of collective will could be in the hands of a destructive individual,
593
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Voronov clearly viewed individuality as a dangerous tendency among the young—his
reference to students reveals the persistence of such anxieties, formerly a major theme at
KP in 1956. He was concerned that young people would “develop an unhealthy
relationship” to the idea of their individuality, that they were “responsible only for my
own conscience”—a pervasive concept in “old writers,” presumably a reference to prerevolutionary authors. This kind of thinking led to people creating their own social
groups, which, while not dangerous in itself, it was concerning “for those people who
write about their independence.” Referring to such people as “outlaws,” Voronov
reaffirmed the principle that “we ought to worry about every person” and reiterated the
Marxist conception of the direct relationship between labor and social benefit: “from each
according to his abilities, to each according to his labor.” The problem of individual
capability was especially central to the evaluation of “identity” (s tochki zrenia lichnosti),
to the future of Communism.594 Voronov’s conception of individual growth as
interdependent rather than autonomous points to a deeper cultural continuity. The
cultivation of a new personality (lichnost’) was crucial to social service for the prerevolutionary intelligentsia, and these values, embraced by the Bolsheviks and harnessed
to Marxism-Leninism, became Soviet values as well.595
Voronov made no direct reference to a particular social phenomenon or group,
though his distrust of individuality and sociability outside of official frameworks was
obvious. Recent historical scholarship may offer some insight into his concerns: young
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intellectuals increasingly began to gather in small groups to discuss ideas, a phenomenon
frequently referred to as “kompaniia.” In his study of the intelligentsia, Vladislav Zubok
presents many examples of revolutionary idealism that were not synonymous with
support for the Party. Voronov’s views seem in opposition to these forms of social
activity, since he identified them with literary work that lacked a revolutionary pedigree
and took a cautious approach to the individual conscience. His direct reference to those
who wrote about their own independence is evocative of earlier literary controversies,
such as the critical response to Vladimir Dudintsev’s Not By Bread Alone, which I
discussed at length in chapter two.596 Though it is not possible to prove whether any
particular episode inspired Voronov’s caution, his words highlight the ambiguous aspects
of the reform project. While journalists’ recovery of authorial power was of clear social
benefit, the reading public’s interpretation of policy could be de-stabilizing. These
arguments challenge the distinction Thomas Wolfe sets up between the relatively
independent press under Khrushchev and the suspicion of individual initiative under
Brezhnev: Voronov only celebrated individualism in particular forms.597 The extent to
which a focus on personhood also meant toleration of new ideas was another unresolved
tension of creative work.
•••
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While some journalists struggled to balance their interest in individuality with
their commitment to collective progress, others turned to challenges that are more
familiar from the inaugural congress: the relationship between journalism and literature,
and the need for Soviet journalists to surpass their “bourgeois” counterparts. Like
Voronov, Evgenii Riabchikov linked an understanding of genre to professional success,
claiming that a proper appreciation of facticity would lead journalists to understand that
their field had distinct advantages over literature. Riabchikov’s in-depth discussion about
the importance of facts and truth presents another opportunity to reflect on the nature of
Soviet and liberal views of journalism. While the interest in factual accuracy points to a
common preoccupation, the close links between journalism and literature seem more
reflective of the value Soviet culture placed on linguistic labor. Riabchikov considered it
“entirely logical” that discussions about tradition and “mastery” related to the “native
brother, the closest sphere—literature.” He was not the first to discuss affinity between
the two professions, since both Boris Polevoi and Aleksei Surkov had stressed the
possibility of mutual benefit and exchange at the inaugural congress, and rank-and-file
journalists argued for economic and social parity between the professions during the
bylaws debate. Though both were “written with the same pen, on the same paper,”
Riabchikov advised young journalists to avoid using the “methodology” of literature,
since the art form depended on “creative images…of typical traits in typical
circumstances, and journalism relied entirely on facts.” Riabchikov’s main example was
particularly rеvealing: the recent work of Konstantin Simonov, who first achieved fame
as a war correspondent. Riabchikov reminded his audience that Simonov had indeed
based his protagonist in The Living and the Dead, Serpilina, on an actual Soviet officer,
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S. F. Kutepov. But comparison of the actual biography to the novel revealed that
Simonov had “collected multiple similar actions” to compose his character, and made a
“different person.” As a personal example, Riabchikov described meeting a man who was
in prison with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and inspired the character of Buinovskii in the
concentration camp novel One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch. He argued that the
man’s profile in Izvestiia was more inspiring for readers since they could see a “real
life.”598 In the sociology of journalism, facts are often discussed as a part of news making
in the United States. Journalists construct “webs of facticity” to establish the legitimacy
of their sources and quickly convey information. Riabchikov’s defense of facts thus
points to a convergence of journalistic values. Though I have found many instance of
journalists expressing envy of writers, Riabchikov’s vision did not position journalism as
a “younger” sibling to its literary relative—as had occurred at the inaugural congress in
1959.599
Continuing his interest in problems of facticity, Riabchikov went on to describe
less salutary examples and what young professionals should learn from them. Recent
experience at Moscow University confirmed his pessimism about the younger
generation’s appreciation of this value. During diploma defenses at Moscow University,
both young journalists and instructors debated whether it was appropriate to print ocherki
with invented names or altered facts. In Riabchikov’s view, there was a clear and
unambiguous response to this question: “there is a wonderful form of literary creativity,
it’s the short story.” The ocherk “describes a real person…where facts and names are
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given, and here it seems to me such distortions are not permissible.” Unsurprisingly,
Peskov’s prize-winning work was a clear example of how to properly achieve this
standard, since he “tells us very poetically and romantically about living people.” Тhis
was in contrast to the work of the Village Prose writer Valentin Ovechkin, whose work
could tentatively be called an ocherk but, argued Riabchikov, they were more accurately
classified as a short story. A postwar literary movement that spanned generations and
themes, Village Prose works concentrated on rural life, often with an attitude of
veneration and nostalgia.600 Facticity, then, not only distinguished journalism from
literature but also provided the justification for normative judgments of colleagues.
Definitions of genre could help to determine professional boundaries—there was
nothing immoral or inappropriate about the short story unless a journalist used its
conventions improperly, without a professional’s unswerving commitment to factual
accuracy. These kind of boundaries between genres, in an American context, were often
used to distinguish the “soft news” of the “feature story” from the “hard news” found on
a newspaper’s front page.601 While Peskov’s literary technique and choice of subject
matter were clearly evocative of the Village Prose movement, Riabchikov’s view of
genre boundaries reads as an attempt to acknowledge similarity while protecting a central
professional value. While the use of similar distancing techniques in the United States
points to some affinity between the two print cultures, the effort to distinguish between
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literature and journalism seems far more reflective of a Soviet cultural landscape.602 As in
the literary examples involving Simonov and Solzhenitsyn, facticity was used to establish
journalism’s status as a taxing and demanding field: “if you begin to describe real facts,
this is a hundred times more difficult than to change names and go on the path of the
short story.” Riabchikov considered it particularly upsetting that Anatolii Zlobin, who,
after writing two novels, “stopped writing ocherki.” While it may have been the case that
Zlobin “will be an excellеnt novelist and will be an excellent writer,” his departure from
the “documentary ocherk” (dokumentalnyi ocherk) is “bitter and upsetting for us.”603
While someone like Boris Polevoi could cross professional boundaries and belong to both
the Writers’ and Journalists’ Unions and openly celebrate the connections between
journalism and literature, Riabchikov highlighted literary gains at his own profession’s
expense.
Where Riabchikov was concerned with professional approaches to facts and
genre, other speakers at the publisistika conference were interested facticity as it related
to criticism and their responsibility to inform the public. Where Riabchikov focused on
facutal distortions, these journalists argued that silence on controversial topics was its
own dereliction of professional duty. A journalist from Stavropol’ was even critical of
Adzhubei: if the Izvestiia editor wished to see journalists be “brave” about their social
problems, such as a recent rash of fires, he should “give the order not to us, but to the
censor.”604 Bravery, then, was less a matter of individual courage than official sanction—
a familiar theme from my KP case study. This was the only reference to censorship I
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have found at a creative union event—perhaps the political value of publisistika
contributed to the more forthright reflections on professional agency. A journalist named
Kondrat’iev from the city of Kuibishev offered a spirited defense of writing on
controversial topics. When journalists chose “shaky” (nesolidnie) topics, this could result
in failures to properly instill moral values. While it was upsetting for journalists to hear
statistics about rising crime and sexual license, and “uncomfortable to write about sexual
education of youth, in particular schoolchildren, is it really comfortable when ninthgraders begin to engage in debauchery? It turns out that, a fact itself exists in life, but it’s
somehow uncomfortable to write about it.” Soviet official reticence about sexuality has
recently received more attention from historians. Stalin-era educational programs were
often confined to medical literature or propaganda posters about healthy proletarian
sexuality. Open reference to sexual misconduct was not in itself unusual—licentiousness
and criminality were frequently linked in official discourse.605
What is striking here is the insistence on journalists’ responsibility to overcome
their personal discomforts and overturn cultural norms. In a less inflammatory example,
Kondrat’iev argued that some journalists might find it “awkward” to write about dairy
workers, since their form of manual labor was nonmechanized. But, in the final analysis,
“we are speaking about a person” and narrow mindedness in journalism was “terribly
dangerous.” Newspapers should turn away from “nursemaids” who feared conflict and
raise even contentious subjects, including the previous year’s poor harvest and resulting
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rises in food products. Audience needs were more important than avoiding controversy,
and he defined success as the certainty that “people understood facts correctly, and
thought about them correctly, and not in a petty-bourgeois fashion.”606 Kondrat’iev’s
remedies departed from cultural orthodoxy: arguing that dairymaids were just as
proletarian as factory workers was certainly an expansive definition of the “masses.”
While it was not uncommon for Soviet journalists to argue for more extensive coverage
of economic issues, the mention of harvest failures and food prices is in some contrast to
the usual exhortations to write only about triumphs. Still, all of this clearly remained
within defined parameters—writing about failures was expected to somehow reassure or
perhaps even pacify the population, as a “petty-bourgeois” response would likely have
involved more overt expressions of dissatisfaction.
Other discussions of openness and transparency referenced the international
ideological struggle, demonstrating the difficulty of drawing a clear line between the
creative union’s two mandates. At the publisistika conference, foreign broadcasting was
discussed largely as a motivator for Soviet journalists to improve their work and change
their attitudes toward disseminating information, often in the broader context of the
changing political climate. Тhe editor of the Lithuanian republic newspaper, Tiesa, a G.
Zimanas, argued that prior to Stalin’s death, journalists had “gotten out of the habit of
arguing” but had recently begun to “genuinely debate.” His example was particularly
topical: discussion of how to implement the corn campaigns in Lithuania had resulted in
debates between journalists and party officials. Zimanas was unusually frank about the
tensions facing Soviet journalists—specifically, their investigative mission and conflict
606
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with the Party. On one hand, people could declare, “you can achieve the solution of this
problem yourselves,” which, while an accurate statement, “publistika suffers as a result
of this, and not our own prestige.” On the other hand, people could declare, “you became
wise only after a Central Committee decision.” Zimanas was circumspect in his
evaluation of the former statement, declaring, “I do not wish to state the opposite of this,
but this is a very complicated question, here there are contradictions which do not always
appear immediately.” For Zimanas, there was no publisistika “without the struggle of
opinion.” This did not mean allowing “dangerous speeches,” but it did require the setup
of an “open conversation” in the newspaper, which sometimes required “removing
informational taboos.” Again, the specific example was agricultural: there had been
problems with the harvest the previous year, and some “nonparty members” found out
about this issue before others by listening to foreign radio broadcasts, which resulted in
“all kinds of conversations” when there was less bread available. It was therefore very
important that the newspapers be timely in discussing important issues, or, as Zimanas
said candidly, “there are some things, which become known sooner or later, and we
should speak about them ourselves.”607
The arguments here included a more expansive view of journalistic agency, which
reflects the less rigid ideological climate of de-Stalinization. While he maintained the
importance of a relationship between the press and the Party, Zimanas hesitated to
characterize the press as a mirror for policy, and instead offered a vision of the mass
media as a site for debate, within acceptable parameters. His direct reference to foreign
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radio broadcasts may be partly due to the particular complications of the Baltics as the
relatively porous Western frontier, but rather than concentrate on castigating “bourgeois”
sources, Zimanas focused on the ways foreign influence placed obligations on Soviet
journalists to improve themselves. While Soviet journalists rejected Western notions of
objectivity and individualism, they could not easily set aside the challenges of Cold War
competition. Like KP journalists in 1956, Zimanas argued that greater access to
information and discussion of social problems was essential to this task. The use of
sociological methods to reach audiences was another dimension of this contest, and the
last major theme of this chapter. Where Zimanas was anxious that Soviet approaches to
controversy were a disadvantage, social scientists exhibited more faith in Soviet values.
•••
The turn toward sociological methods of understanding and shaping public
opinion was an important part of the creative union’s activity after its inaugural congress,
for both correspondence experts and journalists interested in publisistika. Where analysis
of genre tended to describe abstract methods of forming readers, discussions of opinion
polling were more specific. In this section, I introduce the American experience of
polling as a comparative case to demonstrate the importance of collectivist values and
Cold War competition to the Soviet experience of sociological data. During the 1963
correspondence seminar, Emilianova’s last major theme was the pursuit of audience
engagement, specifically, “to instill in the reader the wish to write to a newspaper.” Some
of these tactics involved mass journalism techniques: Komsomol “raids” and party
control work. Newer techniques involved opinion polling or conducting a reader’s survey
(chitatelskuiu anketu) and KP’s publishing of the work of its Public Opinion Institute
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(hereafter IOM). One of the IOM’s polls involved the work of communist labor brigades,
while the most recent had been about free time and another, aimed at the “cultural level”
of readers, was “what would you take with you into space?,” including specifics about
which music or sports items or other examples of humanity’s accomplishments might be
selected. The resulting contributions were valuable, especially those from older readers
who had been “made wise by life.” While early Soviet “reader studies” concentrated on
the simultaneous cultivation of literacy and cultured reading habits, the creative union’s
members could focus on sociological methodology and reader-generated content, since
their audience was more sophisticated.608
As part of their interest in reader relationships, publisistika experts eagerly
embraced the new polling methods. A Moscow University faculty member, E. P.
Prokhorov, commented that writers extensively analyzed socialist realism, including
volumes on theory published by the institute of world literature, and suggested journalism
would benefit from similar dedication.609 He quoted a speech by Ideology Department
head D. F. Il’ichev from the Twenty-Second Party Congress on the need to
“scientifically” consider ideological work. Though journalists often spoke about engaging
the sentiments and rationality of their readers, “there is a large gap between these words
and a concrete conversation about publisistika.” Prokhorov drew on both historical and
contemporary evidence to support his points—Marx had argued for more study of public
opinion, and Khrushchev himself continued to make similar points. Even worse,
American journalist Walter Lippmann’s book on the subject was in its seventh or eighth
608
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edition, along with others concerning “the formation of a public opinion that is amenable
to the bourgeoisie.” In disappointing contrast, a single work on the subject had come out
in the Soviet Union, which “we have, apparently, let out of our sight.” Scholarly analysis
was integral to the process of understanding “how public opinion differs from ideology,
from morals, or from politics.” Prokhorov further stressed public opinion’s continually
evolving nature: “in order to form public opinion, we must know its status at a given
moment,” and without such knowledge, the publisist “shoots into the air.” This new
methodology presented a different problem, since the “publisist must be a sociologist, as
well as an artist.” Тhis “holistic” approach was apparent in the work of Agranovskii,
Radov, and Mikhalevich, while others failed to master the “weaving together of the
rational and the emotional image.”610 Soviet academics and journalists, despite being the
product of a Marxist-Leninist state, had progressed no further in their understanding of
society than their bourgeois counterparts and were even falling behind. Prokhorov saw
public opinion as a field of study in its own right, not merely part of ideology or even
subjectivity. He discussed “readers” in terms of their emotions and thoughts, without
reference to class-based language, except to clarify that his was a sociology of public
opinion that would differ from Lipmann’s. This conception of journalism as both artistic
and scientific suggests an effort to move beyond the profession’s literary roots, though in
a different direction from Pankin’s earlier suggestions about adding economics to
university curricula. Anatolii Agranovskii, who features prominently in Thomas Wolfe’s
investigation of 1960s journalism, was particularly well known for his focus on ordinary
people and their inner lives. The open celebration of him here not only indicates the
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extent of his popularity but the overall embrace of his particular approach to the moral
and ethical theme.611
The “scientific” approach to the reading public was a theme addressed not only by
academics like Prokhorov but also by Valentin Chikin, who worked closely with Grushin
at the IOM along with his writing for KP. Chikin spoke approvingly of the Academy of
Science’s recent initiatives, and described the IOM’s novelty: it was not a “substantive
organization” but rather a special rubric in the newspaper—this was an important
corrective, since readers had at first assumed it was an educational institution. A woman
from Cheliabinsk had written such an “application,” referencing her interest in a career
change to study “information.” While Chikin referenced the episode for its “comical”
nature, the anecdote effectively presents Soviet sociology as a new and unfamiliar field,
especially for potential research subjects. Returning to the serious side of opinion work,
Chikin noted that journalists could no longer rely “only on their own observations…we
must also seriously study people’s opinions.” While letters were an invaluable source of
insights, they still had “defects,” and opinion polls could especially improve pieces on
propaganda or political themes. This was a marked shift from the usual exaltation of the
letter at earlier seminars. To demonstrate sociology’s value, Chikin cited the IOM’s first
poll from May of 1959, where subjects were asked their views on the possibility of
averting war, and published when it was unclear whether the Paris Peace conference
would be held due to the U-2 crisis. According to Chikin, the bourgeois press argued that
Khrushchev had ordered the poll to support his position, since most citizens had
answered in the affirmative. Chikin viewed the data as a sign that government policy and
611

Wolfe, Governing, 71–104.

345

popular opinion coincided, which was a great propaganda victory. Polls about the
younger generation had a similar significance, since Chikin alleged that propagandists in
the West were particularly eager to find flaws, rather than the “the true face of Soviet
youth” visible from sociological studies.612 These examples suggest that opinion polling
was useful for advancing arguments about the superiority of socialism and the resonance
of Soviet cultural values for respondents.
Chikin’s domestic examples, particularly recent polls about the public’s
perception of its material position, were more appreciative of sociological nuance. He
argued that while the “general question” of the population’s well-being was a resounding
affirmative, polling demonstrated the diversity of individual experience. The majority of
poll participants reported improvements to their quality of life and, even among those
who said their standard of living was worse, it was “for happy reasons” like the birth of a
child or their salaries had decreased because they had left Moscow. In his conclusion,
Chikin noted that while the creation of public opinion institutes was not appropriate for
every newspaper, he was certain sociologists could be useful to journalists.613 Diverse
perceptions of economic progress were presented as valuable, rather than being
immediately equated with deviance or misunderstanding as they might have been in the
Stalin era. Soviet people could now impart meaning to their own experiences—though
the evaluative component, which privileged journalists and experts, was always presented
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as more significant. As Simon Huxtable has pointed out, Chikin was eager to claim that
surveys could change readers’ opinions as well as record them.614
Grushin’s personal papers preserve both foreign and domestic reporting on the
IOM’s work—both types of media highlighted the relative novelty of such polling in the
Soviet Union and the explicitly socialist concerns of its surveyors. An early KP
publication about the IOM stressed that Soviet citizens of all social groups were
interested in pressing issues of the day, as evidenced by the large number of letters the
newspaper received. The IOM was presented as a new means for analyzing foreign and
domestic policy and the “communist upbringing of workers.” A CBS news report on the
recent poll about the state of the younger generation directly stated that the IOM was less
interested in the “spiritual world” of Soviet youth and more focused on using the polling
data to conduct social campaigns against hooliganism and other forms of deviance. These
assessments assumed that polling data revealed deep truths but that Soviet ideology
prevented this knowledge from being fully appreciated.615
In their own responses to the IOM, selected Soviet readers expressed hopes that
the results would be widely published and that the data would allow citizens to “verify
the correctness or incorrectness of their thoughts and ideals,” as one factory worker from
Zaporozhia put it. A worker from Dnepropretrovsk argued that the IOM publications
“forced one to argue and to think,” in contrast to the newspaper’s more typical
“informational bulletins.” Several respondents positioned the IOM’s work as part of a
longer Soviet tradition of engagement with the “masses” or argued that polling was
614
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particularly useful in light of the new goal of building a Communist society. Others
positioned polling as part of Cold War competition, arguing that KP’s questionnaire
about the young family had been more substantive than a similar 1948 poll published in
America magazine, the State Department’s Russian-language magazine designed to
inform the Soviet public about life abroad. Not all respondents were enthusiastic,
however—a forty-seven year-old engineer from Baku believed that the recent poll on the
young family should have been “more significant” and contained little to show young
people “who they are in essence.” Asking young families themselves was useless, since
subjects lacked expertise. Any prescriptions for the future should involve “smart people”
who would then offer their proposals to the state and let it make policy. Future endeavors
should be “desk work for scientists, and not for young fools, who cannot boil soup for
themselves.”616 Soviet citizens who embraced the IOM envisioned sociological research
as part of progress toward Communism, where forward momentum depended on
embracing new methods of self-understanding. Polling was another avenue for Soviet
citizens to feel confident about domestic social evolution and the ultimate victory over
capitalism. Enthusiasm for sociological data, at least in these instances, was about
knowing individuals for the pursuit of collective goals. This is in some contrast to Gallup
polls and other social surveys in the United States, whose promoters were explicitly
interested in empowering individuals to act as democratic subjects.617 If polling’s
successes were ultimately tied to socialist visions of progress, the skepticism about the
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IOM was equally particular, since the engineer from Baku implied that polling
respondents were not “smart people,” in contrast to trustworthy academics or politicians.
Concerns about the value of survey data were not new or unique to the Soviet
Union—the first subjects of modern American sociological research in the “Middletown”
studies of Muncie, Indiana doubted that the research team possessed more complete or
genuine knowledge of the area than residents themselves. But their objections did not
present academic expertise or state action as superior to more individualized modes of
knowing, as the skeptic of the Grushin studies did. In comparing American and Soviet
polling, it becomes clearer that the “modern consciousness” at work in the IOM conveyed
the endurance of socialist subjectivity rather than the emergence of a liberal public.618
Soviet sociologists, like American ones, compelled citizens to think about themselves as
they encountered new forms of knowledge, but Grushin’s subjects engaged with modern
methods without rejecting their Soviet selves. As they celebrated the IOM, creative union
members operated within a similar framework.
•••
Satiukov’s closing speech from the publistika seminar is a fitting place to
conclude the story of the creative union under Khrushchev. He listed some of the
standard criticisms the organization faced, such as a lack of plenums on creative topics,
problems with the creative union’s trade journal, and a lack of exchange between central
and local newspapers. He offered his own commentary on socialist personhood, arguing
that while portrayals of cosmonauts were beneficial, Soviet society lacked works
featuring ordinary people, such as workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia: “We are very
618
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much concerned with his convictions, his integrity, a person’s character…fighting with
all his being against the morass of the petty-bourgeois…speaking about the laboring
person…we should not write only about percentages, his fulfillments, but we should go
more deeply, to know about his intellectual reserves.” Emotional depth had become a
generally accepted standard for measuring the success of journalistic writing. Satiukov
singled out Peskov’s recent work as a successful depiction of everyday life and socialist
people.
Satiukov’s discussion of censorship is perhaps the more fitting conclusion: some
matters, it was obvious, “should be withdrawn…but of course limitations are not always
correctly enacted, but it is impossible to reject certain limits. The preservation of state
secrets is completely necessary and not all journalists fully remember what it is possible
to say and what is not possible.” Satiukov’s acknowledgement of censorship’s
imperfections reflects the limits of liberalization: complaints about Glavlit could be aired,
but censorship was ultimately defended. At the same time, his speech demonstrates a gap
between the creative union’s rank and file and its leadership: Satiukov could respond to
complaints about censorship, but his references to flaws were much more cautious than
the earlier complaints. Most importantly, Satiukov portrayed it as a professional
responsibility for journalists to remain aware of the boundaries of the permissible,
without acknowledging the challenges of such an exercise. While contemporary
historians of de-Stalinization have recently emphasized the conflict and confusion
stemming from radical paradigm shifts, Satiukov and other leaders of the Journalists’
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Union, presented recovery from Stalinism as a complete and discernible process.619 In
focusing on the triumphs of personhood rather than past trauma or the limits of reform,
Satiukov, as he had in 1963, offered a circumscribed vision of journalistic agency. While
the capacity of journalists to instill socialist values was expected to be limitless, their
ability to alter the political and institutional landscape was not.
•••
While the 1959 inaugural congress crowned journalists “The Party’s Lieutenants”
and generally celebrated Soviet print culture, the meaning and value of journalism was
far from settled, and some journalists continued to question the value of the creative
union itself, either directly, as in the 1963 plenum, or indirectly, by calling attention to its
lack of influence. However remote figures like Adzhubei, Tess, or Voronov were from
the day-to-day operations of most newspapers, the creative union clearly provided them
with a forum to raise substantive theoretical questions. As creative union members, these
leading Soviet journalists reflected on a diverse range of issues, from sociology to genre
politics. The all-Union seminars and plenums, then, read almost as a more concrete
extension of the bylaws debate: instead of offering remarks on a single document,
journalists reviewed their own values and work practices in light of Khrushchev’s reform
agenda and their relatively recent commitment to a reader’s internal world.
While Soviet journalists were expected to master an evolving body of knowledge,
personhood was at the core of all such debates, whether journalist sought to define the
nature of an “educated professional” or discussed the value of correspondence work. As
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much as they obsessed over readers’ internal development and the best means to interact
with their audience, creative union members also expressed concerns that individualism
might be dangerous—as was most evident in Voronov’s remarks to the 1964 youth
journalism seminar. Though they celebrated encounters with individuals, the real success
of most of these stories was the capacity of an exemplary figure—or a delinquent—to
reveal broader truths to a large number of readers and thus reshape society. This
attachment to illiberal views of print culture extended to the new interest in sociology and
opinion polling—Soviet journalists saw sociology as a means to further cultivate the
appropriate ideological outlook in their readers.
Close analysis of the Journalists’ Union’s creative seminars and interest in
professional development raises the question of Soviet journalism’s comparability to
other print cultures and the Soviet Union’s relationship to other modern states. For
creative union elites, the United States was an important comparative standard, and in
this chapter, I have most often compared Soviet and Anglophone print cultures, as
journalism scholars frequently focus on the latter case. In many respects, Soviet
journalists’ insistence on the uniqueness of their work should be taken seriously. Soviet
journalism explicitly rejected any commitment to objective reporting, preferring instead a
Marxist-Leninist view of society and social progress. The particularly high status of
reading and writing in Russian culture, and the growing importance of certain genres,
such as publisistika and the moral and ethical theme, further set Soviet journalism apart.
Not only were Soviet journalists dedicated to a materialist and politicized journalism,
they also embraced the emotional life of exemplary individuals as vital subject matter for
a truly dedicated professional. Emotion and motivation are not often considered
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prestigious or appropriate topics in American journalism—in this sense, Soviet
journalists were not inaccurate when they accused their “bourgeois” counterparts of
inattentiveness to this aspect of readers’ experience.
Other aspects of the Journalists’ Union’s work reveal points of intersection along
with departures from American or Western European practice, suggesting that Soviet
journalism, in the final analysis, should be placed in the developmental trajectory
scholars have termed “modern.” In their commitment to professionalization, creative
union members were interested in social reform and in supporting the development of
expert knowledge. The affinities are clearest in higher education. Though they assumed
all journalism education required a solid foundation in Marxist-Leninist theory, creative
union leaders grappled with many of the same issues as their American counterparts: the
extent to which journalism should be considered part of the humanities and how to
adequately prepare graduates for future work. Journalism’s uneasy disciplinary fit
remained a key problem for the creative union into the 1970s.
Membership questions and the extent of the creative union’s authority were a
growing concern for the creative union in the 1960s—the terms of this debate reveal both
convergence with other states and particularity. As they had during the bylaws debate,
rank-and-file creative union members insisted that professional status should be conveyed
only on the ideologically reliable and professionally sophisticated. They even expressed
hopes that the creative union would adopt policy positions and take a leading role in
newspapers throughout the nation. In so doing, they embraced the notion that
professional status, especially work that was socially and politically valuable, should
convey increased influence. This optimism was quickly curtailed by the creative union’s
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own president. As Satiukov made clear in his 1963 plenary address and at the 1964
seminars, the creative union would always remain close to the Party, and any discussions
of professional agency required acknowledging that dominance, including an acceptance
of censorship. Though creative seminars attest to journalists’ continued sense of political
responsibility, they exercised this capacity in more limited ways due to the Party’s greater
ability to supervise their work than that of other creative professionals.
Methods of audience engagement are another area where Soviet journalism was
distinct from its Western counterparts. In their dedication to reader interests and needs,
Soviet journalists increasingly deployed modern means to non-liberal ends. Grushin’s
sociological studies at the IOM were aimed at understanding and shaping a socialist
public, in contrast to the liberal and democratic agendas that drove the development of
opinion polling in the United States. Like the subjects of the first American surveys,
Soviet citizens had their own opinions about the effectiveness and value of the IOM’s
mission, but they engaged the modern methodology without rejecting socialist values.
Creative union work on genre and readers further highlight the contradictions and
tensions in journalism work under Khrushchev. Soviet professionals were expected to
celebrate de-Stalinization without dwelling on past or present flaws or their own
participation in the system. Readers could be encouraged to work on themselves, but this
included not only the search for positive heroes but also the use of disciplinary
mechanisms. Due to their close proximity to party elites and extensive social
responsibilities, journalists directly confronted the challenges and limits of liberalization.
The creative union, then, served as a forum for defining both Soviet professionalism and
Soviet personhood. While some of these issues remained part of the creative union’s
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work in later years, the 1964 creative seminars were the clearest articulation of this new
subjectivity, as many of its proponents experienced major professional upheaval in the
early Brezhnev years.
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Chapter 6
“This Great Army of Journalists”: Professionalization and Reform in the Early
Brezhnev Years
In the opening minutes of Sergei Gerasimov’s 1967 film, Journalist, young and
energetic journalist Iurii Aliabev receives two promising assignments. He is newly
promoted to the foreign affairs department of his newspaper and will soon go to Europe
on assignment. Before he can depart, Aliabev is given one last domestic assignment: to
travel to a small town in the Urals, where a woman named Anikina writes letters claiming
that she is beset by vengeful neighbors. When he arrives in the small mountain town,
Aliabev discovers that Anikina is not a victim of injustice— her letters are denunciations
of her neighbors crafted entirely out of spite and a desire for personal gain. The trip
carries other rewards for him, however, as he makes many friends in the province and
becomes smitten with a young Komsomol member named Shura. Rather than denounce
Anikina and continue his investigation, Aliabev decides to leave for France, though he is
deeply tormented at parting from Shura. While abroad, he engages in ideological debates
with a young American colleague and resists the temptations of Western life. In the end,
it is the return home that is most transformative for Aliabev, as he finally exposes
Anikina and proves himself worthy of Shura. Gerasimov’s film won the Grand Prize at
the Moscow Film Festival in the year of its release, adding to his already established
reputation. He won three Stalin Prizes for his films The Teacher, The Young Guard, and
For the Liberation of China. In 1958, he adapted the Stalin Prize-winning novel, The
Quiet Don, whose author, Mikhail Sholokhov, had also received the Nobel Prize for
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literature. The film is, at its core, a cinematic depiction of the relationship between
professionalism and personal growth, along with the tension between domestic and
international responsibilities.620 Throughout this chapter, I will periodically return to
Aliabev’s personal and professional journey as they relate to the creative union’s
professionalization project in its second decade.
The years after Khrushchev’s forced retirement were tumultuous for journalists,
as they were for other groups within the Soviet intelligentsia. In an effort to make sense
of this transition, in recent years, historians have debated the fate of reform and the extent
to which Brezhnev’s rule constituted a “re-Stalinization.” Beginning from the premise
that the term “stagnation” was applied retroactively by Gorbachev to discredit his
predecessors, this new scholarship points to a more complex picture. I reach similar
conclusions, in contrast to Thomas Wolfe’s pessimistic view that journalists became the
“public relations arm of the Soviet Union’s most powerful institution,” and found
themselves in a contradictory position where their work was still necessary to the
function of the state but viewed with suspicion. While this view is unsurprising given
Wolfe’s overwhelming focus on Adzhubei—who was fired from Izvestiia and removed
his post in the creative union in 1964—other journalists were more optimistic about their
professional possibilities at the start of the Brezhnev period. These optimists, who
included Pravda journalist Len Karpinskii, celebrated Khrushchev’s removal because
they had little faith in his personal power to bring about change. Early appointments in
the creative union further demonstrate some continuity with the Khrushchev period:
Aleksei Rumiantsev, an early pioneer of the reform-focused journal, Problems of Peace
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and Socialism, was initially appointed editor-in-chief at Pravda and replaced Satiukov as
head of Journalists’ Union.621
The early months and years of Brezhnev’s rule point to a somewhat incoherent
official stance toward journalistic criticism and creativity. There were significant
personnel changes at central newspapers in 1965. Rumiantsev was fired in the spring of
that year after penning a controversial editorial on cultural politics. Less than six months
later, Voronov published an article on a controversial corruption case and was also fired.
Adzhubei’s replacement at Izvestiia, Vladimir Stepakov, lasted in his post for less than a
year. One reformer began his work not long after these firings: Egor Iakovlev, later a
close associate of Gorbachev’s, took on an ambitious restructuring of the creative union’s
trade journal in 1966. He remained editor-in-chief until 1968, when anxieties surged
about the Prague Spring’s broader implications. Though these upheavals would seem at
first to indicate a sustained interest in removing reformers, it is important to note that
Iakovlev and Rumiantsev were appointed to their posts under Brezhnev and removed
only in response to specific articles or editorial positions. Though these upheavals would
seem at first to indicate a sustained interest in removing reformers, it is important to note
that Iakovlev and Rumiantsev were appointed to their posts under Brezhnev and removed
only in response to specific articles or editorial stances. Distrust between journalists and
officials was a cyclical occurrence in a dynamic process rather than an official policy
position, in which the general anxieties regarding the Prague Spring were a more decisive
event than Brezhnev’s assumption of power. In his description of the first years of
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Brezhnev’s rule, Vladislav Zubok argues that most intellectuals “wanted dialogue, not
confrontation with the state bureaucracy and the communist regime.” I have found this to
accurately describe the position of journalists at this moment, as well. Those who
continued to pursue an agenda of reform and renewal did so out of enthusiasm for the
new political order, not as a rejection of it.622
Continuities in policy and personnel are even more apparent in the case of the
Journalists’ Union, and many of the protagonists of this chapter are familiar from
previous episodes. Dmitri Goriunov remained a prominent member of the creative
union’s governing board and stayed in his post as TASS director until 1967, when he
embarked on a diplomatic career in Africa. L. M. Ivanova and E. A. Lazebnik, who
appeared in chapter five in discussions of creative mastery and higher education,
addressed these subjects at length at creative union plenums. Moscow oblast’ chapter
president V. N. Golubev assumed a new role in the creative union, taking charge of its
new section on work with local newspapers. Though he was now a pensioner, former
Orgburo president N. G. Pal’gunov also participated in major events before the 1966
congress. Former Orgburo member Boris Burkov, still director of the Novosti news
agency, gave a major address on the organization’s new bylaws. Though he features only
briefly in this chapter, Iasen’ Zasurskii began his long tenure as dean of Moscow
University’s journalism department in 1965.
Under its new leadership, the creative union took several steps toward
strengthening its domestic mandate. It held two major plenums in 1965 alone: one in
February and one in December, and prepared for a second all-Union congress in late
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September of 1966. As part of this process, local chapters held conferences a few weeks
prior. The all-Union Congress, which convened at the end of that same month, featured
the adoption of new bylaws and organizational structures. Rather than treat each event in
isolation, I discuss the major debates across these gatherings. Some issues, like genre
politics and higher education, reveal important thematic continuities between the
Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods, though these discussions generally failed to introduce
new solutions. Debates about material privilege, foreign travel and cultural diplomacy,
and membership policies were more heated and drawn out, as all three issues intersected
with the ongoing effort to revise the organization’s bylaws. While the first bylaws debate
saw journalists express high expectations of the new organization and hopes for its future,
the second featured more frustration and a persistent gap between rank-and-file
expectations and those of elite members. The persistent attention to bylaws, when
journalists faced more serious challenges to their agency, points to another kind of
structural weakness. Since Satiukov had made clear in 1963 that the creative union would
not exercise any great influence over newspaper content or journalism policy, revision of
membership policies and privileges was one of a few areas where the organization could
exercise real control.
Though the debates over its domestic mandate show important continuities, the
creative union’s second congress suggests that significant shifts in values and practices
were underway, even as the creative union continued its public dedication to engagement
with the moral and ethical theme and the reader’s inner world. Attitudes toward foreign
influence suggest an increase in xenophobia, and the organization took a more restrained
approach toward social science data than it had at the 1964 seminars. To further illustrate
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these shifts, I engage in a close reading of two publications: KP under Boris Pankin and
the creative union’s restructured trade journal under the editorship of Egor Iakovlev. Both
cases suggest that examining journalism provides important nuance for our understanding
of the period’s cultural and intellectual history. While members of the editorial board
were anxious about KP’s coverage of dissident writers, there was less debate than in
1956. Perhaps more importantly, Pankin’s reaction to the case suggests that Voronov’s
firing, and a scandal about Grushin’s polling institute the following year, were moments
of far greater impact. Iakovlev’s policy stances at Zhurnalist, in contrast, demonstrate
that reformist journalism persisted into 1967, with the Prague Spring as a pivotal moment
of transition.
•••
At the end of February 1965, a mere weeks after he was elected head of the
creative union, Rumiantsev published an article in Pravda on cultural politics, titled,
“The Party and the Intelligentsia.” The article’s themes and content demonstrate
Rumiantsev’s support for intellectual freedom within a socialist context, and he was fired
not long after its publication. Though a recent set of interviews with former Central
Committee officials suggests the piece was co-written, I treat Rumiantsev as the author in
the absence of concrete evidence to the contrary.623 Rumiantsev’s essay displayed a
profound optimism about the relationship between the Party and intellectuals, taking his
inspiration from the revolutionary past and the more recent lessons of de-Stalinization.
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His vision of the future, which privileged intellectual expertise over political stature, was
perhaps his most utopian vision, which helps account for official disapproval of the piece.
At the start of his essay, Rumiantsev developed his belief in the mutually
beneficial relationship between the Party and the intelligentsia through an analysis of the
revolutionary past and Marxist-Leninist theory. Rumiantsev reminded his readers that
Lenin himself had supported scientists and argued against treating all intellectuals as
“opposed to the proletariat.” Since socialist society had advanced even further in recent
years, Rumiantsev argued that it would be “absurd” to treat intelligentsia members as
“builders of socialism and communism as an inferior sort.” This defense of the
intelligentsia’s social contributions was not new—Stalin himself had formally recognized
the intelligentsia as a vitally important “social stratum,” bestowing both prestige and
material privilege on creative elites.624 Parts of Rumiantsev’s vision for the future were
similar to the genre politics I discussed in chapter five, as he expressed a deep
commitment to the internal life of individuals. He highlighted the capacity of creative
works to introduce individuals both to “social life and the people’s internal world.” Real
creative effort, the kind he called “a manifestation of the human spirit…cannot be
stimulated by an order, does not endure a statist-bureaucratic approach…but comes from
social demands, which have received their form from the internal compulsions of the
scientist or artist.” While he defended socialist realism and the importance of dialectics,
Rumiantsev considered “free expression and clash of opinions” to be a key part of fruitful
creative development. He warned against making overly hasty assessments about
ideological phenomena, citing Lenin’s declaration that “in cultural matters, haste and
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sweeping gestures are most dangerous of all.” He then offered his own vision of how to
remain true to this ideological heritage: the fundamental criteria for judging an artistic
work should be “the building of communism, expressed in the continuous free
development of the identity of each member of society.”625 This harmonious relationship
between mental labor and social development positioned intellectuals as uniquely capable
of bringing about the communist future.
Rumiantsev’s truly radical stance—which explains the article’s unpopularity with
the Party leadership—concerned his reflections on the difference between political
expertise and creative skill. He began this section with a bold declaration:
The Party’s role as the ruling and organizing foundation of Soviet society
strengthens according to the principles of socialist democracy—and the
most important of these principles is the principle of collective
leadership…Тhis collective inspiration cannot manifest itself when the
principle of collective leadership is trampled on. Аnd this is
unsurprising— a single ‘great leader’ believed himself to be the sole
arbiter in all spheres of human аctivity, relating with mistrust and
intolerance to people of mental labor, who baselessly pretended to
authority in one or another sphere of life.
Here the historical parallels grew more direct and potentially subversive—though
he continued to avoid mentioning Stalin by name, Rumiantsev did reference one of his
titles, and Stalin’s propensity for taking positions in intellectual debates was wellestablished. His portrayal of Stalin’s relationship to intellectuals fits neatly with the
established narrative of the “personality cult” as a blighted time in contrast to the more
enlightened present, similar to the narratives of journalistic repression from chapter five.
Though the principle of collective leadership was an official doctrine, forcefully
propounded by Khrushchev after the Twentieth Congress, Rumiantsev did not praise the
625
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Party without reservation.626 It was likely his statements about the future of the Party’s
relationship to the intelligentsia that earned official ire, rather than his critique of the
Stalin period.
Turning to the present and his vision of the future, Rumiantsev laid down a set of
principles he thought would contribute to a more fruitful collaboration between the Party
and intellectuals and fully redress past wrongs. At the core of this was his vision of skill
and competency within the Party apparatus, which he described as a series of grave
obligations:
The Party demands from all of its members, in all fields of government,
from the lower ranks to the more senior, competence and a completely
scientific approach to all of the questions brought forth by life. Neither
leadership in itself, nor the occupancy of a post, provides a basis for
interference in the course of life, competence and practice in one or
another sphere of knowledge provides this. The Communist Party, as the
ruling and governing force of Soviet society, carries out its functions
precisely because it relies on a leading scientific worldview, the method of
Marxism Leninism; because it employs highly qualified cadres of
specialists in all spheres of activity, relying on their knowledge and
creative initiative; because it concentrates within itself the ideological
singleness of purpose of the entire Soviet people and the Communist
future.627
Rumiantsev insisted that authority came from competence rather than position: a
subtle though unmistakable challenge not only to Stalinism but also to any political
management of the cultural sphere. Since Rumiantsev had already positioned the
intelligentsia as the group which historically engaged in mental labor and acquired skill
and competence, his vision of the future presupposed a leading role for this group, one
which the Party would simply allow to flourish. Rumiantsev did not specify how the
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intelligentsia was to respond to mismanagement of its work or how one was to determine
the inappropriateness of official intervention. This interpretive challenge is similar to the
ambiguities KP journalists confronted in chapter two—how to condemn corruption
without de-stabilizing political authority.
A 1990 Pravda interview published three years before his death offers some
insights into Rumiantsev’s motives for publishing the piece. Rumiantsev unfavorably
contrasted the atmosphere at Pravda to his prior time in Prague, specifically the
“toadying” of subordinates. He called “The Party and the Intelligentsia” the product of
many years of personal reflection and conversations with both foreign and Soviet
colleagues. His personal attachment to it is perhaps further confirmed by his tendency to
quote the article during the interview, especially his conviction that creative activity
could not be produced “by order.” Rumiantsev claimed that he knew the article would
have an unfavorable reception and he hesitated to show it to colleagues. Though the
article had resulted in official “scolding,” he had received many letters of support from
intellectuals and regretted not having them in his personal archive.628 These reflections
position the article as a deeply emotional philosophical commitment, borne partly out of
disillusionment. Even more than in the original piece, Rumiantsev relied on the social
value of intellectual labor more than political approval—reader support meant more than
official reprimands. As a result of Brezhnev’s displeasure with the article, Rumiantsev
was removed from his post at Pravda, and Goriunov replaced him as acting chief of the
creative union. Though Rumiantsev’s removal took place some months before the formal
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arrest and trial of Andrei Siniavskii and Iulii Daniel’—a milestone I will address later in
this chapter—it points to growing concerns with excessive liberalism in cultural matters.
•••
Only a few months after Rumiantsev’s firing from Pravda, Iurii Voronov was
replaced at KP—the last major personnel shift at a central newspaper under Brezhnev.
Like the controversy surrounding Pankin’s youth club article a decade earlier, Voronov’s
firing was a response to the paper’s criticism of a corrupt official, though the conflict
involved high levels of the Politburo rather than displeased local bureaucrats.
Voronov was among those reformers encouraged by Brezhnev’s early policies.
He was particularly cheered by the downfall of Soviet geneticist Trofim Lysenko.
Lysenko, a critic of Mendelian genetics who promoted the inheritability of acquired
characteristics, had dominated Soviet agronomy since the 1920s. He was removed from
his post in the Academy of Sciences early in 1965, and central newspapers featured
articles denouncing his policies.629 Voronov’s next target was corruption in the Soviet
military. In July of that year, well-known publisist Arkadii Sakhnin published “In Flight
and After,” whose principal subject was a naval official named A. N. Solianik. For his
long career in Soviet whaling fleets, Solianik had received the Hero of Socialist Labor
award and represented his home district at the CPSU’s Twenty-Second Congress in 1961.
Sakhnin’s article demonstrated the extent of Solianik’s corrupt behavior.630 Boris Pankin
recalled going through a massive envelope of evidence against Solianik with his
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colleagues and becoming so incensed that they decided to take the case to Voronov.631
Pankin’s stress on empirical evidence of wrongdoing, and the moral imperative to present
the facts to the public, structured much of the later newsroom reaction to the case. At the
July 28 editorial board meeting on Sakhnin’s article, Goliakov, that week’s weekly critic
or designated reviewer (dezhurnyi kritik), linked Solianik’s abuse of power to Lysenko’s,
since the latter had also “fought the newspaper” when criticism of his work appeared.632
Though they worked in separate fields, Lysenko and Solianik had committed the same sin
of abusing their positions.
The Solianik case, like my KP case study of 1956, demonstrates the structural
limitations Soviet journalists faced in their pursuit of social reform. The reactions in the
editorial board, which I analyze below, were overwhelmingly positive, describing the
abuses of a corrupt official and calling for his removal offered hope for continued social
rejuvenation. The official reaction to the case demonstrates that the Party leadership did
not share this expansive view of journalistic responsibility: criticism of deviant
individuals was permissible, but it could not point to broader systemic abuses or
implicate prominent figures. In his review of Sakhnin’s article, Goliakov praised the
work not only for its subject matter but for its wider resonance: “it will no doubt force
many other people who find themselves in ‘captain’s posts’ to examine themselves.” The
article called attention to “indifference, bureaucratism, and lack of principle,” deficits the
entire nation needed to correct. Goliakov expressed his sense of personal and professional
obligation to continue this struggle, declaring, “No responsibility is more serious for us,
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than the responsibility to bring about the resolution of these problems.”633 As was the
case in 1956, the successful journalist was portrayed as unafraid to challenge authority,
especially those in “captain’s positions.” Now, clarity of critical vision was more
explicitly linked to reform of the individual conscience along with the socialist body
politic. Criticism was presented as an ethical stance rather than a de-stabilizing force.
Voronov did not expect opposition to the Sakhnin article: according to Pankin, he
was more self-assured after Khrushchev’s removal and believed firmly in the official
declarations from the CPSU that the struggles to fight corruption would continue, as
would an overarching commitment to individual freedom. Pankin describes Voronov as
particularly cheered by Lysenko’s downfall.634 Voronov, like Goliakov had in his weekly
review, saw scientific reform as proof of Brezhnev’s broader interest in social renewal.
This link would prove tenuous, however, as the Solianik case involved Brezhnev
personally and tested the limits of journalists’ reformist role.
The account of Voronov’s official reprimand over the Solianik case relies on
memoirs and secondary literature, due to an absence of archival sources. Though the
authors had different relationships to parties involved, all make special note of Voronov’s
vulnerability in the face of political disapproval. Boris Pankin stressed Solianik’s position
as a popular hero whose feats in the whaling fleet were regularly covered in the press.
Pankin even suggested that reaction might have been even swifter under Khrushchev,
since Brezhnev was in a “paradoxical position,” having committed himself to addressing
his predecessor’s mistakes despite his personal dislike of controversy. After the head of
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Ukraine’s Communist Party accused the paper of distorting facts, a formal investigation
was launched. This process was headed by Aleksandr N. Iakovlev, then an assistant head
of the Central Committee’s Ideology department and a future supporter of Gorbachev.
Iakovlev headed the inquiry at the urging of Politburo member Mikhail Suslov. His
investigation proved the facts of the case, so when the matter went to the Secretariat for
review, Iakovlev was “surprised” to see Brezhnev himself attend. Тhe resulting
discussion, at which Iakovlev was not permitted to speak, began unfavorably for the
paper, though Suslov was more restrained than expected, and advocated that Solianik be
removed from his duties. Brezhnev only broke his silence to “bark” at Iakovlev and
Voronov, “Don’t make a fuss!” Pankin, based on his conversation with Voronov
afterward, recorded Brezhnev’s remarks as, “Criticize, but we won’t permit you to make
a fuss!” In Iakovlev’s view, Voronov was fired because Solianik had given lavish gifts to
Party leaders, including Brezhnev himself. Other accounts cast the episode as a power
struggle between Politburo member Alexander Shelepin and Brezhnev—the latter, a
longtime supporter of Voronov’s, hoped to discredit Brezhnev and the Ukrainian
leadership by bringing down Solianik.635 Voronov’s decision to publish implicated the
paper in a complex web of client politics. While the Kaluga authorities had been unhappy
with Pankin’s 1956 article about their mistakes with youth leisure, that uproar occurred
on a much smaller scale. Though Voronov’s firing occurred not long after Rumiantsev’s,
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both were reactive attempts to restore order and minimize political fallout rather than a
coherent persecution of reformers.
In the aftermath of the Solianik case, Voronov was dismissed from KP. After a
brief period at Pravda as an editorial board secretary, he was ultimately assigned to West
Germany as a foreign correspondent. Though work abroad was often associated with high
status, Voronov’s situation was different. As a native of Leningrad who had survived the
German blockade as an adolescent and retained feelings of enmity toward Germany for
his whole life, Voronov was deeply unhappy during this period. Colleagues who recall
the episode in memoir accounts stress both the cruelty of the punishment and the injustice
of his demotion.636 While Rumiantsev’s replacement at Pravda, M. V. Zimianin, had
more experience as a Party functionary and diplomat than as a journalist, Voronov’s
successor was Boris Pankin, who remained editor-in-chief at KP until 1973.
Though a detailed study of KP under Pankin is beyond the scope of this study, it
is impossible not to discuss KP’s approach toward liberal intellectuals, particularly those
who were positioned as traitors for publishing their work abroad. KP journalists, as befit
their role as active participants in the cultural Cold War, were responsible for ensuring
that the public understood the danger such individuals posed—and that Western
sympathy for such individuals was misplaced. One prominent piece in this genre was a
February 1966 essay by Arkadii Sakhnin entitled, “I Do Not Understand,” about dissident
author Valerii Tarsis. Tarsis had become a target of official disfavor under Khrushchev,
as he published a short story abroad in 1962. KP’s article, which described Tarsis’s early
life and subsequent attempts at a literary career, presents him as the moral inverse of the
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positive hero—an individual without scruples and motivated entirely by avarice and
malice. Тhe article opened with the recollections of an Italian named Cesare Di Zappuli,
who had first met Tarsis on a trip to the Soviet Union in 1960. Tarsis was depicted as
eager to meet with a foreigner, and the two men met later in a cafe, where Tarsis’s
mother in law brought some heavy packages, which the Italian carried out only with
difficulty—Sakhnin later explained that these packages contained the author’s slanderous
manuscripts which he hoped would be published abroad. Sakhnin then described the
young Tarsis and his work in publishing, taking great care to stress that the young man
could be “obsequious” one moment and “brazen” the next. Even worse, he had a
tendency to pass off the work of literary acquaintances as his own. By the time he began
work at the Goslitizdat publishing house, he began to spy on colleagues and pry into their
personal lives for the purposes of denouncing them, which made him an object of fear
and dread. Tarsis did have a particular talent for languages and began to work as a
translator, which gained him entry to the Writers’ Union—a skill that Sakhnin presented
as evidence of his untrustworthiness.637
His troubles with the literary establishment were compounded by sins in his
personal life—he left his first wife for a teenage girl and then accused his first wife of
embezzlement to ensure that she could not bother him further. Tarsis was also presented
as a mediocre writer—Sakhnin cited an unfavorable 1957 review of Tarsis’s novel, The
Dream from Novyi Mir, which described the incoherent plot and characterized the
relationships and behavior of the characters as “improbable” and incomprehensible.
637
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Tarsis nevertheless continued writing novels and to disparage Soviet society in private
conversations in his apartment. Not long after his meeting with Di Zappuli, Tarsis
claimed that an Italian publishing house had accepted several of his works. Тhough Tarsis
was delusional on this point as on others—Sakhnin took care to stress his long history of
mental instability—the publishing house decided to take his work in the interest of
discrediting the Soviet Union and knowing they could profit by distributing it through
“underground channels” inside the country. They commissioned a “slanderous” work,
which Tarsis readily produced, knowing he would be paid in dollars. To discredit the
work further, Sakhnin cited an approving review from New York Times foreign
correspondent Harrison Salisbury, underlining the latter’s anti-Soviet stance. Salisbury,
and other Western journalists who reviewed the work, did not extensively praise its
merits but attributed its popularity to its anti-Soviet nature. Sakhnin’s quotation of
Salisbury is essentially accurate, however hyperbolic the rest of his descriptions were.
Sakhnin described the extent of Tarsis’s delusions but maintained that he could feel no
sympathy for the man. He described a meeting with him in which the author “did not
seem sick” and dedicated himself to “struggle with the Bolsheviks.” Sakhnin was most
disturbed that Tarsis was protected by Soviet law from any personal retaliation he might
have wanted to inflict.638 Tarsis was stripped of his Soviet citizenship shortly after the
article appeared and emigrated to Switzerland.639
When Sakhnin’s article was up for review at a letuchka, the participants were
concerned with any possible misinterpretations or ambiguities in the paper’s stance. This
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was not because editorial board members themselves disagreed about the facts of the case
of its interpretation—all of them condemned Tarsis and all others who published abroad.
Letuchka participants openly compared Tarsis’ case to the public trial of dissident writers
Iulii Daniel’ and Andrei Siniavskii—an event which deeply troubled Moscow’s liberal
intellectuals.640 The concerns about misinterpretation seem directed, instead, at the
possibility that ambiguous wording or imprecision in the article might provoke sympathy
from readers. In his review of events, weekly critic Goliakov compared and contrasted
the trials of dissident authors to other recent criminal processes, such as those against
currency speculators. While condemnation of economic criminals tended to be
“unanimous,” the “infamy” of these writers provoked diverse reactions. Though it was
natural for people to wish to “make sense of events themselves,” it was equally important
that the newspaper not create “misunderstandings” but “give readers facts, and not
epithets.” In this regard, Goliakov considered Sakhnin’s essay more successful than
Izvestiia’s critique of Siniavskii and Daniel’ written by Iurii Feofanov. KP’s article had
“given the reader the opportunity to evaluate these events themselves. But Feofanov gets
upset himself and makes the reader perplexed, when speaking about the worth of the
Soviet court, he writes about things which were considered even under the civil code.”
The critique of Feofanov here is striking—it was still important for readers to engage
with the case on their own terms, even when the desired outcome of such contemplation
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was obvious. Though the reference to civil law is ambiguous—Feofanov himself did not
use the phrase—it implies that he supplied irrelevant detail.641
Feofanov wrote a series of articles about the case under the rubric, “From the
Courtroom.” In keeping with this title, much of his analysis focused on legal procedure
and audience reaction during the trial. His coverage featured more detail and overt
epithets than Sakhnin’s—he claimed that Siniavskii’s chosen pen name of Abram Tertz
was meant to evoke the name of a legendary criminal from 1920s Odessa, and routinely
called Daniel’ “naive” for claiming that he did not consider his work anti-Soviet. He even
included excerpts from Article 70 of the Soviet legal code, which concerned the
definition and penalties attached to anti-Soviet slander, as if to ensure that his reader truly
appreciated the seriousness of the crime. At the same time, Feofanov took great pains to
establish that Siniavskii and Daniel’ had shown their work to many friends—and that
many of these individuals had failed to recognize the seriousness of their crime, instead
concentrating on the language and content of their published works.642 His response to
the case, then, was not only more pointedly didactic but also more damning of liberal
intellectuals. Where Tarsis was a deluded lone actor, Siniavskii and Daniel’ had
“infected” others, who still did not appreciate the seriousness of their crime even after
their arrest.
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Another participant in the letuchka, Bilenkin, criticized Sakhnin’s article for its
imprecision and exaggerations. He considered it excessive to criticize Tarsis for knowing
foreign languages, since this was a common literary skill. It was also unbelievable to him
that Tarsis could have successfully had his first wife imprisoned under false pretenses.
Sakhnin’s use of quotations was confusing, especially since he presented quotes that,
“belonged to fictional characters as though they precisely represented the author’s
position. It is possible that this is true. But the article needs to show this and prove this!”
Though he found Tarsis personally repugnant, the evidentiary standards for arguing
against him needed to be as high as any other case. Another journalist, Egorov, spoke
more about the diversity of public responses, particularly the responses “in a particular
part of the intelligentsia…In connection with his process, Herzen has been mentioned,
even Lenin’s name in the period of emigration. Let us explain to people whаt a lofty
patriotic flame these great emigrants lit and what is the essence of this emigration.”
Pankin agreed with many of the critiques but cited official support for the article: notable
writer Konstantin Simonov had written a personal letter to Sakhnin praising it. Pankin
closed the meeting with this remark, as if to give Simonov the last word on the subject.643
As in November of 1956, it was crucial that KP show no deviation from the official
stance on such a controversial issue, and that the newspaper’s coverage guide readers to
the correct conclusions. At such a sensitive moment, the preoccupation with factual
accuracy and interpretive precision was a matter of political importance as much as
professional pride. This was likely even more important so soon after Voronov’s firing. It
is not entirely clear why Pankin would need to invoke Simonov’s approval, however,
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since Sakhnin’ condemnation of Tarsis was unambiguous. His stance may be explained
by his relatively new status as editor—hed had held the position for less than a year—and
lingering caution in the aftermath of the Solianik case. Though he does not mention the
Tarsis article in his memoirs, Pankin palpably conveys the nervousness and anxiety at the
paper in those months.644
KP journalists were clearly aware of the sensitivity and importance of the various
campaigns against writers—and of the challenges the new evidentiary standards
presented for their work. The attempt to equate a character’s views with those of a text’s
author, while not questioned directly, was presented as a challenge to conventional views
of journalistic facticity. The problem of historical precedent was its own difficulty: Soviet
public culture celebrated intellectuals who had been persecuted under tsarist repression,
and, in these mythic usages, publishing abroad was a sign of healthy dissent. Soviet
readers would have been intimately familiar with Lenin’s publications from exile and
with Herzen’s work in London. Excluding Tarsis—or Siniavskii and Daniel’—from this
tradition required a carefully crafted narrative. Official grappling with the past was not in
itself new—the October Revolution myth underwent substantial reworking in the
transition from the NEP to Stalinism. What is distinct here is the presentation of
journalistic work as self-consciously historical, similar to the “foundation narratives”
crafted by the Bolsheviks about their seizure of power.645 While the early months of deStalinization had made the Soviet past less coherent, the literary scandals of the late
1960s required a unified narrative; political pressure to report correctly was even higher
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than it had been during the controversy surrounding Not By Bread Alone. At that time,
even Voronov had been able to sympathize with Dudintsev’s plight. Pankin, in contrast,
celebrated the paper’s negative coverage without reservation, using the praise from
Simonov as proof of harmony between the literary establishment and the newspaper.
The Solianik case, and the literary scandals which followed it, both involved
highly sensitive topics, since the former detailed domestic corruption and the latter
described writers publishing abroad. The Solianik article was cause for greater
celebration, since it allowed the paper to continue its combative stance begun earlier that
year with its attacks on Lysenko. At the same time, the article’s reception demonstrates
the deep gulf between professional aspirations and the Party’s sense of the permissible:
exposure of corruption could attack only lone individuals rather than systemic problems.
The essay on Tarsis demonstrates the pressures of the cultural Cold War on domestic
newspaper content: since his cause had attracted foreign sympathy and his crime was so
grave, editorial board members debated whether his public excoriation had been
sufficiently thorough. Any ambiguities might lead readers to doubt his guilt or equate his
behavior with that of unimpeachable revolutionaries who had published in exile. At this
moment, KP’s stance on literary dissidents was rigid and entirely in step with the Party’s
response—in contrast to the doubts some had expressed during the Dudintsev scandal a
decade before.
***
In the next major section of this chapter, I turn away from newspapers and back to
the Journalists’ Union—specifically, its plenums and second congress, and what those
events reveal about professional values and practices under Brezhnev. Gerasimov’s film,
377

with its emphasis on professional and personal growth and the relationship between
foreign and domestic work, is a particularly useful thematic touchstone. The first part of
Journalist, “Meetings,” deals with Aliabev’s promotion to the foreign affairs bureau and
his last domestic assignment in the Urals. Aliabev is young, well dressed, and
sophisticated; when he arrives in the Urals, he is greeted as a kind of celebrity. But it is
Aliabev who is most changed by his journey: he befriends the provincial newspaper
editor, Reutov, and learns to enjoy fishing trips. He eagerly attends a local theater
performance and is more engaged and lively during meetings with Shura and her worker
friends than with his Muscovite girlfriend. Contemporary reviewers of the film noted that
Aliabev is more of a calm observer during this segment, and the other characters,
especially Shura, are more prominent. For these critics, Shura’s kindness and work ethic
made her the “real embodiment of the new person,” and the Urals scenes reveal “the
spiritual beauty of Soviet people.”646 This preference for domestic triumphs is one of the
film’s enduring themes, and is also visible in the creative union’s activities after October
of 1964. In its second decade, creative union leaders displayed an acute awareness that
the organization’s domestic mandate had been neglected in favor of cultural diplomacy.
Where Gerasimov’s film presents local journalists as competent and perhaps superior to
Aliabev—local editor Reutov is more able to recognize Anikina’s malice—creative union
members expressed no such certainty and argued that local journalists were in greater
need of support from the organization. At the same time, the organization’s views on
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reader relationships and genre closely correspond to events in the film, as I will address
later in this section.
The tumult at central newspapers in 1965 altered the creative union’s leadership
structure in important ways, though some of the leaders in favor of a renewed domestic
mandate are familiar from previous chapters. At the organization’s fifth plenum, on
February 5, 1965, both Pavel Satiukov and Aleksei Adzhubei were removed from their
posts. A. M. Rumiantsev, Satiukov’s replacement at Pravda, was appointed the creative
union’s president. Despite his official recognition as the organization’s leader,
Rumiantsev did not address the event. His controversial Pravda editorial, “The Party and
the Intelligentsia,” was published only a few weeks later—it is possible, though not
proven, that he was already slated for removal.647 The creative union remained closely
affiliated with the Communist Party: seventy-eight percent of its members held either full
or candidate membership in the Party. As in the past, women were underrepresented
among delegates to the Congress, as they were in the organization as a whole, accounting
for only 57 out of 462 delegates.648 Тhough M. V. Zimianin was by this time editor-inchief of Pravda, he would not begin his decade-long leadership of the Journalists’ Union
until later in the year—D. P. Goriunov became acting head after Rumiantsev’s removal.
Several speakers at the February plenum critiqued the creative union’s excessive
focus on cultural diplomacy and the secretariat’s general ineffectiveness. The editor of
Rabotnitsa, the journal for female workers, Valentina Vavilina, critiqued the hierarchy
and structure of the creative union. She questioned the wisdom of staffing the
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organization’s secretariat almost entirely with editors in chief of newspapers or directors
of central information agencies, since “they are extremely busy people, not in a position
to seriously direct the creative internal life of the Journalists’ Union.”649 This critique
highlights the creative union’s persistent structural limitations: as early as 1963, Satiukov
had insisted that the organization could not manage publications or dictate newspaper
content. Vavilina’s suggestion that leading media managers were too overworked to
direct the creative union further points out the organization’s distance from day-to-day
media work. At the same event, a journalist from Perm named Kuznetsov described the
limited work of many local branches. Though the creative union had important
international goals, he wished to see enhanced effort to assist “this great army of
journalists” inside the Soviet Union. In practice, this meant strengthening oblast’-level
organizations in recognition of those journalists who could not attend all-Union seminars
in Moscow.650 While the Secretariat’s work with the Council of Ministers on housing
issues was a positive sign, this coordination only took place on the republic level. Since
the Russian Republic did not have its own bureau of the creative union, it was not clear
how these matters would be resolved there.651 In partial recognition of these issues, the
creative union significantly expanded its work with raion-level newspapers in 1965, a
decision which seemed designed to correct longstanding grievances about local neglect.
The commission’s first head, Moscow oblast’ chapter president V. N. Golubev,
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concentrated on educational disparities between raion journalists and their counterparts at
more prestigious publications.652
Though the creative union’s next plenum, in December 1965, was devoted
entirely to domestic matters, its speakers addressed longstanding problems for the
organization: the definition of journalistic expertise, and the quality and features of
educational programs. E. A. Lazebnik, who delivered the address on professional
mastery, had first complained about the creative union’s lack of intervention on the
subject at a 1963 plenum, while L. M. Ivanova’s complaints about higher education were
often very similar to her proposals at the 1962 cadres seminar. As we saw in chapters
four and five, Lazebnik was the editor of Ukraine’s Rabochaia gazeta in addition to
holding academic posts at Kiev University, and Ivanova remained on Izvestiia’s editorial
board. Though they had distinct areas of expertise, Ivanova and Lazebnik were each
concerned with the nature of professional knowledge, journalism’s relationship to other
fields of creative inquiry, and the value of sentiment as a tool to engage audiences.
Though an entire plenum devoted to domestic issues was a significant change, the
arguments offered at this event differed little from Khrushchev-era discussions, and
highlighted journalists’ inability to resolve interpretive challenges or expand the creative
union’s influence.
In her remarks on higher education, Ivanova called specialization itself into
question. The demands on journalism were greater than ever: audiences were more
sophisticated and interested in reading about specialized topics, from agriculture to art.
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This lead Ivanova to openly wonder if “future journalists must contain within themselves
at least two professions?” Successful students would need “natural thinking abilities” and
“skill with language” (vladenie iazikom). These skills could be developed if an individual
already possessed them, but they could not be taught. Lazebnik’s view of “professional
mastery” was similarly expansive—he argued that journalists’ success depended on their
ability to incorporate philosophy, sociology, and economics. Mastery could not be
“pressed into the narrow frame of language and style, as some journalists think.”653
Ivanova’s rhetorical questions relate to fundamental aspects of this study: the extent to
which Soviet journalism constituted a profession and the role the creative union played in
this process. Ivanova and Lazebnik each presented journalism as its own discipline that
nevertheless required a specialized knowledge of other fields—an implicit challenge to
the utility of degree programs. Lazebnik’s views further highlight the extreme pliability
of professional mastery as a concept, since it could include language-based skill as well
as familiarity with other fields of inquiry.
Despite their ostensibly separate interests, Lazebnik and Ivanova both felt that the
ability to elicit reader engagement was an essential skill for journalists. Lazebnik was
particularly concerned with reader’s emotional needs, suggesting that the focus on
inwardness and sentiment that was so apparent during the 1964 genre seminars remained
a priority. While journalism during the first Five-Year-Plans focused on “production,”
there was now more interest in “intimate conversation with the reader.” The cultivation of
intimacy was essential as educated readers had enhanced not only their “moral
perception” but also their participation in a “culture of feeling,” and they would be more
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invested in works with appeals to both reason and sentiment. It was not enough that most
Soviet people read newspapers out of a sense of “duty.” For her part, Ivanova supported
including more social science in university programs and urged young journalists to
move beyond genre in their understanding of professional responsibility. Rather than
strive to become an ocherkist or feuilletonist, each student and teacher should think of
“influence on the reader, from the point of view of the lively subject matter in which he
would like to participate.” The tendency toward “academism” was compounded by most
instructors’ clear lack of practical newsroom experience.654 Both Ivanova and Lazebnik
presented journalism as a social practice, where genre was only a vehicle for expression
of a deeper commitment. Lazebnik’s belief that most Soviet people saw newspaper
engagement as an act of civic participation evokes the high cultural value of books and
reading—in the new social climate, every citizen could access this resource, and
journalists should not lose sight of this opportunity to influence society as a whole.
These prescriptions are strikingly similar to the focus on the internal world from
the 1964 creative seminars. While Khrushchev’s specific policy prescriptions and
leadership style had fallen into disrepute, the dedication to reader sensibilities had not.
Gerasimov’s depiction of reader relationships and personal growth demonstrates similar
continuity. Aliabev’s experiences in the Urals are itself an example of the moral and
ethical theme: wen he confesses his love to Shura, she rejects his advances, fearing a
scandal and claiming that nothing lasting can come from their relationship. After their
encounter, both are shown in torment, with voiceovers expressing their mutual regard and
uncertainty. Aliabev upbraids himself for his poor behavior, and Shura contemplates the
654

GARF f. 10124, op. 1, d. 267, ll. 103–6.

383

depth of her regard for the young journalist and her mother’s suffering at the hands of
men. This is the first scene where Aliabev is portrayed as a person of deep intellect and
feeling. The next morning, fresh from this revelation, he discovers Anikina is not what he
expected. Far from being a victim in need of investigatory expertise, she is bitter and
vengeful. Alone in his bedroom, he overhears her dictating a letter to her foster-son,
describing an illegal abortion mill in Shura’s apartment. Though he confronts her,
Anikina is unrepentant, and Aliabev soon departs for Moscow. His editor describes
Anikina as an example of “social forces” used for ill. Anikina’s abuse of the near-sacred
journalist-reader relationship establishes her as the film’s villain: to the Soviet viewer,
her letters would evoke the Stalinist practice of denouncing neighbors for personal gain.
Gerasimov offers his own solution to the problem of professional development:
investigation and encounters with readers will result in professional and personal
growth.655
In their remarks on Lazebnik’s draft speech, members of the creative union
Secretariat criticized Lazebnik for his overly academic orientation and his failure to
describe professional attainment in the newsroom—the place where most journalists
matured creatively.656 Lazebnik’s privileging of publisistika and descriptive writing was
common among young professionals. At the 1966 Moscow oblast’ conference, creative
union members complained that university graduates’ preference for these genres made
them unsuitable for work in raion newspapers, as they struggled to write on more
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common topics such as the Komsomol or the economy.657 This preference for interpretive
over descriptive writing is unsurprising, given the social weight attached to publisistika
and the popularity of its more famous practitioners. At the same time, it suggests that the
creative union’s vision of professionalization was not only abstract but also irrelevant to
local journalists’ needs and experiences. Young graduates’ preference for publisistika is
understandable—descriptive writing allowed journalists to assume an analytical stance
and argue specific points as knowledgeable authors, in contrast to descriptive reporting.
Gerasimov’s cinematic depiction of professionalism makes a similar statement, since
local editor Reutov encourages Aliabev to write an ocherk comparing and contrasting
Anikina’s complaints with his own experiences. It is implied that Aliabev does not
complete the article before leaving for his foreign trip—it is only later in the film that he
properly contextualizes his experiences and address the social wrong he had discovered.
Social responsibility was an equally important theme in creative union discussions
of higher education, though material support issues also played a significant role. While
Ivanova complained about aspiring journalists who only entered the profession for
“money and glory” and did not understand that truly successful journalism required a
“sense of endless responsibility before myself and other people,” Moscow oblast’
journalists struggled to attract practicum students to their newspapers, as stipends were
insufficiently high.658 The contrast between Ivanova’s deals and the struggles of oblast’
journalists suggests that a sense of social mission did little to overcome young people’s
desire to live comfortably. Ivanova advocated replacing the current admissions system,
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which privileged work experience, with a process that required a written portfolio and an
interview by a special commission—she referred to such a process as a “creative
contest.”659 This view of professionalization, even more than her opening remarks,
stressed journalism’s contributions to the development of Soviet society—a public
mission which transcended any possible material benefits. This assertion closely
correspondents to Jurgen Kocka’s definition of Central European professional status:
“social prestige based on competence, professional ethics, and the special importance of
[its] work for society and common weal.” Given the official disdain for wealth and
excess in Soviet culture, it is unsurprising that elite creative union discussions focused
more heavily on this aspect of professionalization, even as rank and file members were
concerned with material support.660 However strongly its elite membership sought reform
and encouraged debate on educational issues, they controlled neither admissions nor the
faculty at universities. Like professionals in Germany, another country where state
agencies had decisive influence on the development of professions, “practitioners did not
control the transmission of knowledge.”661 Even in the 1970s and 1980s, university
admission was based on work experience and many journalists found workplace
“socialization” more important than their degree programs. Explaining this persistent
trend would require extensive study of the Ministry of Higher education bureaucracy.662
•••
Aside from the plenum on higher education and mastery, the renewed focus on
the domestic mandate was devoted to three subjects: the organization’s membership
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standards, material support benefits, and foreign travel and cultural diplomacy. These
issues dominated creative union events from 1965 to 1967. All three themes were tied,
directly or indirectly, to the creative union’s bylaws, which determined membership
policies and contained explicit language about material support and cultural diplomacy.
The near-constant conversations on these topics over such a long period is striking, since,
as we have seen elsewhere, journalists faced more profound structural limitations, such as
official opposition to critical campaigns and the power of state and Party officials to
remove popular editors and censor newspaper content. The preoccupation with the
bylaws, then, reflects the creative union’s subordinate position. Since the organization
had no direct control over newspaper content, limited influence on higher education
policy, and struggled to establish an independent support base, membership policies and
responsibilities were one of a few arenas where the creative union exercised exclusive
influence. Though the organization’s development remained at least partly driven by
member input, the tenor of this second debate over bylaws suggests more frustration than
optimism, and a persistent gulf between rank-and-file expectations and elite goals.
Egorov’s specific remarks about the creative union at the February 1965 plenum
stressed both its relative youth and its growth. While the initial decision to create the
organization had been correct, it still had serious deficits. Regrettably, “we feel that we
have a union only when we pay dues, we still do not feel creative assistance from the
Journalists’ Union.”663 Membership was a persistent issue—just as Satiukov had at
previous plenums, Egorov commented that some members of the creative union had
“written only a few short pieces, were not journalists by profession or active workers’
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and peasants’ correspondents.”664 Though both elite and rank-and-file journalists had
invested a great deal of effort in finalizing the bylaws during the incubation period, this
did not guarantee members’ attachment to the organization or alleviate concerns about its
expansive membership approach. In their comments on the bylaws before the second-all
Union congress, journalists from Moscow oblast’ admitted that many capable journalists
in the oblast’ were not members of the creative union. An editor named Aleksandrovskii
pointed out that the chapter had more young journalists than senior authority figures, as
those with more established careers felt they had nothing to lose in remaining outside the
organization during its incubation period. He saved his harshest criticism for those who
remained members but did not substantively contribute: “you, members of the union,
have gained nothing, besides having paid membership dues.”665 As during the original
bylaws debate, writing and creative output were considered to be the key marks of a
qualified journalist. At the same time, local journalists were no more attached to the
organization than they had been a decade previously, since Aleksandrovskii complained
about its “passive members.”
In a separate address at the February 1965 plenum, the editor of the journal
Tekhnikha Molodezhi (Technology for Youth), В. D. Pekelis’ brought up specific
examples of moral and professional decay. Pekelis’ had noticed some young women
expelled from the House of Friendship for their “indecorous” conduct. To his dismay,
when he went to the nearby Central House of Journalists for dinner, he heard music and
discovered women doing a kind of “twist” which would have made them suitable
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subjects for KP’s columns on delinquency, under titles such as “Their Morals” or “An
Evening in a Cabaret.” The young women in question had entered the house “with so
called journalists, people in our union by chance, but, sadly, members of our union.” The
episode illustrated the clear necessity of “cleansing our ranks of such haphazard
people.”666 The behavior here was strikingly reminiscent of the earlier scandals in Varna,
with music, dancing, and female misbehavior explicitly linked to moral decay and
general organizational contamination.667 Where “philistine” newspaper coverage took a
shallow approach to the most pressing ideological concerns of the day—the cultural
contest with the West—unprincipled creative union members failed to consider how their
behavior reflected on the profession as a whole. Gerasimov’s film contains a similar
example: Aliabev is promoted to the international department because a senior member
has become an alcoholic who cannot fulfill his responsibilities. Rather than accept his
failures and reform, the senior journalist is unrepentant. When in Switzerland on
assignment, Aliabev is both attracted and repelled by bourgeois society: he puts a franc in
a nickelodeon, only to discover that it is an erotic peepshow in which women strip down
to their lingerie. Rather than turn away immediately, however, he puts in another franc—
and only then does he pronounce the entire thing “disgusting.” When he is taken to a
disco, Aliabev refrains from dancing. Immediately, bourgeois ideology is equated with
sexual perversity, drawing on a longstanding Soviet cultural trope. Though his real
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maturation comes with his return home, Aliabev’s behavior both in the newsroom and
abroad is above reproach.668
The new attention to the bylaws—and by extension, the creative union’s goals
and needs—is also visible in the pages of its trade journal. In August of 1965, the
responsible secretary of the Moscow city branch of the creative union, a G. Garbunov,
published a short article for Sovetskaia pechat’ on the creative union’s membership
issues. He was particularly concerned with a membership “loophole” in the original
bylaws, which allowed those without strong professional ties to enter the organization.
He cited the clause that opened membership to anyone who “contributed” to the press
(sotrudnichat’), even if they only wrote occasionally. Adding to the confusion, the
document’s second membership clause stipulated that members must have three years’
work experience—a “contradictory” state of affairs. Significantly, membership
applications from less qualified candidates nearly always referenced the first clause as
support for their applications; simply denying them membership outright would have
constituted a clear procedural “violation.” As a result of a too-liberal application of these
clauses, the Moscow branch of the organization had excessively large numbers of artists
and photographers. The author advocated more precise formulations and, specifically,
that staff positions be required for membership. Other interpretive ambiguities arose
during membership debates about workers’ and peasants’ correspondents, as journalists
themselves were obligated to decide what made one correspondent “more active” than
another.669 A September 1966 address from former Orgburo president Pal’gunov reveals
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the quantitative effects of this expansive membership policy. In 1956, the Orgburo had
decided not to create an “academy of journalists” that would have perhaps four or five
hundred members but had instead established a “mass creative organization.” To
demonstrate the fruitfulness of the second option, Pal’gunov noted that out of
approximately fifty one thousand journalists in the entire Soviet Union, about forty three
thousand belonged to the creative union. Though all-Union plenums often featured
complaints about a lack of interest in the organization, Pal’gunov’s data demonstrates the
creative union’s substantial growth since the inaugural congress—at that time there had
been only twenty two thousand members. The Journalists’ Union remained the USSR’s
largest creative union by far—at its largest the Writers’ Union had only ten thousand
members.670
As the creative union began to prepare for its second all-Union congress, a trade
journal editorial appeared in June 1966 urging local journalists to think seriously about
their responsibilities to the organization and promising future attention to the matter.671 In
a similar article that July, a journalist from Volgograd insisted that membership should
signify more than the mere satisfaction of statutory requirements. His more novel
suggestions included restricting membership to those who had published in oblast’-level
or central publications, even if they were staff members on a raion-level publication. This
requirement would inspire raion-level journalists to “raise their mastery.” In their work
with membership applications, members should be especially attentive to the work
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histories of freelance journalists.672 These proposals indicate a clear effort to make the
organization more exclusive than it had been originally by privileging journalists who
occupied staff positions and thus earned their living through media work. The proposals
in favor of a more prestigious publishing history were an even more obvious departure
from the vision that had triumphed during the original bylaws debate, as most raion
journalists only published locally. Since the creative union had recently pledged to
improve its work with these journalists—and created a new commission devoted to this
task—this standard seems almost contradictory, though it would have undoubtedly
achieved the author’s stated goal of a more “professional” body.
Other material from the trade journal, along with commentary from the Moscow
oblast’ conference, suggests that dissatisfaction with the creative union was expressed not
only in critique of the bylaws but through discussion of material privilege and benefits.
Other local journalists linked membership issues to the creative union’s longstanding
debates about local representation and financial support. In an August 1965 article in the
trade journal, a journalist from Leningrad noted that even in newspapers with large
numbers of creative union members, colleagues seldom met to discuss creative union
matters, and the “designated representative” to the oblast’ organization merely collected
dues or issued tickets to events, rather than leading substantive discussions. The creation
of primary organizations could improve the atmosphere in a publication, perhaps even
improving upon or taking responsibility for conducting letuchki. The complaint that dues
were not differentiated by income, first raised during the original bylaws debate, was
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brought up again.673 These visions for revised bylaws indicate a persistent desire to
increase both the creative union’s influence and members’ financial security. The
mention of letuchki is particularly telling, since it demonstrates that a more powerful
creative union would draw on and enhance existing practices of professional sociability.
•••
The expanded work on domestic journalism issues in the Journalists’ Union did
little to alter the creative union’s commitment to cultural diplomacy and the general sense
that journalism was essential to the cultural Cold War. The second part of Gerasimov’s
film, “The Garden and Spring,” acknowledges this: Aliabev asks his editor to send him to
Switzerland even as Anikina’s perfidy has not been fully investigated. Though he urges
Aliabev not to let the matter rest, the editor lets his young protégé depart for Switzerland,
temporarily letting international responsibilities outweigh domestic concerns. Discussions
of foreign travel inside the Journalists’ Union featured both rank-and-file and elite
journalists defending the value of cultural diplomacy. The interests of these two groups
diverged in important ways, however: creative union elites were more concerned with
inadequate news coverage of foreign countries and presented trips abroad as a
professional responsibility for the expert and ideologically reliable few. Rank-and-file
members, in contrast, viewed travel as a material and social privilege and presented their
lack of access to it as a sign of their own marginalization. Gerasimov’s Aliabev is much
closer to the elite vision of the zhurnalist-mezhdunarodnik: he speaks English and French
and works for a central publication. Aliabev makes a successful personal contact while
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abroad: he meets a his ideological opposite, a young American journalist named Sid
Barton, who teases him for being a “pacifist” and claims that the essence of journalism is
“sensationalism”—confirming Soviet tropes about Western journalists. Barton later takes
Aliabev to a disco, where the latter refrains from dancing—the camera remains focused
on the twisting movements rather than Aliabev’s disinterest, however, which somewhat
undercuts the moral message. Barton is portrayed as relatively proficient in Russian, and
he shows Aliabev around Paris, including introducing him to his Communist friend
Michelle, and Aliabev defends his friend from colleagues who dislike his work and cast
aspersions on their friendship. Barton is presented as more misguided than dangerous.
Though he is not won over to the Soviet cause, he admits that the Soviet Union was the
first nation to propose disarmament. He further encourages Aliabev to talk about Shura,
indirectly contributing to Aliabev’s decision to return to the Urals immediately after
leaving Europe. Though media elites were often concerned with the negative effects of
foreign influence, Aliabev is strengthened in his resolve through time abroad. Though the
film was reviewed very positively, Pravda’s film critic believed that the foreign scenes
lacked the sense of a “tense struggle” and the reality of ideological clashes.674 The
Pravda reviewer cast Gerasimov’s portrayal of the relative amity between Aliabev and
Barton as an artistic misstep marring an otherwise excellent artistic work. Real
journalistic errors in cultural diplomacy or foreign coverage were treated with far greater
seriousness—this became a major theme of creative union events in the early Brezhnev
era.
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At both the February 1965 plenum and 1966 all-Union congress, creative union
elites used familiar arguments about sensationalism and foreign influence to critique
domestic newspaper content. These anxieties were frequently coupled with discussions of
the creative union’s cultural diplomacy efforts and the need for effective foreign
coverage. In his remarks at the 1965 plenum, A. G. Egorov displayed significant anxiety
about Soviet foreign coverage, especially of the people’s democracies and the developing
world. Reporting from Eastern Europe was so lacking that Egorov asked, “does it not
seem to you that we write about life in these countries, with the language of ‘local
journalism’ forgetting that we are speaking about states, where each one has its own great
history, its culture, and spiritual life?” Egorov considered relationships to be particularly
complicated and worried about foreign media making use of “any inaccuracy” in Soviet
coverage of these nations—though he did not name a specific agency, this was likely a
reference to foreign radio broadcasts or Western media sources. Coverage of developing
countries should stress the “mutually beneficial” aspects of these relationships. In his
address to the 1966 congress, Goriunov was similarly concerned about Eastern Europe
coverage and reminded his audience that readers in newly independent countries were
now “three-fifths of all human kind,” evoking the anti-imperialist strain which was so
central to the 1963 World Journalists’ Meeting. Goriunov called foreign exchange the
creative union’s “most important responsibility,” and celebrated the MOJ’s promotion of
foreign exchange between socialist journalists. He made special note of the
organization’s educational endeavors for journalists from the developing world. Goriunov
was careful to stress that cultural contacts were not limited to “developing” countries.
Exchange with capitalist counterparts was most productive “when the basis for these
395

contacts constitutes sincere professional interest, a wish to know each other better.”675
The immediate mention of challenges in international propaganda by both speakers along
with Egorov’s critique of Khrushchev makes the continued importance of cultural
diplomacy in creative union work clear. In Egorov’s view, more diverse and multifaceted
coverage would improve the Soviet Union’s international standing, and prevent foreign
media outlets from using “inaccuracies” or superficial content to their advantage. His
comments about the developing world demonstrate acute sensitivity to the politics of
foreign aid and the consequences of alliances with less technically advanced nations.676
Goriunov’s discussion of capitalist cultural diplomacy is particularly revealing when
compared to the creative union’s early years—whereas the Helsinki meeting ten years
prior had hinted at possible reduction of Cold War tensions, Goriunov took a decidedly
more cautious stance toward the West a decade later. His reference to “sincerity” implies
that he believed that other capitalist journalists were more interested in ideological debate
or persuasion than meaningful exchange.677
In his discussion of the creative union’s exchange programs at the February 1965
plenum, Egorov focused on logistical issues: a tendency toward overly formal visits and a
shortage of adequate guides. Despite these concerns, he also noted significant
quantitative increases—the creative union had hosted nearly a thousand visitors from
1960 to 1964. Yet quantitative improvement did not mean the system was flawless: when
Soviet journalists went abroad, the effects of their journeys were not always well studied,
675
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and knowledge of foreign languages was still at a premium. Of the 210 Soviet journalists
who had visited foreign countries from 1963 to 1965, only 55 were from non-central
newspapers. As if to defend the bias toward elite journalists, Egorov declared, “these trips
are not tourism, but great political work.” When journalists traveled without a sense of
responsibility toward the public, they produced “objectivist and philistine” coverage of
foreign countries, an epithet that linked failed cultural diplomats to a pursuit of
“bourgeois” cultural value. Egorov apparently meant that this coverage was too
superficially moralistic and did not deeply analyze American failures, as he went on to
provide an example of an otherwise successful journalist who “failed to deeply study
American life.” Unlike this errant correspondent, truly committed Soviet journalist were
obligated to take more profound approaches and follow the “Leninist principle of partymindedness” in their work.678 Changes in leadership had not altered the creative union’s
interest in the reception of cultural diplomacy and adequately training journalists for
cross-cultural encounters. The standards for cultural diplomats remained so high that elite
selection standards that limited opportunities for local journalists were openly presented
as professional necessities.
Former Orgburo president N. G. Pal’gunov made similar points in his address to
the 1966 Moscow oblast’ conference. He pointed out that journalists “from the
periphery” were less likely to possess foreign language skills and declared, “it is not
useful for journalists to go abroad merely as tourists, since the most important aspect of
foreign travel was development of “personal contacts.” Pal’gunov remarked that
journalists were able to spend more time overseas than in the past, in part due to
678
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exchange agreements with other socialist countries, and he celebrated increased
assistance to the developing world and Soviet membership in the MOJ. Though he
recognized journalists’ personal interest in travel, Pal’gunov’s view of cultural diplomacy
placed utility over enjoyment.679
Strikingly, discussions of travel were associated with another longstanding
grievance: the absence of Zhurfond, a separate material support fund for journalists that
the creative union would have controlled exclusively. Journalists in Moscow oblast’
strongly advocated for such an institution and often used travel to illustrate their sense of
marginalization and deprivation. One journalist named Aleksandrovskii followed up his
calls for Zhurfond with a direct comparison to the Writers’ Union. Colleagues who had
recently traveled did so through personal or work connections and not with the aid of the
creative union. Writers, however, gained travel access through creative union
membership.680 These journalists were well aware of the legal and social distinctions
between trade unions and creative ones and felt comfortable arguing for privileges based
on these distinctions. At the same time, when local journalists compared themselves to
writers, they concerned themselves with economic status and social privilege rather than
genre politics. Though he defended the high standards attached to foreign travel,
Pal’gunov affirmed the creative union’s commitment to providing for members’ leisure
and material support, reminding his audience about the leisure house in Varna and the
new facilities on Hungary’s Lake Balaton. Both locations provided opportunities to
combine vacation with meeting foreign colleagues. Pal’gunov promised that the
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Zhurfond project had not been abandoned and described tentative plans for a resort in the
Moscow oblast’ city of Zvenigorod.681 Though he could not promise them equal access to
foreign travel, Pal’gunov clearly felt obligated to remind local journalists of cultural
diplomacy’s importance. At the same time, his mention of vacation opportunities and
Zhurfond demonstrates some willingness to abide by a socialist social contract that
entitled creative professionals to special opportunities for leisure. Such privileges were
enshrined in both the creative union’s bylaws and the Soviet Constitution.682
Dmitri Goriunov took a similarly complex stance in his remarks on this topic at
the September 1966 all-Union congress. Goriunov supported increased work with
oblast’-level organizations, especially in the Russian Republic, because there was no
Republic-level organization to oversee such activity. As a symptom of this problem,
requests from known genre experts, like feuilletonists or sports reporters, to visit
localities and conduct seminars “were frequently left unanswered.” To improve their
professional work, journalists should have access to “transit tickets” around their oblast’,
similar to those held by trade workers or prosecutors, since “journalists travel more than
others.” Goriunov proposed improvements to the organization’s creative infrastructure,
such as a “creative resort” (doma tvorchestva) and special living arrangements for union
members. Goriunov acknowledged that “persistent proposals are made for the creation of
Zhurfond, and it is necessary to create a scientific research center for journalistic
problems under the auspices of the union.”683 Some of these proposed improvements
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reflect longstanding complaints dating to the bylaws debate and intervening years,
particularly concerning the neglect of local needs by specialists and possible
underrepresentation of the Russian republic. Goriunov’s remarks highlight journalism’s
unique status compared to their literary counterparts: an RSFSR Branch of the Writers’
Union was formed in 1963—as an institution, it would come to be closely identified with
rising Russian nationalism, particularly as the Brezhnev regime grew distrustful of more
liberal trends within the intelligentsia.684 No Russian branch of the Journalists’ Union
ever formed under the auspices of the all-Union body, despite the creative union’s large
size and Russian majority.
Goriunov’s request for subsidized transit reinforces the link between creative
union membership and material advantages. His vision for the creative union’s second
decade involved increasing material benefits for members and the profession’s overall
academic authority: both aspirations reflected longstanding grievances of rank-and-file
members. At the same time, the creative union itself had failed to meet its members’
basic needs: Goriunov cited a particularly troubling case involving a journalist from
Krasnodar with a sick child, and noted that the Secretariat’s folder of unanswered mail
was very large.685 Even as Goriunov presented journalists as a group in need of more
social support, he took pains to describe the obligations creative union membership
imposed. Remarks from Moscow oblast’ chapter president Golubev go some way to
describe the complexities of the Zhurfond project: though he endorsed establishing a
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creative union fund, Golubev considered it impossible for his colleagues to abandon their
trade union affiliation, not least because this would result in the loss of pensions.686
Golubev was not the only creative union leader concerned about the implications
of local demands for material support. In his address on the bylaws, secretariat member
Boris Burkov insisted that any intervention in journalists’ workplaces—such as
approving job dismissals or providing paid leave—would have usurped the functions of a
trade union. He was equally dismissive of any proposals that would have enhanced the
creative union’s disciplinary powers and made them more like those of the Communist
Party. These additional procedures, according to Burkov, would have resulted in a “loss
of creative character.”687 The other longstanding debate that Burkov touched upon in his
speech concerned the procurement of “advantages and privileges”—among them,
housing and pensions—which would render journalists more equal to their other creative
counterparts. Burkov acknowledged the “many” voices in favor of the creation of
Zhurfond, and he tentatively suggested that its main source of income would come from
publishing activities and a small percentage of authorial honoraria. Plans for the use of
the fund ranged from tangible benefits such as travel, prizes, and contests to an expansion
of creative activity through funding of research and publishing. Unlike his more
extensive discussion of other proposals, Burkov merely stated that the creative union’s
new governing board would undertake this project.688 As we saw in chapter one,
journalists were the only creative professionals who were also members of the trade
union for cultural workers—the other organizations relied on their own exclusive support
686
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funds. Though a detailed study of the Soviet welfare state is beyond the scope of this
study, it seems clear that undoing a longstanding relationship in favor of a new support
fund was a distinct organizational challenge—especially since Zhurfond never came into
existence.689 Whether this absence was due to institutional inertia or a more profound
problem would require further study of the creative union’s financial structure. The
rejection of expanded disciplinary procedures—which would have expanded the power
and influence of local creative union chapters—further demonstrates the gap between
elite and rank-and-file desires.
•••
The most significant agenda item at the September 1966 all-Union congress was
the discussion and ratification of new bylaws. Boris Burkov, director of the Novosti press
agency, delivered this address, and many of his remarks were based explicitly on
comments from rank-and file-members. Burkov praised the initial bylaws and declared
that much of the original organizational structure, including its legal status and
relationship to the trade union, would remain in place. The changes to the bylaws, as had
been the case seven years earlier, were made on a consultative basis by asking local
organizations for input, along with consulting existing creative union bylaws, both Soviet
and Eastern European. I was unable to find an archival collection reflecting these aspects
of the process in the materials concerning congress preparations; in this section I rely
almost entirely on Burkov’s published address and on the new bylaws.690

689

A. I. Schiglik, “Vvedenie,” 15–8.
“Ob izmeneniakh i dopolneniakh k ustavu soiuza zhurnalistov SSSR: Doklad B. S. Burkova,” in
Doklady vystupleniia rezoliutsii, Prilozhenie k zhurnalu Sovetskoi pechati, (Moscow: Pravda, 1966), 22–3.
690

402

The bulk of Burkov’s remarks expanded on issues addressed previously in the
trade journal or at the Moscow oblast’ conference. He came out strongly in favor of a
stricter membership policy, arguing that the inclusion of freelance journalists and
workers’ and peasants’ correspondents had brought more damage than benefit. Burkov
argued that the “union is losing the signs of creative unification of professional
journalists, that is people who have dedicated themselves exclusively to journalism,”
unlike the other creative unions, the bylaws of which were much more specific. Burkov
was particularly clear about the repercussions of this policy. Since it was impossible to be
stricter about membership than allowed by the bylaws, there had been a “bloating of
organizations, unnatural growth of their numbers, due to people who were in journalism
by chance, who do have neither the necessary qualifications, nor sufficient experience,
nor professional interest.”691 Though others had celebrated the organization’s size as an
indication of its social value, Burkov portrayed the other creative unions as more
successful professional bodies due to their greater exclusivity. The new “primary
organizations” of the creative union—chapters made up of members who worked in the
same publication, below the oblast’ level—would continue to work with nonprofessional
press contributors. Prospective members would now be required to submit
recommendations from journalists with at least five years’ work experience, and Burkov
hoped that in future members would submit a list of published works to “characterize the
journalists’ ‘profile’ and the level of his mastery.” With stricter membership policies, the
creative union would become “an organization created, so to say, by professional
journalists of professional journalists.” Burkov’s new vision for the organization is in
691
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some contrast to the dominant views of the membership debates during the incubation
period, when many participants had supported including workers’ and peasants’
correspondents. Staffing newspapers with these correspondents had once reflected the
particular aspirations and needs of post-revolutionary society that sought to replace
“bourgeois” specialists with proletarians. By stepping away from this class-based vision
of journalism, these new proposals effectively made the creative union more professional
than revolutionary.692
The conclusion to Gerasimov’s Journalist serves as the film’s closing statement
on the nature of professionalism and the relationship between work abroad and domestic
reform—like the revised bylaws, the last scenes of the film attempt to define professional
success and how a model journalist should seek to achieve it. A conversation with his
American friend Sid Barton helps Aliabev realize that he is still in love with Shura, and
he returns to the Urals almost immediately after leaving Europe. As we have seen,
successful cultural diplomacy was expected to result in both personal growth and creative
output. Aliabev’s decision to return to the Urals demonstrates that he has fulfilled the
former mandate and that he now understands that the real meaning of his life resides in
the Soviet Union and not his prestigious foreign posting. Aliabev finds things much
changed in the small town—his friends at the local paper are cool toward him, and over
lunch with Reutov, he learns that Shura was forced to leave her apartment and live in the
factory dorms after Anikina wrote another series of slanderous letters. He finds Shura
depressed and timid, and it is only on a late night visit to the dormitory that he is able to
truly convince her of the depth of his feelings. He tells her of his time abroad, including
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his friendship with Barton—in this moment, he fulfills the responsibility of any good
zhurnalist-mezhdunarodnik to inform and enlighten Soviet audiences about life abroad.
At the film’s close, Shura has arrived in Moscow and Reutov has given the pair his
blessing. 693
Izvestiia’s film critic reflected at length on the film’s ethical dimension,
commenting on Aliabev’s dual responsibility to restore Shura’s faith in people and
unmask Anikina. He presented the work as a “film novel” (kinoroman), with echoes of
the Russian classical tradition and the “struggles of our contemporary person to resolve
great moral problems.”694 Soviet reviewers immediately grasped the narrative as a moral
and ethical journey, one where Aliabev becomes worthy of Shura and his new career.
Strikingly, no mention is made of any consequences for Anikina’s malice, and we are
never shown any news story that resulted from the case. In the end, Aliabev the ardent
suitor is a more enduring image than Aliabev the investigator, which seems particularly
appropriate for a film released after the firing of Adzhubei, Rumiantsev, and Voronov.
The film affirms the centrality of personal development to professional growth but
subordinates criticism and social reform to psychological drama.
Though the creative union’s altered bylaws likely did little to alter the gap
between journalists’ sense of their professional identity and their actual material and
social position, the document does reflect some effort to more precisely define the
meaning of membership. In keeping with the substance of Burkov’s address, the principal
alterations to the bylaws were in membership structure and requirements. Burkov’s view
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of membership corresponded closely to the main contours of the earlier bylaws debate: he
invoked the values of “collectivism, creative help, honesty, intolerance for injustice,
idleness, dishonesty, careerism, acquisitiveness, national and racial intolerance,” and the
Moral Code of the Builder of Communism. Burkov advocated that these moral principles
should be expressed in the bylaws. The importance of morally upstanding professional
practice, and the explicit reference to a foundational document of Khrushchev era social
policy, demonstrates a continuity of professional expectations.695 The creative union’s
essential ideological goals remained the same as in the original document—the
construction of communism and struggle against bourgeois ideology.
Yet there were some substantial additions. The organization was now obligated to
“propagandize Soviet patriotism,” a formulation that does indicate changed political
priorities.696 Under Brezhnev, “Soviet patriotism” came to be closely associated with a
revival of Russian nationalism and an increased emphasis on Soviet military victories,
especially in the Great Patriotic War. The opening clauses further stressed the
requirement to “bring the Party’s decisions to life,” and “struggle against pageantry, selfassuredness, and conceit.”697 Despite these new rhetorical figures, the organization’s
goals and objectives were fundamentally unaltered. The “goals and objectives” section
still described the importance of professional mastery, creative work, and the importance
of ensuring that members adhered to “journalistic ethics.” Its creative work was still
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carried out through creative commissions and publishing activities, and international
work remained a major concern. Journalists who “constantly and actively worked in press
organs or radio and television,” continued to be eligible for membership at the discretion
of the all-Union Secretariat, though worker and peasant correspondents were no longer
listed along with “professional journalists” as possible members—a clear, if somewhat
limited effort to restrict the organization’s size.698 The new document formally
established “primary organizations” in newspapers, journals, and information agencies,
which would meet regularly in any publication or agency with more than three creative
union members.699 Though the organization remained committed to its members’
“cultural and quotidian needs,” these were addressed through the trade union rather than
with a separate support fund.700
As the establishment of primary organizations was the most significant positive
change to the bylaws, the concept deserves some explication here. The term referred to
local chapters of the creative union below the oblast’ or krai level, based at individual
publications. Though many local journalists had advocated for the creation of these
bodies, the Orgburo had decided against establishing them during the initial bylaws
debate. The main reasons for the reversal at this point were practical, and closely related
to the organization’s large size. As we saw in chapters one and three, in the
organization’s early years, every publication was to designate a “representative” to the
oblast’ and republic bodies. This individual was personally responsible for the collection
of dues and to report on any creative activities of note. Since it was now entirely possible
698
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for a publication to have five to seven members of the creative union, even in a small
city, or for particularly large organizations to have more than three hundred members, no
single person could effectively execute these functions. Burkov hoped that primary
organizations would help “with the perfection of creative work in the collective” and
expressed confidence that they would not “duplicate the work of the party or the trade
union in the publication.” Their activity would consist of lectures, professional exchange
with other publications or agencies, and provision of assistance to all journalists,
including the young and non-staff, in matters of “theory and practice.” Burkov’s
proposed lecture topics for such events focused on the issues related to the cultural Cold
War, including the “psychological warfare of international imperialism” and “the
methods of bourgeois propaganda.” Though some suggested making attendance at
republic- or oblast’-level creative events mandatory for members of the creative union, it
was considered better for primary organizations to take responsibility for their own
members’ development. The new primary organizations would be set up in particular
publications, provided they had more than three members. Primary organizations would
have a secretary to lead their meetings. In organizations with more than forty members,
more secretaries could be elected, and these organizations would have discretion over
membership decisions, pending the final approval of a larger local organization.701 The
creation of primary organizations was not only the fulfillment of an aspiration from the
bylaws debate but also a clear practical and philosophical response to the organization’s
growth.
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The section on responsibilities included the original clauses about professional
development and press work, with expanded attention both to questions of morality and
to hierarchies of authority. Every creative union member was expected to be an
“objective, truthful leading fighter for the cause of the Communist party,” “to speak out
against damage to the state,” and to “resist any effort to stifle criticism,” while also
remaining faithful to “journalistic ethics” and the “formation and development of the
person of a communist society.”702 The importance of morality and socialist personhood
points to enduring principles from the original bylaws debate and in creative work in
general. At the same time, this vision of responsibility contained important tensions:
journalists like Voronov viewed criticism precisely as a means to fight “damage to the
state” but nevertheless found themselves at odds with political leaders who themselves
“stamped out criticism.” The new bylaws offered no clear insight into how to criticize
without political or personal repercussions, in part because the document assumed an
essentially harmonious relationship between the Party and the creative union.
Journalists were still dependent on the trade union for their material needs,
however much they complained about this disparity. Though creative union members did
achieve more material privilege over time—Thomas Remington discusses both housing
advantages and greater access to cars as important advantages among journalists in the
1970s and 1980s—these advantages were not on the same scale as those offered by the
other creative unions. The reasons for this remain somewhat obscure, though their origins
may well lie in the organization’s incubation period. When they chose to establish
membership on an individual rather than collective basis, the Orgburo members had
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Ibid.

409

helped to ensure that the Journalists’ Union would be the nation’s largest creative
organization. Over a decade earlier, the Central Committee had estimated that the Soviet
Union had twenty-five thousand journalists—even if only half of these individuals had
become creative union members, this would still have produced an organization many
times larger than any of its counterparts. This no doubt made the establishment of a
support fund a daunting task, though concrete evidence of this would require a more
sustained financial history of creative unions.703
Though central newspapers had major personnel upheavals in 1965, many central
figures from the creative union’s early years remained involved in its work and were reelected to the governing board, though some had changed positions in the intervening
years. These included figures who had been key cultural diplomats under Khrushchev:
TASS assistant director A. A. Vishnevskii, who had participated in preparations for the
1963 world journalists’ meeting, Moscow News editor Iakov Lomko, and Kraminov, who
remained editor of Za rubezhom. P. P. Erofeev’s profile indicates that he became the
creative union’s representative to the MOJ. Former Sovetskaia pechat’ editor Viktor
Podkurpov was re-elected, as was Mikhail Kharlamov, who now directed the Politizdata
publishing house. Pal’gunov was included as well, though his inclusion seems largely
symbolic since he was now a pensioner. Iurii Voronov, though he was out of political
favor, was included, along with his KP successor, Boris Pankin. Other personnel changes
reflected increases in favor or status: Vassili Peskov, no doubt because of his Lenin prize
and national profile, was elected, as was Egor Iakovlev, in reflection of his new status at
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the trade journal. Iasen’ Zasurskii, now dean of Moscow University’s journalism
department, was also included, as his predecessor Khudiakov had been.704 Despite the
earlier high-profile firings in 1965, the overall composition of the editorial board featured
many of the same figures from the organization’s first decade.
•••
Though the creative union’s plenums and bylaws revisions are essential to tracing
the professionalization process in the early Brezhnev era, a truly comprehensive
evaluation of values and practices requires moving beyond the Journalists’ Union once
again. In this concluding section, I employ Komsomol memoranda, creative union
records, and the history of its reformed trade journal to trace attitudes toward reform,
criticism, and sociological methods. Komsomol memoranda from late 1965, together
with Goriunov’s remarks at the creative union in September 1966, reveal an increasingly
cautious approach to reform and de-Stalinization. Though many of the methods for
reaching audiences were familiar, such as the use of social science research or cultivation
of the moral and ethical theme, anxiety about foreign influence had only increased and
the language of reform and renewal was replaced by an increased xenophobia and a more
restrained approach to audience engagement. Soviet patriotic values were also embraced
as one solution to the increase of foreign influence and the popularity of samizdat
literature; according to Komsomol First Secretary S. P. Pavlov, these values had
practically been absent from public culture in recent years. A central issue was the
interpretation of the recent past, particularly the “vulgar and subjective approach to the
evaluation and revelation of the so-called period of the personality cult.” In the author’s
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view, such approaches unnecessarily denigrated the entire period’s accomplishments,
such as the Stakhanovite movement and the consolidation of Soviet culture. Such overly
negative views were pervasive even in institutions and publications that “had a
responsibility to orient the entire ideological apparatus.” One recent error included an
encyclopedia article which described Hitler’s rule as a “personality cult.” Тhough he
admitted the personality cult had been “damaging,” Pavlov argued for “corrective”
interpretations of the recent past and even approvingly spoke of the American practice of
reciting the Pledge of Allegiance in schools, suggesting that similar rituals be introduced
into Soviet life.705 Much as KP journalists had, Pavlov and his colleagues saw deStalinization as a crisis of historical and cultural interpretation, though they were more
certain that the process was harmful—the critical view of the past was portrayed as a kind
of infection that had spread to the most essential aspects of Soviet life. At the same time,
the entire approach to cultural and political education demonstrates a keen awareness of
the need for a specific ideological content—as though the “discursive spaces” left behind
by Stalin’s death would remain empty if no suitable alternative were found. The praise of
an American patriotic ritual, in a series of reports disparaging foreign influence, points to
the extent of this perceived crisis.706 Parts of Goriunov’s address at the September 1966
congress are consistent with this tone, as he disparaged “those who slander the
motherland under the guise of criticizing the personality cult or other negative
phenomena,” and sharply criticized the increase in foreign words in newspapers.707
Though peaceful coexistence remained an official policy, anxieties about foreign
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influence had acquired a new urgency, as Soviet journalists were now enjoined to resist
the very language of ideological enemies.
Goriunov’s remarks on journalists’ investigative responsibilities still presented
criticism as key to social progress, though his approach as acting head of the creative
union differed from the stance he had taken as KP editor. He lamented that many
journalists had not been taught to “think independently and express original judgments”
which resulted in “colorless” work. The most important thing, in his view, was to
imagine the reader as a “thinking interlocutor, who understands you, and to try and
convince him of the fairness and reasonableness of one or another step.” Any celebration
of successes should be moderate, just as criticism should not result in a “nihilistic”
approach to problems.”708 Goriunov presented journalists as rational figures who could
exercise their own critical capacity, even after the earlier controversies such as Voronov’s
firing. At the same time, he took a far more cautious approach toward criticism than he
had in 1956. At that time, Goriunov had supported Pankin’s critical initiative and rejected
the accusations leveled at the paper by the Komsomol leadership; only those who were
anxious about de-Stalinization, like Komolov, had associated criticism with “nihilism.”
This stance on criticism contrasts sharply with the generally optimistic approach of the
1964 creative seminars as well, suggesting that the shift in tone was due to both the
political climate and Goriunov’s new seniority and published position. Though Goriunov
would lead the creative union’s next reform project—the reshaping of its trade journal—
the enhanced anxieties here suggest the gradual emergence of a new set of journalistic
values, which prioritized social stability over reform.
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The process of restructuring the creative union’s trade journal, like its bylaws,
spanned several years. The publication’s transformation into a more political journal
demonstrates that reformist journalism did not disappear after 1965, even as xenophobia
and moderate approaches to social change were acquiring prominence. Complaints about
the trade journal were frequent at both the February plenum and the all-Union congress:
both Moscow oblast’ chapter president V. N. Golubev and Kurtynin expressed serious
dissatisfaction with it. Golubev was unhappy that the Writers’ Union had more
publications, even though the Journalists’ Union was larger. For his part, Kurtynin hoped
that future iterations of the journal would allow the profession to “delve into a wide array
of social problems.”709 Where Kurtynin focused on analytical depth as the key to both
creative seminars and a successful publication, Golubev raised the familiar issue of
competitiveness with the Writers’ Union. In his address at the 1966 all-Union congress,
Goriunov devoted significant time to the trade journal, admitting that it remained
“insufficiently popular” among members, and assured his audience that it was “in the
process of reconstruction.” Apparently, censure from the Central Committee seven years
earlier had done little to improve the print organ’s standing or its quality.710
By the time Iakovlev became editor, the prospects for change were promising—
new artists and designers came to the publication, and Goriunov personally supported
Iakovlev’s efforts. The two worked to rename it Zhurnalist, the same name it had when it
was the trade publication for journalists in the 1920s and 1930s. A Central Committee
decree was passed authorizing the name change and making Iakovlev a member of the
709
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Pravda editorial board. These official sanctions gave Iakovlev more license use the
journal as a platform to defend local newspaper editors from Party figures, and, in his
words, to turn the journal from a “factory” publication to a “social and political
journal.”711
A long analytical piece, called “Milk or Rope,” of which Iakovlev was
particularly proud, is an illuminating example of his efforts. The article’s аuthors were
fairly well known—Genadii Lisichkin was a graduate of Moscow’s prestigious State
Institute for International Relations (MGIMO), went on to head a collective farm in
Kazakhstan during the Virgin Lands campaign, and became an influential economist,
reaching the height of his fame during perestroika. His co-author, Iurii Chernichenko,
was a member of the Writers’ Union and an ocherkist who specialized in agricultural
themes. He would later host a successful television program. The article dealt largely
with questions of agricultural reform through analysis of one particular collective farm in
Moscow oblast’, run by a chairman named Ivan Snimschikov, who had first assumed the
post in 1954. In response to the high costs and low profits associated with producing
milk, the chairman had decided to invest more of his peasants’ energy into making rope,
which could be produced year-round. By 1963, Snimschikov was accused of being a
“Nepman”—a pejorative term from the 1920s which referred to entrepreneurs who took
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advantage of Lenin’s New Economic policy, and he was soundly criticized in the
newspapers.712
Due to a series of administrative restructurings, he remained in his post even after
an oblast’ Party committee had recommended his removal. He and his colleagues were
particularly enthusiastic about the Party’s 1966 emphasis on rational economic reforms
and returned to their previous undertaking, which allowed the farm to become more
profitable and to improve the infrastructure and standard of living of its members. When
the journalists investigated the structural reasons for Snimschikov’s decisions, they found
a problem with the current pricing system—all milk was priced the same, regardless of its
quality. If the nature of a product corresponded to its pricing, the agricultural output near
places like Moscow oblast’ would improve.713 Like other examples of critical journalism
in this dissertation, the article featured a protagonist who had undertaken a controversial
or daunting task of great social significance. The article’s overall conclusions, however,
implied that the original attack on Snimschikov as an individual had been incorrect; more
cogent contemporary analysis correctly identified the systemic nature of the problem.
The article’s political weight and controversial nature has been the subject of
some analysis in recent historical works and newspaper articles. In a study of political
persecution under Soviet rule, the writer N. A. Andreev included the episode in a
reflection on Party interventions in agriculture. He focused on the multiple authorial
voices in the article—Lisichkin took the positions most sympathetic to Snimshikov, while
Chernichenko was anxious and disturbed by the trend he represented. Though the text
712

G. Lisichkin and Iu. Chernichenko, “Moloko ili berevka: Obozrenia, zametki o professii” Zhurnalist 1,
no. 3 (1967): 48–51; On Nepmen, see Alan M. Ball, Russia’s Last Capitalists (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1990).
713
G. Lisichkin and Iu. Chernichenko, “Moloko,” 48–51.

416

itself does not overly distinguish one author’s contributions from another, the pro et
contra approach is visible in several instances. Detailing Snimschikov’s initial
persecution as a Nepman, the author quotes him in ways that highlight his social
conscience: “A Nepman worked for himself, and I work for society. Let us speak like
people. I am overfulfilling the supply plan…Who is harmed by our ropes, construction,
and shipping? It is built by us, and for whom if not for society?” At a later point, the
author describes the positive press the collective farm had received since the 1966
agricultural reforms, including the “ecstatic focus on the fruits of satisfaction and labor.
But, strictly speaking, all of this only arouses curiosity and gives rise to unanswered
questions…By what means [is all of this achieved]?” A third narrative voice emerges as
section breaks in the article are accompanied by descriptions of the role of the press in
agricultural reporting, describing improvements and an increase in analytical depth over
time. The “introduction” to discussion of Snimschikov’s initial persecution concludes
with the remark: “public opinion (and journalism, as its inextricable part), was not ready
to plunge into the essence of problems and the primary sources of increase.” At the
article’s conclusion, this authorial voice suggests that twenty years in the future, the
views in the article will themselves appear incomplete from the perspective of a more
perfect Communist future.714
The multiplicity of views sets this piece apart from critical articles like Pankin’s
piece on youth clubs or even Rumiantsev’s unorthodox approach to cultural politics,
since the “liberal” and “conservative” interpretations of the phenomenon were both
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presented in full. At the same time, the third narrator openly embraces a historical, even
dialectical, view of journalistic progress, imagining future readers who have progressed
even further in their understanding of both society and economics. The presentation of a
unified text suggests a single author, but the various voices occupy three distinct views
on the world and even distinct chronological spaces. The two commentators are anchored
in the present on the collective farm, though they take on the voice of Snimschikov and
his critic, respectively. The third voice takes the reader through past struggles, toward a
present resolution, and gestures toward an even more hopeful future.
The use of multiple perspectives and open acknowledgement of the problem’s
complexity is similar to the publitsistika of Anatolii Agranovskii, whose essays Thomas
Wolfe takes as emblematic of the “new journalism” under Khrushchev. Its persistence
into 1967, like the continued engagement of professional discussions with the moral and
ethical theme, suggests genre politics changed less rapidly than the political leadership
had. However, the fate of the story’s protagonist is illustrative of a less tolerant social
environment as time went on—in 1969, Snimschikov was accused of theft of state
property and sentenced to six year’s imprisonment along with the seizure of his personal
assets.715
Iakovlev’s reform agenda came under similar attack after the tumult of the Prague
Spring brought on intensified desires for ideological stability. Changes in the leadership
of the Agitation and Propaganda department—and Zhurnalist’s unpopularity with other
leading editors—made the editor’s situation increasingly precarious. A supporter of
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aspects of the reforms of Prague Spring, Iakovlev had the new Czechoslovak Law on the
Press published in the journal, which caused “ferocious bitterness” and fears that if the
journal were allowed to continue publishing, similar events might occur in the USSR.
These anxieties, combined with some controversial photography and design choices,
provoked official ire. After an official meeting of the Central Committee, Iakovlev was
dismissed as editor. In the resulting decree, Iakovlev was accused of committing “serious
mistakes…incorrect illumination of the practice of Party leadership of the press, radio,
and television. Ideologically weak materials that incorrectly orient press workers are
published often.” Special mention was made of the mistakes with illustrations. Iakovlev’s
firing, like that of other reformers, had a clear precipitating cause—a major foreign
policy setback and corresponding anxieties about domestic reform made his greater
tolerance for controversy dangerous. In most treatments of the period, the Prague Spring
is discussed as a major blow to reform-minded intellectuals, and developments at
Zhurnalist fit this broader pattern of initial optimism followed by disillusionment.716
This pattern emerges at other, more central publications as well. The IOM was
moved from KP and transferred to the Academy of Sciences after Len’ Karpinskii and
Fedor Burlatskii published a controversial article on censorship not long after the institute
conducted an unpopular poll on the Komsomol.717 In 1968, Grushin set up a new Center
for the Study of Public Opinion under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences.
Sociologists and academics did come under increased official scrutiny after the Prague
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Spring. Grushin himself left for Prague in 1974 and only returned to Moscow with the
advent of Gorbachev’s reforms.718
Though Boris Pankin remained KP editor until 1973, and continued the paper’s
coverage of environmental devastation at Lake Baikal, he clearly considered 1968 a
transformative moment in his career. Not long after the tumult in Prague, KP had
unfavorably reviewed two novels by conservative writer Ivan Shevtsov, In the Name of
the Father and the Son and Love and Hatred, which depicted its more Stalinist characters
as genuine heroes and excoriated any “freethinkers,” as Pankin put it. KP printed a
critical review of the works, and the more conservative editor of Sovetskaia Rossiia fired
back, accusing KP of violating the “collective leadership” of the Party. The resulting
furor reached the attention of foreign radio sources, including Radio Free Europe and the
Voice of America. As he had during the Voronov affair, Politburo member Aleksandr
Iakovlev supported KP. In the end, it was decided that the final word on the matter would
be an announcement via the Novosti news agency affirming the Soviet government’s
opposition to the personality cult. Pankin argues that Brezhnev’s displeasure with the
affair helped contribute to Iakovlev’s assignment as Soviet ambassador to Canada in
1973, and his own removal from KP that same year.719 As they participated in the efforts
of reform and renewal in 1956, only to be rebuked after the Hungarian crisis, journalists
were equally caught up in the foreign policy tumult and domestic reaction to 1968.
Where Egor Iakovlev was removed for overtly championing the Czechoslovak cause,
Pankin experienced more intense domestic pressures for overtly supporting de-
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Stalinization. As in 1956, the situation in Eastern Europe complicated domestic
journalism work, though the reprisals were more severe under Brezhnev.

•••
Given the close links between journalism and the politics, it is unsurprising that
the transition from Khrushchev to Brezhnev had serious consequences for newspaper
editors and leading figures in the creative union. At the same time, certain aspects of
these personnel transitions reflect the political challenge of media work in a Soviet
context, irrespective of political leadership. Both the Rumiantsev and Voronov episodes
illustrate the tendentious place of criticism in journalism work, whether in the context of
a corruption campaign or a philosophical meditation. But these issues were not in
themselves products of Brezhnev’s personal antipathy toward journalistic activism—as I
have shown in my KP case study, criticism was a difficult issue even at the height of deStalinization, and xenophobic rhetoric increased after the Hungarian uprising. The full
effect of 1968, and the distinct journalistic culture of the 1970s, awaits the work of other
scholars and a more thorough investigation of memoir literature.
As for the creative union’s philosophical and political work, the organization’s
second decade was less about the consolidation of orthodoxy and more focused on
improving domestic professionalization. At first, this involved giving voice to
longstanding grievances on a larger scale—debates about higher education and centerperiphery relationships were now taken up in Moscow by elite leaders rather than simply
aired locally. The revision of the bylaws openly acknowledged the importance of primary
organizations to facilitate local creative development. This revision process also
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highlighted the persistence of unresolved issues from the incubation period—particularly
about membership exclusivity and material support. Later data indicates that the statutory
changes limiting membership for workers’ and peasants’ correspondents did little to
diminish the creative union’s size— it was still the largest in the country until the Soviet
Union’s dissolution. As far as material concerns, as I have noted many times, no evidence
for the creation of Zhurfond exists, though the creative union did succeed in improving
its members’ access to housing, vacations, and automobiles over time.720 While the
reasons for this failure would require a detailed study of trade union politics and the
Soviet welfare state, the creative union’s large size and complicated administrative
structure seem likely causes. Like the material issues, education reform remained a
longstanding problem for the creative union—as late as 1977, Iasen’ Zasurskii continued
to advocate updates to the admissions system and curriculum. Some of these, such as
waiving the work experience requirement, were first debated in 1962. Though these
setbacks point to a persistent gap between professional consciousness and professional
achievements, the reasons for this failure appear more administrative and economic than
ideological. All of these failed reform projects were discussed at public gatherings, by
creative union members who were also Party members, with prominent members of the
ideological apparatus in attendance.
The content of creative work, like professionalization efforts, adhered to earlier
approaches in many respects, though close reading of source materials betrays an
increased paranoia about foreign influence. The definition of professional mastery,
though no less abstract than in the past, still rested on the new popularity of social science
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data as a means to understand both readers and media workers. The moral and ethical
theme remained in place as a dominant genre and celebrated approach to both writing and
reading. While some of these discussions, such as engagement with emotions or the
relationship between journalism and literature, were not fundamentally different than
those of past years, there was a marked increase in xenophobic rhetoric. Due to political
setbacks, most major social science initiatives took place within academic research
centers, rather than publishing their results in newspapers and engaging more directly
with research subjects as readers. The overall effect of these shifts changes an increased
distrust not only of journalists, but also of the reading public.
Though the relative spirit of celebration and optimism characteristic of the
inaugural congress was less in evidence at the all-Union Congress in 1966, there were
important continuities both of personnel and thematic emphasis. The most important of
these was the ongoing effort to balance the creative union’s international and domestic
mandates, so clearly epitomized in Gerasimov’s cinematic depiction of the profession.
The pursuit of cultural diplomacy grew more complex in the creative union’s second
decade as work in the developing world expanded, but its fundamental goals—and the
apparatus for achieving them—remained unaltered. This is in stark contrast to the
domestic arena, where reform proposals proliferated and many remained unresolved. At
the same time, my work in this study, along with memoir literature, points to a strong
professional consciousness that was not always expressed through increased agency or
access to material support structures. In this sense, the conclusion to The Journalist
expresses a deeper truth: Aliabev’s principle achievement is his personal growth rather
than lasting social reform.
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Conclusion
The Journalists’ Union undertook its domestic and international mandates at a
pivotal moment in Soviet history, as media managers and political leaders sought to
spread Soviet values abroad while engaging in domestic de-Stalinization. As Danil’
Kraminov’s 1954 memo makes clear, the organization was created to increase Soviet
effectiveness in the cultural Cold War by supporting its members in their domestic media
work and serving as a key agent of cultural diplomacy and foreign exchange. Though
journalism was always politically significant in Soviet life, the creative union’s formation
period was unique: the Journalists’ Union was not formed to increase control over
journalists but to expand their responsibilities and improve their qualifications. The
composition of the organization’s Orgburo highlights the centrality of war experience and
both foreign and domestic expertise to the new organization.
As they drew up bylaws for the Journalists’ Union, the members of the creative
union’s Orgburo discussed the meaning and value of their work in their efforts to
determine how exclusive the new organization should be and what advantages and
responsibilities would come with membership. Beginning in the fall of 1957, draft bylaws
were made available to local branches of the creative union, which debated them
extensively in the lead up to the inaugural congress in November of 1959. This lengthy
process showcases the uniquely consultative approach to creative intellectuals under
Khrushchev—though the establishment of a creative union was driven by larger global
concerns, the organization’s ultimate form was determined on a partially consultative
basis. The majority of Journalists’ Union members had full or candidate membership in
the Communist Party, and many of its key figures had close ties to the Central
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Committee’s Agitation and Propaganda Department. Unlike other creative fields,
newspaper content was easily accessible to senior political figures, making journalistic
agency more complicated than that of composers. The creative union’s 1959 inaugural
congress made this relationship particularly explicit, as Khrushchev himself addressed
the delegate and encouraged them to celebrate their status as “The Party’s Lieutenants.”
The organization’s new governing board included many journalists close to Khrushchev.
The kinds of comments and suggestions rank-and-file members offered the
Orgburo reveal important traits of Soviet professionalization. Like other “modern
professionals,” journalists saw themselves as engaged in socially significant work that
required a certain level of skill and education. As they argued that this skill set should be
accompanied by economic and social advantages, rank-and-file journalists evoked the
privilege attached to writing and reading in Russian and Soviet culture and the stature of
the Writers’ Union. Since they also produced written texts for wide audiences, rank-andfile journalists felt that their creative union should also provide access to leisure, travel,
and creative development through an independent financial fund that the creative union
would control. Though their organization’s large size necessitated putting this project on
hold, material support became a key theme of all future discussions of professionalization
inside the organization.
As the final bylaws show, rank-and-file members’ vision of professional
responsibility was more easily achieved than their material aspirations. Plagiarism,
slander, and libel were included in the expulsion criteria. Though some members hoped
for an exclusive organization, open only to the most skilled writers or established figures,
more members advocated including workers’ and peasants’ correspondents and young
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journalists, a policy which was ultimately enacted. Debates about the value of inclusion
and the need for high membership standards, like material support issues, were persistent
topics of discussion well after the ratification of the bylaws in 1959.
The actual content of the inaugural congress saw its key speakers address many
professional and political problems that would dominate the creative union’s agenda in
the coming years and into the early Brezhnev era. These included strong opposition to
any of the traits of “bourgeois” journalism—particularly an overemphasis on
sensationalism—and insisting that the Soviet media system was healthier than its
capitalist counterpart. Though they celebrated Khrushchev’s recent trip to the United
States and defended the value of “peaceful coexistence,” the participants in the inaugural
congress made clear that foreign policy reform and the pursuit of cultural diplomacy did
not mean compromise of Soviet values.
The inaugural congress, even more than the bylaws debate, opened up the
question of journalism’s relationship to literature and the more established and privileged
position of the Writers’ Union. In his address at the event, Adzhubei went to great lengths
to position journalism as both distinct from and superior to literature, even as he
acknowledged that many of his colleagues regarded belles-lettres as more prestigious. In
their remarks there, Orgburo members acknowledged rank-and-file dissatisfaction with
the creative union’s financial resources and defended the decision to make the
organization less elitist by including freelance journalists and other “nonprofessionals.”
Though the inaugural congress was presented as the conclusion of the incubation period,
many of these issues featured again and again at creative union plenums and seminars in
the 1960s.
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Though the creative union was an important site for the articulation of
professional identity, it did not control the content of newspapers, and its proximity to the
Party made open debate less likely. The Soviet newsroom, on the other hand, was an
officially sanctioned space for sociability, as my case study of KP during 1956
demonstrates. During weekly letuchki, KP journalists openly debated de-Stalinization’s
social implications, and its meaning for their broader communicative mission. Though
they expressed some concern that the “positive hero” was overshadowed by critical
articles, international upheaval transformed these initial doubts into full-blown arguments
and debates. The autumn 1956 uprising in Hungary, and subsequent unrest among Soviet
students, saw the KP editorial board split between champions of criticism and those who
identified it with social instability, even if they did not repudiate the Twentieth Congress
itself. These events impacted not only the reception of critical articles but also the paper’s
response to literary works, such as Dudintsev’s Not By Bread Alone. The fall of 1956
only heightened the contrast between journalist’s behavior in Party meetings and in
letuchki, as the atmosphere in the Party cell became increasingly xenophobic. In the
winter of 1957, the paper was sharply censured by the Komsomol Central Committee for
a critical article by Boris Pankin, which might well have been embraced only a few
months prior. While examining the letuchki highlights the extent of oversight journalists
experienced, it also demonstrates that truly frank debates about professional
responsibility took place in the newsroom rather than the creative union. Though this
distinction is partly one of timing—the Journalists’ Union had no members until 1957—
the creative union’s activity in later years was never as controversial as KP letuchki.
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The importance of the international climate was especially apparent in the
Journalists’ Union’s efforts to conduct cultural diplomacy. Though they provoke laughter
in the contemporary reader, the antics of Soviet journalists in the Varna leisure resort
were treated as matters of great political import. Well before the Varna resort was built,
internationally experienced journalists were key figures in efforts to restructure the entire
domestic cultural diplomacy apparatus, including the creative union, as the aftermath of
Polevoi’s American trip shows. Most cross-cultural encounters were marked by high
levels of anxiety—a rhetorical commitment to openness was central to peaceful
coexistence but did little to assuage journalists’ fears about loss of prestige and
ideological contamination. The Varna resort continued to generate controversy and
oversight from the Central Committee, though the creative union managed to maintain
control of the project. The front organization’s political stances reflect the Soviet Union’s
own struggles to maintain superpower status: before the Hungarian uprising, creative
union leaders hoped for increasing contact with the “bourgeois” world, inspired by the
success of the first World Journalists’ Meeting. Subsequent years saw the organization
turn more to the developing world, as if in recognition of this lost opportunity, where it
successfully navigated the early years of the Sino-Soviet split. But Soviet representatives
to the MOJ were seldom content with the organization’s efforts or the creative union’s
management of its affairs and continually proposed new organizational structures or a
more vigilant approach to foreign influence.
The creative union’s work to expand its domestic mandate after 1959 took the
form of more frequent plenums and increased increased genre seminars. These events
featured the participation of prominent political figures and leading journalism reformers.
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Though the topics were diverse—ranging from higher education to the genre of
publisistika—they demonstrate an increased effort to professionalize the organization and
ensure that all Soviet journalists understood their responsibilities to the newly
sophisticated reader. Some of these seminars expanded on issues that were first apparent
during the inaugural congress—creative union members continued to be divided on the
issue of journalism’s relationship to literature. The nature of domestic professionalization
efforts raises issues of Soviet journalism’s comparability to that of other nations. While
discussions of higher education point to some convergence with Western print cultures,
the pursuit of audience engagement was founded on fundamentally illiberal premises.
Even as they embraced the modern methodology of sociological research and opinion
polling, creative union members wrote for individuals who understood their personal
development as a political and national project and did not seek autonomous inner lives
separate from the social whole. Though they venerated reader response and the newly
popular moral and ethical theme, this interest in inwardness was most often expressed in
terms of its social and political utility to inspire large numbers of readers. The tensions in
this pursuit of individuality were not the creative union’s only domestic challenge. Rankand-file members of the organization remained dissatisfied with the creative union’s
social influence and material status, along with its membership policies. Creative union
president Satiukov dealt a decisive blow to these aspirations, openly defending the
leading role of the Party in media work and taking a decidedly cautious approach to
critics of censorship.
The creative union’s evolution after Khrushchev’s ouster adds to ongoing debates
about the extent of continuity and change in Brezhnev’s style of rule and approach to the
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intelligentsia. Though some prominent reformers were removed from their posts
immediately, others remained in place until they took unpopular policy positions—
suggesting that Brezhnev and his close supporters feared journalism’s destabilizing
potential but only reacted to specific instances rather than pursuing a coherent policy of
repression. Journalists’ response to the literary scandals of 1966 suggest less debate and
controversy than had erupted during the early months of de-Stalinization. Journalists
were much more affected by the removal of reform-minded editors than the regime’s
increasing distrust of the liberal intelligentsia.
Within the creative union itself, there were also important continuities in the
organization’s leadership and its major initiatives: though Adzhubei and Satiukov were
fired, Goriunov, Burkov, and other figures who had been prominent during the
Khrushchev period remained in place. The creative union remained concerned with
cultural diplomacy, though xenophobic rhetoric and anxieties about foreign content were
more prominent. The organization’s efforts to refocus on its domestic mandate reveal
important shifts in values amid continuities: revision of the bylaws and discussions of
privilege and membership reveal the extent of rank-and-file dissatisfaction with the
creative union and reinforce the organization’s relative weakness, as it was unable to
exert control over higher education, provide all its members with foreign travel, or
establish an exclusive means of material support. Similar changes are visible at creative
seminars: discussions of criticism were more qualified than in the past, and social science
data was confined to expert use rather than being published in newspapers. My
preliminary findings indicate that 1968 was a more transformative moment than other
upheavals: Iakovlev’s firing from the creative union’s print organ, followed by Pankin’s
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experiences at KP, point to an increasingly tense climate for more reform-minded
journalists. The limited memoir literature on journalism in the Brezhnev era suggests that
professional consciousness remained strong, even as the regime became more suspicious
of activist journalism.
Though I have taken issue with many of his analytical positions, Thomas
Remington’s overview of the creative union in the 1970s and early 1980s suggests that
the organization’s first decade was particularly formative, in that many of its challenges
remained constant. While the organization expanded its capacity to dispense material
advantages, it did so without a separate support fund, and Iasen’ Zasurskii’s reform
agenda was little altered between 1962 and the 1970s.721 The creative union and the MOJ
remained important forums for cultural diplomacy—World Journalists’ Meetings were
hosted throughout the 1970s, and more events took place in Western Europe, suggesting
that further study of the effects of detente on foreign exchange is warranted. As Michael
David-Fox has noted, the late 1960s featured another important institutional change—the
GKKS was shuttered in 1967 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumed responsibility
for cultural diplomacy. In ending the Party-state hybrid arrangements that had prevailed
up to that point, Soviet leaders embraced a more “conventional” approach to hosting and
receiving foreign guests, similar to that of other modern states.722 These new institutional
arrangements did little to diminish journalists’ roles as cultural diplomats, as Dina
Fainberg’s work on foreign correspondents has demonstrated. These deep continuities,
then, suggest that Soviet professionalization was always tied to national service, whether
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that service took place in a domestic newsroom or a foreign delegation.723 Though
sustained engagement with journalism under perestroika awaits the work of other
scholars, Thomas Wolfe’s conclusions about the 1980s are instructive in one important
respect: they suggest a growing disengagement from the Party among some section of
professionals—a marked contrast from the deep enthusiasm for reform and socialist
development so evident in my protagonists.724
Thomas Wolfe, as other historians have, openly compares Khrushchev’s reform
project to Gorbachev’s—the career trajectories of several of my protagonists suggest
further affinities. Iurii Voronov returned from Germany in 1984 and became editor of the
journal Znamia and headed the Central Committee’s culture department from 1986–88.
From 1988 to 1990, he edited Literaturnaia gazeta—an unsurprising career move since
Voronov was elected a secretary in the Writers’ Union in 1984 and was also a published
poet. Voronov replaced Aleksandr Chakovskii, LG’s longtime editor whose political
stance has been interpreted in various ways by contemporaries and scholars. After
leaving KP, Boris Pankin headed the newly established All-Union Association for
Copyright, before becoming Soviet ambassador to Sweden in 1982 and to
Czechoslovakia from 1990 to 1991.Pankin’s participation in perestroika was even more
overly political than Voronov’s: he was the USSR’s last Minister of Foreign Affairs, and
was appointed to that position due to his personal opposition to the August 1991 putsch
where high-ranking Party members attempted to depose Gorbachev and replace him with
a more orthodox leader. Iasen’ Zasurskii remained dean of Moscow University’s
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Journalism Department from 1965 until 2007. Zasurskii thus presided over the creative
union’s greatest transition into an independent social organization in a state without
censorship. Тhe Journalists’ Union of the RSFSR, which formed in November of 1990,
became the Journalists’ Union of the Russian Federation in 1992.
Journalists’ experiences after 1991 reveal not only the formative influence of the
Soviet experience on discussions of values and practices but also the renewed importance
of questions about professional autonomy and material support. Continuities should be
contextualized rather than assumed, however. Though it traces its own origins to the
Orgburo of the Journalists’ Union of the Soviet Union, the Journalists’ Union of the
Russian Federation (hereafter the RUJ) now espouses many of the liberal principles that
were openly denigrated by its predecessor. The organization is a member of the IOJ,
while the MOJ faded into obscurity after 1989. Not all of the cultural diplomacy activity
of the Soviet period is irrelevant to current practice: Iasen’ Zasurskii has maintained his
ties with the journalism education center in Strasbourg to the present day.725
Though the RUJ remains a “social and creative organization” with ties to a trade
union, its bylaws, adopted in 1993, explicitly state that it is tied to no party or ideology.
And while it is dedicated to the “carrying out creative and professional activity of
Russian journalists,” along with their “economic and professional-creative interests,” it is
founded on the principles of “press freedom, democracy and tolerance,” and its bylaws
openly prohibit censorship. In short, where the bylaws of the Soviet Journalists’ Union
rested on an illiberal Marxist-Leninist conception of press work, its successor has
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embraced a liberal conception of journalism. It retains ties to higher education and
awards prizes for journalistic excellence. Like its predecessor, however, the RUJ features
only briefly in this conclusion. While many of its members are openly critical of their
profession’s precarious status in contemporary Russia, the organization’s capacity to alter
these circumstances is relatively limited. It retains a database of murdered journalists and
provides material support to the families of deceased colleagues.726
Questions of state interference in the mass media, rather than fading away with
Soviet legal structures, have only acquired new urgency in recent decades, resulting in
new scholarship and critical articles in both English and Russian. Perhaps the most
notable, and disturbing, shift is the number of journalists who have been murdered or
died under suspicious circumstances in the Russian Federation. Though this trend is most
closely associated with Putin’s rule, the constitutional crisis of 1993 and the renewal of
hostilities in Chechnia that same year saw many journalists lose their lives. What is
striking about Putin’s first and second terms, however, is the number of investigative
journalists who died under suspicious circumstances while researching government
corruption and human rights abuses.727 I will briefly describe two cases from the first
decade of the twenty-first century, before moving to recent events in Ukraine and their
implications for journalists’ relationship to the state.
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Two cases stand out in light of my previous findings: Iurii Shchekochikhin began
his journalistic career at KP, and was considered one of its rising stars in the 1970s.728
Shchekochikhin began a political career in the 1990s, and was elected to the Duma as a
member of the liberal Iakbloko Party in 1995. He devoted his political and journalistic
career to exposing corruption and human rights abuses, openly opposing the Chechen
wars. He frequently wrote for the opposition newspaper Novaia gazeta. In 2002, he was a
member of the investigative commission into the causes of the 2000 apartment bombings,
a series of attacks in three cities, including Moscow, which killed and injured hundreds
and were initially blamed on terrorists from the Caucasus. Shchekochikhin was a member
of the Kovalev Commission, an investigative body which explored the possibility that the
state security services had masterminded the bombings but was unable to publish
conclusive findings due to government obstruction. The trials of the defendants were
closed to the public, so that the evidence against them was never accessible to journalistic
investigation. Government critics saw the bombings as a means of assuring popular
support for a new Chechen offensive and to increase the popularity of then-unknown
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who assumed the presidency not long after.729
Some of the obstacles to journalistic agency can be directly traced to government
initiative. Since 2000, the government has been increasingly hostile toward critical media
sources, especially television. Oligarch Boris Berezovskii was once a controlling
stakeholder in Russian Public Television (Obschestvennoe Rossiiskoe Televidenie, or
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ORT). As Berezovskii and others close to him became increasingly critical of Putin’s
policies, the government became increasingly hostile to media sources owned by
oligarchs. Putin openly discussed this stance in an editorial in the French newspaper Le
Figaro, claiming that criticism would not be tolerated from such outlets. His words were
soon followed by legal and political actions. Berezovskii was forced out of ORT and sold
his shares. In spring 2000, the NTV television station was raided on charges of tax
evasion. In the aftermath, its founder, Vladimir Gusinskii, sold his controlling shares to
the state-controlled energy company Gazprom.730
Shchekochkhin’s last major corruption case once again brought him into direct
conflict with the state. He investigated the criminal activities of FSB officers, including
money laundering and illegal imports, a scandal known as “Three Whales,” after the
furniture-shipping complex implicated in smuggling goods without paying customs
duties. Just before he was due to discuss the case with the FBI in the United States—
since the case also had ties with American organized crime—Shchekochikhin died under
mysterious circumstances in a Moscow hospital.731 Shchekochikhin’s post-Soviet
journalism career, with its focus on corruption, has some kinship with the Soviet
investigative tradition, with crucial distinctions. In a post-socialist setting, he was able to
work openly in opposition and directly implicate those in positions of authority. Cases
like Shchekochikhin’s highlight the challenges of investigative journalism in a postsocialist space: the absence of an independent judiciary and the continued influence of
the FSB make real systemic change unlikely. The murder of Anna Politkovskaia, which
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attracted widespread Western media attention, confirms this trend. Politkovskaia gained
fame for her coverage of human rights abuses in Chechnia for Novaia Gazeta; her early
career has significant overlap with figures from my study. From 1994 to 1999, she wrote
for Obschaia Gazeta, Egor Iakovlev’s post-Soviet news venture, covering refugee issues.
Politkovskaia was a graduate of Moscow University’s journalism department, and Iasen’
Zasurskii spoke at her funeral.732
In recent years, journalists who came to professional maturity have called for a
greater reckoning with the Soviet past and its journalistic legacies. In 2008, three former
Izvestiia journalists—Pavel Gutiontov, Leonid Shinkarev, and Al’bert Plutnik—
published a manifesto calling for a new appreciation of Soviet journalism as a means for
media renewal. Though they faintly evoked Lenin by titling their document, “April
Theses,” their manifesto has more in common with the journalism of the 1960s than the
revolutionary period. The authors began by arguing that however much contemporary
journalists might wish to leave the past behind, they unwittingly found themselves
adopting the worst of past practices and discarding useful legacies. They celebrated
“freedom of expression” as a key distinguishing principle between Russian and Soviet
journalism but declared, “it would be ideal if in these conditions, journalistics would be
able to preserve the best of the past, having added the best of the present.” These remarks
make the authors’ mission clear: to find a meaningful heritage for post-Soviet journalism,
without celebrating censorship or state power.733
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The role of the state was a key issue for manifesto authors, as a key structuring
principle for both journalists’ behavior and their creative accomplishments. State power
was presented as a permanent distinguishing feature leading to both strength and
weakness:
Тhe Russian press, as nowhere else in the world, was created for the needs
of state power…in each line of a newspaper our reader was accustomed to
seeing the state’s point of view…censorship had a negative psychological
effect, but it forced journalists to make use of the sharpest nuances of the
Russian written language, to become brilliant at hinting. Thanks to all of
this, the Russian press came close to ‘great literature,’ as nowhere else in
the world.734
The language of Russian exceptionalism here is striking. Though “top-down”
journalism was presented as detrimental to readers and print professionals, it gave rise to
the close relationship between journalism and literature, presented as a significant,
perhaps unprecedented, accomplishment.
Reader relationships were an even greater source of pride for the “April Theses”
authors than linguistic skill, especially the letter to the editor and investigative missions.
The authors held up Sakhnin’s essay on the abusive whaling captain, and Voronov’s great
personal courage in publishing the story, as an example of the kind of “investigation”
which contemporary journalists would do well to adopt. Part of journalism’s social power
had come from its structural weakness, since, “the defense of the ‘little person,’
immersion in his problems, was bequeathed to us from great Russian literature in large
part because journalists were not in large part permitted to write about ‘important
persons.’” A similar caution existed in contemporary Russia, the authors argued, as
common theme for studies of history and memory in recent years. For an example from the post-Soviet
case, see Rosalind J. Marsh, Literature, History and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia, 1991–2006 (New York:
Peter Lang, 2007), especially 152–4.
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journalists were now afraid to delve deeply into corruption and the realities of oligarchy
since newspapers had been “transformed into businesses.” In a clear moment of nostalgia
for the moral and ethical theme, the authors lamented that journalists had lost interest in
writing about real “family problems” and instead were preoccupied with elites and the
nature of business success.735 The “newsroom values” here are familiar from my study of
the Soviet Journalists’ Union: reader relationships that allowed for investigative authority
into personal problems, a focus on the lives of ordinary individuals, and a willingness to
confront corruption. The specific mention of Voronov and the Solianik case highlights
the authors’ firm belief in taking controversial stands for the public good. At the same
time, the manifesto is hostile to capitalism—or at least its post-Soviet variant—since
private ownership of newspapers prevented real corruption investigations and interest in a
new celebrity culture obscured the struggles of ordinary individuals.
Unsurprisingly, the “April Theses” contain few concrete solutions to the ills
plaguing Russian journalism. The authors themselves admitted that, a “free press
demands many things. An independent judiciary, for example. Active local government.
Those who undertake policies must take responsibility for what they carry out. Еconomic
transparency. But all of this is mere noise without an independent press.” At various
points in the essay the authors insisted that journalists needed to recover a sense of
“personal pride,” and individual authorship—similar to the distinct authorial voices
ocherkisty like Agranovskii cultivated. They were openly disdainful of the Internet, as it
“is not a profession, but allows anyone the slightest bit literate to write what he saw.”
This skepticism about new media sources seems reflective of the author’s generational
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status and the date of the essay.736 The preference for a strong authorial voice, while
explicable, ignores an important historical reality: Agranovskii published when
circulation numbers were extremely high—there is no acknowledgement in the essay that
declining readership might lead journalists to less cerebral approaches. Even the policy
prescriptions about party structures and the judiciary seem necessary but not sufficient,
since they only hint at the tangible effects of Putin’s media policies. While the authors
were open about the Marxist-Leninist past, they made no mention of the murder of
activist journalists or increasing state control of media outlets as explanations for
investigative journalism’s decline.
Though I have thus far described print and television media issues, the last decade
has seen another media explosion in Russia: an increase in Internet news outlets and the
explosion of social media networks. Though this media evolution has had important
political consequences, this was in response to unforeseen domestic events rather than a
renewal of journalism’s public mission like that espoused in the “April Theses” In the fall
of 2011 and winter of 2012, the largest protests since the end of Soviet rule erupted in
Moscow and other cities, as increasing numbers of people expressed concerns about
occurred in response to irregularities during elections for the state Duma and called for
new elections. Much of the information about these events circulated on online social
networks, as state-owned outlets paid little attention or painted the protests as destructive
unrest. The protests did result in firings from newspapers, reminiscent of cases from the
late 1960s: editors at the business daily Commerce-Power (Kommersant’ vlast’) were
fired after publishing a caricature of then-Prime Minister Putin which referred to election
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fraud. 737 Though the protests fizzled out after violent crackdowns in May of 2012 during
Putin’s inauguration for a third term as president, media issues took on new prominence
in the following year.
The development of a mass protest in Kiev in November 2013, in response to
former president Viktor Ianukovich’s refusal to sign a cooperation agreement with the
European Union, highlight that regional unrest still has important implications for
Russian media space and domestic policy. Russia’s state-run media persistently portrayed
the protestors as dangerous nationalists with fascist tendencies and denounced
Ianukovich’s removal as illegitimate—a narrative that has important overlap with Soviet
coverage of the 1956 Hungarian uprising. This narrative also circulates abroad in
Russophone communities in former Soviet republics.738 Due to modern media
technology, Putin’s supporters need no longer rely on cultural diplomacy and foreign
delegations—their vision, like that of their opponents, can circulate through television
and internet sources. Perhaps the best known is Russia Today, a news channel which
releases pro-Russian broadcasts in multiple languages. The use of journalism in foreign
policy is not new, but unlike the MOJ, the channel’s status as a government-funded
initiative is not hidden or denied publicly. The station’s mandate to present a more
positive and affirmative image of Russia is reminiscent of the Journalists’ Union’s
mandate to promote “objective” rather than “bourgeois” journalism, though its goals are
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explicitly nationalist rather than devoted to the international cause of proletarian
solidarity.
The state response to the Ukrainian events and an increase in Western sanctions
reveals both an increase in repression and a renewed focus on material incentives as a
means to reward journalists with closer ties to the state. In March of this year, the editor
of the news service Lenta.ru was fired, and its entire team resigned—a move which
signaled the loss of yet another independent media outlet. In a more open attempt to crack
down on the Internet, Russian bloggers with large numbers of followers must register
with the state as journalists, and by 2016, personal data of Russian social media users
must be available on Russian servers.739 These maneuvers have been accompanied by
positive incentives for the more compliant: on April 22 of this year, Putin officially
rewarded some three hundred journalists for their “objective reporting” on events in
Crimea and the region’s return to Russia, though the text of the order was never
published. The state orders many of these individuals received come with substantial
increases to their state pensions—up to three or four times higher than the nationally
fixed figure. Where members of the Soviet Journalists’ Union complained about regional
inequalities in material access, the main differentiating factor under Putin appears to be
the extent to which a journalists’ writing praises or excoriates the regime’s goals. Recent
commentators have noted that the scale of this award was unprecedented—in 2008, in the
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aftermath of conflict in Georgia, then-President Medvedev only gave eleven such
awards.740
Former Izvestiia journalist Pavel Gutiontov, one of the authors of the “April
Theses,” wrote a blistering essay in response to these events, published by the Russian
Journalists’ Union. The essay is both an excoriation of his privileged colleagues and a
meditation on professional values of the past and present, and is thus a fitting conclusion
to the dissertation. In his account, Gutiontov made special note of the fact that most of the
awardees had close ties to state run media, including Channel One and Russia Today. He
then began by calling it decidedly “strange” that the order was unpublished and its details
kept secret, since “are not journalists people whose profession presupposes work for the
public, and nothing else besides?” He then speculated that the honorees themselves
“suspected that they are doing something inappropriate, something not right, which will
give rise to improper interpretations it would be altogether better to avoid.”741
Gutiontov’s remarks here highlight his vision of professionalism—an insistence on
transparency, which reflects his embrace of liberal values. Where many of my subjects
took pride in their connection to the state and felt that it should be accompanied by
material recognition, Gutiontov declared that close ties to the state were now “improper”
and damaging to reputations.
Gutiontov’s recognition of journalism’s importance in the cultural Cold War
further underscored his deep misgivings about the politicization of media work,
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especially the use of militarized rhetoric. Gutiontov felt that, “this very concept of an
information war is embedded in social consciousness and strongly associated with the
concept of journalism itself…but real journalism is not a weapon of war, or a special
operation for the achievement of victory, but a precise and fragile instrument, naturally
functioning in conditions of peace and mutual understanding.”742 Relying on a militarized
function of journalism would not result in lasting notions of professional achievement, as
political objectives would invariably change, leaving journalists little to celebrate when
they looked back on their awards.
To support these points, Gutiontov described the careers of several distinguished
Russian journalists, including figures who feature in my study. Konstantin Simonov
received many state awards for his work, but Gutiontov was careful to note that, “that
war was Great and Patriotic…and what of that war which today’s troubadours puff up,
with greedy blazing eyes and their polished copper horns?”743 Gutiontov presented
Simonov as an example of genuine national service in a time of crisis, in contrast to his
contemporaries, who artificially exaggerated the extent of conflict for their own material
gain. The image of the troubadour is particularly arresting, since pro-Kremlin journalists
are cast as mere instrumentalists following a score written by someone else, rather than
producing their own narratives.
Тhe rest of Gutiontov’s list of journalists who worked for many years and
received relatively limited state adulation included Vasilii Peskov, who featured in
chapter five, and Izvestiia correspondent Leonid Shinkarev, famous for his coverage of
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Siberia and the Far East along with his foreign coverage. He argued that the Soviet
Union’s most decorated journalist, Iurii Zhukov, was far less beloved and remembered
than these figures. Gutiontov’s list of celebrated journalism figures is, like his earlier
essay, a clear attempt to give Russian journalism a “usable past” from the traditions of the
1960s.744 Strikingly, the list includes journalists who were members of the creative union,
but Zhukov, who was instrumental to its founding and the conduct of its cultural
diplomacy, is deliberately outside the narrative. While he presented journalism as a
public service, as many creative union members did, Gutiontov’s preference for
separation from state institutions and a journalism less overtly devoted to foreign policy
represents a significant departure from Soviet practices and contemporary Russian
realities.
Gutiontov’s closing remarks focused on a different historical contrast—between
the journalism of the 1990s and the Putin era. He reminded his readers that Dmitrii
Kiselev once refused to read an official television announcement about unrest in the
Baltics in 1991, which resulted in his being fired and subsequently receiving an award
from the Lithuanian government. As his political views evolved, the Lithuanian
government stripped him of the award—a decision Gutiontov considered entirely
appropriate, as “the Kiselev who was stripped of the award is not the one who received it.
Today’s Kiselev would be happy not to remember this sad fact of his biography.” Kiselev
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is notorious for his anti-Western rhetoric, which has grown particularly intense since the
protests in Ukraine, which he considers illegitimate and fascist 745
This example, and Kiselev’s diverse career, highlights the extent of Russia’s
evolution in the nearly twenty-five years since the Soviet collapse. Perhaps most striking,
however, is the contrast between Gutiontov’s career and Kiselev’s: while the former is
respected in liberal circles, Kiselev has a much wider audience and undoubtedly earns
more for his work. Gutiontov’s contrast between Putin’s version of “objective”
journalism and his own is evocatively drawn, and more compelling to contemporary
audiences than Soviet resistance to “bourgeois” journalism standards. In a moment where
Putin’s government enjoys relative popularity and a near-monopoly on the media, it is
opposition journalists who struggle to maintain the professional agency and material
support for their work that Soviet journalists once desired. An understanding of audiences
is perhaps even more urgent at this moment than it was in the Soviet period. Alternatives
to state narratives are more accessible than they once were, but as long as most of the
population receives its news from television rather than the Internet, it seems far more
likely that the regime’s version of “objectivity” will continue to dominate and that the
Russian Journalists’ Union will remain even weaker than its Soviet predecessor.746
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